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REVOLUTION, DEMOCRACY AND THE CRITICAL ROLE OF
CONSTITUTION-MAKING: SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
VED P. NANDAt

I.
Scholars continue to debate the definition of political and social
revolution and offer various theories of revolution.' In 1971, French social and political philosopher Jacques Ellul lamented in his book Autopsy
of Revolution that "[n]owadays the term 'revolution' is flagrantly misused to designate anything and everything." 2 Indeed, the term "revolution" is used so broadly, to cover so many different situations, that scholars fail to agree on its operational definition. To illustrate, although
coups d'itat are excluded, "revolution" is used to signify every one of
the following historical situations leading to political changes: the English Glorious Revolution of 1688; the American, French, Russian, and
Chinese Revolutions; the Cuban, Iranian, and other third-world revolutions; the "velvet" revolutions connoting non-violent regime changes
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, including the defeat of
Communism in 1989 in Czechoslovakia and the changes in 2003 in
Georgia, 2004 in Ukraine, and 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, called "color revolutions"-the Rose, Orange, and Tulip, respectively.
Among many scholars who have studied conventional revolutionary
theory, Theda Skocpol and Forrest Colburn, identify the major elements
associated with revolution. According to Skocpol, "[s]ocial revolutions
are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures;
and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based

t John Evans University Professor, University of Denver; Thompson G. Marsh Professor of
Law and Director, International and Comparative Legal Studies Program, University of Denver
Sturm College of Law
1. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (rev. ed. 1990); Rod Aya, Theories of
Revolution Considered,ContrastingModels of Collective Violence, 8 THEORY & SOCIETY 46 (1979);
CRANE BRINTON, THE ANATOMY OF REVOLUTION (1938); PETER CALVERT, A STUDY OF
REVOLUTION (1970); FORREST COLBURN, THE VOGUE OF REVOLUTION IN POOR COUNTRIES (1994);
Robert H. Dix, Varieties of Revolution, 15 COMP. POLITICS 281 (1983); JACQUES ELLUL, AUTOPSY

OF REVOLUTION (Patricia Wolf trans., 1971); Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., Revolution Reconsidered, 18
J. DEMOCRACY 42 (Jan. 2007); JACK A. GOLDSTONE, REVOLUTIONS (1986); SAMUEL P.
HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg trans., 1945); JAROSLAV KREJCI, GREAT
REVOLUTIONS COMPARED: THE SEARCH FOR A THEORY (1983); THEDA SKOCPOL, STATES AND
SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND CHINA 4 (1979);
CHARLES TILLEY, EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS, 1492-1992 (1993); A CENTURY OF REVOLUTION:
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN IRAN (John Foran ed., 1994); THE COLOR REVOLUTIONS IN THE FORMER
SOVIET REPUBLICS: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES (Donnacha 0 BeachAin & Abel Polese eds., 2010).
Ellul, supra note 1, at 177.
2.
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revolts from below." 3 Colburn writes that "revolution is the sudden, violent, and drastic substitution of one group governing a territorial entity
for another group, formerly excluded from the government, and an ensuing assault on state and society for the purpose of radically transforming
society."A
The elements they identify are: (1) a government is overthrown by a
group "formerly excluded from the government"; (2) the change is usually rapid; (3) the change usually entails violence or threat of violence; and
(4) transformation occurs for society and state structures "from below,"
which is usually associated with popular participation from "the people."
Implicit in this description is the idea that the change occurred by unconstitutional, illegal means.
Two of these elements of revolution-overthrow of a government
and transformation of society-are unchallenged. However, several critical questions on which there is no consensus among scholars and which
remain unanswered by Skocpol and Colburn, include how suddenly and
rapidly the change has to occur and how much violence or threat of violence has to accompany it. Also, the nature of transformation and the
issue of legitimacy of the new structure of the state and society are not
addressed in these definitions. Consider, for example, the American
Revolution as contrasted with the Russian Revolution that led to a totalitarian regime, or with the Iranian Revolution that led to an antidemocratic, authoritarian theocracy, which has brutally suppressed freedom and people's choices.
The Denver University Law Review makes a valuable contribution
to the literature with this symposium, in which several noted scholars
thoughtfully respond to some of these questions by paying special attention to the outcome phase of revolutions.
II.
Three contributions specifically address the process by which a revolution takes place. In their provocative piece, Democracy and Revolution: An Enduring Relationship?, Joel Colon-Rios and Allan C.
Hutchinson argue that for a revolution to be democratic, how an established constitutional order is changed, that is, by unconstitutional or constitutional means, does not matter. For them,
there is no sharp or enduring distinction between some revolutions
and constitutional changes: a robust democracy will incorporate constitutional means by which to facilitate periodic revolutions. To paraphrase de Tocqueville, there is no need in a true democracy to invent

3.
4.

Skocpol, supranote 1, at 4.
Colburn, supra note 1, at 6.
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the end of revolution as it becomes a continuing and integral part of
democratic arrangements themselves.5
Tuan Samahon, in Democracy, Violence, and ConstitutionalRevision in the Shadow of Democratic Revolution Theory,6 challenges the
assertion that so-called nonviolent revolutions in history were indeed
nonviolent-that the label "bloodless," used to describe the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 is misleading, as it involved a Dutch invasion by an
army of 14,000 and resulted in casualties in several battles that followed
the invasion. He also considers it a mistake to focus solely on Gandhi's
nonviolent campaign for India's independence, for the struggle involved
violence and bloodshed. Another example he gives is that of Kyrgyzstan's "Tulip Revolution," which, he says, was marred by violence and
political assassinations.
Haidar Ala Hamoudi challenges the usefulness of distinctions between "coup," "reform," and "revolution," in describing "normative
power of democratic transformations." Similarly he considers "less than
helpful . . . a relentless focus on the people as being the exclusive agent
of such transformation," as he suggests that "any transformation is fundamentally important, whether it be registered at the moment of change
or years later, at first election."8
All the contributors discuss various aspects of the outcome phase of
revolutions rather than their causes and procedural dimensions. ColonRios and Hutchinson suggest that the theory of constituent power provides a much better explanation of democratic revolutions than other
competing theories. By "constituent power" they mean "the power to
create new constitutions or the source of the production of fundamental
juridical norms." 9 Thus, according to them, this theory "is particularly
concerned with the identity of the creator of the constitution and with the
constitution-making process,"'0 and they find democracy's "disruptive
and unmanageable dimensions" worth celebrating.
However, because of the disruptive aspects of democracy in both
theory and practice, many scholars of constitutionalism reject constituent
power, and as an example, Colon-Rios and Hutchinson note Bruce
Akerman's description of constituent power as a lawless activity, identifying it as an arbitrary will that it manifests itself as when "law ends, and

5. Joel Colon-Rios & Allan C. Hutchinson, Democracy and Revolution: An Enduring Relationship?, 89 DENV. U. L. REv. 593, 593 (2012) (citation omitted).
6. Tuan Samahon, Democracy, Violence, and Constitutional Revision in the Shadow of
Democratic Revolution Theory, 89 DENV. U. L. REv. 735 (2012).
7.
Haider Ala Hamoudi, Arab Spring, Libyan Liberation and the Externally Imposed Democratic Revolution, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 699 (2012).
Id. at 723.
8.
Colon-Rios & Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 595.
9.
Id
10.
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pure politics (or war) begins."" They also cite Hannah Arendt as sharing
similar concerns and suggest that that is why in France, too, there was a
conscious attempt to prevent "constituent power's future exercise and

relevancy."l

2

Referring to the Arab despotic regimes having been overthrown because of their denial to citizens the liberal protections embodied in the
American and French Revolutions, they contend that
at a different and deeper level, all these societies (i.e., United States,
France, Libya, Egypt, etc.) share a fundamental similarity in constitutional terms. Like the constitutions established by the American and
French revolutionaries, the juridical systems being challenged and
overthrown in the Middle East and Africa lack an opening for constituent power to manifest from time to time. By prioritizing constitutional supremacy over popular sovereignty and subordinating the latter to the former, these institutional arrangements attempt to avoid future revolutions and democratic re-constitutions. Strong constitutionalism trumps weak democracy.' 3
Next, they posit that democratic legitimacy of a revolution depends
not only on citizen support and governanc.e by the new regime in the
name of the citizenry, but also on "whether it attempts to re-produce its
democratic impulse through a weak constitutional order that provides
participatory procedures for its own transformation." 4 They refer to the
amendment rule of the U.S. Constitution, Article V, which provides a
very strict procedure for proposing amendments and even stricter process
for their ratification, making constitutional amendments very difficult to
adopt and the adoption procedure non-participatory because only representatives are involved in the process. Thus, they contend that under this
process changes in constitutional arrangements do not happen, and whatever change does happen, it occurs by even less democratic means than
those provided for by the Constitution itself. Colon-Rios and Hutchinson
note that in the United States, for example, judges create changes under
the guise of interpretation, as in Brown v. Board of Educations and Roe
v. Wade.16
The authors challenge the suitability of courts to speak and act on
the people's behalf, for courts are neither constituted nor operated in a
representative fashion or according to popular will. Thus, they seem to
suggest that courts lack democratic legitimacy, and under the U.S. system, democracy seems to be firmly put under the control of the Constitu11.

BRUCE AKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 11 (1998), quoted in Colon-

Rios & Hutchinson, supranote 5, at 597.
12. Colon-Rios & Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 598.
13. Id. at 600.
14. Id. at 594.
15.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tion and is at best "reduced to merely one value in a much broader range
of constitutional commitments."1 7
Finally, Colon-Rios and Hutchinson propose what they themselves
call a radical proposal: that "an unconditional commitment to democracy
would require that revolutionary-initiated constitutions leave the door
open for future exercises of constituent power or, what is the same thing,
for future democratic revolutions."' 8 In conclusion, they provide a broad
vision of a truly democratic constitutional order under which constituent
power would be able to manifest and assert itself from time to time without state interference, in the form, for example, of civil disobedience,
informal gatherings, and other types of protest, and which "would also
establish more formal and less complex processes which citizens could
trigger and through which they could deliberate and decide on important
constitutional transformations. . . . The constitutional journey of democracy never ends, but occasionally pauses for breath."l 9
In The Importance of Constitution-Making,David Landau makes a
powerful and convincing case for paying special attention to the question
of what the new regime looks like after the revolution, which means "the
constitution-making moment [is] the key to understanding the effects of
revolution,"20 an area neglected thus far by traditional legal and constitutional theory, as well as international law. He studies contemporary situations from North Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. He especially draws on Honduras, where he worked as part of a team for the
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation analyzing constitutional issues
surrounding the 2009 military coup in that country, which was provoked
by then President Zaliya's attempt to call a constituent assembly and
which resulted in his removal. Their task also included making recommendations for constitutional reforms to strengthen Honduran democracy
and prevent a recurrence.
Landau examines the situation following the tumultuous events in
Egypt resulting in the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak, a fluid
situation in which several social groups and political parties were competing for control of the process of writing the new Egyptian constitution. He finds several other recent situations involving a regime change,
such as Venezuela after Chavez came to power and Libya where similar
tensions existed.
Landau takes several recent Latin American examples from Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, where constituent assemblies were
used to replace their constitutional texts while the old constitutions of
17.
18.
19.
20.
(2012).

Colon-Rios & Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 605.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 609-10.
David Landau, The Importance of Constitution-Making, 89 DENV. U. L. REv. 611, 613
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these countries did not provide for the use of a constituent assembly for
that purpose. In some cases, the courts did not pass on the legality of
these actions or the assembly proceeded even in the face of a negative
judicial ruling; while in other cases, the courts upheld the assembly on
the grounds that the people have a residual power to make or un-make
their constitutional order. The point Landau makes is that domestic constitutional theory does not provide clear rules or constraints regarding the
constitution-making process. He also finds that international law, which
is subject to slow and subtle changes, fails as well to address this issue.
Using Egypt, Libya, and Honduras as examples, he concludes that "the
international community often responds far more forcefully and readily
to regime changes than it does to the complex but more important series
of events occurring after the regime change."21
Landau points to Honduras as an example of how both domestic and
international law suffer from serious gaps, for as the United States, the
Organization of American States, and other international actors provided
a rigorous response to the military coup and illegal overthrow of President Zaliya, they failed to even react to the various illegal actions he had
taken before the overthrow. Similarly, there has been no international
attention to the new government's efforts to re-write the entire Honduran
constitution.
Thus he argues that, while military coups are disfavored,
subtler attacks on the democratic institutions that provide "horizontal
accountability" to presidents, like congresses and courts, may be
more acceptable. At the very least, the president can use the mantle
of "popular legitimacy," arguing that he is carrying out the people's
will while other institutions are frustrating it. Zaliya repeatedly relied
on that sort of rhetoric. Chavez in Venezuela and Fujimori in Peru
provide clear examples of this threat-each undertook serious manipulations of legislatures and courts to attain maximal power. Correa
in Ecuador, Morales in Bolivia, and Uribe in Colombia have all provided more but still troubling cases of the same trend. Internal erosion of democracy, rather than the military coup, is now the major
threat to democracy in Latin America and perhaps in most of the
world.22
Reiterating that questions of constitution-making process are critical, Landau warns that political actors and social groups may use the
process by invoking "claims to majoritarian support (whether true or
false), and tools such as plebiscites and referenda" to impose their own

21.
22.

Id at 621.
Id. at 627 (citations omitted).
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desired constitution so as to remake the state to serve their own interests.23
In conclusion Landau calls for new scholarship, especially on constitution-making. He suggests that there is an urgent need to develop
guidelines and principles that the international community can use to
evaluate the proposed constitutional assemblies in the new or reconstituted democracies. 24
In a well-documented article, Constitutional Pragmatism, the Supreme Court, and Democratic Revolution,25 Mark S. Kende studies the
U.S. constitutional revolution, presenting his thesis that different types of
pragmatism have shaped the revolution. His typology includes commonsense, transitional, political, democratic, economic, empirical, common law, flexible, critical, and comprehensive pragmatism. While most
of these are essential components of revolution, a few, such as critical
and comprehensive pragmatism, are not. Also, he does not explore philosophical pragmatism in depth. In the discussion of each type of pragmatism he examines its connection to the U.S. constitutional revolution and
cites pertinent U.S. Supreme Court cases to support his thesis.
This article, which Kende calls "mainly descriptive and somewhat
exploratory,"26 is part of his larger project on pragmatism in constitutional thought, which he hopes "can help scholars, judges, and others discuss
constitutional pragmatism more intelligently, as well as see its complexity and ubiquity." He says, for example, that political scientists could use
his typology to code Supreme Court cases.
Kende contends in conclusion that his article "does not argue that
the [Supreme] Court should reject the more traditional modalities in constitutional interpretation, such as precedent and text. It also does not exclude the relevance of moral considerations. Yet the paper is sympathetic
to the claim that pragmatic considerations are and should frequently be
dispositive."27
Stephen M. Feldman sketches the supplanting of the republican
democratic regime under which the United States had operated from the
framing through the 1920s by the new pluralist democratic regime in the
early 1930s. In his article, Democracy and Dissent: Strauss, Arendt, and
Voegelin in America,28 he says that what brought about the change was a
combination of forces, including industrialization, urbanization, and imId. at 629. See generally id. at 629-32.
23.
24. Id. at 633.
Mark S. Kende, ConstitutionalPragmatism, the Supreme Court, and Democratic Revolu25.
tion, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 635 (2012).
26. Id. at 637.
27. Id. at 670.
28.
Stephen M. Feldman, Democracy and Dissent: Strauss, Arendt, and Voegelin in America,
89 DENV. U. L. REV. 671 (2012).
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migration. Republican democracy in the United States meant that "citizens and elected officials were supposed to be virtuous; in the political
realm, they were to pursue the common good or public welfare rather
than their own 'partial or private interests."' 29
Feldman states that historicism, ethical relativism, and social science empiricism, which are modem intellectual components, "were manifested in political realities" in the new era. 3 0 He describes the change:
According to pluralist democratic theorists, the only way to determine public values and goals was through a process of "free competition [among] interest groups." By "composing or compromising"
their different values and interests, the "competing groups [would]
coordinate their aims in programs they can all support." Legislative
decisions therefore turned on negotiation, persuasion, and the exertion of pressure through the normal procedures of democratic government. Process rather than substance (such as the substance of the
common good) determined the legitimacy of governmental actions.31
Since the transition from republican to pluralist democracy was neither sudden nor violent, but was certainly historic, and depending upon
how one defines revolution, it could indeed be considered revolutionary.
Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, and Eric Voegelin all opposed pluralist democracy. They had all escaped from Nazi Germany in the 1930s
and by the beginning of the 1950s were influential political philosophers
in the United States. Strauss rejected historicism on the ground that it
"undermines the very possibility of knowledge and understanding." 32 He
criticized social scientists for claiming that modem social science is
"value-free" and "ethically neutral," and warned that "[m]odern social
science, with its desire to be empirical and 'neutral in the conflict between good and evil,' relegates us to a radical and irrational individualism-where each person acts on arbitrary preferences-and ultimately,
to nihilism." 3 3 Later, he turned to classical political philosophy, arguing
that "it could lead us from opinion to truth."3 4 Harkening back to the era
of republican democratic regime, Strauss called for "the political activities of citizens and governmental officials [to] be virtuous, aiming for
perfection and justice."3 s
For Hannah Arendt, "modernity generated danger: it not only rendered possible totalitarianism, Nazism, and the Holocaust, but also
threatened the United States and its pluralist democratic system with
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 673.
Id. at 674 (citations omitted).
Id. at 676.
Id. at 678 (citations omitted).
Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
Id. at 683 (citation omitted).
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risks unrecognized by most Americans."36 According to her, politics or
political action could cure the ills of modernity, for "politics could be the
source and the realm of meaningful human existence."37 She rejected
pluralist democracy, considering it to be "a process-structured pursuit of
self-interest." 38
Eric Voegelin was, just as Strauss and Arendt, critical of modernity
because, according to him, "its roots are twisted around a cancerous misinterpretation of society, vis-a-vis 'the transcendent order of being."' 39
He considered modern societies to be spiritually and religiously bankrupt, and the answer was "a resurrected devotion to Christianity, which
he deemed the best interpretation of God and experience." 4 0 Feldman
says that Voegelin's emphasis on religion, especially on Christianity,
"appealed to a coterie of 'Catholic, traditional conservatives,' but it could
not captivate a more diverse group of American intellectuals."4 1
Arendt's writings have, however, been heralded within the world of
political theory. Among the three dissenters, Strauss has been especially
influential on the American political scene, for, as Feldman says,
"[n]umerous neoconservatives have drawn sustenance from Strauss's
thought."4 2 He specifically mentions Irving Kristol and Allan Bloom,
who "echoed Straussian themes with their attacks on the ethical relativism of modernity and the substantive vacuity of pluralist democracy.
They called for a renewed 'moral clarity' that harkened back to the republican democratic concepts of virtue and the common good." 4 3
Feldman suggests that
because the neocons exerted political power during Republican presidencies, several neoconservative oriented Justices have been appointed to the Supreme Court and have subsequently brought neoconservative themes to bear in their decisions and opinions, especially those related to constitutional jurisprudence. The now standard
conservative invocation of originalism denotes a desire to return to a
pre-1937 republican democratic style ofjudicial review.4
He names Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia as flag bearers
for this approach on the Court, and pays homage to these dissenters:
"[W]hile pluralist democracy remains predominant, the dmigrds dissent-

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 688.
Id at 690 (citation omitted)
Id at 692 (citation omitted).
Id at 693 (citation omitted).
Id at 695.
Id at 696-97 (citation omitted).
Id at 697 (citations omitted).
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ing voices have made (and continue to make) their marks in American
political thought and government.A
Hamoudi distinguishes between democratic transformations of the
state and non-democratic political transformations, placing the uprisings
in the Arab world in the former category and the Iranian Revolution of
1979, which he discusses in detail, in the latter category. His main point
is that it is not the agency of the democratic transformation with which
we should be concerned, but instead with the democratic transformation
itself. He discusses at length the transformation in Spain from Franco by
the King of Spain. He also gives examples of external interventions that
brought about democratic transformations in Iraq and Japan: Iraq
achieved popular democratic rule by U.S. intervention, and in postWorld War II Japan, General MacArthur imposed his vision of a new
constitution for Japan, which "remains in force and is the foundational
document of its liberal democracy."4 6
Hamoudi applauds the NATO intervention in Libya, for NATO's
support was critical for the rebels' success. He advocates external intervention to bring about democracy in a country where there is popular
support for it and considers references to "responsibility to protect" and
humanitarian intervention "quite deleterious" because they require
nations to obfuscate respecting the nature of their intervention, which
of course can lead to confusion respecting its ultimate aims. Qaddafi
insists preposterously that NATO's ambitions were colonial. It is
helpful when confronting such nonsense to respond with what one's
true aims are as they concern regime change (namely, democratic
transformation), and why they are legitimate, rather than to obfuscate
in turn by claiming the aim of protecting civilians even when the actions are clearly not directed in such a fashion. 47
The second reason he offers is that "the honest approach permits the recapture of the sacred ground for democratic transformation. It permits
the United States to establish and proclaim clearly its values, and explain
when it might be derogating from them and why." 4 8
Hamoudi acknowledges "that the United States and its NATO allies
may not be in any sort of position to intervene to impose democracy
wherever the ground seems suitably fertile."49 But, he suggests that we
should admit to ourselves that "this is a compromise to principle rather
than its realization and that our commitments, our sympathies, our ideals,

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Hamoudi, supranote 7, at 727 (citation omitted).
Id. at 732-33 (citation omitted).
Id. at 733.
Id.
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and our vision lie with the democratic revolutionaries and not with their
opponents."5 o
In conclusion he recommends that our commitment to the transformation should
be unaltered if achieved with the support, or even the instigation, of
an external power with subsequent popular endorsement or by a domestic force, friendly monarch or professional military, acting with
popular support. In the end, what is at stake is government, of, for,
and by the people. How it is achieved, and by whom in the first instance, is of little consequence.s5
This indeed is a radical thought, for notwithstanding the nobility of
a country's intensions-especially those of the United States-to promote democracy abroad, unilateral military intervention, or intervention
by a "coalition of the willing," is in the face of the U.N. Charter's prohibition on the use of force as embodied in Article 2(4)52 and the international community's 2005 Summit Outcome Document's commitment to
authorize the U.N. Security Council as the only body to intervene by the
use of force and this only when a state is manifestly unable or unwilling
to protect its citizens from atrocity crimes-genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Such interventions if undertaken unilaterally are likely to create anarchy which a country committed to
the rule of law, such as the United States, must unequivocally reject.
Finally, in his response to Richard Albert's paper on democratic
revolution, Samahon considers the role of constitutional revision and
interpretation as means of bringing about changes in society. He asks
whether the U.S. Constitution's Article V and its interpretation could
"adequately serve the ends that a democratic revolution might otherwise
seek to attain,"54 and concludes that if revolution's association with violence is true, "Article V rightfully becomes more attractive as a deliberative mechanism for change that seeks broad consensus and change without the inevitable bloodshed that attends the People's irregular exercise
of constituting power.""

50. Id
Id. at 733-34.
51.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 reads: "All Members shall refrain in their international rela52.
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any otheT manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
53.
U.N. General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1,
138, 139,
U.N. Doe. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdfPOpenElement. See generally Ved P. Nanda, From Paralysis in
Rwanda to Bold Moves in Libya: Emergence of the "Responsibility to Protect" Norm Under InternationalLaw-Is the International Community Ready for It?, 34 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1 (2011).
54. Samahon, supranote 6, at 743.
Id. at 745.
55.
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III.
This symposium clarifies many aspects related to the study of revolution. The authors provide fresh insights into the post-revolution phase
in a country passing through democratic transformation. Scholars and
statesmen, alike, will greatly benefit from the valuable suggestions provided in these essays on constitution-making.

DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION: AN ENDURING
RELATIONSHIP?
JOEL COLON-RIOst AND ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON"
"[F]or in a rebellion, as in a novel, the most difficult part to invent
is the end."
-Alexis

de Tocqueville'

Democracy and revolution are juxtaposed in history and its academic commentary. As a general rule, they are considered to be unrelated and
occasionally antagonistic practices. But this is a far too sweeping and
misleading statement. While there are some revolutions that bear little
connection to democratic motives or aspirations, there are others that are
done in the service of a democratic impulse. These democratic revolutions bear little resemblance to the coup d'itats that tend to replace one
elite with another. There is a world of difference between those political
transformations that usher in a more democratic regime and those that do
not. Whereas one occurs under conditions of popular participation and
support, the other does not. In short, not all revolutionary struggles are
the same in terms of their democratic legitimacy.
In this Article, we take the view that, as understood from a thoroughly democratic standpoint, certain revolutions can be seen as part and
parcel of a vigorous democratic culture and sensibility. Indeed, we contend that a democratic revolution can not only occur in cases in which a
popular majority succeeds in overthrowing the established constitutional
order illegally (that is, without recourse to the constitutionally recognized
rule of change) but also when challengers self-consciously adopt and use
constitutionalmeans to transform the state. For us, there is no sharp or
enduring distinction between some revolutions and constitutional changes: a robust democracy will incorporate constitutional means by which to
facilitate periodic revolutions. To paraphrase de Tocqueville, there is no
need in a true democracy to invent the end of revolution as it becomes a
continuing and integral part of democratic arrangements themselves.2
This Article is divided into three parts. The first part is devoted to
explaining how democratic revolutions can be profitably understood as

t Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand
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Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto,
Canada. We are grateful to Ian Lanlois and Bryan Marco for critical assistance and intellectual
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ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE RECOLLECTIONS OF ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE 56 (J.P.
Mayer ed., Alexander Teixeira de Mattos trans., Meridian Books, Inc., 1959) (1896).
2.
See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supranote 1, at 64.
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exercises of constituent power unmediated by any particular way of proceeding; reference will be made to contemporary developments in global
politics. The second part contends that the democratic legitimacy of a
revolution does not depend only on whether it was supported by citizens
or on whether the regime it creates governs in the name of the citizenry,
but also on whether it attempts to re-produce its democratic impulse
through a weak constitutional order that provides participatory procedures for its own transformation. Finally, in the third part, we defend the
radical proposal that an unconditional commitment to democracy would
require that revolutionary-initiated constitutions leave the door open for
future exercises of constituent power or, what is the same thing, for future democratic revolutions. Throughout, we develop and stand by an
account of democracy as both a theory and a practice that re-orders the
traditional relationship between popular sovereignty and constitutional
supremacy.
I. REVOLUTIONS AND CONSTITUENT POWER

A usual starting-point for an analysis of revolutions is Hans
Kelsen's work.3 Kelsen was interested in legal revolutions. His focus
was on changes in the constitutional regime that could not be legally
justified; these were situations in which an "order in force is overthrown
and replaced by a new order in a way which the former had not itself
anticipated." Most importantly, Kelsen's account of legal revolutions
does not involve an inquiry into the political morality of the historical
facts and forces that brought about the founding of a new legal system.
Kelsen was not concerned with whether the revolutionaries had just
cause or were driven by a genuinely democratic impulse. On the contrary, since according to Kelsen, norms can only derive their validity from
other norms, his attention to the ultimate origins of the legal system was
only directed at explaining the "objective" validity of the revolutionary
constitution.. Put differently, he was not interested in examining the
democratic character of the constitution-making act that brought the revolutionary constitution into existence. From the perspective of his pure
theory of law, it is simply irrelevant if a new and effective constitution
was posited "by an individual usurper or by some kind of assembly." 6

3. See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg
trans., 1945) [hereinafter KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY]; see also generally HANS KELSEN, PURE
THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cali. Press 1967) (1934) [hereinafter KELSEN, PURE
THEORY].
4.
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supranote 3, at 117.

5. Id. at 116-17 (looking at the origins of the legal system not to determine whether those
origins were consistent with any moral or political principles, but in order to explain why a constitution adopted in violation of the established rules of constitutional change can be seen as resting on a
higher norm (i.e. the newly presupposed basic norm that accompanies a successful revolution)).
6. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY, supranote 3, at 115.
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While Kelsen's theory allows a better understanding of the relationship between revolutions and constitutions as well as that between lawful
and unlawful constitutional change, it is not intended to provide the tools
needed to distinguish between a democratic re-constitution and a military
coup d'dtat.7 Consequently, instead of looking at Kelsen's pure theory of
law for understanding revolutions, democrats might be better advised to
consult the theory of constituent power, developed during the American
and French Revolutions. Constituent power, as will be seen below, is the
power to create new constitutions or the source of the production of fundamental juridical norms. In its modern formulation, constituent power is
always considered to rest with the people who possess a legally unlimited faculty to give themselves any constitution they want. In that sense,
the theory of constituent power is particularly concerned with the identity
of the creator of the constitution and with the constitution-making process. As such, it is much more palatable and appealing to the democrat
than a Kelsenian pure theory.
Although receiving its first major theoretical formulation in France,
the concept of constituent power was already present in revolutionary
North America. "[T]he people . . ." wrote Thomas Young in 1777 in a

letter to the citizens of Vermont, "are the supreme constituent power and,
of course, their immediate [r]epresentatives are the supreme [d]elegate
power." 8 Similarly, but at the eve of the revolution in France, Emmanuel
Sieyes wrote that the constitution was not "the creation of the constituted
power, but of the constituent power," and that the bearer of the constitu9
ent power was "the source and the supreme master of positive law." In
this line of thinking, a political community could not be permanently
subject to any constitution; the constituent power always remained free
to unbind itself from the established constitutional regime and create a
new juridical order. It is a view that places democratic legitimacy ahead
of theoretical purity.
But Sieyes combined his theory of constituent power with a strong
commitment to the principle of representation. He explicitly rejected
more participatory forms of democracy and even suggested that members
7.

This does not mean,. however, that Kelsen was uninterested in democracy. See Hans

Kelsen, On the Essence and Value of Democracy, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 84, 84-

85 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., 2000).
8. Letter from Dr. Young to the Inhabitants of Vermont (April 11, 1777), in RECORDS OF
THE COUNCIL OF SAFETY AND GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF VERMONT (E.P. Walton

ed., 1873); see also Joel Colon-Rios, The Legitimacy of the Juridical:ConstituentPower, Democracy, and the Limits of ConstitutionalReform, 48 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 199, 199 (2010) (presenting a
contemporary discussion of the theory of constituent power and its connections to democracy and
democratic legitimacy).
9.

EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES, WHAT IS THE THIRD ESTATE? 124, 128 (1963). Sieyes's

theory is not an invitation to continuous revolutionary activity. In fact, it can be said that Sieyes saw
that one of the fundamental tasks of politics was that of ensuring that a situation of unbinding, an
exercise of constituent power, does not occur once a constitutional order is in place. MARTIN
LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAw 63 (2003).
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of the ordinary legislative assembly could transform themselves into a
constituent body. He thus maintained that "[t]he people, I repeat, in a
country which is not a democracy (and France would not be one), the
people may only speak and may only act through its representatives."'o
Of course, Sieyes's ideas did not carry the day for everyone.
A prominent critic was Carl Schmitt, the controversial German jurist, who rejected this aspect of Sieyes's thought." Schmitt insisted that
the constituent power of the people could not be effectively represented.
He stressed that constituent power could not be reduced to any specific
forms or procedures. This is why he had a critical attitude towards the
French Revolution. In particular, he disagreed with the decision of the
National Constituent Assembly of not submitting the Constitution of
1791 to popular ratification and of adopting instead the Sieyesean view
of a "represented" constituent power. "It would have been consistently
democratic," wrote Schmitt, "to let the people itself decide, for the [constituent] will of the people cannot be represented without democracy
transforming itself into an aristocracy. Nonetheless, democracy was not
at issue in 1789. It was, rather, a constitution of a liberal, bourgeois

Rechsstaat."I 2
Despite his democratic rhetoric, Schmitt was far from being a democrat himself. However, his radicalization of the theory of constituent
power provides the basis for a more thoroughly democratic conception of
revolutions. For example, building on Schmitt, Andreas Kalyvas has
argued that from the perspective of constituent power, "phenomena such
as civil disobedience, irregular and informal movements, insurgencies,
and revolutionary upheavals retain all their dignity and significance even
if they directly challenge the existing constitutional structure of power."l 3 In this conception of the relation between democracy and constitutionalism, democracy is something much more earthy and organic than
the purist ambitions of many legal theorists. Its disruptive and unmanageable dimensions are something to be celebrated, not lamented.

10.

Lucien Jaume, Constituent Power in France: The Revolution and Its Consequences, in

THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 67, 80

(Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007). In fact, Sieyes opposed democracy to the idea of
representation: where representation was necessary, like in France, there could not be a democracy:
'No aristocracy' ought to become a kind of rallying-cry for all the friends of the nation and good
order. The aristocrats will think that they can resort by crying: 'No democracy'. But we will repeat
'No democracy' with them and againstthem. These gentlemen do not realize that representatives are
not democrats; that since real democracy is impossible amongst such a large population, it is foolish
to presume it or to appear to fear it . . . ." SIEYES, supra note 9, at 196; see also RAYMOND CARRE
DE MALBERG, TEORIA GENERAL DEL ESTADO 1165 (1948) (arguing that through the introduction of
the principle of representation, Sieves weakened the scope of his system of popular sovereignty).
11.
See CARL SCHMirr, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 128, 132 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans.,
Duke Univ. Press 2008) (1928).
12. Id. at 128 (citation omitted).
13.
Andreas Kalyvas, Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power, 12
CONSTELLATIONS 223, 230 (2005).
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It is not surprising, therefore, that many contemporary scholars of
constitutionalism have worked to contain the unsettling impact of constituent power in both theory and practice. The very term constituent
power has almost entirely disappeared from even the most populist approaches to constitutional change. 14 When mentioned, it is only to be
discarded as an undesirable political concept. For instance, in the sequel
to We the People, Bruce Ackerman identified constituent power as an
arbitrary will that manifests itself in acts of upheaval in which "law ends,
and pure politics (or war) begins."' In distancing his theory of dualist
democracy from the idea of constituent power, he describes constituent
power as a lawless activity; it takes place during a political crisis in
which an arbitrary will that fails to respect the constitution triumphs over
the existent constitutional regime. 16 However, it is worth noting that,
even though Ackerman's recommended constitutional politics do not
involve the "sheer acts of will" that allegedly characterize constituent
power, his celebrated revolutionaries (e.g., the Founding Federalists, the
Reconstruction Republicans, and the New Deal Democrats) failed to
follow the established rules for constitutional change, even if they "expepowerful institutional constraints on their revisionary authoririenced
17
ty-"
In an earlier vein, Hannah Arendt shared similar concerns, maintaining that a juridical order could never achieve sufficient stability if it
was conceived as originating in the ever-changing will of a disorganized
multitude. She maintained that any structure built on the will of the multitude as its foundation "is built on quicksand."' 8 Although these scholars
are writing in a much later era, it is likely that those were the types of
concerns that drove North American and French revolutionaries to close
the doors of their constitutions for any future exercises of constituent
power. The well-known North American debate between James Madison
and Thomas Jefferson provides the classical example.
Madison reacted against Jefferson's insistence in periodic constituent assemblies designed to allow the people to exercise its "right to
choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive of its
own happiness."' 9 For Madison, Jefferson's proposal suggested to the
citizenry that their current system of government was somehow defec14. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment Outside
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 459 (1994) (highlighting how the government may enact change
without actually going to the people); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT

IT) 18 (2006).
15.

BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 11 (1998).

16.
17.

Id.
Id.

18.

HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 163 (Penguin Books 1977) (1963).

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THE PORTABLE
19.
THOMAS JEFFERSON 552, 560 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
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tive, depriving the government of "that veneration which time bestows
on everything, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability."2 0 Instead of periodic
assemblies that, by opening the Constitution to the "decisions of the
whole society" interested "too strongly the public passions,"2 1 Madison
favored a complicated amendment procedure. That is, a process that involved a series of extraordinary majorities at the federal and state levels,
and this made even minor constitutional changes difficult to propose and
unlikely to succeed. Justice John Marshall provided judicial support to
this approach when he declared that, while "the people have an original
right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness .... [t]he exercise of
this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be
frequently repeated." 2 2 He went on to add that, since "the authority from
which they proceed ... can seldom act, [these principles] are designed to
be permanent." 23
Even in France, where the theory of constituent power was onginally voiced, there was a conscious attempt to prevent constituent
power's future exercise and relevancy. In the very last article of the
French Constitution of 1791, this approach received a concise legal formulation: "The National Assembly, having heard the reading of the
above Constitutional Act, and having approved it, declares that the Constitution is completed and that nothing may be altered therein."24 Probably in a similar mood, Isaac Le Chapelier, the French eighteenth century
jurist and member of the National Constituent Assembly, claimed that
"[t]he revolution [was] finished" because there were "no more injustices

20. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
21.
Id. at 315.
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
23. Id.
24. 1791 CONST. VII. The French Constitution of 1791 also contained a complicated amendment provision, which is prefaced by the following statement:
The National Constituent Assembly declares that the nation has the imprescriptible right
to change its Constitution; nevertheless, considering that it is more in conformity with the
national interest to use only the right of reforming, by the means provided in the Constitution itself, those articles which experience has proven unsatisfactory, decrees that it
shall be effected by an Assembly of Revision in the following form.
Id See Denis Baranger, The Language of Eternity: ConstitutionalReview of the Amending Power in
France (or the Absence Thereof), ISR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (describing how contemporary
French constitutional theory generally sees constituent power as susceptible of being exercised by
the ordinary legislative assembly). A similar approach is found in John Locke's draft constitution for
the Carolinas, which stated, "These fundamental constitutions . .. shall be and remain the sacred and
unalterable form and rule of government of Carolina forever." The Fundamental Constitutions of
Carolinas,THE AVALON PROJECT: DOCUMENTS IN LAW, HISTORY AND DIPLOMACY, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th century/ncG5.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). See also THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE GREAT SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA Dec. I1, 1969, art.
37 ("The present constitutional proclamation shall be in effect until a permanent constitution is
issued. It will be amended by the Revolutionary Command Council only in case of necessity and in
the interest of the Revolution.").
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to overcome, or prejudices to contend with."25 Some years later, Napoleon echoed this view and with characteristic bombast declaimed that "Citizens, the revolution is determined by the principles that began it. The
constitution is founded on the sacred rights of property, equality, freedom. The revolution is over.",26
These fabled exchanges set the stage for contemporary debate and
still manage to dominate it. The exercise of constituent power, of a power that threatens to replace the existing constitutional regime, has been
relegated to the terrain of the exceptional.27 This is hardly unexpected;
the quest for constitutional stability seems to have trumped all other ambitions. Interestingly, democracy has historically been seen as carrying
with it similar risks. For many, the prospect of the mass of ordinary people always getting what they want and continually making and unmaking fundamental laws represents the antithesis of good government;
it is considered to be the rule of persons' ever-changing wishes against
the empire of law and reason. 2 8 Yet the concepts of constituent power
and democracy have a natural affinity: constituent power is not simply a
power to create new juridical orders, but to create them with those who
will be subject to it. The concept of constituent power, in this respect,
points toward a self-determining demos, a populace that adopts the laws
that will regulate their political association. This amounted to what Carl
Friedrich called "the right to revolution,"2 9 which the people could invoke and exercise at will.
Indeed, it is this collective aspect of constituent power that connects
it so intimately and effectively with democracy; they both reinforce each
other in their commitment to the notion that there can and should be
mass, direct, and continuing participation in constitution-making . The
recent events in the Middle East and North Africa demonstrate this phe25.

Jaume, supra note 10, at 71 (citations omitted).

26.

ANTONIO NEGRI, INSURGENCIES: CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE MODERN STATE 2

(Maurizia Boscagli trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1999) (1992) (referencing Napoleon's statement
made on December 15, 1798). But these sentiments are not only of historical interest. The very same
words find an expressive echo in contemporary constitutional theory. As a prominent political commentator observed, "By making a constitution, the revolutionary forces are digging their own graves;
the constitution is the final act of the revolution." Ulrich Preuss, Constitutional Powermakingfor the
New Polity: Some Deliberationson the Relations Between Constituent Power and the Constitution,
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 639, 641 (1993). Similarly, even the fabled John Rawls took the view that the
adoption of a "democratic constitution" should be understood as an expression by the people of a
profound demand to govern itself in a certain way and of fixing, "once and for all," certain constitutional essentials. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 232 (expanded ed. 2005).
See generally ANDREAS KALYVAS, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF THE
27.
EXTRAORDINARY: MAX WEBER, CARL SCHMITT, AND HANNAH ARENDT (2008) (providing an
excellent discussion of the relationship between constituent power and the exception).
See JEAN BODIN, SIx BOOKSOF THE COMMONWEALTH 193 (M.J. Tooley trans., 1955); see
28.
also ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 257 (Fania Oz-Salzberger
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY AND
29.
PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 129 (Ginn & Co. 1950); see Preuss, supra note 26, at 647; see
also Kalyvas, supra note 13, at 238.
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nomenon. Unorganized throngs of people have come together to demand
political freedom. This has manifested in the rallying-cry Al-sha'b yurid
isquat al-nizam (The people want the downfall of the regime!). 3 0 With
warts and all, this is an undeniable embodiment and manifestation of
constituent power at its most insistent and immediate. These popular
uprisings are reminiscent of Schmitt's view that "[t]he will of the people
to provide themselves a constitution can only be made evident through
the act itself and not through observation of a normatively regulated process." 1 As such, they represent not a step towards democracy, but a feral
exercise of the democratic instinct; they are as much a part of the democratic initiative as more stable and less spontaneous political engagements.
The despotic regimes that have been overthrown (and those which
being challenged by popular movements in the Arab world)
currently
are
denied citizens the traditional liberal protections enshrined in the constitutions founded in the American and French Revolutions (and this is, of
course, part of the reason why they are being overthrown). But, at a different and deeper level, all these societies (i.e., United States, France,
Libya, Egypt, etc.) share a fundamental similarity in constitutional terms.
Like the constitutions established by the American and French revolutionaries, the juridical systems being challenged and overthrown in the
Middle East and Africa lack an opening for constituent power to manifest from time to time. By prioritizing constitutional supremacy over
popular sovereignty and subordinating the latter to the former, these institutional arrangements attempt to avoid future revolutions and democratic re-constitutions. Strong constitutionalism trumps weak democracy.
This prioritization of constitutionalism over other political values
and commitments leaves those who decide to engage in democratic revolutions in an unfortunate position. Once they have exhausted the limited
range of conventional political avenues for change, they have to resort to
the unmediated, disorganized, and occasionally violent exercise of constituent power. And that is part of the reason why the French and American Revolutions are not as democratic as it might otherwise be suggested. Although to varying degrees and with varying consequences, these
upheavals suffer from and share the same democratically-debilitating
tendency to stifle and de-legitimize constituent power as those regimes in

30. Perry Anderson, On the Concatenation in the Arab World, 68 NEW LEFT REv. 5, 9-10
(2011).
SCHMITT, supra note 11, at 131. "Self-evidently", he added, "it can also not be judged by
31.
prior constitutional laws or those that were valid until then." Id. They are also reminiscent of Sheldon Wolin's invitation to embrace democracy's inclinations towards revolution and re-conceive it as
fugitive and episodical in character. See Sheldon S. Wolin, Fugitive Democracy, in DEMOCRACY
AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 31, 43 (Seyla Benhabib ed.,

1996). "Democracy," says Wolin, "is a rebellious moment that may assume revolutionary, destructive proportions, or may not." Id.
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the Middle East and North Africa.32 Constitutionalism tends to efface,
not simply channel or contain constituent power.
H. LIMITING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The prevailing conception among "constitutional democrats"according to which the democratic character of a constitution depends on
its substantive content 33 -allows us to celebrate the democratic features
of the French and American Revolutions, but not to offer a critical assessment of their democratic shortcomings. Yet it is in those shortcomings that the key to assessing the democratic legitimacy of a revolution,
and of the constitution it inaugurates, lies. Put shortly, a revolution, as an
exercise of constituent power, should not be seen as a one-time event, or
as the extraordinary founding of a permanent juridical order that is supported by the citizenry and that purports to permanently govern with
their consent. It is both much more and much less than that.
The dominant conception of revolution, in which a revolution is a
highy exceptional (and usually undesirable) event, is inconsistent with
the idea of the people's constituent power. 34 More pointedly, it is gravely
problematic from the perspective of democratic legitimacy. Most of the
revolutions that would be considered democratic under this approach
generally follow a similar pattern: a movement supported by the people
is successful in transforming the state in a way that was not anticipated
by the extant rules of change of the established constitutional order, and
the new regime replaces the existing constitution with a new one. Moreover, this new constitution protects a set of political and individual freedoms that were not respected by the previous regime. Those political and
individual freedoms would normally take the form of a bill of rights and
underpin a republican form of government. So constituted, the new regime would be showcased as being governed and legitimated by the consent of the people.
This conception, however, does not address the crucial way in
which the constitution established by a successful "democratic revolution" permits or facilitates the possibility of any future exercise of constituent power. That is to say, there is no account taken of whether the
new constitution provides the citizenry with the means of engaging in the
type of constitutional overhaul that the previous regime prohibited and
that made an "illegal" revolution necessary in the first place. The constiSee generally JOEL COLON-RIOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND
32.
THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY (2012); ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, THE PROVINCE OF
JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATIZED (2009).
See RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW
33.
POLITICAL DEBATE (2006).
The classical formulation of this view is found in Locke, who although defending the
34.
people's right to revolution, limited its exercise to situations of extreme injustice in which the government engaged in a "long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices." JOHN LOCKE, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 433 (Peter Laslett ed., 1963).
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tutional regimes present in modem states are in fact characterized by
institutions designed to ensure that a democratic revolution never occurs.
In that respect, they share the spirit of Isaac Le Chapelier's and Napoleon's dictums-if the constitution established a just and democratic regime, why not protect it from future revolutions? Indeed, why not hinder
rather than facilitate the reemergence of constituent power?
The problem, of course, is that no constitution can establish a permanent, and democratic regime: the very idea of a just, finished constitution that seeks to prevent instances of popular constitutional change is
incompatible with democracy. Instead of treating important constitutional transformations as occasions for establishing more just constitutional
forms and superior mechanisms for democratic engagement, most modern constitutions attempt to regulate their own transformation through
very limited and highly technical mechanisms. They make change difficult and unlikely, even if supported by great majorities of the population.
These amendment rules are driven by an aspiration to consolidate the
permanency of the constitutional regime, not by an urgent impetus to
maintain and preserve the revolutionary spirit that brought the constitutional regime into existence.
For example, take Article V, the amendment rule of the U.S. Constitution." While it was created by a successful revolution, it makes future
changes in the Constitution extremely difficult to effect. Indeed, it is one
of the most demanding constitutional amendment processes in the
world.36 Under Article V, two-thirds of both houses of Congress may
propose amendments or two-thirds of the state legislatures may apply for
a constitutional convention for proposing amendments. These proposals
must then be ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures or by threefourths of special state conventions. With such formidable hurdles, it is
not surprising that the U.S. Constitution has been amended only twentyseven times in over two centuries. Moreover, it is equally telling that the
ratification of the Twenty-seventh Amendment took 200 years to be
completed; it was ratified in 1992, after being originally presented by
James Madison in 1789.37 All told, Article V seems to be less an
amendment rule and more a non-amendment rule.
Again, from a strong democratic viewpoint, Article V not only
makes constitutional amendments almost impossible to adopt, it also
makes their (unlikely) adoption non-participatory; amending the Constitution is left in the exclusive hands of government officials, albeit elected
35.
36.

U.S. CONST. art. V.
See ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF

NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, 102 (2009); see also Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional
Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL

AMENDMENT 237, 260 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
37. Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 497, 498 (1992).
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representatives. This is true even when the initiative to propose constitutional changes is not only placed in Congress, but states are provided
with the faculty of applying for a (unprecedented) convention which
would arguably have an unlimited power to propose amendments or even
an entirely new fundamental law. 38 Such a convention, at least in theory,
could be seen as an attempt to reproduce the process through which the
Constitution was established in the first place. Even leaving aside the
difficulties involved in calling a convention (created in part by the supermajority rules in the initiative and ratification processes and by the possibility that Congress might refuse to call it or to send its proposals for
ratification)," there are certain ambiguities in the text of Article V that
make its democratic credentials questionable. For example, would the
members of the convention be democratically elected? If they are elected, would they be elected by the people at large or according to the principle of state quality (e.g., one delegate for each state regardless of the
size of the state's population)? Would the convention have the power to
adopt its own internal rules? Does the convention or Congress have the
power of creating an alternative ratification procedure (such as a binding
national referendum)? Could Congress transform itself into a convention? 40
Of course, the upshot of having a next-to-impossible-to-use
amendment process is not that no changes in constitutional arrangements
happen. On the contrary, it is that change occurs by other, even less democratic means than that provided by the written constitution itself. It is
difficult to identify or imagine any society whose constitution, even if its
form remains the same, remains fixed in substance over any extended
period of time. This is especially the case in common law jurisdictions,
like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. While jurists
and politicians may pay lip-service to a nation's founding and enduring
documents, they know that this is only the beginning of the search for
constitutional meaning. Amendment is simply one kind of change that is
more formal, less technical, and often, although not always, more significant. Changes, even of a large and significant nature, occur even though
the formal process of constitutional change itself remains unused and
unchanged. While there is no simple or fixed causal relation, the informal amendment process is inextricably linked to the formal amendment
38. See Walter E. Dellinger, The RecurringQuestion of the "Limited" ConstitutionalConvention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623, 1623 (1979) (discussing states calling for a constitutional convention).
39. In fact, according to some interpretations, the number of applications required to call an
Article V Convention was surpassed in 1993, but Congress did not call the Convention. Michael
Stokes Paulsen, How to Count to Thirty-Four: The Constitutional Casefor a ConstitutionalConvention, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 837, 856 (2011). By 2010, the number of states asking for a Convention had decreased from forty-five to thirty-three (thirty-four being the requisite number of
states). Id at 857-58.
40.
Some of these questions are considered in Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V:
The Problems Created by the National Convention Amendment Method and How to Fix Them, 96
VA. L. REV. 1509, 1523 (2010).
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process in "that an informal amendment process exists because formal
amendment is so difficult."'
In the United States, changes in constitutional law have happened at
a steady and continuous pace. While taking place under the guise of interpretation, there have been some monumental changes in the regime of
constitutional structures and rights. If Brown42 and Roe,43 for example,
are treated as merely interpretive adjustments, then the supposed distinction between interpretation and amendment becomes blurred and unreliable. Constitutional history shows that there is no change that is so big
that it could not be achieved informally (and in spite of the written constitution) if the political forces are sufficiently aligned to demand or facilitate it." It is only when there is insufficient support for change (particularly from the elites) that the formal amendment process will appear
as a brute obstacle to change.45 Otherwise, change will proceed with little
concern for the distinction between legal interpretation and constitutional
amendment and between the formal and informal practices of change.
More importantly, by exploring how such changes have occurred, it
becomes possible to glimpse and uncover the fundamental and operative
assumptions about political power and democratic legitimacy at any
point in history. In particular, the actual institutional levers and location
of such constitutional changes disclose where a society situates the actual
seat of sovereignty and where it locates the actual locus of legitimacy,
regardless of what formal constitutional provisions might suggest or recommend. As regards the United States, this site is most definitely not the
people themselves. It is the courts, especially the Supreme Court, which
have become the preferred site for effecting important changes in the
constitutional order. By design and default, the Court has claimed the
ultimate authority to act on behalf of the American citizenry as a selfgoverning and self-constituting nation: judges have become the filters
and proxies for the citizenry.46

41.
Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to
Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REv. 925, 933 (2007).
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43. Brown v. Bd. of Edue., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
45. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevanceof ConstitutionalAmendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457, 1464 (2001). See generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism
and Section Five Power: PolicentricInterpretationof the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE
L.J. 1943, 1984 (2003) and Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitutionfrom the
People: JuricentricRestrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 34 (2003), focusing on the
ways social movements and other socio-political forces shape constitutional culture.
46. This approach finds one of its earlier expressions in Marbury, and is also echoed in Ackerman, which seems to attribute the Supreme Court with the ability to speak in the people's name.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803); see also Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 63, 82

(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
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In a society that claims to be devoted to the ideas and practice of
democratic legitimacy, it is far from clear why the courts are the suitable
or appropriate institution to speak and act on the people's behalf. To put
it more pointedly, if the courts are assumed to have democratic legitimacy, then democratic legitimacy is a very thin device and counts for little
in the general political scheme of things. The courts are neither operated
nor constituted in line with popular will or representative viewpoints.
Indeed, the democratic legitimacy of the courts is somewhat perversely
grounded in their willingness to act as a check on popular and direct expressions of constituent power. 47 This seems to put democracy firmly
under the control of the constitution. At best, democracy is reduced to
merely one value in a much broader range of constitutional commitments.
III. DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

It should be uncontroversial to conclude that formal amendment
processes, like Article V, and more informal practices of judicial interpretation do not sit at all well with a commitment to a strongly democratic approach to constitutional ordering. These mechanisms empower
narrow minorities (both political and judicial) with the right to veto any
proposal for change and disallow almost all forms of direct citizen participation. Democracy is brought under the disciplinary aegis of a strong
constitutionalism and is relegated to, at best, a secondary or fringe position in political engagement.
However, it is not clear that a constitution's amendment rule, no
matter how phrased or constructed, could be seen as creating a genuine
opening for constituent power to manifest itself; amendment rules, it may
be said, are precisely designed to prevent revolutions (democratic or otherwise) from taking place. As mentioned earlier, one of the main features
of a revolution, according to most analysis, is that it must involve the
overthrowing of the existing regime through a violation of the established rules of constitutional change. In other words, a revolution must
be accompanied or immediately followed by the coming into force of a
new Grundnorm.4 8 This approach creates several theoretical and democratic difficulties.
47.

Cf. BARRY FRIEDMAN,

THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS

INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).

Friedman has attempted to show that the Supreme Court of the United States has historically been
responsive to the views of the majority of the people. The point here, however, is not judicial responsiveness or non-responsiveness to the views of popular majorities (i.e., a dictator can be very
responsive to popular majorities as well), but the fact this mode of constitutional change allows nonelected officials to set aside decisions made by more democratic institutions.
The Grundnorm or basic norm, according to Kelsen, is the last presupposition upon which
48.
the validity of all the norms of a legal order depends; it postulates that "one ought to behave as the
individual, or the individuals, who laid down the first constitution have ordained". KELSEN,
GENERAL THEORY, supra note 3, at 115. When a revolution takes place, a new basic norm needs to
be presupposed. Id. at 118.
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First, as many critics of Kelsen's theory of revolution have pointed
out, new constitutional regimes are often born without the sort of legal
rupture that the Kelsenian approach requires. 49 For example, India
achieved its independence as a result of a set of events that can be characterized as revolutionary; however, there was arguably no legal rupture
with respect to the United Kingdom, who reluctantly passed the Indian
Independence Act in 1947 .o

Second, this view supposes that there is a fundamental incompatibility between a democratic constitution and revolutionary change. Under that perspective, there cannot be such a thing as a constitution that
presents itself as open for future democratic revolutions. That is to say,
regardless of how participatory and radical the relevant constitutional
change is, if it does not takes place through a violation of the established
constitutional order, it is not a revolution. This is not only a matter of
terminology, for it invites the type of approach to constitutional change
that characterizes the currently dominant conception of constitutionalism.
Constitutional change is thus seen as a special type of law-making, one
which is subject to stringer procedures but that is not to be associated
with, or attempt to facilitate, the exercise of constituent power. This approach sees democratic revolutions as something that happens to undemocratic or authoritarian constitutional arrangements, but that has no
place in a properly functioning constitutional state that governs with the
support and in the name of the people. Such a conception runs the risk of
betraying the very basis of a democratic revolution: a politically engaged
citizenry that gives itself a new constitution through the exercise of constituent power.
In a weakly democratic or non-democratic constitutional structure,
as that present in countries such as the United States and Syria, the exercise of constituent power would of course be non-constitutional, as it
would require a violation of the established amendment rules (which are
not characterized by creating meaningful and direct opportunities for
popular participation in constitutional change). But there is no reason
why all constitutional regimes have to be like that. Instead of looking at
constituent power and revolutions as a threat to a constitution that has
already achieved the desirable degree of democracy, constitutions should
approach revolutions and constituent power as offering opportunities for
correcting existing injustices through radical and participatory change. It
is in providing that possibility, where an important part of the democratic
legitimacy of a revolution and of the constitutional regime that it inaugu49. See, e.g., J. M. Finnis, Revolutions and the Continuity of Law, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 44, 52-53 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 2d ser. 1973) (discussing this idea in the context of
Australia's independence); see PETER C. OLIVER, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENCE: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND 7-9

(2005).
50.

Indian Independence Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 30, pmbl. (U.K.).
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rates rests. Instead of seeing as legitimate a regime that governs with the
consent or support of the people, democratic legitimacy is only consistent with a constitution that sees citizens as potential authors of a new
constitutional regime and that have the capacity of triggering future democratic revolutions.
As part of a practice of empowered democracy, there is a commitment to the institutional challenge of constructing and implementing a
practical set of constitutional arrangements that approximates to what
Roberto Unger has termed "the structure of no-structure."' This is the
effort to incorporate an element of perpetual revolution into a constitutional set-up. The ambition is not to do away with any constitution
(which seems as a hopeless and unachievable ideal anyway), but to develop a constitutional tradition that ensures that no legal institution is
immune to revision and transformation. In the attempt to diminish the
distance between structure-preserving routines and structuretransforming conflicts, "no hard-and-fast distinction separates criticism
and construction." 52 An integral dimension of such a political program of
strong democracy would be, among other things, a genuine attempt to
entitle citizens to challenge, de-stabilize, and disrupt established institutions and practices, including and especially the constitutional ones. This
would enable the closing of both an existential and institutional gap between ordinary and constitutional politics, between routine and radical
engagement, and between revolutionary and evolutionary change.
Understood in this way, a vigorous theory of democratic legitimacy
would be obliged to take the concept and practice of constituent power
seriously. Constituent power, according to its traditional formulation, is
not binding on itself. The problem, of course, is that the typical liberal
constitution treats constituent power as exhausted in the activity of establishing a new constitution. As such, the original power of the citizenry to
re-create their constitution through extraordinary procedures in which
popular involvement is at its highest and most meaningful is nowhere to
be found in the constitutions of the world's greatest revolutions. These
constitutions proceed as if the people relinquish its sovereignty after establishing a juridical order. Such a conception, even if it might symbolically appeal to "the people" every now and then, neutralizes popular sovereignty in actual political practice under the ideal of constitutional supremacy.
In contrast to this common and limited view of the relation between
democracy and constitutionalism, the democratic potential of the theory
of constituent power lies precisely in its insistence that the people's constitution-making power can be exercised at any moment after a constitu51.

(1987).
52.

ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 46

Id. at 143.
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tion is in place. This is in fact one of the major challenges that Sieyes and
Schmitt pose for the tradition of liberal constitutionalism.5 3 As has been
correctly noted, for them the "pouvoirconstituant remains a force to be
reckoned with well after the revolution."54 As showcased in the practical
operations of the American constitutional order, the constituent power
has not only been tamed and neutered, but it has been recast as an illegitimate force.
Accordingly, the democratic legitimacy of a revolution and of any
ensuing constitution is to be found as much in its openness to future exercises of constituent power as in its pedigree and the form of government it establishes. Thinking about constituent power in this way, as
being facilitated by a constitution, might appear contrary to some of its
defining features, such as its unmediated character and its irreducibility
to any pre-established legal forms. But this would be mistaken. A closer
look at the theory of constituent power shows that, while the constituent
power is to be construed as "independent of any procedures," 5 this does
not mean that a constitution may not facilitate its exercise by making
participatory constitutional change its preeminent and central feature. It
is true, of course, that constituent power cannot be limited or regulated
by any form or procedure; the bearer of the constituent power can give
life to a new constitutional order through any extra-constitutional
mechanism (as long as the mechanism is consistent with the very idea of
constituent power, that is to say, of a people giving itself a constitution).
However, it does not follow that constituent power cannot be exercised
through established procedures that attempt to come as close as possible
to a popular constitution-making episode or, what is the same thing, to a
democratic revolution.
In fact, Schmitt considered this possibility. He maintained that, even
though the initiation of constituent power could not be regulated by any
institution, the execution andformulation of the decisions of the constituent subject normally required certain organization and procedure.5 6 If
this were not the case, the constituent subject might remain in a state of
powerlessness and disorganization; it would be unable to transform its
will into law. In the absence of mechanisms that facilitate the execution
and formulation of the decisions of the constituent power, the success of
53. For Sieyes, "a nation can neither alienate nor waive its right to will; and whatever its
decisions, it cannot lose the right to alter them as soon as its interest requires." SIEYES, supra note 9,
at 127. Agreeing with Sieyes, Schmitt saw the exercise of constituent power as an ever present
possibility. The constituent power, he wrote, "is not thereby expended and eliminated, because it was
exercised once", but always "remains alongside and above the constitution." SCHMITT, supra note
11, at 125-26.
54.

William E. Scheuerman, Revolutions and Constitutions, in LAW AS POLITICS: CARL

SCHMITT'S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 257 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1998). Scheuerman is referring
here to specifically to Schmitt, but the point applies with the same force to Sieyes's conception.
55.

SIEYES, supra note 9, at 128.

56.

SCHMITT, supranote 11, at 132, 138, 140.
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a popular movement in producing important constitutional change depends on many-sometimes democratically irrelevant-factors such as
how effective is the state's repressive apparatus, how effective is a mass
political movement in persuading people to engage in different forms of
protest that might even involve the risk of death, how is the challenge to
the existing regime, and the regime itself, perceived by the international
community, etc. This helps to explain why in some countries (e.g., Tunisia and Egypt) the popular movements were successful in overthrowing
the existing regimes, while in other places (e.g., Bahrain and Syria) the
regimes in question have been able to survive for longer. 5 7
However, even in those places in which protestors were able to initiate the exercise of constituent power that ended in some sort of constitutional change, those changes were not adopted through participatory
processes. 58 Not surprisingly, those initiatives have been criticized for
failing to meet some of the main demands of the citizenry.59 In those
cases, to paraphrase Schmitt, the constituent power was not able to transform its proposals into law.60 It is exactly this desire to divert the future
exercise of constituent power into a constitutional blind alley that offends
the commitment to a mode of strong democratic governance.
III. CONCLUSION

The role of the democratic constitutional theorist, as well as that of
the revolutionary constitution-maker, should be to provide novel ways of
exercising the "right of revolution." 61 This will entail the continuing responsibility to devise institutional mechanisms that would allow constituent power to manifest and assert itself from time to time. Of course, the
exercise of constituent power would normally be initiated in the streets,
in the form of informal gatherings (as those now taking place in Greece
and Spain),6 2 civil disobedience, and other types of protests. However, a
truly democratic constitutional order would not only allow those types of
popular manifestations to occur without state interference, it would also
establish more formal and less complex processes which citizens could
57.

For a discussion of some of these events, see Tarek Masoud, The Upheavals in Egypt and

Tunisia: The Road to (andfrom) LiberationSquare, JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, July 2011, at 20, and

Jason Gluck, Constitutional Reform in TransitionalStates: Challenges and Opportunities Facing
Egypt
and Tunisia, U.S.
INST.
OF PEACE,
PEACEBRIEF (April
29,
2011),
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB92.pdf.
For example, the constitutional changes recently approved in Egypt (via referendum) were
58.
drafted by a committee of experts appointed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Army
Council Issues Statement on ConstitutionalAmendments, EGYPT ST. INFO. SERVICE (Feb. 27, 2011),
http://www.sis.gov.eg/en/Story.aspx?sid=53903.
59. See, e.g., Gregg Carlstrom Deep Divisions Over Egypt's Referendum, AUAZEERA, (Mar.
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/spotlight/anger-in-egypt/2011/03/
2011),
18,
20113159273349129.html.
60. See SCHMITT, supra note I1, at 132.
61.
FRIEDRICH, supra note 29, at 129.
62. Nicholas Kulish, Ethan Bronner & Jim Yardley, As Scorn for Vote Grows, ProtestsSurge
Around Globe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2011, at Al.
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trigger and through which they could deliberate and decide on important
constitutional transformations. In other words, a constitutional mode of
democratic governance would promote rather than combat the occurrence of revolutions. The constitutional journey of democracy never
ends, but occasionally pauses for breath.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING
DAVID LANDAUt

In this short invited contribution,I argue that scholars and policymakers need to shift focus from the moment at which the break with the
old regime occurs towards the moment at which new constitutional orders are constructed. The constitution-makingprocess in countries like
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, for example, is likely to determine in large
measure what these new regimes are likely to look like. In particular,I
draw off of a case study of the 2009 military coup in Honduras, which
was provoked by ex-President Zelaya's attempt to call a constituent assembly, to make two points. First,both constitutionaltheory andinternational law and politics have allowed constitution-making processes to
occur in a vacuum-neither provides any real restraints on these processes. Second, the main risk of constitution-making is that powerful
individuals or politicalparties use either real or manufactured majorities to impose constitutions on the rest of their societies. An urgent task
in constitutionaldesign and theory is therefore to construct models that
will constrain this kind of constitution-making, and to find ways to enforce those constraints.
Recent events in the Middle East and elsewhere, as well as recent
scholarly contributions, have again pushed to the forefront questions of
revolutionary change and democratic transition. The events in Egypt and
elsewhere open up possibilities for democratization and for peaceful
change in parts of the world where this was previously thought unlikely.
But we must avoid idealizing these moments. Revolutions and constitution-making processes are often traumatic experiences, and transitions
from authoritarian regimes can often prove to be false ones, replacing
these regimes with new authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments.i
The key question is thus the following: what determines the end
state of revolutions? What factors cause a revolution to end up in an ultimately democratic or nondemocratic outcome? Here, I think it is important to recognize that revolutions and other types of regime change 2
t Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to thank
Noah Feldman, Will Partlett, Brian Sheppard, Fernando Teson, and Manuel Utset for conversations
about the ideas in this draft.
1.
See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM:
HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR (2010); Andreas Schedler, The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism, in ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM: THE DYNAMICS OF UNFREE COMPETITION 1, 1

(Andreas Schedler ed., 2006) (arguing, among other things, that "[a] large number of political regimes in the contemporary world ... have established the institutional facades of democracy").
2. Note that I do not in this essay carefully distinguish revolutions from other types of regime changes, such as coups, because my point does not depend on how the event is categorized.
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are sequential events, with at least two major stages. In the first stage,
new power holders replace existing power holders in control of the government. For the kinds of events being considered here, this replacement
is usually done by extralegal means. From the standpoint of the existing
legal regime, the shift to a new government is done illegally and generally in flagrant violation of the existing legal order. In the second stage, the
new regime seeks to establish the rules under which it itself will be governed. This is the stage in which constitutions are written and new institutions created. In Egypt, for example, the first phase occurred when the
people took to the streets and forced the removal of Mubarak. The second stage is ongoing-the interim military government is still at work
planning the new constitution and preparing to hold the first set of elections.
We must pay more attention, both in scholarship and in international politics, to the second stage. In particular, we must be much more attuned to the process by which new institutions are constructed. Observers, diplomats, and international organizations often pay great attention
to the dramatic moment at which an existing regime falls; these actors
pay far less attention to the aftermath, when new institutions are constructed.
Similarly, international law has traditionally had nothing to say
about these situations, and scholarship in both comparative politics and
comparative constitutional law have both deemphasized the constitutionmaking process itself as an object of study. Traditional legal theory compounds the problem by viewing constitution-making as a kind of legal
black hole. Hans Kelsen's theory of revolution, for example, holds that
revolution occurs precisely when there is a decisive legal break with the
old constitutional or legal order.3 Once such a break has occurred, the
state is in a kind of legal no-man's land until the new constitutional order
has been constructed-there is no legal standard for evaluating the propriety of acts by the interim regime.
The manner in which the old regime collapses generally does not
determine how the process of constructing the new regime will turn out.
Instead, a revolution or coup generally leaves a chaotic jumble of emerging parties and civil society groups in its wake. The shape of the new
regime will be determined by how these groups interact and participate
to construct the basic institutions of the new regime. And thus it is the
second stage that is likely to govern the normative desirability of revolutions and other overthrows of existing regime-the key question is not
The broad point is that regardless of how a regime change occurs, we should be paying much more
attention to the attempt to construct a new regime.
3.
See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 117 (Anders

Wedberg trans., 1945).
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how the old regime was overthrown, but rather what the new regime
looks like. This process, then, is exactly where we should focus our energies as scholars. Yet, despite an outpouring of high quality recent
work, it is still undertheorized.4
Constitution-making holds great promise. Constitutional politics has
the potential to establish the legitimacy of a new democracy across a
broad spectrum of social groups. This sort of legitimacy is the foundation
of a vibrant democracy. But constitution-making is also dangerous and
commonly abused; constitution-making is often seized to impose the
agendas of particular social groups or, even worse, of particular actors
who are trying to consolidate power. Such processes are likely to lead to
poorly functioning and unstable states. Thus, an important but very difficult task is to devise ways to prevent this kind of abuse from occurring.
Rather than designing constitution-making in an attempt to reach some
idealized end state, we may be better served by developing a "risk
averse" model of constitutionalism, where the major goal is to prevent
democratic breakdown.
The rest of this response is organized as follows: In Part I, I lay out
the importance of my object of study, explaining why we should focus
on the constitution-making moment as the key to understanding the effects of revolutions, coups, and other methods of fundamental regime
change. In Part II, I explain the ways in which this area is a traditional
legal and constitutional theory, as well as international law, even when
fortified by some pro-democratic norms, pays no real attention to questions regarding the quality of democracy in existing regimes or to the
constitution-making processes. Part III gives an example of these problems in practice, drawing off of my own recent work as part of a team
analyzing the 2009 coup in Honduras. While the international community was fixated on the coup itself, it offered almost no responses to the
dangerous abuses of constitution-making that both preceded and followed it. The Honduran example is cautionary-it shows that constitution-making processes are often dangerous exercises.
Part IV jumps off from another observation based on the Honduran
case: the chief risk of constitution-making may be the risk that it will be
abused by powerful political actors or social groups for their own ends.
Put another way, the main risk of constitution-making seems to be that it
may be excessively majoritarian: politicians and social groups may manufacture momentary majorities, either real or invented, to remake the
state in their image. This kind of constitution-making does lasting damFor some examples of recent scholarship, see FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF
4.
TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING (Laurel E. Miller, ed., 2010); Ozan Varol,

The Democratic Coup dEtat, 53 HARV. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2012); William Partlett, Making
Constitutions Matter: The Dangers of ConstitutionalPolitics in Current Post-AuthoritarianConstitution Making, 38 BROOK. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2012).
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age to democratic institutions. Finally, Part V concludes by suggesting
that there is an urgent need to develop guidelines that will help to stop
this kind of constitution-making, and that will incorporate these ideas
into domestic and international politics. I do not here develop a complete
theory of constrained or risk-averse constitution-making; that is a task I
and other scholars have worked towards in other work.5 My goals here
are more modest: I point out the difficulty in achieving constraint in these moments, and the urgent need to do so.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING MOMENT
No account of a regime's upheaval is complete without considering
what happens next, as coups and revolutions do not and cannot end at the
moment in which the old regime dies. The new regime needs to organize
itself in some fashion, by establishing fundamental rules. This is going to
be true regardless of which political and social groups hold power after
the coup or revolution. In the past, new authoritarian regimes might have
settled for organizing power with some form of provisional statutes or
other document short of a constitution. This would have permitted the
regime to establish working rules for dealing with intra-elite disputes,
while also giving flexibility. 6 Recently, though, virtually all new governments have moved relatively quickly towards the establishment of
new constitutions. And even authoritarian regimes have generally
clothed these constitutions in democratic garb. As Levitsky and Way
have recently shown, there is now enough international pressure towards
democracy that even basically authoritarian regimes like Iran and the
more authoritarian post-Soviet states create some democratic institutions,
such as elections, within otherwise non-democratic states.7
Egypt poses a classic variant on the problem-opposition protests
resulted in the overthrow of the authoritarian regime headed by Mubarak
in February 2011. But this left the state with essentially no framework
for governance; the military therefore established a temporary regime,
quickly establishing a provisional constitution (based on amendments to
the old constitution) in March 2011 and promising to hold elections by
late 2011. The provisional constitution, which was drafted by the military
and approved via wide margins in a referendum, was never intended to

5.

See David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming

2012).

6. Even classical, personalized authoritarian regimes like Pinochet's Chile in the 1970s
sought to impose some form of organizing principles, initially in the form of a Statute of the Junta,
and later a full-fledged Constitution. As Barros argued, these documents meant something-they
served to as checks on Pinochet's power by other members of the junta. However, even this authoritarian regime eventually moved towards adopting a permanent constitution, which came into effect
in 1980. See generally ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DICTATORSHIP: PINOCHET, THE

JUNTA, AND THE 1980 CONSTITUTION 167-254 (2002).

7. These regimes they refer to as "competitive authoritarian" states. See LEVITSKY & WAY,
supra note 1, at 1.
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be a permanent document.8 Instead, the interim regime established vague
plans for the creation of a new text sometime after the first set of elections were held.
Both the timing of elections and the process for writing the new
constitution have created tension among the various social groups in
Egypt. Islamist groups, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, have dominated
the initial elections for Parliament, and-after initially promising not to
run a candidate-captured the presidency.9 The military and its allies
(particularly the judiciary) have in various ways-some clumsy, others
more sophisticated-tried to limit the electoral power of Islamist groups.
The military's initial attempts to impose a set of principles on the constitution-making process were met with widespread derision and renewed
protests,' 0 but the courts have subsequently had considerable success in
limiting the power of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the supreme administrative court suspended the constituent assembly appointed by the Parliament, the supreme constitutional court dissolved the Parliament itself,
holding that the electoral rules used to elect part of the legislature were
unconstitutional." What has emerged is a complex negotiation process
between forces, the outcome of which will determine the future of the
Egyptian state.
These conflicts show that the revolution did not in any sense end
with the overthrow of Mubarak. Nor will it be over when the first set of
elections are held, because the new Parliament will still lack a constitutional text or other principles to guide its work and to establish the basic
institutional framework for the country. Moreover, the fights staged
amongst the various political groups and between those groups and the
government are critical because they will shape the new constitution and
thus the basic character of the new regime. A constitution written by
Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood working alone, or by the
military working alone, would look very different from the constitution
written by secular political groups or by all of the new groups working in
cooperation. This first set of parliamentary elections and the new constitution will define what the Egyptian revolution means.
8. Turnout at the referendum was 41.2%, and 77% of voters approved the constitutional
changes. Egypt Referendum Strongly Backs Constitution Changes, BBC NEWS,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12801125 (last updated Mar. 20, 2011,6:05 PM).
9.
See Leila Fadel, Final Results Confirm Islamists Winners in Egypt's Elections, WASH.
POST (Jan. 21, 2012), www.washingtonpost.com/world/.../glQAXpwbGQstory.html (stating that
the Freedom and Justice Party won 47% of seats in the lower house, and the conservative Islamist
Salafist Nour party won 25%).
10.
These principles offered some guarantees of the liberal nature of the new democracy, but
also gave the military considerable autonomy and power over the new state. See Declarationof the
FundamentalPrinciplesfor the New Egyptian State, Draft Dated November 1, 2011: A Commentary
4 (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2011).
See INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, ELECTIONS IN EGYPT:
11.
IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT COURT DECISIONS ON THE ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK 9-10 (2012), avail-

able
at
http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2012/
Egypt SCCDecisions August9.pdf.
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And this is the normal course of affairs. There may be some cases
where one political and social group (i.e., the military) has so much power that it will make no difference what the electoral and constitutional
processes look like: the outcome is foreordained by the dominance of
that group.12 But this situation is highly unusual-in most recent situations involving regime change (for example, Venezuela after Chavez
came to power, Egypt, and now Libya) the situation is highly fluid, with
new social groups and political parties organizing and a variety of new
groups vying for control. No one faction has clear control in the new
regime. In these cases, the constitution-making process will indeed be
one of the key moments in shaping the character of the new regime. Yet,
as I show in Part II, these processes fall through important gaps in both
legal theory and in international law and politics.
II. THE SILENCE OF LEGAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
In this section, I explain why constitution-making moments constitute a kind of "wild-west" both in domestic constitutional theory and in
international law. Kelsenian theories of revolutionary break emphasize
that revolutions occur, legally, when the new regime makes a decisive
legal break with the old one. In other words, they occur when the old
constitution is expressly abrogated; its procedures and substantive constraints are thrown out. In practice, virtually all new constitution-making
occurs this way, because it is rare for an existing constitution to have a
provision allowing its own replacement by an entirely new text. But this
leaves a vacuum, because new constitutions are then written outside of
any set of domestic legal constraints. International norms do not fill that
vacuum; international law, even when concerned with the promotion and
maintenance of democracy, has not developed any clear rules about what
constitution-making must look like.
A. Domestic ConstitutionalTheory
Kelsen defines a revolution as an event that replaces the "entire legal order." 13 In other words, the constitution is altered or replaced by
some process other than the one contemplated in the text, and as result,
the old constitution and laws lose their efficacy. In practice, almost all
constitution-making follows this route. Very few constitutions allow for
the calling of a constituent assembly within their text, and thorough replacement of a constitutional text by means found within an existing
constitutional order is, ordinarily, likely to prove difficult or impossible.
12. Some classic authoritarian regimes, like Chile post-1973, might fit this model: the postauthoritarian regime was dominated by a small clique of military officials. But it is notable that even
in Chile, the military regime eventually moved towards writing a new constitution, which came into
effect in 1980. And as Barros shows, the final product was heavily influenced by the negotiations
between different factions of the military and by the involvement of commission's composed of both
right-wing and centrist lawyers. See BARROS supra note 6, at 168.
13. See KELSEN, supra note 3, at 118.
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Constitutions, in other words, contemplate their amendment but almost
never their replacement. To take examples from recent Latin American
history, the Colombian Constitution of 1991, the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999, the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008, and the Bolivian Constitution of 2009 all utilized constituent assemblies to replace their constitutional texts, and the use of a constituent assembly to replace the old
constitution was not mentioned in any of the old constitutions.
How, then, did these events occur? In some instances they are basically extralegal--courts simply refrain from passing on their legality ex
ante, or the assembly proceeds even in the face of a negative judicial
decision.14 In other cases, the court upholds the assembly, generally on
the grounds that there is a residual power in the people to make or unmake their constitutional order. In 1990, for example, the Colombian
Supreme Court held that the president could proceed with elections to
call a constituent assembly, essentially on the grounds that "the people
... is the primary constituency from which all constituted and derivative
powers emanate." 5 Thus, despite a constitution which stated only one
method of constitutional amendment (approval by an subabsolute majority of congress in two separate congressional sessions), the public always
has a residual power to call a constituent assembly to replace the existing
political order.
The consequences of both courses of events are the same-the constitution-making process is subject to no clear rules or constraints under
domestic law. In the Colombian case, for example, the court held that
because "the Nation [is] is the primary constituency which takes on a
sovereign character, . . . it cannot have any limits other than those it im-

poses on itself, nor can the constituted powers revise its acts."' 6 In other
words, the constituent power acts outside of all existing legal principles
or restraints. The Venezuelan court took on the same view in 1999,
when it held that the constituent assembly convoked by Chavez was a
supraconstitutional body that had the power to dissolve or reorganize all
of the existing branches of government while it worked to write a new

' 14. The Honduran example, discussed below in Part III, is an example of this route-Zelaya
attempted to move forward with a non-binding vote on whether to hold a constituent assembly
despite judicial decisions to the contrary.
15.

RAFAEL BALLEN M., CONSTITUYENTE Y CONSTITUCION DEL 91, at 169 (1991) (giving the

full text of the decision).
16. See id. at 170-71.
17.
The Pakistan Supreme Court, in the case Syed Zafar Ali Shah v. General Pervez Musharraf Chief Executive of Pakistan, (2000) 52 PLD (SC) 869, attempted an ex post halfway house
between legitimating the coup of President Musharraf and restraining it. It thus legitimated the coup
on grounds of public necessity while stating that the regime had to follow the existing constitution
and was barred from altering its fundamental principles. Such approaches, however, are rare in
constitutional theory, and even rarer when dealing with bodies like constituent assemblies.
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constitution. 8 As often conceived, domestic law has nothing to say about
these moments.
B. InternationalLaw
International law has traditionally held a state's form of government
to be irrelevant. Historically, this was because international law was concerned with relations between states rather than with the relationship
between a state and its own citizens.' 9 But even as international law has
built up a formidable body of law governing human rights, which prevents a state from taking certain kinds of actions against its own citizens,
the rule that international law is unconcerned with the internal governance of a state has persisted. For example, in Nicaraguav. United States,
the International Court of Justice held that the United States' claim that
the Nicaraguan government was attempting to impose a "totalitarian"
form of government was irrelevant: "Every State possesses a fundamental right to choose and implement its own political, economic and social
systems." 20
Changes in international law have been slow and subtle. Some
scholars have argued that there is an emerging customary international
law norm of democracy. 2 1 But this requires consistent state practice coupled with an opinion by states that they are following that practice because it constitutes binding international law (opinio juris). Given the
variation in types of governance that still exists around the world, and
pronouncements like the statement by the Nicaragua court, such a customary norm seems doubtful.22

18.

See 77-80 REVISTA DEL DERECHO PUBLICO Ill (1999); see also ALLAN R. BREWER-

CARiAs, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: THE CHAVEZ AUTHORITARIAN EXPERIMENT

58-60 (2010) (discussing this case and its implications); Joel 1.Col6n-Rios, Carl Schmitt and Constituent Power in Latin American Courts: The Cases. of Venezuela and Colombia, 18
CONSTELLATIONS 365, 369-72 (2011) (discussing the Venezuelan case as a way to use the idea of
"constituent power" to get around legal constraints).
19.

See,

e.g.,

J.L. BRIERLY,

THE LAW

OF

NATIONS:

AN

INTRODUCTION

TO

THE

INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 1 (4th ed. 1949) (defining international law as "the body of rules
and principles of action which are binding upon civilized nations in their relations with one another").
20.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, *131
(1986); see also Fernando R. Teson, Le Peuple, C'est Moi!: The World Courtand Human Rights, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 173, 177-78 (1987) (criticizing ruling on grounds that the form of government, at
least in extreme cases, is deeply relevant to the enjoyment of human rights in a given country and
stating that "if the political system described as 'totalitarian dictatorship' results in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, then that system cannot validly be 'chosen' by a state").
21.
See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46,46 (1992).
I recognize that there are resolutions by both the U.N. Human Rights Commission and the
22.
U.N. General Assembly affirming or suggesting that democracy is a human right. See, e.g., Commission on Human Rights Res. 1999/57, Commission on Human Rights, 57th Sess., Apr. 27, 1999, U.N.
CHR E/CN.4/RES/1999/57; G.A. Res. 55/2, pt. 5, U.N. Doc. A/55/L.2 (Sept. 8, 2000). However, as
with most of the other instruments studied in this section, the Human Rights Commission and General Assembly Resolutions do not constitute a form of binding international law.
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At most, there are now some norms within regional treaties that
bear on or protect the existence of international democracy; there appear
to be no norms at the global level. And most of these norms are nonbinding forms of soft law. For example, the Commonwealth nations associated with the British crown have signed multiple declarations expressing a commitment to democratic governance. 2 3 The Treaty on European Union in its current incarnation states democracy as a basic principle of the Union and states that adherence to the essential principles
should be a core criterion for admission.24 Finally, the Inter-American
Democratic Charter (which does not enjoy the formal status of a treaty)
explicitly states a "right to democracy," and the preamble states that "cooperation between American states requires the political organization of
those states based on the effective exercise of representative democracy." 25 The agreement also creates certain instruments that would aid the
Organization of American States (OAS) in assessing and responding to
breakdowns in democracy.2 6 These are all important regional pronouncements, but none of them really represent binding international
norms-they are all effectively forms of international soft law.27
Perhaps more interesting are those few instances where guarantees
of democratic governance, along with enforcement mechanisms, have
been incorporated into regional treaty regimes. In both the Latin American and African cases, the emphasis is on avoiding coups or other interruptions of democratic governments. Little attention is paid to other
problems, such as reconstituting states after interruptions or avoiding
erosions in democracy from overreaching presidents or other figures.
They therefore preserve international law's traditional focus on order
within the international community, without expanding the focus to look
more broadly at democratic governance. The Charter of the OAS states
that "[a] member of the Organization whose democratically constituted
government has been overthrown by force may be suspended" by the
See, e.g., Heads of Gov't in Harare, Zim., Harare Commonwealth Declaration, THE
(Oct. 20, 1991), http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared-asp files/
WEALTH
GFSR.asp?NodelD=141095 (reaffirming a commitment to "democracy, democratic processes and
institutions").
24. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 2, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J.
(C 115) 13 (stating democracy as a basic value); id. art. 49 (requiring that states "respect[] the values" referred to in article 2 to become members of the Union), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF.
25. Inter-American DemocraticCharter, ORG. OF AM. STATES (Sept. 11, 2001) pmbl., art. 1,
http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution I enp4.htm.
26. The Charter allows a state to request the support of the Secretary General of the OAS
whenever the democratic institutional order may be at risk. See id., arts. 17-18. It also provides that
the OAS should immediately use diplomatic means to repair an "unconstitutional interruption" of
democracy or a "unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime" that significantly impairs
democracy in a country. See id, arts. 20-21. If these efforts fail, the OAS is empowered to suspend
the violating state by a two-thirds vote. See id., art. 21.
International soft law is not binding on states or individuals, although it often has consid27.
erable persuasive or other significance. See, e.g., Hartmut Hillgenberg, A FreshLook at Soft Law, 10
EUR. J. INT'L L. 499,499 (1999).
23.

COMMON
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OAS.28 Somewhat similarly, the Constitutive Act of the African Union
provides that "[g]overnments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of
the Union." 2 9 Both of these are essentially anti-coup clauses; they prohibit the unconstitutional replacement of one democratic regime by another,
but they say nothing about post-revolutionary circumstances where a
new democracy is being constituted, or about situations where an incumbent leader is taking steps to weaken democracy.
This kind of a focus--on dramatic interruptions like coups rather
than on other types of events that threaten democratic governance in subtle but important ways-is confirmed by looking at the way in which
these instruments have been carried out, and more broadly on how the
international community responds to different kinds of threats to democracy. The suspension mechanisms in the OAS and African Union are
sometimes invoked in response to unconstitutional overthrows of democratic governance, as occurred in Honduras after President Zelaya was
removed in 2009,30 and in Cote d'Ivoire, where President Bedie was
overthrown by a military coup in 1999.31 But where Hugo Chavez in
Venezuela used his lawfully elected position to undermine other democratic institutions by, for example, closing and intimidating hostile media
and weakening and packing the country's Congress, Supreme Court, and
control institutions like the Ombudsman, the response of the OAS was
much more tepid. The organization has done virtually nothing, because
in the absence of an unconstitutional interruption in democracy that
might trigger the suspension clause, it is able to monitor and facilitate
dialogue only at the invitation of the Venezuelan state.32
Even if international organizations wanted to intervene, it is unclear
whether and how they could do so. As noted by Franck and
Thiruvengadam, there is "no firm evidence of rules applicable to the process of constitution making" within international law. 3 3 While the authors try to leverage both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and recent practice as a source for emerging legal norms, the
most that can be found is a general set of principles about public partici28.

Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States (A-56),

ORGANIZATION

OF

AMERICAN

STATES,

WASHINGTON

D.C.

(Dec.

14,

1992),

http://www.oas.org/dil/treatiesA-56 Protocol of Washington.htm.
29.

CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRiCAN UNION July 11,

2000, art. 30, available at

http://www.africa-union.org/rootlau/aboutau/constitutive-act en.htm.
30. See discussion infra Part Ill.
31.
See Theodore J. Piccone, International Mechanisms for Protecting Democracy, in
PROTECTING DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 101, 119 (Morton H. Halperin & Mima

Galic eds., 2005) (discussing the Bedie case).
32. See id. at 107 (discussing the ineffectiveness of the OAS's attempted responses to
Chavez); see also supra note 26 (explaining the mechanisms created by the Inter-American Democratic Charter to protect democracy).
33. Thomas M. Franck & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Norms of InternationalLaw Relating to
the Constitution-MakingProcess, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES
IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 3, 14 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010).
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pation in constitution-making processes.34 This is probably too vague a
principle to be much good at restraining the risks posed by constitutionmaking that are outlined in Parts III and IV below. 35
More broadly, the international community often responds far more
forcefully and readily to regime changes than it does to the complex but
more important series of events occurring after the regime change. Egypt
and Libya offer recent examples: the attention of world media and world
governments was fixated in winter and early spring 2011 on the fall of
the Mubarak regime, and again in late spring and summer of 2011 on the
attempts of the rebels to dislodge Quaddafi with NATO support. But the
questions surrounding the subsequent construction of democratic governance in Egypt have received far less attention. There is little doubt
that the new Libyan leaders will be in a similar position. The example of
Honduras leading up to and following the 2009 removal of President
Zelaya, which I lay out in the next section, offers similar examples.
III. HONDURAS AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE SILENCE IN ACTION

In this section, I explain how Honduras offers an example of the
gaps in domestic and international law that I laid out in Part II. The point
is no longer that international law is wholly unresponsive to questions of
form of government. The point is that that response was focused only on
a narrow swath of issues. The OAS and other international actors responded vigorously to the illegal overthrow of President Zelaya in
2009.36 However, there was virtually no international reaction to the various illegal actions taken by President Zelaya before the overthrow,
which could have damaged the institutional framework of Honduran
democracy. Nor is there currently any attention paid to the new government's movement towards rewriting the entire Honduran Constitution.
Moreover, this section supports my argument that changes in government are complex, multi-stage events, and that it is critical to expand
the focus beyond the moment in which an old regime is brought down.
The Honduran example is much closer to a coup than a revolution; but
34. The authors use article I of the ICCPR, which creates a right to "self-determination," and
article 25, which gives a right "to take part in the conduct of public affairs." See id. at 5-6.
1do not mean to imply that the international community is always uninvolved in constitu35.
tion-making processes. Various post-conflict constitutions have been drafted with a high degree of
United Nations involvement-one can think of East Timor, Afghanistan, and Kosovo, for example.
See, e.g., Vijayashri Sripati, The United Nation's Role in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making Processes: TWAIL Insights, 10 INT'L COMMUNITY L. REV. 411, 415 (2008). But these tend to occur in
situations where the domestic state has been destroyed and domestic institutions and social groups
gravely weakened. In such instances, the international community essentially substitutes for domestic institutions in constructing the new constitutional order, and it acts according to sets of best
practices that it has developed rather than according to clear legal rules.
36. Most importantly, they quickly suspended Honduras from the Organization. See, e.g.,
Ginger Thompson & Marc Lacey, O.A.S. Votes to Suspend Honduras Over Coup, N.Y. TIMES, July
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/05/world/americas/
at
A6,
2009,
5,
05honduras.html?pagewanted all.
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even though the events simply changed the identity of the ruler rather
than thoroughly altering politics and society, the most important events
may be occurring after the coup rather than during the coup itself. The
actual change in regime in 2009-the irregular overthrow of President
Zelaya-was an important event in Honduran politics and society, but it
occurred in the middle of a much longer chain of events. Prior to the
removal, Zelaya himself engaged in a series of events that were calculated to weaken Honduran democracy. 37 And the new regime has strongly
suggested that it will seek to engage in either a significant constitutional
reform or the writing of a new constitution.38 How this constitutional
reform process is carried out will go a long way towards determining
whether Honduran democracy will be strengthened or gravely weakened
in the longer run.
The analysis in this section is based heavily on work that I undertook, as part of a team including Noah Feldman, Brian Sheppard, and
Leonidas Rosa-Suazo, to analyze constitutional issues surrounding the
removal of Zelaya for the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation of
Honduras. Our task was both to analyze the constitutionality of the actions of both Zelaya and those removing him, and to make prospective
suggestions for constitutional reforms in order to prevent a recurrence
and to strengthen Honduran democracy.39
Our essential finding was that both sides acted unconstitutionally at
various key points. Zelaya won election in a political environment that is
notoriously closed and exclusionary. 40 The political system is controlled
by the two traditional parties, the Liberal and National parties. Moreover,
these parties themselves are controlled by a small collection of largely
homogenous elites that also control most of the economic power in the
country.4 1 Zelaya, who himself is part of this group, won election as an
orthodox liberal, but began taking positions of a more "populist" variety
that were at variance with the leadership of his own party. From a foreign
policy perspective, he began aligning himself with Hugo Chavez, signing
several agreements, for example, to receive subsidized petroleum and
other kinds of aid.42 From a domestic perspective, he adopted a vague

37. See infra text accompanying notes 40-49.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 78-80.
39. The full text of this report is available in both English and Spanish. See Noah Feldman,
David Landau, Brian Sheppard & Leonidas Rosa Suazo, Report to the Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation of Honduras: Constitutional Issues (Fla. State Coll. of Law, Pub. Law, Research
Paper No. 536, 2011), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-1915214.
40. See Michelle M. Taylor, When Electoral and Party Institutions Interact to ProduceCaudillo Politics: The Case of Honduras, 15 ELECTORAL STUD. 327, 328-29 (1996) (providing a useful
overview of the basic nature and history of Honduran politics).
41.
See id. at 331-32.
42.
See, e.g., Central America: Zelaya Plays the Chdvez Card, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 2008,
availableat http://www.economist.com/node/12522958?storyid=12522958.
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discourse and policy in favor of participation by a broader set of actors.43
He also began issuing increasingly strident attacks against the other institutions of the Honduran government, including the Congress and the
Supreme Court."
Zelaya's rhetoric aimed to delegitimize traditional political actors
and to gain political support from a broader range of traditionally marginalized political groups. His root goal appeared to be the strengthening
of his personal political power. He began signaling in late 2008 that he
would seek to call a constitutional convention to write an entirely new
constitutional text, replacing the current constitution of 1982. While
Zelaya never stated that he intended to reform the constitutional article
prohibiting presidential reelection, and indeed stated that he intended to
hold only one term in power, the widely held assumption was that he
would use the convention to extend his own term.46
This effort was complicated by two features of the Honduran Constitution. First, Article 373 establishes only one method for constitutional
reform: approval by two-thirds of Congress in two different congressional sessions.47 It says nothing about the legality of a constituent assembly.
Second, Article 374 establishes that certain provisions, including the
prohibition on presidential reelection, cannot be reformed under any circumstances. 48 Article 239 enforces the prohibition on reelection by mandating that anyone who "breaks the prohibition or proposes its reform,
along with those who support [that effort] directly or indirectly" will

43.
For example, one of President Zelaya's first acts as president was to sign a new "Law of
Citizen's Participation." See Ley No. 30,917, 27 Jan. 2006, Ley de Participacion Ciudadana [Law of
Citizen's Participation] Decreto 3-2006, LA GACETA, DIARIO OFICIAL [L.G.], 1 Feb. 2006 (Hond.),
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Parties/Honduras/Leyes/LeyParticipacion.pdf (stating that "sovereignty
belongs to the people, from which emanates the powers of the State," and therefore that the government is based on "the principle of participatory democracy).
For example, Zelaya failed to present a 2009 budget to Congress by the constitutional
44.
deadline of September 15, 2008, and thus no budget was passed for that year. The Congress and
Supreme Court both claimed that they received no budgetary allocations in 2009, up until the point
when Zelaya was removed from power. See Presupuesto2009 no Ilega al Congreso Nacional [2009
Budget Does Not Come to Congress], LA PRENSA (Hond.) (Feb. 5, 2009, 11:02PM),
http://archivo.laprensa.hn/Pac3%ads/Ediciones/2009/02/06/Noticias/Presupuesto-2009-no-legaal-Congreso-Nacional.
45.
See Manuel Zelaya propone asamblea constituyente [Manuel Zelaya Proposed Constituent
Assembly],
EL
HERALDO
(Hond.)
(Nov.
22,
2008,
11:15AM),
http://www.heraldohn.com/index.php/content/view/full/46876.
46. See id.; see also Buscan crear vacio de poder en Honduras [Seek to Create a Power
Vacuum
in
Honduras], EL
HERALDO
(Hond.)
(Jan.
16,
2009,
10:20PM),
http://eng.elheraldo.hn/content/view/fullI69737 (describing the view of other political actors who
believed Zelaya would attempt to perpetuate himself in power).
47.

See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS [CN.] tit. Vil, ch. 1, art.

373, 11 Jan. 1982, as interpreted by Decreto No. 169/1986.
48. See id. art. 374 (rendering unamendable, inter alia, provisions dealing with the form of
government, the national territory, the length of the presidential term, and the prohibition on being
reelected president).
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cease immediately in her office and be ineligible to serve any public
function for ten years. 49
At any rate, Zelaya pressed forward with his plans for the constituent assembly, issuing several decrees ordering the carrying out of a nationwide "consultation" or "poll" on June 28, 2009, to see whether the
public supported the effort.5 0 The decrees stated that the consultation
would be non-binding and would be used as political support for
Zelaya's project."' An administrative court in May 2009 blocked the first
decree, and the court's order was not successfully appealed. Zelaya then
essentially issued the same order under a slightly different name, and the
court issued a "clarification" to its order to cover the new decree.5 2 Nonetheless, Zelaya pressed forward with his plans. Allegedly, the Supreme
Court opened a criminal investigation of the president on various
grounds (including treason and abuse of authority) on June 26, 2009, and
issued an arrest warrant, to be carried out by military officials, on June
27. The military arrived at Zelaya's house on the morning of June 28
and, instead of taking him to the country's Supreme Court as allegedly
specified in the warrant, took him on a plane and carried him to Costa
Rica. 53 Later that day, the Congress purported to "separate" Zelaya from
the office of president and to appoint the president of the Congress (Roberto Micheleti) as interim president. The Congress took this action even
though it lacked any explicit presidential impeachment or removal power.54
The public debate in Honduras about the legality of Zelaya's actions
centered largely on whether it was legally possible to hold a constituent
assembly to write an entirely new constitution, including the prohibition
on presidential reelection. 5 Those are very difficult questions to answer
49. See id ch. VI, art. 239, 11 Jan. 1982, as amended by Decreto No. 374/2002 and ratified by
Decreto No. 153/2003. ("[W]hosoever breaks this disposition or proposes its reform, as well as those
who directly or indirectly support him, shall immediately cease in the exercise of their office and
will be disqualified from the exercise of any public function for ten (10) years.")
50. See Decreto No. PCM-005-2009 (Hond.) (ordering a "public consultation" managed by
the National Institute of Statistics); Decreto No. 31,945, PCM-020-2009, LA GACETA DIARIO
OFICIAL [L.G.], 25 June 2008 (Hond.) (changing the name of the "public consultation" to a poll);
Acuerdo Ejecutivo No. 027-2009 (Hond.) (ordering the armed forces to provide "support" for the
"poll").
51.
See Decreto PCM-005-2009, art. 3 (Hond.) ("The positive result of this popular consultation will serve as a legitimate basis for the Executive to send to the National Congress a special legal
project to place the [issue] on the ballot in the general elections of November 2009.").
52. See Decreto No. 31,945, PCM-020-2009, L.G., 25 June 2008 (Hond.) (changing the name
of the "consultation" to a "poll").
53. See, e.g., Micheletti Sucede a "Mel" [Micheletti Happens to "Mel"], LA TRIBUNA
http://www.latribuna.hn/2009/06/29/micheletti-sucede-a2009),
(June
29,
(Hond.)
%E2%80%9Cmel%E2%80%9D/.
54. See, e.g., id
55. See, e.g., Edmundo Orellana, Golpe de Estado en Honduras [Coup in Honduras],
at
available
2009),
27,
(Sept.
VOSELOBERANO.COM
http://voselsoberano.com/vl/index.php?option=comcontent&view-article&id=856:golpe-de(arguing
estado-en-honduras-un-analisis-juridico-por-edmundo-orellana&catid=17:debate-juridico
that a constituent assembly would be possible in the existing framework).
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from within an existing constitutional framework. Most constitutions are
silent about their own replacement by new texts. And even if a constitution had an explicit prohibition on constituent assemblies or on the writing of new texts, arguably the public retains an inherent and inalienable
power to rewrite their constitution.
Our analysis focused much more on serious problems in the constitution-making process. Regardless of whether Zelaya somehow could
have moved towards convoking a constituent assembly, he did not follow
procedures that were mandated by Honduran law and would have been
necessary to ensure the fairness of the process. First, Zelaya had no legal
authority to call for the vote, and he did not seek the Congress's assent to
56
the passage of a new law that would have given him that authority.
Even the consideration of the convoking of a constituent assembly is a
serious event better processed on the basis of consensus or near consensus. Zelaya instead set up his project in opposition to both the Congress
and the judiciary, as part of a general pattern of attacks against those
institutions.s7
Moreover, while the constitution sets up a fairly well-functioning
Supreme Electoral Tribunal as the institution charged with supervising
elections, Zelaya instead placed his "consultation" or "poll" under the
charge of a National Institute of Statistics, which is basically the Honduran equivalent of the census bureau.59 The Electoral Tribunal has the
capacity and experience to monitor polling places and ensure the overall
fairness of an election; the National Institute of Statistics had none of
these capabilities. Finally, and even more troublingly, Zelaya ordered the
military to "support" the "poll," basically using the specter of military
force as a cudgel against those groups who opposed the effort.60The military ordinarily provides logistical support during elections, but under the
authority and orders of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal; Zelaya instead
invoked his direct authority as chief of the armed forces. 6 1

56.
Zelaya attempted to use the Law of Citizen Participation as support for his action, see
supra note 46, but it was clear that that law did not give him the power to carry out a nationwide
vote, even if non-binding.
57.
See supranote 44.
58.
See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS [CN.] ch. V, art. 51, 11
Jan. 1982, as amended by Decreto No. 154/2003 (creating a Supreme Electoral Tribunal charged
with "everything related with electoral acts and procedures").
59.
See Decreto No. PCM-005-2009 (Hond.); Decreto No. 31,945, PCM-020-2009, L.G., 25
June 2009 (Hond.) (both providing that the National Institute of Statistics would "supervise the
effective execution" of the consultation or poll).
60.
See Acuerdo Ejecutivo No. 027-2009 (Hond.).
61.
See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE HONDURAS [CN.] ch. X, art. 272, 11
Jan. 1982, as amended by Decreto No. 245/1998 and ratified by Decreto No. 2/1999 (ordering the
president to place the military at the disposition of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal one month before
all elections).
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In short, we regarded the question of whether Zelaya could legally
have moved towards a constituent assembly as relatively unimportant.62
It was far more relevant that the particular process he had chosen lacked
legitimacy. He moved forward without ensuring that any sort of consensus or near consensus existed. And his choice of institutions-the National Institute of Statistics and military-to support the vote would not
have provided any guarantee of fairness in outcome.
We were also struck by the nature of the international reaction surrounding the incident. The condemnation by almost all countries and by
the OAS of the illegal removal of President Zelaya by the military and
congress was proper. For example, the OAS condemned the incident as a
"coup d'etat" and suspended Honduras under its democracy clauses,6 3
while the Obama Administration also sharply condemned the removal as
"illegal" and demanded the restoration of Zelaya.64 There was a constitutional procedure to remove Zelaya-trial before the Supreme Court-but
the actors opposed to Zelaya did not follow that process. In so doing,
they raised the specter, which had long plagued democratic governance
in the region, of military intervention in politics. International organizations and other states rightly condemned the actions of those opposed to
Zelaya.
But there was little condemnation of Zelaya's actions prior to his
removal. And it is critical to see that these actions too raised the specter
of a serious threat to democratic governance: the threat that a strong-man
president will use his power to undermine other institutions of government and essentially erode democracy from within. This is no mere fantasy, and in fact has been far more common in recent times in Latin
America than direct military intervention in politics. 65 Following
Levitsky and Way's argument, pro-democracy norms have now become
sufficiently entrenched that obviously anti-democratic action like mili-

62. There are plenty of examples of new constitutions being written outside of the structure of
existing constitutional law, but in ways that clearly produce highly legitimate texts. Colombia in
1991, for example, convoked a constituent assembly and wrote an entirely new constitution to replace the Constitution of 1886, even though the Constitution (as in Honduras) only gave the Congress the power to amend the constitutional text. Yet the constitution-making process has produced a
highly legitimate text. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
63. See OAS Suspends Membership of Honduras, ORG. OF AM. STATES (July 5, 2009),
http://www.oas.org/en/media center/press release.asp?sCodigo-E-219/09.
64. See, e.g., PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34027, HONDURAN-U.S.
RELATIONS 14 (2009), availableat http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128853.pdf; see also
Noah Feldman, David Landau & Brian Sheppard, Op-Ed., Fixing Honduras, L.A. TIMES, June 7,
2011, at 11, available at http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/jun/07/opinion/la-oe-landauhonduras-20110607 (noting the significant "real-world effects," like loss of foreign aid, of the international steps taken against Honduras).
65. Aside from the Honduran case, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Evo
Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Alvaro Uribe in Colombia have all arguably
attempted similar erosions of democratic governance. See, e.g., Scott Mainwaring, The Crisis of
Representation in the Andes, in LATIN AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 18, 18-19 (Larry
Diamond, Marc F. Plattner & Diego Abente Brun eds., 2008).
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tary coups has become disfavored. 66 But subtler attacks on the democratic institutions that provide "horizontal accountability" to presidents, like
congresses and courts, may be more acceptable. At the very least, the
president can use the mantle of "popular legitimacy," arguing that he is
carrying out the people's will while other institutions are frustrating it.
Zelaya repeatedly relied on that sort of rhetoric.68 Chavez in Venezuela
and Fujimori in Peru provide clear examples of this threat-each undertook serious manipulation of legislatures and courts to attain maximal
power. Correa in Ecuador, Morales in Bolivia, and Uribe in Colombia
70
have all provided more but still troubling cases of the same trend. In
ternal erosion of democracy, rather than the military coup, is now the
major threat to democracy in Latin America and perhaps in most of the
world.
Yet the United States merely observed blandly that Zelaya's referendum was an internal matter and requested that the relevant parties
come to a "consensual democratic resolution." 7 ' The OAS, however,
played a more pernicious role. The OAS Secretary-General agreed, at
Zelaya's request, to send a mission to observe Zelaya's "poll" or "consultation."72 The Secretary-General stated that due to the "nature" of the
vote, this mission would be a "mission of accompaniment," rather than
the standard "electoral mission" that would observe an election and that
is explicitly mentioned in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. 73 Regardless of the formal name for the mission, the Secretary-General's
action served as a form of legitimization for Zelaya's "consultation."
Some commentators have suggested that politics played a role in the
Secretary-General actions, noting his closeness to Chavez and other Latin America leaders within his sphere of influence.74 But the ideological
structure of international law and politics also played an important role:
66. See LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 1, at 43-54.
67. In Guillermo O'Donnell's model of delegative democracy, popular presidents use their
link to the public in order to weaken other institutions that might serve as checks on their power. See
Guillermo O'Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 55, 59-62 (1994); see also Guillermo O'Donnell, HorizontalAccountability in New Democracies, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE:
POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY INNEW DEMOCRACIES 29, 29 (Andreas Schedler et al. eds., 1999)
(arguing that many developing countries in Latin America and elsewhere are plagued by the "absence" of horizontal accountability).
68. See supra text accompanying note 47.
69. See Mainwaring,supra note 65, at 22-24.
70. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Seligson, The Rise of Populism and the Left, in LATIN AMERICA'S
STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY, supranote 65, at 77, 77.
See MEYER, supra note 66, at 14.
71.
72. See OEA Analiza Enviar Misidn a Honduras: El Organismo Internacional Tendrd un
Enviado Especial para Mediar en el Problema, EL HERALDO (Hond.), June 26, 2009,
http://www.elheraldo.hn/AI%20Frente/Ediciones/2009/06/26/Noticias/OEA-analiza-enviar-misiona-Honduras.
73.
See id.; see also Inter-American Democratic Charter, ORG. OF AM. STATES (Sept. 11,
2001) arts. 23-25, http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution I en p4.htm.
74. See generally The Facts and the Law Behind the Democratic Crisis in Honduras,2009: A
ConstitutionalandInternationalDemocracy Law Analysis, HUMAN RIGHTS FOUND. (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://thehrf.org/HRF TheFactsAndTheLaw Honduras2009.pdf.
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the ire of the OAS and the international community was properly and
forcefully invoked against the removal of Zelaya. And the OAS's clear
provisions against "interruptions" of democratic governments were used
to suspend the new Honduran regime. But the international community
lacked a set of conceptual or legal tools to respond to Zelaya's attempts
to undermine the other institutions in his own democracy.
The aftermath of the removal offers similar lessons. After new elections were held in November 2009, and the interim president, Micheleti,
was replaced by a new permanent president from the National Party,
Porfirio Lobo, the reaction of the international community began to soften. The State Department in the United States "noted that it recognized
the complicated nature of events" in Honduras.7 5 Moreover, Zelaya and
the regime reached a set of agreements that granted him legal immunity
for actions taken during the crisis and allowed him to return to the country. And in June 2011, the OAS lifted the suspension of Honduras from
the organization by an overwhelming vote of thirty-two in favor and only
one (Ecuador) against.76 The message of the international community
was that the intervening events in the country-both electoral politics
and the accord between Zelaya and the regime-had cleansed the damage done by the removal of Zelaya. Thus, normalcy had been restored,
and Honduran politics once again became a wholly domestic affair.
The problem is that politics in the country had not really been restored to normal. There were documented human rights abuses against
Zelaya's supporters in the aftermath of his removal, and the election of
Lobo in November 2009, while untainted by fraud, was also not conducted in a fully open environment.7 Moreover, the Honduran state had
suffered a deep crisis of legitimacy; such a crisis cannot be healed in a
short period of time. In this social and political context, there have been
recurring calls for a new overhaul of the Constitution. Some constitutional articles have already been reformed-for example Article 5, which
regulates plebiscites and referenda, has been broadened to make these
devices easier to use and to possibly allow for sweeping constitutional
reforms via some sort of direct democracy. 78 The current presidential
administration has suggested that it favors these reforms, and the common understanding is that its emphasis is on doing exactly what Zelaya

75. See Feldman, Landau & Sheppard, supranote 64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. See OAS Lifts Honduras Suspension After Zelaya Agreement, BBC NEWS, June 1, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13622939.
77.
HUMAN

See, e.g., INTER-AM. COMM'N HUMAN RIGHTS, ORG. OF AM. STATES, HONDURAS:
RIGHTS
AND
THE
COUP
D'ETAT
59-62
(2009),
available
at

http://www.cidh.org/pdf/o20files/HONDURAS2009ENG.pdf (documenting both human rights
abuses and problems in November 2009 election).
78. See CN Aprob6 Reformas a la Constitucidnde Honduras, EL HERALDO (Hond.), Jan. 12,
2011, http://www.elheraldo.hn/Ediciones/2011/01/12/Noticias/CN-aprobo-reformas-a-Constitucionde-Honduras.
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was trying to do: change the constitution to allow for presidential reelection.7 9
This overhaul is not particularly popular with the public: a recent
poll showed that just less than half of the population favored significant
reforms.80 In the wake of the serious trauma faced by the Honduran democracy, such a result is, at first blush, surprising. But I think it is explained by the way in which these reforms have been framed: it is obvious to citizens that the push for constitutional reforms has occurred because of specific, short-term political agendas. As with Zelaya, it appears
that the discourse about popular legitimacy, increased participation, and
constitutional politics is a cover for the continuation of the power games
that have always been played between the small Honduran elite.
IV. THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS

The Honduran example highlights the main risk of constitutionmaking: that momentarily powerful actors or groups will use the constitution-making process to remake the state in order to serve their own
interests. Typically, they use claims to majoritarian support (whether true
or false), and tools such as plebiscites and referenda, in order to make an
end-run around existing democratic institutions.
Recent work by Partlett demonstrates this risk in Eastern Europe.
Partlett draws heavily on the example of Russia, where Yeltsin withdrew
the constitution-making process from Parliament and moved it to an appointed constituent assembly in order to take more control over the process. In other words, in Russia the invocation of a constitutional moment
was a ruse used by the president, and the resulting constitution has
lacked legitimacy and has failed to constrain strong-man Russian executives.
In Latin America, constitution-making in Venezuela, Ecuador, and
Bolivia, along with the Honduran example explored above, demonstrates
the same risk to varying degrees.82 Venezuela is perhaps the classic example. Hugo Chavez, who had formerly led a failed coup attempt against
the political system in 1992,83 won the presidential election in 1998 with
79. See, e.g., Lobo Consultard a Sectores Sobre Posible Reforma Constitucional en Honduras, LA NACION (Costa Rica), June 29, 2011, http://www.nacion.com/2011-06-29/Mundo/Loboconsultara-a-sectores-sobre-posible-reforma-constitucional-en-Honduras.aspx.
80. See id.
See William Partlett, Making Constitutions Matter: The Dangers of ConstitutionalPolitics
81.
in Current Post-Authoritarian Constitution Making, 38 BROOK. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=1924958 (looking also at examples
in Belarus and Kazakhstan).
For a fuller exploration of the Venezuelan and Bolivian examples, see Landau, supra note
82.
5.
83.
See Felipe Ag~iero, Crisis and Decay of Democracy in Venezuela: The Civil-Military
Dimension, in VENEZUELAN DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS 215, 215-16 (Jennifer McCoy et al. eds.,

1995) (recounting the coup attempt).
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56% of the vote. Chavez arrived at a perilous moment for the democracy-the country's once very-strong two traditional parties had lost legitimacy because of successive corruption scandals and because they
seemed out of touch with citizens. 84 Chavez thus won election as an antisystem outsider. Chavez campaigned on a promise to hold a constituent
assembly, and once elected moved forward with plans to call a constituent assembly and remake the democracy. He promised to abolish Venezuela's traditional system, which was dominated by two traditional parties, and to create a more inclusive, socially transformative democracy.8 5
While Chavez was fairly popular in Venezuela, the rules for composing the constituent assembly manufactured total dominance by proChavez forces and marginalized all of the opposition.86 Rather than using
pure proportional representation as in Colombia, Venezuela used an electoral system based on either single-member districts or small regional
districts electing a small number of delegates.8 7 This resulted in the massive overrepresentation of pro-Chavez forces. While Chavez had won
election in 1998 with only 56% of the vote, and while his forces only
won 65% of the vote in the Assembly, he won 93% of the seats in the
Assembly and was able to achieve exactly the constitution he envisioned.
The tiny opposition had no power to block or alter any of Chavez's proposals.
The resulting process strengthened Chavez's powers and wiped
away many of the existing checks on the president. First, the constituent
assembly replaced the members of most of the other institutions of state
(including the Supreme Court, National Electoral Council, Congress, and
state legislative assemblies).89 It used its "constituent powers" to take
these actions, which were upheld by the supreme court on the grounds
that the constituent assembly was not bound by the legal constraints of
either the existing or new constitutional order. 90 The Assembly also
drafted a constitution that suited Chavez by allowing for a very strong
chief executive. Indeed, the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution has been
84.

See Michael Coppedge, Partidocraciaand Reform in Comparative Perspective, in

VENEZUELAN DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS, supra note 83, at 173, 174, 187-90 (explaining the

decline of the party system).
85. See Renata Segura & Ana Maria Bejarano, iNi una Asamblea M"s sin Nosotros! Exclusion, Inclusion, and the Politics of Constitution-Making in the Andes, 11 CONSTELLATIONS 217,
224-25 (2004).
86. The traditional parties also helped to marginalize themselves by boycotting the constituent
assembly. See id at 225-28.
87. See id. at 230 (noting that the opposition received more than 34% of the vote but grabbed
only 4.6% of the seats).
88. For the view of one of the members of the opposition during the Assembly, see generally
BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 18, at 35-68.
89. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, The 1999 Venezuelan Constitution-Making Process as an
Instrumentfor Framing the Development of an Authoritarian Political Regime, in FRAMING THE
STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 505, 507 (Laurel E.

Miller ed., 2010).
90. See supra text accompanying note 18 (explaining this decision and its logic).
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called "[h]yperpresidential." 9 1 For example, it allowed presidential
reelection for the first time in many decades and lengthened the presidential term from five to six years. 9 2 It Also weakened other institutions, for
example by abolishing the Senate and by making the judiciary much
more dependent on the Congress than it had been previously. 9 3 There can
be little doubt in the Venezuelan case that the constitution-making process is linked to the constitutional outcome, and it is not difficult to argue
that the Constitution undermined existing institutions and caused longrun harm to the quality of Venezuelan democracy.
If I am correct about the main peril of constitution-making, then this
suggests that the existing literature on the topic needs to be refrained.
The existing literature on constitution-making is dominated by Elster,
who argues that probably the core task of the constitution-making process is avoiding deliberation based on short-term interest. 9 4 Delegates
must be forced to consider the long-term interest of the country rather
than their immediate short-term political goals. Thus, for example, constitutions should be drafted in special chambers like constitutional assemblies rather than in ordinary legislatures, and delegates should be
ineligible to run for office immediately after serving in the assembly.95
Yet if the main risk of constitution-making is instead the risk of
abuse by temporarily popular figures seeking to enhance their power,
then we will need a different set of design recommendations. Presentation of a model keyed to this risk is the topic of my current work and is
beyond the scope of the current project. 96 But the main need is to find
rules and principles that will restrain the ability of powerful individual
figures, minorities, or temporary majorities from imposing their own
desired constitution. 7 Given the current state of domestic constitutional
theory and international law, this will not be an easy task, but it is urgent.

91.
See JAVIER CORRALES & MICHAEL PENFOLD, DRAGON IN THE TROPICS: HUGO CHAVEZ
AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REVOLUTION IN VENEZUELA 16 (2011).

92. See id. at 19
See id.
93.
94. See Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-MakingProcess, 45 DUKE L.J.
364, 394 (1995).
See id at 395 ("The most important [implication] is perhaps that to reduce the scope for
95.
institutional interest, constitutions ought to be written by specially convened assemblies and not by
bodies that also serve as ordinary legislatures.").
96. A more complete theorization is developed in David Landau, Constitution-MakingGone
Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
97. Andrew Arato produces a very helpful analysis of constitution-making in Iraq; he argues
that the effort was hamstrung because the Occupation did not take seriously the need to allow participation from all affected groups. See ANDREw ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER
OCCUPATION: THE POLITICS OF IMPOSED REVOLUTION INIRAQ 122-23, 255-56 (2009). In a provocative recent article, Partlett emphasizes the advantages of drafting constitutions in ordinary
political bodies like congresses rather than constituent assemblies or other extralegal processes like
extraordinary referenda. See PARTLETT, supra note 81, at 27-29. Whether drafting constitutions
using ordinary political institutions rather than extraordinary ones is an adequate check is a more
difficult issue. For example, both Congresses and Constituent Assemblies can be abused if they can
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In Egypt and in other countries with a swirl of emerging political
parties and civil society groups, this likely means that electoral rules
should be structured to try and deny any one faction (say the Islamicist
parties) a clear majority. In Honduras, Colombia, and other countries
with historically exclusionist political systems, it means that electoral
rules and other devices should be used to give representation to groups
that have historically been excluded from the political process. The exact
tools to achieve these goals will be highly context-specific. Proportional
representation rather than a majoritarian electoral system, for example,
should generally help to achieve greater representativeness and avoid the
overrepresentation of the most popular parties are groups. 98 But while the
exclusion of current or even past politicians may be desirable in contexts
where the main problem has been the closed nature of the existing political system (as in Honduras and Colombia), it may be highly undesirable
in new democracies like Egypt, where there is a pressing need for political expertise and technical skill in the assembly.
The basic analysis-that processes must be structured so as to minimize the ability of individual groups to dominate-has other important
implications. In Egypt and in other situations experiencing a democratic
transition, civil society and political parties remain inchoate. Some
movements, in this case the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist
groups, were much more organized than other elements during the Mubarak regime. The domination of these movements in early elections may
reflect in part their organizational advantages rather than genuine popularity. In this context, the role of the military and judiciary in restraining
these forces becomes highly difficult to evaluate. As noted in Part II, the
military-backed judiciary has taken extreme measures, including dissolving the Parliament, in order to slow the electoral power of the Muslim
Brotherhood. Most domestic and international commentators have
viewed these measures as a "judicial coup" or as otherwise fundamentally undemocratic. But the reality may be more complex-as Ozan Varol
has recently argued, the military can actually play pro-democratic roles
during many democratic transitions.99 Further, as Sam Issacharoff suggests, fragile or unstable democracies may need illiberal institutions in
order to stave off implosion from within. 00

be controlled by a single political group. Perhaps more important than the chamber where a constitution is written is the composition of that chamber and the rules under which it will make decisions.
98.

See, e.g., AREND LIJPHART, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A STUDY OF

TWENTY-SEVEN DEMOCRACIES 1945-1990, at 54-77 (1994) (showing how pure proportional representation tends to translate votes exactly into seats, while majoritarian systems overrepresent the
largest parties, sometimes massively).
99. Varol, supra note 4.
100. Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2007) (arguing that
weak democracies may need to use party-banning and other techniques to ensure that antidemocratic elements cannot come to power through lawful means).
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V. CONCLUSIONS

Old regimes fall and new regimes rise in situations of great uncertainty. In these situations, constitution-making is likely to be a key event
in shaping the character of the new regime. The character of the Egyptian
and Libyan regimes, for example, is likely to be worked out largely as a
result of the battles fought and compromises struck as new constitutions
are written in each country. Yet constitution-making is a dangerous and
often socially-traumatic event. In a broad range of situations, we should
be most worried about constructing a robust model of constitutionmaking that seeks to avoid a breakdown of democracy.
But constructing such a model of constitution-making is quite difficult. As noted in Part III, domestic constitutional rules are often no help,
because ideologically there is a long tradition of seeing constitutionmaking as an event outside of the existing constitutional order. In the
classical view popularized by Sieyes, Schmitt, and Kelsen, revolutionary
legal change cannot, logically, be constrained by existing institutions.
Moreover, international law does nothing to fill this gap-it continues to
struggle to reach into the "black box" of domestic political change. Finally, there is a critical practical problem: those institutions capable of restraining undemocratic elements during transitions have often been
weakened by the transition process, and may be viewed as illegitimate.
Like the military in Egypt, they may have lost much of their capacity to
command respect, and may themselves have questionable pro-democratic
credentials.
In this context, the search for constraint on the constitution-making
process is a kind of triage. Even damaged and distrusted domestic institutions like the Egyptian military and judiciary may be useful in stabilizing
new regimes and in acting as a counterbalance to would-be hegemonic
political forces. A restricted democracy, with the military hemming in
electoral politics, may be a reasonable tradeoff against the possibility of a
democratic breakdown. International institutions could also play a
stronger role in backing up domestic institutions. As noted in Part II,
international law says little about democracy and even less about situations that are not coups or other ruptures in the institutional order. But at
the least, we can develop a set of principles to be used by the international community when evaluating the proposed constitutional assemblies in
Egypt and in other new or reconstituted democracies. In so doing, the
international community can help ensure the emergence of vibrant democracies.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRAGMATISM, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
MARK S. KENDEt

I. INTRODUCTION
At first glance, two concepts that do not seem related are revolution
and pragmatism. Even a non-violent democratic revolution connotes
ideological passions, as well as the dramatic replacement of one regime
by another. By contrast, pragmatism suggests, in ordinary parlance, a
non-ideological effort aimed at achieving positive results, with no requirement of transformation.' Yet this is a highly incomplete notion of
pragmatism.
This paper will respond to these misconceptions by illustrating how
the U.S. constitutional revolution was dependent on different types of
pragmatism. This is true of some other nations' revolutions as well. The
paper will also identify and map the various types that can be connected
to the U.S. constitutional revolution. The types include common sense,
transitional, political, democratic, economic, empirical, common law,
flexible, critical, and comprehensive pragmatism. With each type of
pragmatism connected to revolution, the paper will show how its legacy
can also be related to certain parts of the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence. After all, constitutionalized judicial review ended up being a fundamental aspect of the revolutionary break with the British monarchy.
The paper will then discuss two types of constitutional pragmatism
that are not consistent with a revolutionary impulse. These are prudential
and efficiency-oriented pragmatism. The paper will fill an important gap

t James Madison Chair Professor in Constitutional Law, Director of the Drake Constitutional Law Center. I would like to thank Richard Albert, Ian Bartrum, John Edwards, Theresa Howard, Miguel Schor, Mike Seidman, Lee Strang, Renner Walker, Karen Wallace, Robin West, Kathy
Zeiler, and Stephen Sheppard for their assistance. This paper also benefited from discussions that
took place at the Georgetown University Law Center Faculty Workshop and at the Loyola Chicago
Law School Constitutional Law Colloquium.
1. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines pragmatism as "a practical approach to problems
and affairs." It gives the example of a policy that "tried to strike a balance between principles and
http://www.merriamWEBSTER,
MERRIAM
Pragmatism,
pragmatism."
webster.com/dictionary/pragmatism (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). Thus, pragmatism is contrasted,
wrongly or rightly, with the kind of fundamental principles that are at the base of ideological passions. Interestingly, the philosopher Immanuel Kant was one of the first to use a similar term, in a
somewhat different way, and yet he is celebrated as an idealist moral philosopher. LOUIs MENAND,
THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 227 (2001). The term also has Greek roots given Aristotle's discussion of
practical wisdom and ethics. Richard Kraut, Aristotle's Ethics, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY § 6 (Mar. 29, 2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-ethics/.
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in the scholarly literature as constitutional pragmatism has been undertheorized and criticized, without an awareness of this typology.
At its most general level, constitutional pragmatism means that the
Supreme Court should be less formalistic, and should candidly
acknowledge that the traditional modalities of constitutional interpretation do not answer the hardest constitutional questions. As Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote, "The life of the law has not been logic; it has
been experience." 2 Consequences are key, though I will show that moral
principles can also matter. Among the few prominent scholars who support a pragmatic approach are Richard Posner 3 and Daniel Farber.4 Yet
pragmatism does a better job of describing how the influential, and at
times revolutionary, U.S. Supreme Court decides cases than either
originalism or living constitutionalism-two of the more popular theones.
That's why Mark Tushnet has characterized U.S. constitutional interpretation in terms of eclectic pragmatism,5 and Brian Tamanaha has
6
argued that more judges are pragmatists than any other category. Indeed,
Justice Kagan said she would be a pragmatic judge, at her confirmation
hearings, and Justice Alito gave that impression as well.7 In addition,
Justice Breyer has authored a book advocating the workable Constitution.8 Justice Sotomayor has taken a pragmatic approach in her cases, and
Justice Scalia's "soft originalism" acknowledges that stare decisis is important for pragmatic reasons. Moreover, the Justices must write coalition opinions that often cannot reflect foundational views. Also, lawyers
and judges are pragmatists who rely on as many tools as possible in argu-

2.
3.

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (2009).
See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 1 (2003).

4. See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331,
1332-33 (1988) (arguing that legal pragmatism constitutes an adequate foundation for constitutional
law).
5. Mark Tushnet, The United States: Eclecticism in the Service of Pragmatism, in
INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STuDY 7 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006).

6.

Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56

DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 490 (2007); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230 n.2

(2008).
The Nomination of Elena Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
7.
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 82, 122, 177, 178, 270
(2010) (statement of Elena Kagan, Solicitor General of the United States), ("I would look at this very
practically and very pragmatically, that sometimes some approach-one approach is the relevant one
and will give you the best answer on the law, and sometimes another."); Edward Lazarus, What Kind
of Justice Will Samuel Alito Be? A Recent Death Penalty Decision Provides Some Insights,
FINDLAW (May 11, 2006), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/2006051I.html ("But Alito's opinion declaring South Carolina's rule unconstitutional did not fulfill any of these fears. Instead, it
reflects much of the persona Alito ascribed to himself at his hearings-namely, that he was a plainspoken, pragmatic, and precedent-oriented judge.").
8. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEW
(2010).
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mg for, or reaching, a result.9 And many of the framers were legally
trained.
This typology is part of a larger project on pragmatism in constitutional thought. The paper is mainly descriptive and somewhat exploratory. Hopefully, the project can help scholars, judges, and others discuss
constitutional pragmatism more intelligently, as well as see its complexity and ubiquity. Indeed, there is much room for additional work. Political
scientists, for example, could use this typology to code Supreme Court
cases, and examine in more detail how pragmatism has been employed.
A caveat is necessary. This paper will not explore philosophical
pragmatism in depth (e.g., the distinctions among Charles Pierce, William James, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty). That's already been done
by numerous scholars. Indeed, Thomas Grey has made clear that a legal
pragmatist need not be a philosophical one.'o At the same time, there are
connections. Louis Menand and others have examined the close philosophical ties between Holmes and James." Holmes's values skepticism
is connected to the legal realist school, which has roots in pragmatist
philosophy.12 Similarly, John Dewey's more optimistic and "experimental" pragmatism has influenced legal theorists.13 The paper will,
however, examine the strengths and weaknesses of the differing types of
constitutional pragmatism, especially from a revolutionary context. The
paper comes at an interesting time as President Obama has been described as a constitutional pragmatist.14
II. TYPOLOGY
A. Common-Sense Pragmatism
In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote that Americans rejected the
European aristocracy in favor of an egalitarian view rooted in the Puritans." Everyone should have the chance to prosper given the right work
9. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law & the Humanities:An Uneasy Relationship, 18
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 184 (2006) ("Lawyers are rhetorical opportunists and pragmatists: They
are always looking for new ways to impress and persuade their audiences, and to bestow authority
and legitimacy on themselves and on the institutions and practices they seek to defend.").
10. See Thomas C. Grey, FreestandingLegal Pragmatism,in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM
254 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998).
See MENAND, supranote 1, at 217.
11.
12. Id. at 438.
See id. at 360; see also Susan Schulten, Barack Obama, Abraham Lincoln, and John
13.
Dewey, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 807, 815 (2009); Dorothy Evensen et al., Where Have You Gone John
Dewey?: Locating the Challenge to Continue and the Challenge to Grow as a Profession, 108 PENN
ST. L. REV. 19, 26 (2003).
14. See, e.g., Christopher Hayes, The Pragmatist, THE NATION (Dec. 29, 2008),
http://www.thenation.com/article/pragmatist; see also Alexandra Starr, Students Saw in Professor
Obama a Pragmatist, Not an Ideologue, N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
19,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/world/americas/I9ihtpragmatist. 1.1 6306854.html?pagewanted=all.
15.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 32-35 (Harvey C. Mansfield &

Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000) (1835 & 1840).
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ethic, individual character, etc. 16 This ethos was partly responsible for
America's burgeoning middle class. He also suggested that Americans
disliked pretense, intellectual or otherwise.17 De Tocqueville was describing the common-sense temperament of many Americans. This practical sensibility was actually fundamental to the colonist's decision to
revolt and is also central to present American attitudes. Moreover, this
sensibility has found its way into the Supreme Court's opinions.
1. Revolution
Thomas Paine's popular 1776 pamphlet "Common Sense" helped
light the revolutionary fuse.18 It argued for separation from Britain in a
persuasive, clever, and yet accessible manner that resonated with the
educated class. Paine said, "I offer nothing more than simple facts, plain
arguments, and common sense."l 9 Interestingly, Paine was a commoner.20
The pamphlet was pragmatic in other ways. It was propaganda designed to gain support from the French, as well as the American citizenry. 2 1 The pamphlet even specified how a new government should be organized.
This excerpt from the Introduction shows Paine's rhetorical skills:
The cause of America is, in a great measure, the cause of all mankind. Many circumstances have, and will arise, which are not local,
but universal, and through which the principles of all lovers of mankind are affected, and in the event of which, their affections are interested. The laying a country desolate with fire and sword, declaring
war against the natural rights of all mankind, and extirpating the defenders thereof from the face of the earth, is the concern of every
man as to whom nature hath given the power of feeling; of which
class, regardless of party censure, is THE AUTHOR. 22

16. De Tocqueville noted:
[I]n America the aristocratic element, always weak since birth, is, if not destroyed, at
least weakened, so that it is difficult to assign it any influence whatsoever in the course of
affairs. Time, events, and the laws have, on the contrary, rendered the democratic element
not only preponderant there, but so to speak unique. No influence of family or corporation is allowed to be perceived; often one cannot even discover any individual influence
however long lasting. America therefore presents the strangest phenomenon in its social
state. Men show themselves to more equal in their fortunes and in their intelligence or, in
other terms, more equally strong than they are in any country in the world and than they
have been in any century of which history keeps a memory.
Id. at 51-52.
17. Id. at 540-41.
18. See
THOMAS
PAINE,
COMMON
SENSE
(1776),
available
http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamericalmilestones/ commonsense/text.html.
19. Id.
20. HARVEY J. KAYE, THOMAS PAINE AND THE PROMISE OF AMERICA 18 (2005).
21.
See PAINE, supra note 18.
22. Id.

at
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The pamphlet criticized the British king's detachment:
There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the composition of
monarchy; it first excludes a man from the means of information, yet
empowers him to act in cases where the highest judgment is required.
The state of a king shuts him from the world, yet the business of a
king requires him to know it thoroughly, wherefore the different
parts, unnaturally opposing and destroying each other, prove the
whole character to be absurd and useless. 23
Moreover, he wrote, in a scientific vein:
. . . [T]here is something very absurd, in supposing a continent to be
perpetually governed by an island. In no instance hath nature made
the satellite larger than its primary planet, and as England and America, with respect to each Other, reverses the common order of nature,
it is evident they belong to different systems: England to EuropeAmerica to itself.24
He adds that "[c]ommon sense will tell us, that the power which hath
endeavored to subdue us, is of all others the most improper to defend
us." 25 Paine is saying the monarchy's injustice is obvious. The Declaration of Independence echoes this sentiment when it says, "We hold these
truths to be self-evident." 2 6
Paine invoked the Bible frequently. "That the Almighty hath ... entered his protest against monarchial government is true, or the scripture is
false."27 In the appendix, Paine wrote that "we have every opportunity
and every encouragement before us, to form the noblest, purest constitution on the face of the earth. We have it in our power to begin the world
again. A situation, similar to the present, hath not happened since the
days of Noah until now." 28 These Bible references would have resonated
with his audience.
He discussed constitutional principles as well:
I take the liberty of rementioning the subject, by observing, that a
charter is to be understood as a bond of solemn obligation, which the
whole enters into, to support the right of every separate part, whether
of religion, personal freedom, or property. A firm bargain and a right
reckoning make long friends. 29

23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.

26.
27.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)
PAINE, supranote 18.

28.
29.

Id.
Id.
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Robin West has written eloquently, however, that Paine was not endorsing constitutional judicial review here. 30 Harvey Kaye has said that
Paine was the revolution's only real voice of radical democracy.
As Sophia Rosenfeld has shown in her intellectual history of common sense, Paine drew heavily from the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers who subsequently influenced drafters of the U.S. Constitution like
Madison.3 2 Moreover, Philadelphia delegate James Wilson was Scottish.33 These philosophers were empirically minded and critical, yet humane, optimistic, and rights-oriented.
2. Cases
U.S. Supreme Court Justices have frequently relied on commonsense arguments. Justice Potter Stewart said of obscenity, "I know it
when I see it." 34 The Court later ruled that a jury must determine what is
obscene using the "community standard."3 5 Justice Scalia often criticizes
the views of the elites as against the wisdom of ordinary people. 6 More
recently, the Justices are relying on ordinary dictionaries in defining the
words of a statute, rather than trying to assess what the congressional
drafters intended or to use specialized legal references.3 7 Several critics
have argued this could lead to "dictionary shopping."3 8 And U.S. private
law consistently employs the "reasonable person" standard.
The U.S. Supreme Court in J.D.B. v. North Carolina39 recently issued a 5-4 decision in which the majority relied on common sense. The
Court ruled that the police had failed to provide the Miranda warning to
a thirteen-year-old who had been removed from his classroom and questioned in a conference room for thirty minutes. 4 0 He confessed to committing some thefts. 4 ' The government argued there was no "custody" so
30. See Robin West, Tom Paine's Constitution, 89 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2003) ("Pleasing
and even natural though such an interpretation may be, however, my first contention in this Article
will be simply that it is an untenable reading of Tom Paine's philosophy. Neither Paine nor his
famous utterance can be drafted fairly to the cause of judicial review or, more generally, to courtcentered constitutionalism.").
31.
KAYE, supra note 20; see also Joseph J. Ellis, 'Thomas Paine and the Promise ofAmerica': Founding Father of the American Left, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/books/review/3 I ELLISL.html?pagewanted=all.
32.

SOPHIA ROSENFELD, COMMON SENSE: A POLITICAL HISTORY 176 (2011).

33.
34.
35.

Id.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citing Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230

(1972)).
36.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When the Court takes
sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the villeins-and more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court's
Members are drawn.")
See Adam Liptak, Justices Turning More Frequently to Dictionary, and Not for Big
37.
Words, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2011, at All.
38. See, e.g., id.
131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
39.
40. Id. at 2399, 2403, 2418; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-70 (1966).
41.
J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399-400.
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Mirandizing was not needed.42 Justice Sotomayor said that the child's
age had to be taken into account in making the custody determination.43
She used the word "commonsense" five times to justify her ruling,
though she also relied on other legal arguments."
She began by writing:
This case presents the question whether the age of a child subjected
to police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda.
It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to
police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would
feel free to leave. Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to
blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child's
age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis. 45
The Sotomayor opinion, however, also relies on empirical studies,
the American legal tradition of treating youth differently, other cases,
46
and constitutional values. Justice Sotomayor nonetheless concludes:
In short, officers and judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge
of developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social and cultural anthropology to account for a child's age.
They simply need the commonsense to know that a 7-year-old is not
a 13-year-old and neither is an adult. 47
Justice Alito dissented. He explained that Miranda actually overturned the Court's previous fact-specific, case-by-case approach. Thus,
Sotomayor was reopening the slippery slope:
Under today's new "reality"-based approach to the doctrine, perhaps
these and other principles of our Mirandajurisprudence will, like the
custody standard, now be ripe for modification. Then, bit by bit, Miranda will lose the clarity and ease of application that has long been
viewed as one of its chief justifications.48
Alito is therefore using a different pragmatic objection to be discussed later in this paper-efficiency.

42. Id. at 2402-04
Id. at 2399.
43.
44. Id. at 2399, 2403.
45. Id. at 2398-99 (citation omitted). Interestingly, other Justices have used two words,
"common sense," CSX Transp. Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2641 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.), contrary to Justice Sotomayor who views this phrase as only one word. This shows the difficulty of reaching agreement on basic matters.
46. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2400-08.
47.
Id. at 2407.
Id. at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting). Interestingly, Andrew Coan has authored a commentary
48.
that is consistent with Justice Alito's characterization of Justice Sotomayor's approach. Andrew B.
Coan, Towards a Reality-Based Constitutional Theory, 88 WASH. U.L. REV. (forthcoming 201 1),
http://lawreview.wustl.edulcommentaries/toward-a-reality-based-constitutionalavailable at
theory/.
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For example, the ruling could mean that police officers and courts
will have to determine a suspect's intelligence and other personal qualities, in assessing the need for Mirandizing. Common sense will not help
because
the judge will be required to determine whether the differences between a typical 16 V2-year-old and a typical 18-year-old with respect
to susceptibility of the pressures of interrogation are sufficient to
change the outcome of the custody determination. Today's opinion
contains not a word of actual guidance as to how judges are supposed
to go about making that determination. 49
Justice Sotomayor, however, has the better argument. Judges and
police officers determine an individual's mental capacity in many circumstances. Moreover, police officers can ensure clarity by using the
Miranda warning when there is doubt.
Common sense can also support conservative results. In Gonzales v.
50 Justice Kennedy upheld a federal law banning
Carhart,
partial birth
abortions by stating:
While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their
choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe
depression and loss of esteem can follow.

...

It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice

to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more
profound when she learns, only after the event, what she did not
know; that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the
fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.51
For the four dissenters, Justice Ginsburg responds that "the Court
invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable evidence: Women who have abortions come to regret their choices,
and consequently suffer from 'severe depression and loss of selfesteem."' 52 This debate shows that one person's common sense can be
another person's gender stereotype.
As seen, common sense can be a powerful tool. Yet it can be subjective in a way that differs from scientific evidence. For example, while
progressives celebrate Thomas Paine's commitment to radical democracy, Glenn Beck claims Paine's legacy in a book called Glenn Beck's
49.
50.
51.
52.

J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2416 (Alito, J., dissenting).
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 183.
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Common Sense, 53 as does the Tea Party.54 Sophia Rosenfeld has said the
concept can be invoked to promote useful or dangerous forms of populism and anti-elitism."5 Nonetheless, the idea is seeing a resurgence.
B. TransitionalPragmatism
One aspect of many democratic constitutional revolutions is transitional pragmatism. The term refers to government or court actions that
approach rule of law boundaries, usually because of exigent circumstances or regime discontinuities. 5 7 The U.S. is a good example, but there
are foreign situations as well. Even a few U.S. Supreme Court decisions
have a transitional quality.58 An analogy can be drawn to the idea of transitional justice.
1. Revolution
Several major events in American constitutional history pushed the
legal envelope. These include approval of the Constitution, the Louisiana
Purchase, the Emancipation Proclamation, approval of the Civil War
Amendments, the New Deal, certain American military actions, and
more.
a. The Constitution
Some scholars have argued that the framers of the U.S. Constitution
exceeded their authority.5 9 They were supposed to solve the nation's
commerce problems, not create a new charter. Yet this was not their sole
excess. The U.S. Constitution only had to be ratified by nine states,
which contradicted the Articles of Confederation requirement that constiGLENN BECK & JOSEPH KERRY, GLENN BECK'S COMMON SENSE: THE CASE AGAINST AN
53.
OUT-OF-CONTROL GOVERNMENT, INSPIRED BY THOMAS PAINE 11 (2009).
2011,
PARTY
CAMPAIGN-TEA
SENSE
COMMON
e.g.,
54.
See,

http://www.commonsensecampaign.org/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) (demonstrating a Tea Party
group's use of common sense as a campaign theme).
ROSENFELD, supranote 32, at 228.
55.
56.

BARRY SCHWARTZ & KENNETH SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT WAY TO DO

THE RIGHT THING 114, 122 (2010) (discussing the necessity of wisdom in decision making as opposed to non-discretionary rule following); PHILLIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE:

How LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 22-31 (1994) (arguing that in search of certainty, law has
moved from common sense decision making to strict adherence to statute); Mark Modak-Truran, A
PragmaticJustification of the Judicial Hunch, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 55, 58-60 (2001) (arguing that
the "hunch theory" of judicial decision making presents a practical solution to the explosion of fact
and indeterminacy of the law). Truran and Howard are discussing different issues and probably have
distinct views on judicial discretion; however, both invoke common sense. But see DUNCAN J.
WATFS, EVERYTHING IS OBVIOUS: ONCE You KNow THE ANSWER 7-11 (2011) (arguing that com-

mon sense is not easy to decipher and recognize).
57.
Another possibility was to use the term illegality, rather than transitional, but that doesn't
seem to fit. These exigent circumstances mean the legal regime is either in flux or under such tremendous pressure that a clear notion of legality is infeasible.

58. See infra notes 83-88.
59. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 475, 476-486 (1995) (discussing the Federalists' role in creating a strong central government
at the expense of individual state sovereignty).
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tutional amendments be unanimous.o Moreover, the Articles required
61
that amendments be ratified by state legislatures, not state conventions.
Bruce Ackerman describes the framing as a constitutional moment because of the extraordinary transition that was occurring. 62
Many foreign constitutions have similar histories. Regarding eighteenth century France, Jon Elster explained:
... Constitution-makers do not always respect the instructions from
their upstream creators, including instructions about downstream ratification. And a constraint that can be ignored is no constraint. ... In
France, the constituent assembly decided to ignore the instructions of
their constituencies with regard to both the voting procedures and the
63
King's veto.
Moving to the twentieth century, Hungary drafted a new Constitution
that had to be approved by the former communist Parliament. As Istvan
Pogany said:
It remains a singular irony of this entire process of constitutional reform that the bulk of the law providing for the democratization of the
political process in Hungary, for the recognition of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, for the establishment of a Constitutional
Court ... should have been adopted by a legislature which in 1989
had not been democratically elected.6
Similarly, in South Africa, the transition to democracy began when
the apartheid government's racially divided, tri-cameral parliament approved an interim constitution that was drafted by unelected elites in
60. Id; 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 32-60 (1998). Akhil
Amar strongly disagrees. Akhil Amar, America's Constitutionand the Yale School of Constitutional
Interpretation,115 YALE L. J. 1997, 2012 (2006) ("In my view, the Articles of Confederation were a
mere treaty whose repeated violations by virtually all states legally justified exit from the Articles if
a supermajority of states so agreed, as provided by the Constitution's Article VI."). But see Michael
Green, Legal Revolutions: Six Mistakes About Discontinuity in the Legal Order, 83 N.C. L. REV.
331, 344-45 (2005) (critiquing Amar's view). Green also says of the founding that
there are three possible revolutions at issue here, each of which Amar denies occurred:
(1) a revolutionary creation of one American legal system out of the state legal systems at
the time of the Articles of Confederation; (2) a revolutionary recreation of the state legal
systems through the dissolution of the Articles; and (3) a revolutionary creation (or recreation) of the American legal system out of the state systems with the ratification of the
Constitution.
Id. at 348. Green therefore also is saying that Ackerman's view of one constitutional moment at the
founding is not complete. See id.
Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 59, at 478-79.
61.
62.

ACKERMAN, supra note 60, at 160.

63. Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution Making Process, 45 DUKE L. J.
364, 374-75 (1995).
64. VICKI JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 279 (2d ed.
2008). See also id. at 287 (quoting Arato regarding the "temporary lawlessness" that existed in
Eastern European transitions). Hungary is experiencing constitutional difficulties now as the government seeks to restrict rights and the power of judicial review. See, e.g., Judy Dempsey, Hungarian
Parliament Approves
New
Constitution, N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
18,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/world/europe/I 9iht-hungaryl9.html.
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collaboration with old regime representatives. 65 This interim charter
paved the way for an elected coalition executive, and a separate, elected
parliament. This new parliament was then charged with drafting the final
constitution. Yet the racist, illegitimate nature of the tri-cameral parliament cannot be doubted.66 Moreover, the final constitution had to meet
certain criteria created by apartheid officials and other group elites.67
b. Other events
In 1800, the U.S. made the Louisiana Purchase from France and
opened a huge Western frontier. Ironically, the strict constitutional constructionist, President Thomas Jefferson, signed the treaty despite writing
to John Breckenridge, "The constitution has made no provision for our
holding foreign territory, still less for incorporating foreign nations into
our Union. The Executive in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so
much advances the good of their country, have done an act beyond the
Constitution." 68 Moreover, the Constitution did not explicitly authorize
this kind of land acquisition by treaty. And the Constitution did not allow
69
the President to create new states.
In addition, the U.S. knew that Napoleon had already signed a treaty
with Spain agreeing not to cede the land to another nation. 70 But practical
interests won out. It's worth noting that there are powerful arguments in
favor of the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase, but Jefferson's
willingness to go forward was certainly not based on them.
During the Civil War, there were many questionable actions. Presi1
dent Lincoln suspended habeas corpus without congressional authority.7
Through the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln freed the slaves in the
rebellious states by executive order, yet the Constitution only seemed to
allow the states to do that.7 2 Of course, Lincoln invoked his Commander65.

MARK S. KENDE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN Two WORLDS: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE

UNITED STATES 28 (2009).
66.
See generally In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996
(4) SA 744 (CC) (S. Afr.) (regarding the South African transition). Strong legal positivists, however,
might disagree that there were legality gaps in any of these nations.
67.
KENDE, supra note 65, at 34.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson, President, United States of America, to John C. Brecken68.
ridge (Aug. 12, 1803), available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document1915.
69. See generally Robert Knowles, The Balance of Forces and the Empire of Liberty: States'
Rights and the Louisiana Purchase, 88 IOWA L. REV. 343 (2002) (asserting the illegality of the
Louisiana Purchase).
70. Id. at 380.
71.
Ex parte Merryman, 17. F. Cas. 144, 148-49 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (questioning
President Lincoln's suspension of the writ); see generally Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, The Constitution of Necessity, and the Necessity of Constitutions: A Reply to Professor Paulsen, 59 ME. L.
REV. 1 (2007) (describing how President Lincoln relied on the necessity doctrine to suspend habeas
corpus without congressional authority).
Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Was the Emancipation Proc72.
lamation Constitutional?Do We/Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1135,
1144 (2001).
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in-Chief authority since he had strategic motivations to acquire additional soldiers, and to create instability in the Southern states, etc. As U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson later said, the Constitution is not a
"suicide pact." But Lincoln came close to rewriting the Constitution.
Bruce Ackerman and others have concluded the Civil War Amendments were enacted improperly.7 3 The Military Reconstruction Act oppressed the South, though for understandable reasons. As Ackerman
shows, some Southern whites were disenfranchised, and the typical state
deliberative role in the amendment process was curtailed by presidential
pressure.74 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed ready to declare Reconstruction unconstitutional, but Congress removed the Court's jurisdic5
tion as described in Ex parte McCardle.7
Of course, supporters argued
that the Reconstruction Act and the Civil War Amendments fulfilled the
promise of the U.S. Revolution. Even Ackerman says they were a higher
form of lawmaking.76 But they were also designed strategically to denude
the South of certain powers.77
Ackerman has also argued that the "switch in time," where the Supreme Court suddenly started approving the constitutionality of FDR's
New Deal programs, was a constitutional moment.7 8 These rulings permitted transition to a new administrative state. Lastly, several American
military forays, that affected the international balance of power, were
executed without any congressional deilaration of war or the equivalent,
which was quite convenient for the President.79
2. Cases
Several Supreme Court decisions have transitional pragmatic elements, rather than following customary legal conventions.
The Court did not use accepted legal reasoning in Bush v. Gore8 o
because it announced the decision had no precedential value.8' That does
not fit with the rule of law, even given the exigent circumstances. More-

73. ACKERMAN, supra note 60, at 99-119; see also Douglas Bryant, Unorthodox and Paradox: Revisiting the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 555, 556 (2002)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was not constitutionally enacted and may not be a part of
the Constitution).
74. ACKERMAN, supra note 60, at I10, 164.
75.
74 U.S. 506, 512-14 (1869).
76. ACKERMAN, supra note 60, at 172.
77. See Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1747, 1764 (2005) (referencing the
pragmatic qualities of amendments to the Constitution).
ACKERMAN, supra note 60, at 314-15.
78.
79. See Bruce Ackerman, Obama's Unconstitutional War, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 24, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicycom/articles/2011/03/24/obama s unconstitutional war?page=0,0
(discussing instances where the President engaged in war-like activity without the consent of Congress).
80. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
81.
Id. at 109 ("Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes presents many complexities.").
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over, the case was a transitional moment in American presidential regimes, with some even calling it a coup d'dtat.82
One of the Supreme Court's most bizarrely reasoned cases was
Bolling v. Sharpe, which ignored the absence of an equality provision
in the Fifth Amendment, and adopted the confusing doctrine of reverse
incorporation.84 The Court, however, was being pragmatic, as it could
not allow the federal government to support racial segregation after deciding Brown. The decision was therefore part of a changing social dynamic. Of course, transitional pragmatism is not a recommended constitutional interpretive method. It's more like the last available alternative.
There are many critics of the Court who attack other decisions as
lawless. Thus, conservatives say Roe v. Wade85 has no legal basis. Moreover, Justice Scalia has frequently criticized his liberal colleagues as
acting out their personal preferences in cases involving gay rights.8 6 And
many liberals have decried Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission87 and ParentsInvolved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.88 Yet these cases do not involve transitional settings, and the
presence of detailed legal reasoning in the decisions means they do not
approach lawlessness. For all their imperfections, these cases are far
more persuasive than Bolling.
C. Compromise Pragmatism
Scholars have long debated whether controversial Supreme Court
decisions are really politics dressed up in legal terminology. Certainly
the framers were politicians of the first order. And the Court does follow
the election returns. 89 Moreover, according to Otto van Bismark, "politics is the art of the possible." 90 Thus, it's important to examine the role
of compromise pragmatism, and especially compromise, in our constitutional democracy.

82.
Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionalityof Bush v. Gore,
82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 634 (2002) ("One often hears the sardonic remark that George W. Bush 'won'
his election five to four. But even a unanimous court could not have conferred legitimacy on a judicial coup d'6tat, achieved by stopping and displacing an election.").
83.
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Id. at 498-99.
84.
85.
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to terminate a pregnancy is protected by a
privacy interest inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86.
87.
131 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (striking down campaign finance laws as restrictions against
speech).
88.
551 U.S. 701 (2007) (striking down voluntary school desegregation plans).
89. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1901) ("No matter whether the
country follows the flag or not, the Supreme Court follows the election returns.").
THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 86 (Fred R. Shaprio ed., 2006). By contrast, Groucho
90.
Marx said, "Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly,
Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE,
Groucho Marx
wrong
remedies."
applying
the
and
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/g/groucho-marx_3.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2012).
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1. Revolution
PepperdineLaw Review devoted a 2011 volume to compromise and
constitutionalism. Compromise is clearly crucial in constitutional design. 9' In Philadelphia, the larger states allowed the smaller states equal
representation in the U.S. Senate.92 Moreover, constitutional ratification
turned on drafting a Bill of Rights that Madison did not think was a good
idea or necessary. But he made the concession. 9 3 Similarly, in South Africa, the African National Congress revolutionaries did not want a Bill of
Rights for years, but they compromised in the end.94 Compromise also
has a downside as shown by the inclusion of slavery in the U.S. Constitution. Yet the democratic constitutional revolutions in the U.S. and South
Africa could not have taken place without such compromises.
Two more examples from South Africa show this. The first was the
inclusion of the controversial Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
the constitution. This conciliatory approach endorsed the communal
resolution of bitter disputes, not international criminal prosecutions and
revenge. 95 South Africa also left the old legal framework in place despite
the system's connection to oppression, and the presence of many Afrikaner office holders. The ANC, however, believed that the alternative
would be politically destabilizing and could undermine their reformist
and rebuilding goals.97
Similarly, on the reconciliation topic, many commentators on the
U.S. actions, after overthrowing Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime, argued
that the Coalition Provisional Authority should not have ousted all of
Hussein's Baathist party members from their positions, as technically
qualified replacements were lacking. 9 8 This political decision hindered
the transition to democracy and created lingering animosities.
2. Cases
Many U.S. Supreme Court decisions reveal politically pragmatic results, sometimes because of political pressures. The U.S. Supreme
Court's "switch in time" on FDR's New Deal legislation was perhaps the
91.
(2011).
92.

See Sandy Levinson, Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 821, 823
Id. at 828. This is often referred to as the "Great Compromise." See CAROL BERKIN, A

BRILLIANT SOLUTION: INVENTING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 114 (2002).

93.
94.

Levinson, supranote 91, at 823.
KENDE, supranote 65, at 29.

95.
See RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH
AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE 132-33 (2001).
See JENS MEIRERHENRICH, THE LEGACIES OF LAW: LONG RUN CONSEQUENCES OF
96.
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1652-2000, at 288-89 (2008).

97.
98.

See id at 276-77.
See, e.g., Arthur MacMillan, Legacy of US "Mistakes" in IraqPalpable, THE TELEGRAPH

(Feb. 1, 2010, 11:54 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/7127472/Legacy-of-USmistakes-in-Iraq-palpable.html. Admittedly, this was not a simple democratic revolution because the
U.S. invaded Iraq, but the lesson is the same.
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most famous example.99 In Marbury v. Madison,00 Chief Justice Marshall ruled for his political opponent, President Thomas Jefferson, who
refused to allow delivery of a signed and sealed judicial commission to
Mr. Marbury.'or However, the ruling established the power of constitutional review.102 Jefferson won the battle, but Marshall won the war. The
decision was also politically pragmatic in that Marshall faced impeach3
ment had he ruled against Jefferson.10
The Dred Scott v. Sanford'0 case appears to have been Justice
Taney's political attempt to resolve the nation's slavery dilemma by his
obiter dictum that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the federal territories, that slaves could not sue in federal courts, and that slave owners
had due process rights because slaves were chattel.'0 o This solution,
however, failed, landing Dred Scott in the pantheon of the U.S.constitutional-law anti-canon-like the Lochner decision.'o0
Chief Justice Warren obtained a unanimous vote in Brown by agreeing not to state that education was a fundamental constitutional right.107
Then, in Brown 11,108 the Court only required district courts to implement
the remedy "with all deliberate speed."' 0 9 This was an overly cautious
compromise based on fears of violent backlash and fears that the public
would reject the Court's authority. Brown I actually allowed Southern
states to remain more intransigent.
In Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke,"o Justice Powell walked a tightrope."' He wrote that affirmative action should get
strict scrutiny, but that a carefully crafted diversity based plan could be

99.
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 154 (1995). But see BARRY
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEw DEAL: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 4

(1998) (rejecting the politically motivated "switch in time" view of the Court's change in voting
patterns on FDR's social welfare legislation).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
100.
Id at 162.
101.
Id. at 177.
102.
See PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF
103.
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 207 (1997).

104.
105.

LAW:

MARBURY

V. MADISON

AND THE

60 U.S. 393 (1856).
Id. at 411, 427, 451-52.

106.
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES 85 (2005). But see DAVID BERNSTEIN,
REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM I

(2011) (drawing similarities between Dred Scott and Lochner).
107. See James Wilson, Why a FundamentalRight to a Quality Education Is Not Enough, 34
AKRON L. REV. 383, 387 (2000) (discussing the constitutional protections implicitly afforded to
education).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
108.
109. Id. at 301.
110. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
111.
Seeid.at291,316.
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This approach was later vindicated in Grutter v. Bol-

Interestingly, none of the three Justices who authored the plurality
in PlannedParenthood,Inc. v. Caseyll4 may have personally supported
the abortion right.' 15 Yet, they tried to craft a grand compromise that
vindicated the right, while granting the states more license to discourage
abortions. Casey also openly discussed the political danger to its institutional integrity of reversing Roe.11 6 Casey, though, has not dampened
emotions.
In Lawrence v. Texas,'"7 the Court affirmed the right of homosexuals to have sex in private." 8 Yet the Court never adopted a level of scrutiny. This omission was almost certainly needed to retain the required
votes. That compromise reflects what Cass Sunstein calls an incompletely theorized agreement."' 9 Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sibelius is another example as he said the tax argument supported the health mandate, but the
Commerce Clause did not.12 0 He also upheld the mandate but struck
down the Medicaid requirement.121
Another notion of compromise pragmatism has recently come to the
fore. Several constitutional scholars have argued the U.S. Supreme
Court's most revolutionary decisions actually followed public opinion.
Michael Klarman argued that public opinion had already turned in favor
of Brown by 1954.122 Barry Friedman has questioned the existence of any
countermajoritarian dilemma.123 Jeffrey Rosen has a similar thesis.124
112. Id.
113.
539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). The 5-4 decision in Grutterupheld the affirmative action plan.
However, Justice O'Connor, who authored the opinion, has since been replaced by Justice Alito.
Justice Alito, generally opposes affirmative action plans. Moreover, there is a case modeled on
Grutter that has reached the U.S. Supreme Court. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213
(5th Cir. 2011), cert granted, 132 S.Ct. 1536 (2012). This means the Supreme Court could overturn
Bakke and Grutter soon. Adam Liptak, College Diversity Nears Its Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2011, at SR4 (debating the constitutionality of the University of Texas School of Law's affirmative
action plan).
114.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
115.
See id. at 850 (1992) ("Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision."). There is language in the plurality
opinion that indicates ambivalence.
116. Id. at 845-46.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
117.
118. Id at 585.
119. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735-36
(1995).
120.
132 S.Ct. 2566, 2600-01 (2012).
121.
Id. at 2608.
122.
See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 344-46 (2004).
See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
123.
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 375 (2009).
124. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH, HOW THE COURTS SERVE
AMERICA 6 (2006).
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Some have explained this trend by indicating the Court seeks to avert
backlash. Orly Lobel has asserted that constitutional litigation itself is a
compromise since elites comply with the legal system's rules, with the
goal of minimizing grass roots activism. 12 5
Richard Pildes and Justin Driver have challenged this public opinion thesis, arguing that there is no adequate proof that the public supported Brown.' 2 6 Certainly extreme Southern and Northern (Boston) reactions showed opposition. Such decisions were therefore revolutionary
and acted as social movement catalysts, even if they still needed support
from the politicians and federal troops.
Political or compromise pragmatism seems troubling as a method of
constitutional interpretation in that we want the Court to decide cases
based on legal criteria. Yet there is nothing fundamentally inconsistent
between the rule of law and the idea that the Court must be sensitive to
real world implications. Moreover, such compromise is often essential
for democratic revolutions.
D. DemocraticPragmatism
Justice Breyer's judicial opinions promote participation in the political process. Appropriately, his first book as a Supreme Court Justice
was called Active Liberty. The book responded in part to Justice Scalia's
book on originalism.127 Breyer's method has roots in Benjamin Constant,
and in John Dewey's pragmatism.
1. Revolution
The American constitutional revolution was about popular sovereignty. But political and other considerations precluded implementation
of pure democracy. Thus, the framers adopted a Republican deliberative
form of government. The Federalist Papers, for example, contain lengthy
discussions on how pure democracy would risk the dangers of faction,
etc.12 8 Further, Benjamin Constant wrote that the framers sought liberty
beyond negative freedom from government interference.12 9 The framers
sought "an active and constant participation in collective power" or active liberty. 30
125.
Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and
Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 949-56 (2007).
126.
Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritarian" Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 103, 121-23 (2010); Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEX. L. REV. 755, 758
(2011).
127.

ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, at

vii (Amy Gutman ed., 1997).
128.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
129.
BENJAMIN CONSTANT, The Liberty ofthe Ancients Compared with That ofthe Moderns, in
POLITICAL WRITINGS 309, 327 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans.,1988).
130.
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 5 (2005). Several other scholars have promoted
political deliberation as important and as being justified by the republican roots of the U.S. Constitu-
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The pragmatist philosopher and educator, John Dewey, sought to
promote civic engagement:
The trouble ... is that we have taken democracy for granted; we have

thought and acted as if our forefathers had founded it once and for
all. We have forgotten that it has to be enacted anew in every generation, in every year, in every day, in the living relations of person to
person, in all social forms and institutions. Forgetting this ... we

have been negligent in creating a school that should be the constant
13
nurse of democracy. '
Dewey did not believe there was an absolute truth that answered
life's grandest questions. He had an optimistic vision, however, that contrasted with Holmes's pragmatism.1 3 2 Breyer's view that the Court can
work with Congress echoes some of Dewey's optimism.
2. Cases
In Breyer's second book since coming to the Court, Making Our
Democracy Work, he discusses several controversial Supreme Court cases where there were risks that the President or the public would resist
taking. 3 3 He suggests the Court needs to be restrained. He also advocates
proportionality analysis, or balancing, as how the Court should candidly
weigh state versus individual interests.' 34 He has used this method in two
recent dissents.' 35 The method derives from foreign constitutional
sources, though he doesn't mention that, perhaps for "political" reasons.136
In the famous Second Amendment case, District of Columbia v.
Heller,137 Breyer dissented when the Court ruled that there was an individual, not a collective, right to bear arms.' 38 The Court used heightened
scrutiny to strike down a D.C. law restricting firearm possession. 3 9
Breyer, however, said the state's interest outweighed the individual interest given the history of crime, violence, and accidents in D.C. 140

tion. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC

PHILOSOPHY 130-31 (1996).
131.
2 JOHN DEWEY, Education and Social Change, in THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, at 408,
416 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1987)
MENAND, supra note 1, at 4 (describing how Holmes' experiences in the civil war reduced
132.
his optimism about life).
133.

See BREYER,supra note 8, at 9-10.

134. Id. at 163-64.
135. See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 369 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 32-33 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Even Justice Scalia has acknowledged that his originalism must have room for stare
136.
decisis for "pragmatic" reasons. SCALIA, supra note 127, at 140.
137.
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Id. at 595, 681.
138.
Id. at 571.
139.
140.

See id. at 634.
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More recently, the Supreme Court struck down a California law
banning the sale of extremely violent video games to minors.141 Breyer's
dissent acknowledged that the law should receive strict scrutiny because
it was content discriminatory. But his strict scrutiny still involved balancing:
I would evaluate the degree to which the statute injures speechrelated interests, the nature of the potentially-justifying "compelling
interests," the degree to which the statute furthers that interest, the
nature and effectiveness of possible alternatives, and, in light of this
evaluation, whether, overall, "the statute works speech related harm
... out of proportion to the benefits that the statute seeks to provide."l 42
He found that adults could still purchase the games, and kids could
still play them. Moreover, the law facilitated the ability of parents to
raise their children in the manner they see fit. The law also reduced the
likelihood that children would see these horrific videos. Both cases show
Breyer upholding the democratic process and supporting active liberty.
The complication, however, is that Breyer's judgments are not always pro-democracy. For example, he voted to strike down a popular
Minnesota tuition voucher plan that sought to remedy inferior schools.143
Breyer also voted to strike down a law banning partial birth abortions,
despite overwhelming public support.'" A few years later, the Court
upheld a revised version of the ban.145 In addition, his balancing test allows judicial subjectivity to creep into the analysis. Nonetheless, he
would respond that certain laws must be struck down as violating the
Constitution.146
E. Economic Pragmatism
The U.S. constitutional revolution sought to remedy the economic
problems caused by the Articles of Confederation. Historian Charles
Beard even argued that the framers were motivated by financial interests.14 7 More recently, Judge Richard Posner has argued that the Supreme
Court should use economic based pragmatism in constitutional interpre-

Brown v. Entrn't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011).
141.
142. Id. at 2766 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 841 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002).
143.
Sternberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 945-46 (2000).
144.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
145.
For example, Breyer argued in Zelman that the law overwhelmingly benefitted sectarian
146.
religious schools and therefore violated the Establishment Clause. He found the majority's willingness to dismiss this concern as formalism. Thus, his opinion can certainly be viewed as having a
pragmatic, realistic quality consistent with his writings. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 727-28.
CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
147.
UNITED STATES 75-76 (1912).
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tation. 148 Economics may be the dismal science, but it also can be a revolutionary one. It should be made clear, however, that Beard and Posner
had very different views on normative economics. 149 Indeed, Posner's
ideas have evolved over time, as will be shown. 5 o Posner is certainly
aware, however, of their iconoclastic qualities.15 1
1. Revolution
Historian Charles Beard argued that the U.S. Constitution was not
about the high ideals of democracy or the rights of man:
The makers of the federal Constitution represented the solid, conservative, commercial and financial interests of the country-not the
interests which denounced and proscribed judges in Rhode Island,
New Jersey and North Carolina, and stoned their houses in New
York. The conservative interests, made desperate by the imbecilities
of the Confederation and harried by state legislatures, roused themselves from their lethargy, drew together in a mighty effort to establish a government that would be strong enough to pay the national
debt, regulate interstate and foreign commerce, provide for national
defense, prevent fluctuations in the currency created by paper emissions, and control the propensities of legislative majorities to attack
private rights.

... The radicals, however, like Patrick Henry, Jefferson, and Samuel Adams, were conspicuous by their absence from the convention.
... [The Convention was convened] to frame a government that
would meet the practicalissues that had arisen under the Articles of
Confederation. 152
Beard's view dominated American scholarship up to the 1950s.
Eventually, other historians argued that the relatively wealthy framers still had divided interests.' 53 More recently, American popular histo-

148. RICHARD POSNER, supra note 3, at 76-79. Another scholar calls Posner a democratic
pragmatist, not an economic pragmatist. See llya Somin, RichardPosner's Democratic Pragmatism,
8-9 (George Mason Law and Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 04-09, 2004), available at
www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/ papers/docs/04-09.pdf. Somin's description seems less appropriate given
Breyer's greater emphasis on democracy. Somin's differing label shows the slippery nature of Posner's pragmatism.
149.
For an interesting comparison of Beard with Posner, see Jonathan R. Macey, Competing
Economic Views ofthe Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 50, 72 (1987).
150.
See Justin Desautels-Stein, At War with the Eclectics: Mapping Pragmatism in Contemporary Legal Analysis, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 565, 595 (2007) (labeling Posner's pragmatism as
economic and as focusing on a kind of reasonableness assessment).
151.
See POSNER, supra note 3, at 47-49 (pragmatism rejects formalism and artifice, and
insists on candor and critique).
152.

CHARLES A. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 75-76, 88 (1999)

(emphasis added).
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rians have portrayed the framers as men of great wisdom, not as grand
property owners. But Beard's views of economically pragmatic framers
remain influential.
2. Cases
Judge Richard Posner is the most famous legal pragmatist. He argues that the traditional constitutional interpretive tools, such as framer's
intent, text, precedent, etc. rarely answer the toughest legal questions.
Moreover, these tools are subject to the personal vagaries of individual
judges, such as politics, ambitions, institutional concerns, and the like.
Posner therefore advocates economic pragmatism as a descriptively
accurate and normatively desirable approach. 15 4 He seeks to arrive at the
best possible consequences in a case, and economic analysis is a valuable
tool along the way. For example, he writes:
The significance of economics for the study of judicial behavior lies
mainly in the consilience of economics with pragmatism. The economist, like the pragmatist, is interested in ferreting out practical consequences rather than engaging in a logical or semantic analysis of
legal doctrines. 155
Posner also distinguishes sensible pragmatists from other kinds.L 6
Part of what Posner means by economic analysis is cost-benefit assessment. Here's an example of how he treats the Court's major 1973
abortion decision:
There may be no objective method of valuing the competing interests. But analysis can be made more manageable by pragmatically
153.
See FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 93 (1958). Professor Akhil Reed Amar is a more recent opponent of Beard. AICHIL
REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 472-73 (2005).
POSNER, supra note 3, at 78.
154.
POSNER, supra note 6, at 238 (footnote omitted). Interestingly, Justice Scalia dissented in
155.
the Supreme Court's recent California prison overcrowding structural injunction case, which affirmed an order releasing prisoners after many years. He suggests that the facts and empirical information provided by the plaintiffs was a mere cover for the judge's policy preferences. Brown v.
Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1954-55 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But the idea that the three District
Judges in this case relied solely on the credibility of the testifying expert witnesses is fanciful. Of
course they were relying largely on their own beliefs about penology and recidivism. And of course
different district judges, of different policy views, would have 'found' that rehabilitation would not
work and that releasing prisoners would increase the crime rate. I am not saying that the District
Judges rendered their factual findings in bad faith. I am saying that it is impossible for judges to
make 'factual findings' without inserting their own policy judgments, when the factual findings are
policy judgments. What occurred here is no more judicial factfinding in the ordinary sense than
would be the factual findings that deficit spending will not lower the unemployment rate, or that the
continued occupation of Iraq will decrease the risk of terrorism. Yet, because they have been branded "factual findings" entitled to deferential review, the policy preferences of three District Judges
now govern the operation of California's penal system.")
See POSNER, supra note 6, at 239. For another important book on the topic, see MICHAEL
156.
SULLIVAN, LEGAL PRAGMATISM: COMMUNITY, RIGHTS, AND DEMOCRACY (John J. Stuhr ed., 2007).

Sullivan's pragmatism is far different from that of Posner. Id. at 48-49.
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recasting the question as not which of the competing interests is more
valuable but what are the consequences for each interest of deciding
the case one way rather than the other. If one outcome involves a
much smaller sacrifice of one of the competing interests, then unless
the two are of very different value that outcome will probably have
the better overall consequences. That was the approach the Supreme
Court took in Roe v. Wade, in balancing the mother's interest against
the state's interest in fetal life, though the approach was executed ineptly. 157
He responds to moralist critics by arguing that alternatives do no
better, yet contain a false rhetoric of certitude."' Candor matters.
Judge Posner also argues that hard cases are fundamentally about
public policy. This is a revolutionary statement for a judge to make.15 9 It
resembles attitudinal theories about the Court held by many political
scientists. Yet Posner argues that difficult cases still "[p]erhaps can be
answered with a fair degree of objectivity by judges armed with basic
economic skills and insights." 60
Posner says there are constraints. Pragmatist judges should generally use narrow reasoning. 16 1 He also has "external" and "internal" limits.
For example, judges are part of a "labor market" where they must comply with internal rules, vocabulary, and reasoning like everyone else.
They cannot toss a coin to make decisions. Legalism is part of pragmatism.
Posner says his pragmatism would have helped resolve Clinton v.
Jones.162 The Court refused to grant President Clinton immunity, or a
stay, regarding the Paula Jones sexual harassment lawsuit.163 The Court
relied on the principle that no one is above the law in a democracy.'
But the Court's view that such a lawsuit would not distract from the
President's ability to carry out his duties was nafve. Judge Posner writes
that "a Court consisting of politically savvy Justices would have decided
the case the other way-and that, I am content to argue, would not have
been "wrong" either." 65 The Clinton case ended up leading to the salacious Starr report, and a wasteful politically motivated impeachment
157. POSNER, supra note 6, at 242-43.
158. See id. at 252-55.
159. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review ofRichard A. Posner, How Judges Think, 108 MICH. L.
REv. 859, 860-65 (2008) (expressing concern over Posner's statements of how judges are really
another form of policy maker). But see David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791,
1794-95 (2009) (arguing that Posner says nothing radically new in the book about judging). Interestingly, both Sutton and Levi were federal judges at the time they authored their book reviews.
POSNER, supra note 6, at 77.
160.
161.
See id. at 246-47.
162. See id at 250.
163.
520 U.S. 681, 706-07 (1997).
164. See id. at 707.
165.
POSNER, supra note 6, at 250.
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proceeding. Posner, however, supported the Bush v. Gore ruling as preventing possible chaos.166
Interestingly, Judge Posner has critiqued two other pragmatic
books. He has argued that Breyer's Active Liberty relies on Athenian
process-based constitutionalism. Yet Posner rejects the idealization of
process and says our institutions are rooted in the British common law
tradition as modified by republicanism. 167 Posner also critiques Breyer's
balancing "fuzziness."'l 68
Moreover, he critiques David Beatty's book, The Ultimate Rule of
Law, despite Beatty saying proportionality "makes pragmatism the best it
can possibly be." 6 9 Posner says that Beatty only focuses on the consequences for the people involved, not the institutions.170 Posner concludes
that his own legal pragmatism is disciplined by "a structure of norms and
doctrines, commonly expressed in standards such as negligence, good
faith, and freedom of speech that tells judges what consequences they
can consider and how," unlike that of Beatty."'
Judge Posner's admission that judges make law is useful. Unfortunately, his exalting of economics over other methodologies reveals his
own biases. Some of the flaws in his earlier economic views are revealed
in one of his recent books.17 2 Moreover, recent research casts doubt on
the rational individualistic homo economicus.17 3 In the end, Posner selects the best consequences as key, but judges' values often influence the
assessment.
F. EmpiricalPragmatism
Empirical pragmatism involves the use of data or measurement to
resolve constitutional issues. This section could have encompassed Posner's economic pragmatism, but the empirical focus here is broader. This
section is timely given the trends towards empiricism in American legal

166.
See POSNER, supra note 3, at 356. Posner, in this book, uses some powerful language
defending pragmatism:
At least the pragmatic judge will not fool himself that he is the master of an esoteric art
that enables judges to reason their way to the resolution of even the most difficult legal
issues. He will recognize his ordinariness-will recognize that he has no pipeline to truth,
that he is not Apollo's oracle ....
Id. at 351.
167.
See POSNER, supra note 3, at 329.
168.
See id. at 340. Posner has also vigorously criticized the writings of the former Chief
Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court in support of proportionality. See id. at 362-68.
Id. at 355 (quoting DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAw 187 (2004)).
169.
Id. at 361-62.
170.
171.
Id. at 362. David Luban criticizes Posner as vigorously as Posner questions Beatty. DAVID
LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 127, 171-73 (1994).
,RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT
172.
INTO DEPRESSION 1-3 (2009).
173.
See DAVID BROOKS, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL: THE HIDDEN SOURCES OF LOVE, CHARACTER,
AND ACHIEVEMENT (2011).
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scholarship. The roots of empirical constitutionalism extend from John
Locke to the use of statistics in modem constitutional litigation.174
1. Revolution
The U.S. Revolution owes much to empiricism and other Enlightenment ideas, which prompted the colonists' skepticism about monarchy.175 In particular, John Locke, the British philosopher, physician, and
scientist, rejected the Cartesian ideal that people were born with innate
ideas. Locke saw people as born with a tabular rasa, in which the sensory
impressions of experience led to knowledge.176 Locke also advocated the
social contract theory, but not Hobbes's absolutism. 177 Most importantly,
Locke said that revolution could be justified in certain cases.178
The Declaration of Independence borrows from Locke's Second
Treatise on Human Understandingin referencing "the long train of abuses.
In addition, the Declaration's reference to "life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness" echoes Locke's statement that everyone has the
right to defend their "Life, health, Liberty or Possessions." 8 0
Locke's social contract views influenced Hamilton, Jefferson, and
Madison, perhaps the Constitution's primary author. Locke's arguments
in favor of separation of powers, separation of church and state, and the
right to property all found their way into the nation's charter.
2. Cases
The Court has treated empirical evidence inconsistently. The famous advocate, and later Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis authored the "Brandeis brief," which contained almost no case citations.
Instead the brief referenced statistics showing, for example, how much
174. Several articles address similar themes. See e.g., Coan, supra note 48; Timothy Zick,
ConstitutionalEmpiricism: Quasi NeutralPrinciples and ConstitutionalTruths, 82 N.C. L. REV. 115
(2003).
175.
176.

See MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 11-15 (1978).
William Uzgalis, John Locke, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 2 (May

5, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/locke/. Modem science, however, has suggested things are
not so simple.
177.
See id.at § 3.
178.
See id.at § 5.
179.

See

ALLEN

JAYNE,

JEFFERSON'S

DECLARATION

OF

INDEPENDENCE:

ORIGINS,

PHILOSOPHY, AND THEOLOGY 46-47 (1998) (observing not only the similarity of "train of abuses"
language, but the similarity of "the thrust of his argument"); see also PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN
SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 135-137 (1997) (contemplating that the

"long train of abuses" language echoed Locke as well as other thinkers at the time).
180.
See, CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF
POLITICAL IDEAS 27 (1945) (Jefferson had read Locke several times); see also GARRY WILLS,
INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 229-230 (1978) (comparing

Jefferson language with the "Lockean tread"). Wills argued, however, that the Declaration was
rooted strongly in the Scottish Enlightenment, not just in Locke's views. Wills's position, however,
has been vigorously contested. See e.g., Ronald Hamowy, Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment:
A Critiqueof Garry Will's Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, 36 WM. &
MARY Q. 503 (1979).
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women suffered in the early twentieth century workplace.'' One of these
briefs was filed in the 1908 case of Mueller v. Oregon,182 where the
Court upheld the protective legislation for women.183
By contrast, the Court rejected statistical information around the
same time in Lochner v. New York.184 There, it examined a law that limited baker work hours based on data that showed negative health effects.' 85 The majority found this evidence insufficient to prove that being
a baker was inherently dangerous, like being a coal-miner.' 86 The Court
also did not want to open other industries to regulation.' 8 7 Holmes, however, dissented and said that the Court was improperly constitutionalizing
the free market.' 88 The irony was that Holmes was a free marketer. Also
in dissent, Justice Harlan said the data adequately supported the law.' 89
In Brown v. Board of Education,190 the Court relied on social science to strike down racial segregation. Psychologist Kenneth Clark
showed white-colored dolls and black-colored dolls to black and white
elementary children who attended segregated schools.' 9 ' The white children preferred the white dolls.192 Surprisingly, the black children said the
same thing.19' Clark concluded this proved that segregation made black
children feel inferior.194 Separate but equal was not equal.
Unlike the Lochner Court, the Brown Court relied on the scientific
or statistical data presented. The evidence also made the Court's conclusions seem objective. The problem, though, is that social science today
views Kenneth Clark 1950s tests as methodologically inadequate.' 95
Roe v. Wade had empirical elements.' 9 6 Justice Blackmun reasoned
that women had a right to abortion before viability because the medical
community used viability as the point when life began.'9 7 He conducted
his research at the Mayo Clinic library and was a former Mayo General

181.
Orin Kerr, The Original "BrandeisBrief" THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 4, 2011, 1:38
PM), http://volokh. com/2011/05/04/the-original-brandeis-brief/.
182.
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
183. See id. at 423.
184.
198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
185. Id at 59.
186. Id.at55.
187. Id at 59-60.
188. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 65-74 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
190. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See id. at 484-85.
191.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 495.
195.
Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social
Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 61 (1978).
196. 410 U.S. 113, 134-35 (1973).
197. Id. at 162-64.
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Counsel.' 9 8 Scholars have questioned this "scientific" view because they
thought the viability line would shift over time, as doctors got better at
keeping premature babies alive.199 Interestingly, this line has not shifted
much. Pro-life groups, however, are relying on empirical evidence to
purportedly show that a fetus feels pain beyond twenty weeks old.200
While Brown and Roe were liberal majority opinions relying on
empirical data, Craig v. Boren20 1 reached a liberal result but showed
Lochner's data skepticism. The Court struck down a law that allowed
women, but not men, between ages eighteen and twenty-one to drink a
low alcohol beer. The statistics showed that eighteen- to twenty-oneyear-old males were ten times more likely to be arrested for drinking and
driving than their female counterparts. Justice Brennan, however, responded:
It is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state officials to be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical
technique. But this merely illustrates that proving broad sociological
propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the
202
Equal Protection Clause.
In McCleskey v. Kemp,20 3 the Court upheld the Georgia death penalty despite a multi-variate regression analysis showing systemic racial
bias. 204 The Court said the study did not prove discriminatory intent affected Warren McCleskey's particular sentence.205 Moreover, our legal
system accepts that each jury is different.206 Ironically, the Court later
credited simplistic data, when it declared the death penalty constituted
cruel and unusual punishment as applied to minors207 or the mentally
retarded.20 8 The data involved counting how many states had such laws
in the books.
As previously mentioned, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a
California law that banned violent video games from children. 20 9 Justice
Scalia rejected the adequacy of psychological studies introduced by the
state because they showed no causation between utilizing these video
LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S SUPREME
198.
COURT JOURNEY 27, 90 (2005).
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUnONAL LAW 855 (6th ed. 2009).
199.

200. Steven Ertelt, Pro-Lifers Welcome First Fetal Pain Abortion Ban Lawsuit,
LIFENEWS.COM (Sept. 1, 2011, 10:23 AM), http://www.Iifenews.com/2011/09/01/pro-liferswelcome-first-fetal-pain-abortion-ban-lawsuit/.
201.
429 U.S. 190 (1976).
202. Id. at 204.
203. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
204. Id. at 286-87, 312-13.
205. Id. at 297.
206. Id. at 294.
207. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-70 (2005).
208. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002).
209. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741-42 (2011).
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games and violent behavior.2 10 At most, they showed some correlation.
He said such videos are no worse than the gruesome violence in children's fairy tales.212 Further, parents can limit child access by using the
video industry rating system.2 13
Justice Breyer responded that.the Court should defer to the legislature because
[t]here are many scientific studies that support California's views.
Social scientists, for example, have found causal evidence that playing these games results in harm. Longitudinal studies, which measure
change overtime, have found that increased exposure to violent video
games causes an increase in aggression over the same period.
Experimental studies in laboratories have found that subjects randomly assigned to play a violent video game subsequently displayed
more characteristics of aggression than those who played nonviolent
games.
Surveys of 8th and 9th grade students have found a correlation between playing violent video games and aggression.
Cutting edge neuroscience has shown that "virtual violence in video game playing results in those neural patterns that are considered
characteristic for aggressive cognition and behavior."
And "meta-analyses," i.e., studies of all the studies, have concluded that exposure to violent video games "was positively associated
with aggressive behavior, aggressive cognition, and aggressive affect" 214
Leading pediatric organizations, including the AMA, endorsed a
joint statement on the dangers of these games. 2 15 Breyer said these studies explain "in a commonsense way" that video games are more harmful
than films or television because the games involve "acting out" the violence. 2 16 To summarize, the Court has been inconsistent in its treatment
of empirical data. Yet such data has mattered in some revolutionary cases
like Brown and Roe.

210. Id. at 2739.
211.
Id.
212. Id. at 2736.
213.
See id. at 2740-41.
214.
Id. at 2768 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
215. Id. at 2769-70. There is an interesting article discussing the difficulty of studying the
effects of porn or violent entertainment on children. Brian Palmer, Bush v. Gore: Is it Worse for a
Child to See Pornography or Graphic Violence?, SLATE (June 28, 2011, 5:02 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news andjpolitics/explainer/2011/06/bush v gore.html.
216. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (emphasis omitted). This commonsense reference resembles Justice Sotomayor's opinion previously discussed.
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G. Common-Law Pragmatism
Some argue that constitutional adjudication resembles the common
law. The judges examine cases one by one, look at precedent, and then
consider moving the law forward incrementally based on gradually
changing community values. The common law does not favor courts
announcing grand principles or using deductive reasoning. Recently,
David Strauss advocated common law constitutionalism in The Living
Constitution.217
1. Revolution
There are many views regarding the ideological origins of the
American Revolution. John Locke is at the center, but it's harder after
that. Bernard Bailyn's Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
offered five possibilities: classical antiquity, Enlightenment rationalism,
the British common law, New England puritanism, and republicanism
(sometimes called radical Whiggism). 2 18 Bailyn's inclusion of the common law is interesting because that was the underlying legal framework
in Britain, which the American Revolution revolted against. Garry Wills
would likely add the Scottish Enlightenment.219
James Stoner 2 20 and Michael McConnell 221 support a common law
view of the revolution.222 The colonists fought the revolution to redeem
their natural rights as British citizens.2 23 Stoner and McConnell rely for
historical support on writings by Coke and Blackstone.224
Supporters of this view assert that the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution drew on these traditions. They criticize Bailyn for
overemphasizing republicanism. Stoner also critiques the Locke emphasis:
The influence of Locke on the doctrine of natural rights and revolution is unimpeachable, and Locke's theory, however much it echoed
and then influenced English practice, begins as a theory of abstract
right. But at least as much as Locke ever intended, into that theory

217.
218.

See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 2-3 (2010).
See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 23-

35 (1967).
219. See WILLS, supranote 180, at xiii-xiv.
220. See JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, HOBBES, AND
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 8-9 (1992).

Michael W. McConnell, Traditionand ConstitutionalismBefore the Constitution, 1998 U.
221.
ILL. L. REV. 173, 175 (1998).
See generally Andrew C. Spiropoulos, JustNot Who We Are: A Critique of Common Law
222.
Constitutionalism,54 VILL. L. REV. 181, 184-91 (2009); Adrian Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits ofReason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482 (2007).
223. McConnell, supranote 221, at 196.
224. STONER, supra note 220, at 11-68, 162-75; McConnell, supra note 221, passim.
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were integrated doctrines and practices of English common lawyers
and their notion of an ancient constitution .... 225
Stoner likewise argues that Paine's Common Sense and Dickinson's
Letters to a Farmerhave common law roots. 22 6 Stoner's views, however,
are contested.227
2. Cases
David Strauss relies on some of Justice Holmes's reasoning about
the common law, 2 28 but Strauss has a more progressive bent. Strauss also
invokes Edmund Burke to argue that constitutional precedents are valuable intellectual capital. 22 9 He then says of the common law:
The.., attitude is an inclination to ask "what has worked in practice?" It is a distrust of abstractions when those abstractions call for
casting aside arrangements that have been satisfactory in practice,
even if the arrangements cannot be fully justified in abstract terms.
The world is a complicated place; no body of theory can fully account for it. If a practice or an institution has survived and seems to
work well, those are good reasons to preserve it; that practice probably embodies a kind of rough common sense, based in experience,
that cannot be captured in theoretical abstractions.230
Strauss shows how the U.S. Supreme Court's endorsement of certain types of affirmative action relied on support from moderately conservative businesses and the military, both of which found such policies
useful in a globally competitive environment. 231
Strauss then discusses the California Supreme Court decisions nullifying the privity in contract requirement. 23 2 There was a complex interaction between a changing society, popular sentiments, expectations about
the roles of corporations, etc. Similarly, in the constitutional arena, the
Court's views about free speech, and racial segregation, evolved over
time. Strauss says Brown was a kind of "common law overruling" of

STONER, supranote 220, at 189.
225.
See id. at 190.
226.
See, e.g., Barry Alan Shain, An Unconvincing Defense, FIRST PRINCIPLES (June 2, 2008),
227.
http:/www. firstprinciplesjournal.com/articles.aspx?article=79 (critiquing Stoner's overreliance on
common law). But see 2 EDMUND BURKE, Speech on Moving His Resolutionsfor Conciliation with
the Colonies (March 22, 1775), in THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 100-

03 (John C. Nimmo ed., 1887) (supporting the common-law view).
228.

See generally OLVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE PATH OF THE LAW AND THE COMMON

LAW (Kaplan Publ'g 2009)
(1897) (laying out Justice Holmes's views on the common law).
229. See STRAUSS, supra note 217, at 41.
230.
Id.
See id. at 42, 44. The Court's reliance on stare decisis in the abortion decision, Casey, has
231.
a common-law quality.
232. Id. at 81-82.
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Plessy v. Ferguson2 33 based on the NAACP's lengthy litigation cam234
paign.
Several critiques are possible. Strauss's evolutionary theory doesn't
describe the Supreme Court's sudden reversals of a nineteenth century
legal tender ruling or the Court's 1937 switch in time on the New Deal.
Also, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court outlawed restrictions on gay sex
that had been allowed less than twenty years earlier.235 Even Strauss concedes these cases are like de facto constitutional amendments.2 36 Moreover, there is something troubling about using private law norms, which
facilitate profit making, to govern public law principles.
H. Flexible Pragmatism
The Supreme Court is frequently deferential in assessing the constitutionality of actions taken by the other government branches, especially
given changing social circumstances. In McCulloch v. Maryland,23 7 the
Court gave a broad definition of the Necessary and Proper Clause 238 that
allowed for a Bank of the United States to serve a new nation.239 Chief
Justice Marshall said this was a constitution being expounded, not a
code. The Court's previously discussed "switch in time" cases allowed
FDR's administrative state to be created. The Court's liberal approach to
delegation doctrine is a further example. Another well-known, flexible
separation-of-powers case was Morrison v. Olson,240 which upheld the
constitutionality of the independent counsel statute, even though the law
created a powerful and unorthodox Executive Branch position.24'
By contrast, the Court was strict in INS v. Chadha24 2 and in Clinton
v. City of New York, 243 which involved the legislative veto and line-item
vetoes, respectively. The Court upheld rigid interpretations of bicameralism and presentment in those cases. 244 During the Korean War,
Justice Jackson authored a very pragmatic opinion in Youngstown Steel
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer,2 45 which took account of three possible types of
wartime situations.246 Yet he ultimately reasoned that President Truman
lacked the authority to seize domestic steel mills.
233.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
234. See STRAUSS, supra note 217, at 85.
235. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,578 (2003).
236. See STRAUSS, supranote 217, at 116.
237.
17 U.S. 316 (1819).
238.
U.S. CONST. art 1,§ 8, cl. 18.
239.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 324-46.
240. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
241.
See id. at 659-62.
242. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
243. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
244. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 421; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
245. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
246.
See id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). It is possible that rigorous formalism may also
be the most pragmatic approach in some cases.
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Subsequent developments, however, have vindicated the dissents in
some of the above cases. Many scholars now think that Justice Scalia's
formalistic dissent was right in Morrison because of the massive amount
of power and money that independent counsel Ken Starr later wielded
while investigating sexual shenanigans and perjury by President Clinton.247 Moreover, despite Chadha, an informal system of legislative vetoes remains because it is so useful.248
Overall, this kind of pragmatism is consistent with a revolutionary
impulse because it allows for institutional change to be accepted in certain cases.
I. CriticalPragmatism
Feminists, 249 Africanists,250 and some other legal scholarS251 have
supported critical pragmatism. It has been contrasted with complacent
pragmatism. 252 The American Revolution certainly required a critical
capability, though not in a post-modem sense.
1. Revolution
In 1987, during bi-centennial celebrations of the U.S. Constitution,253 Justice Thurgood Marshall gave a famous speech criticizing the
document and the framers.254 He argued that the Constitution (and revolution) was forever tainted by treating slaves as three-fifths of a person
and therefore as sub-human. 255 He said this showed why the Constitution
had to be seen as a living and evolving document.256 His speech was the
kind of critique that fits with this strand of pragmatism.

247.

See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in

Separationof Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 24-27 (1998).
248.
See Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

121-22 (1992).
249.
See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699,
1699 (1990).
250.
See Celestine 1.Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381, 409-10
(2000) (discussing how critical pragmatism can be used to attack gender hierarchies).
251.
See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Pragmatism, Pluralism and Legal Interpretation: Posner's
and Rorty s Justice Without Metaphysics Meets Hate Speech, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 97, 147-48
(1996) (detailed discussion of critical pragmatism, as opposed to constructive pragmatism).
252.
Irma J. Kroeze, Doing Things with Values II: The Case of Ubuntu, 13 STELLENBOSCH L.
REv. 252, 262-63 (2002).
253.
The U.S. Constitution is frequently treated as sacred as are its drafters. See, e.g., Ozan
Varol, The Originsand Limits of Originalism:A Comparative Study, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id-1912202 (explaining that there is a cult of personality in the United States built around the framers and the Constitution, and that Turkey, among other nations, has a similar situation).
254.
Thurgood Marshall, Remarks at The Annual Seminar of the San Francisco Patent and
Trademark
Ass'n,
(May
6,
1987),
available
at
http://www.thurgoodmarshall.com/speeches/constitutional speech.htm.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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2. Cases
The basic premise of critical pragmatism is that constitutional law
appears to use objective legal criteria, such as precedents, but that the
courts are actually protecting powerful groups. Critical pragmatists want
the Court to shed this pretense and use the law to achieve justice, especially for the subjugated and vulnerable groups that need protection.
These scholars reject legal formalism and do not see law as easily separable from politics. They also focus on the factual context of cases and
seek to undermine hierarchical paradigms. The Supreme Court has only
used an approach like this a few times.
25 7
For example, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
the Court up25 8
held a minimum wage law for women.
This overturned Lochner by
rejecting freedom of contract. The Court instead recognized there was a
huge imbalance of power between employee and employer, especially
259
given the Great Depression.
Moreover, the law assured that women
received a living wage, rather than the community having to subsidize
unconscionable employers by providing welfare later.

The 1950s and 1960s Warren Court issued numerous decisions that
favored the vulnerable. The most famous was Brown. When Chief Justice Burger took over, this trend continued, to some extent, as the Court
issued Goldberg v. Kelly.2 60 Goldberg repudiated older notions of property and ruled that welfare benefits were a constitutional entitlement in the
right circumstances.2 6 1 And in Romer v. Evans,262 the Court said laws
against discrimination should be presumed part of the status quo, in a
case that involved gay people.263
The Constitutional Court of South Africa has been far more transformative. This makes sense as its constitution was designed to reverse
the legacy of apartheid.2 64 Thus, that Court has outlawed the death penalty, vindicated socio-economic rights, authorized gay marriage, and took
many other measures to bring about substantive equality.26 5 Certainly,
critical pragmatism is consistent with the goal of bringing about a democratic revolution. Moreover, it shows that constitutional pragmatism is
connected to moral principles.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Id. at 398-400.
Id. at 400 ("The bare cost of living must be met.").
397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970).
Id. at 270.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Id. at 623.
S. AFR. CONST., Preamble 1996.
See generally KENDE, supra note 65.
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J. ComprehensivePragmatism
Dan Farber's notion of constitutional pragmatism "essentially
means solving legal problems using every tool that comes to hand, in6
cluding precedent, tradition, legal text, and social policy." 6 Farber is
holistic:
Pragmatism provides no reason to exclude consideration of original
intent, precedent, philosophy, social science, or anything else that
might be appropriate and helpful in resolving a hard case. Ideally, all
of these factors point to the same outcome. When they conflict, the
only recourse is to make the best decision possible under the circumstances. Although this methodology, if it can even be called one, may
seem quite open-ended, pragmatists argue that in concrete cases it is
often possible to identify the most reasonable resolution to such conflicts. Decisions are channeled by the professional training and experienced judgment of the judge, which do not provide unlimited leeway and may in fact be felt as coercing a single "right answer."267
Moreover, Farber argues that any foundational method has significant gaps.268
Farber's arguments, however, still raise the question of what guides
a judge in utilizing these different tools other than personal preferences? 269 Farber says that judges should "decide cases, try to construct
theories, and determine what level of generality works best. The pragma266. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatismand the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1332
(1988) [hereinafter Farber, Legal Pragmatism]. Farber coauthored a book that critiqued the most
prevalent foundational constitutional theories and seemingly endorsed pragmatism, subject to further
development. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, at x (2002). Their sequel, however, did not
develop a robust pragmatic approach, but instead relied more on the constraints that exist by virtue

of legal convention, as well as the importance of judicial character. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-7 (2009). Ste-

phen Griffin is not a pragmatist but shares the pluralistic impulse behind Farber's approach. Stephen
Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation,72 TEX. L. REv. 1753, 1758-62 (1994); see also,
Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A PragmaticDefinition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PITT.
L. REV. 673 (1985).
267. Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatismfor the Twenty-First Century
1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 169 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
268. Id.
Richard Fallon has published one of the most famous articles discussing how the Supreme
269.
Court should choose between differing interpretive modalities in particular cases. He says there is no
algorithm, but he does develop an order of priority starting with the text as the most important. See
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1243-46 (1987). Fallon rejects pragmatism, and is no living constitutionalist a
la Thurgood Marshall or Ronald Dworkin. He has another fascinating article on a similar theme.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a ConstitutionalTheory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535 (1999). Fallon
helped develop the distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction
or implementation. More recently, William Van Alstyne has criticized living constitutionalism by
highlighting its numerous variants. See William Van Alstyne, Clashing Visions of a "Living" Constitution: Of Opportunists and Obligationists, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 13, 18 (2011). But see,
Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 593, 595-96 (1999)
(disagreeing with Fallon's rejection of pragmatism and endorsing a contextual pragmatism for constitutional interpretation).
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tist would like as much system as possible but is agnostic about how
much this will really turn out to be." 2 70 The judge should focus on context and consequences. Pragmatism can also rely on moral principles in
the right cases. 2 7 1 He adds that it's easier to demonstrate pragmatism than
explain it.272
Interestingly, Farber's pragmatism is based on his view of tradition.
Thus, Roe v. Wade was correct because it reflected a social consensus
and tradition against the fetal interest trumping the woman's, especially
if the woman's life or health is at stake.273 He also says that pragmatism
would candidly wrestle with the key issue of the status of fetus, presumably unlike Justice Blackmun's opinion.2 74 He asserts that abortion restrictions are largely unenforceable in practice, except against the poor or
minorities who can't travel.275 And he expresses concern over the Court's
institutional legitimacy, if it were to reverse itself on abortion. What is
fascinating is how closely the Supreme Court's decision in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey followed Farber's logic, in discussing the absence
of changed circumstances and in showing concern over the Court's repuS276
tation.
Farber also discussed why Lochner was unworkable:
Given [the] background of pervasive and accepted governmental intervention, the idea of a natural right to be free from all governmental
interference is simply foreign to our culture. We can hardly imagine
what our lives-or property ownership, for that matter-would be
like without this pervasive aspect of our society. To say that we were
born with economic liberty but are now enslaved by government regulation seems as eccentric as saying that "fish were born to fly but
everywhere they swim."277
Farber's article is a bit dated. For example, it makes no mention of
the usefulness of foreign constitutional law, which Farber (and Breyer)
has discussed recently. But the article boldly challenges the Supreme
Court's formalism. In that way, it is revolutionary.
K. PrudentialPragmatism
Phil Bobbitt famously described six modalities of constitutional interpretation including prudentialism. 2 78 This paper will use the term to
focus on the Court's cautious tendencies. Edmund Burke could be con270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Farber, Legal Pragmatism,supranote 266, at 1349.
Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1377.
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1370-72.
Id. at 1375.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992).
Farber, Legal Pragmatism,supranote 266, at 1359.
Phillip Bobbitt, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7-8, 93 (1982).
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sidered the philosophical parent. The leading proponent of such an approach, former Yale Law School Dean Alexander Bickel, was a Burke
enthusiast and judicial conservative, though a political liberal.
Bickel argued that the courts were the "least dangerous branch" because of the "passive virtues." 27 9 These include the Court's use of the
political question doctrine and justiciability limitations such as standing,
mootness, and ripeness. The major criticism of these doctrines is that the
Court can easily manipulate them. Stare decisis is also cautious as it
means that courts should follow their earlier decisions. This supposedly
ensures stability. Yet in Casey, the Court upheld Roe v. Wade on staredecisis grounds, but then jettisoned Roe's trimester framework.2 80
From a comparative perspective, the Constitutional Court of South
Africa has developed a rights jurisprudence with both transformative and
cautious elements. For example, the Court has ruled that the South African Constitution's socio-economic rights provisions are judicially enforceable, but has often deferred to the legislature to develop remedies in
particular cases.2 81
Certain other approaches to constitutional interpretation are prudential. James Bradley Thayer argued that the Court could not strike down a
law unless it was clear beyond question that the law was unconstitutional.282 Adrian Vermeule has updated this analysis.283
Cass Sunstein argues that the Supreme Court should generally be
minimalist rather than announce broad principles. 284 This promotes democracy and institutional integrity. He also introduced the idea of "incompletely theorized agreements," namely that the nine members of the
Court will not frequently agree on broad principles.285 Yet, Sunstein has
been criticized as inconsistent since he supports some of the Court's
broad rights rulings. 286
Prudential pragmatism does not support revolution. Instead, it justifies the status quo. Some of President Obama's left-wing critics have
279. Alexander M. Bickel, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 197-98 (1962).
280. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-73.
KENDE, supra note 65, at 260-71 (2009); Gov't of the Republic of South Africa v.
281.
Grootboom, 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) at 106-08 (S. Afr.) (holding that the government violated
the constitutional right to access adequate housing, and that the legislature must therefore develop
programs to assist the homeless).
282. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129, 144 (1893).
283.
See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (2006).
CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT ATIME, at xi-xiv (1999).
284.
Sunstein, supra note 119, 1746-51 (1995).
285.
286.
See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). It must be acknowledged, however, that minimalism and incompletely theorized agreements can support a living constitution. They can be used to justify progressive results, but on narrow grounds. Some have argued
that this is Sunstein's real strategy. Thus, minimalism does not always have to support the status
quo.
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even blamed him for following Sunstein's views on constitutional issues
rather than those of more liberal scholars.2 87
L. Efficiency-OrientedPragmatism
The Supreme Court has also been pragmatic when it examines
whether a possible ruling will create inefficiencies. For example, the
Supreme Court frequently relies on the administrative convenience rationale to reject rights claims, as in cases like Korematsu v. United
States288 and Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York. 28 9 The Court's
concern with the slippery slope problem, in cases like Washington v.
Davis2 90 and DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,291 is similar. As Justice Brennan said, though, the slippery slope
,,192
concern is akin to saying that there can be "too much justice.
Thus, efficiency oriented pragmatism is another status quo oriented
doctrine with no revolutionary implications.
CONCLUSION

This paper has examined pragmatism through the lens of democratic
constitutional revolutions. It concludes that there are many types of
pragmatism. 293 Some are essential components of revolutions, while a
few are not. The paper also shows how these types of pragmatism are an
influential part of the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence. This
paper does not argue that the Court should reject the more traditional
modalities in constitutional interpretation, such as precedent and text. It
also does not exclude the relevance of moral considerations. Yet the paper is sympathetic to the claim that pragmatic considerations are and
should frequently be dispositive. This would indeed be revolutionary.

See, e.g., Justin Driver, Obama's Law, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 9, 2011, at 10.
287.
323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (holding that mass internment of the Japanese was justified by
288.
national security concerns).
336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (finding that a ban on vehicle advertising was justified by traffic
289.
concerns).
290. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (ruling that disparate impact suits under the Equal Protection
Clause would expose the government to numerous lawsuits).
489 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1989) (arguing that state liability, absent a duty to protect, would
291.
expose the government to numerous lawsuits).
292. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
293. Most of them share what Karl Llewellyn has called a "situation sensitive" contextual
focus. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 268-74 (1960);

see also, Patrick J. Rohan, The Common Law Tradition: Situation Sense, Subjectivism or "JustResult" Jurisprudence?,32 FORDHAM L. REv. 51 (1963) (summarizing the legal realist Llewellyn's
notion of situation sense). Interestingly, most of the pragmatisms discussed in this paper also share
an appreciation for the importance ofjudicial candor and for narrow decisions, where possible.

DEMOCRACY AND DISSENT: STRAUSS, ARENDT, AND
VOEGELIN IN AMERICA
STEPHEN

M. FELDMANt

During the 1930s, American democratic government underwent a
paradigmatic transformation.' From the framing through the 1920s, the
United States operated as a republican democracy. Citizens and elected
officials were supposed to be virtuous: in the political realm, they were
to pursue the common good or public welfare rather than their own "partial or private interests." 2 Intellectually, republican democracy had
premodern roots stretching back to antiquity. 3 As such, republican democratic theorists often conceptualized the common good in objectivist
terms, as if there existed a distinct good that could be clearly ascertained.4 Equally important, for at least a century, republican democracy
seemed to fit the agrarian, rural, and relatively homogenous American
society. Thomas Jefferson, for one, insisted that the agrarian economy
and widespread rural land ownership promoted a virtuous commitment to
the common good.5 And given that, in the nation's early decades, an
overwhelming number of Americans were Protestants who traced their
ancestry to Western or Northern Europe, the people seemed sufficiently
homogeneous to join together in the pursuit of the common good.6
Of course, some Americans did not fit the mold. Not all were white
Protestant Anglo-Saxons. Exclusion, however, preserved at least a surface homogeneity. According to republican democratic theory, nonvirtuous individuals (or non-virtuous societal groups) would not be willt Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of
Political Science, University of Wyoming.
1.
See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 291-382 (2008) (discussing extensively a transition from republican to pluralist democracy).
2.
See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 59
(1969); see also, e.g., VIRGINIA BILL OF RIGHTS (1776), reprinted in 2 BENJAMIN PERLEY POORE,
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1908 (1877) (emphasizing government for "the common benefit").
See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Carnes Lord trans., 1984).
3.
4.
See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTtNE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 21-22 (1975); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 250 (2d ed. 1942).

5.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), reprinted in 2 GREAT

ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE PRESENT DAY 112, 115 (Richard
Hofstadter ed., 1982); see also EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-89, at 7
(2d ed. 1977) (emphasizing importance of land ownership).
6.
See Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of
the First Amendment 219 (1986); STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON'T WISH ME A MERRY
CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 161-68 (1997), THE
FEDERALIST No. 2, at 38 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasizing the homogeneity of

the American people).
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ing to forgo the pursuit of their own private interests. Instead, they would
form factions bent on corrupting republican democratic government.
Thus, an alleged lack of civic virtue could justify the forced exclusion of
a group from the polity. On this pretext, African Americans, IrishCatholic immigrants, women, and other peripheral groups were precluded from participating in republican democracy for much of American
history.' Typically, then, particular conceptions of virtue and the common good mirrored mainstream white Protestant values and interests.
Over time, a variety of forces strained the republican democratic regime, especially in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.9
These forces, including industrialization, urbanization, and immigration,
redounded upon each other, their effects rippling through society. Yet,
republican democracy proved flexible and resilient. Through the nineteenth century and into the 1920s, virtue and the common good remained
the overarching principles of government, though their specific meanings
changed in response to the cultural, social, and economic pressures."o
Eventually, however, in the early 1930s, the republican democratic regime collapsed and a new one-pluralist democratic-supplanted it. By
this time, the reality was that the American population was more heterogeneous than ever before; the majority of Americans lived in cities, and
more Americans were working for wages in factories than working their
own farmland."
Unlike republican democracy, the intellectual furniture for pluralist
democracy was thoroughly modern. Theorists who conceptualized the
new democracy in the late 1930s and 1940s were committed to historicism, ethical relativism, and social science empiricism. From the historicist perspective, history demonstrated that social, cultural, and political
arrangements were contingent and changeable and that human inventiveness could produce endless (though not inevitable) progress.12 Empiricists believed that the path to knowledge lay in experience: the study of
7.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961).
8.
Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First-Amendment Protections: Why
Does the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
431, 434-35 (2006).
9. Feldman, supranote 1, at 166-97 (discussing in greater detail the development and effects
of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration).
For example, political parties were initially considered to be illegitimate factions, see
10.
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 596-617 (1993), but they became
an accepted republican democratic institution in the 1820s and 1830s. See EDWARD PESSEN,
JACKSONIAN AMERICA: SOCIETY, PERSONALITY, AND POLITICS 197-232 (rev. ed. 1985); HARRY L.
WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA 171-74 (1990).
I1. See THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE

PRESENT 409 (1965) (Table: Manufactures Summary: 1849 to 1954) (providing statistical measurements reflecting increasing industrialization); id. at 14 (Table: Population in Urban and Rural Territory) (providing statistics showing population from rural to urban areas).
12. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 19, 84-85 (2000) [hereinafter FELDMAN, VOYAGE];
G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in ConstitutionalScholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485, 506
(2002).
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external reality. Social science empiricism thus entailed the observation
of human behavior, generalizations describing such behavior, and predictions about future behavior. Moreover, among intellectuals, the commitment to empiricism engendered an ineluctable acceptance of ethical relativism; facts and values were distinct. If knowledge must be grounded on
experience, then ethical values seemingly could not be verified. Individuals could and did assert values, but scientists could not empirically test
the validity of those values."
These modem intellectual components-historicism, ethical relativism, and social science empiricism-were manifested in political realities. In his New Deal, Franklin Roosevelt pushed for progress (in accordance with historicism), for immediate action guided by empirical experts:
he relied on legal and social-science experts to shape and administer legislation that responded to the economic needs of a multitude of American
constituencies. The New Dealers passed fifteen legislative acts during the
first 100 days of Roosevelt's first term, and they continued enacting legislation in accordance with the needs and interests of the American people fighting a depression.14 Instead of dismissing the preferences and
values of immigrants, indigents, religious minorities, and other peripheral groups as being non-virtuous, instead of denigrating their desires and
goals as contravening the common good, FDR and his New Deal colleagues sought to incorporate these groups into the polity and to satisfy
their interests. As one of FDR's close advisers, Rex Tugwell, said,
"[T]he New Deal is attempting to do nothing to people, and does not
seek at all to alter their way of life, their wants and desires." 15 Consequently, FDR led the nation toward a more open and inclusive form of
democracy. Mainstream and old-stock Protestant values, long the foundation for the ideals of virtue and the common good, were now to be
balanced with the values of other Americans who constituted the demographically diverse population. No single set of cultural values was authoritative. Consistent with ethical relativism, Roosevelt and the New
Dealers considered all values and interests, or at least a plurality of such
values and interests.16
13.
See WALTER LIPPMANN, A PREFACE TO MORALS 3-4, 8 (1929) (arguing that individuals
admitted that their own moral codes lacked foundations).
14.
E.g., Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended as
42 U.S.C. ch. 7 (2006)); National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)).
15.
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 339 (1963)
(quoting REX TUGWELL, THE BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY 319 (1935)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
E.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Speech (Sept. 23, 1932), in 3 GREAT
16.
ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE PRESENT DAY, 1864-1981, at 335,

341-42 (Richard Hofstadter & Beatrice Hofstadter eds., rev. ed. 1982). Roosevelt was far more
solicitous of African American interests than any previous president, yet he often sacrificed black
interests and values so as to keep white Southerners aligned with the Democratic party. See Feldman, supra note 1, at 327-28. Also, Roosevelt eventually broke with and became antagonistic toward big business. Id. at 318-19, 324.
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Pluralist democracy thus revolved around the assertion of interests
and values by sundry individuals and groups. 17 The pursuit of selfinterest no longer amounted to corruption; rather, it defined the nature of
(pluralist) democracy. The crux of the new democracy was participation
in the political process: to express one's values and interests through the
appropriate channels; to have governmental officials listen to those expressions of values and interests; and to have the government, acting
through experts, fulfill one's desires in a reasonable number of instances.' 8 According to pluralist democratic theorists, the only way to determine public values and goals was through a process of "free competition
[among] interest groups."' 9 By "composing or compromising" their different values and interests, 20 the "competing groups [would] coordinate
their aims in programs they can all support." 21 Legislative decisions
therefore turned on negotiation, persuasion, and the exertion of pressure
through the normal procedures of democratic government.22 Process rather than substance (such as the substance of the common good) determined the legitimacy of governmental actions.23
Pluralist democracy achieved hegemony during the post-World War
II era as the correct theory and practice of government, but it did not go
unchallenged. European 6migrds such as Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt,
and Eric Voegelin, all of whom had escaped from Nazi Germany in the
1930s, raised the most persistent oppositional views.24 By the end of the
1940s, Strauss, Arendt, and Voegelin were established political philosophers within the American intellectual community. Thus, they experienced the rise and entrenchment of pluralist democracy from both an
insider perspective, living and working in the United States, and an outsider perspective, having matured intellectually in Europe. While they all
appreciated the American constitutional system-the United States, after
all, had provided them with refuge-they could not accept unbridled
celebrations of American democracy.25 While in Europe, they had not
17.
See LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO, 19191939, at 254-57, 362-66 (1990) (discussing the transformation of ethnic urbanites into active participants on the national political stage).
18.
John Dewey was an early pluralist democratic theorist. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM
AND CULTURE 176 (1939) (discussing the "methods" of democracy).
19.
WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. Moos, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS 9
(1949).
20.
Id.

21.
22.

Id. at8.
Id. at 10-11.

23.
Robert A. Dahl provided the most comprehensive description of the pluralist democratic
process. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 83, 106, 109-11 (1989); ROBERT A.
DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 67-71 (1956).
24.
See JOHN G. GUNNELL, THE DESCENT OF POLITICAL THEORY 194-98 (1993) (discussing

the arrival of the 6migrds).
25.
Strauss's writings include: LEO STRAUSS, LIBERALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN (1968)
[hereinafter STRAUSS, LIBERALISM]; LEO STRAUSS, THE CITY AND MAN (1964) [hereinafter
STRAUSS, CITY]; LEO STRAUSS, WHAT IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1959) [hereinafter STRAUSS,
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY]; LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953) [hereinafter
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only witnessed the collapse of the democratic Weimar Republic into Nazi totalitarianism, they had suffered personal hardships and dislocations
because of the Nazi perversions of the state. Strauss and Arendt fled
Germany because they were Jews, while Voegelin left because he had
published books contravening Nazi race ideology. From their vantage,
American democracy was too fragile to leave unexamined.26
Part I of this Article explores the views of Strauss, Arendt, and
Voegelin as they dissented from pluralist democracy. Part II discusses
their influences on politics, political theory, and law.28 One caveat might
clarify the goal of this Article. The transition from republican to pluralist
democracy was unquestionably momentous, but whether it should be
characterized as revolutionary is arguable, turning more on one's definition of revolution than the nature of the transition itself. If one maintains
that a revolution must be speedy or sudden, then this transition might not
qualify. It started with a buildup of economic, cultural, and social pressures in the late-nineteenth century and lasted at least through the decade
of the 1930s.29 One can reasonably argue that the Supreme Court did not
accept pluralist democracy until 1937.30 Numerous commentators,

STRAUSS, NATURAL]; LEO STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES (Elsa M. Sinclair
trans., 1952) [hereinafter STRAUSS, HOBBES]. Arendt's writings include: HANNAH ARENDT, ON
REVOLUTION (Penguin Books 1977) (1963) [hereinafter ARENDT, REVOLUTION]; HANNAH ARENDT,
THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958) [hereinafter ARENDT, HUMAN]; HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF
TOTALITARIANISM (1973 ed. 1951) [hereinafter ARENDT, ORIGINS]. Voegelin's writings include:
ERIC VOEGELIN, ORDER AND HISTORY: ISRAEL AND REVELATION (Maurice P. Hogan, ed., Univ. of
Mo. Press 2001) (1956). [hereinafter VOEGELIN, ORDER]; ERIC VOEGELIN, THE NEW SCIENCE OF
POLITICS (1952) [hereinafter VOEGELIN, NEW]. Books and essays discussing one or more of the
6migrds include: BARRY COOPER, ERIC VOEGELIN AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL
SCIENCE (1999); SHADIA B. DRURY, LEO STRAUSS AND THE AMERICAN RIGHT (1997); MICHAEL P.
FEDERICI, ERIC VOEGELIN (2002); GEORGE KATEB, HANNAH ARENDT (1983); TED V. MCALLISTER,
REVOLT AGAINST MODERNITY (1996); JOHN MCGOWAN, HANNAH ARENDT (1998); GEORGE H.
NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA: SINCE 1945 (2008 ed. 1976);
THOMAS L. PANGLE, LEO STRAUSS (2006); STEVEN B. SMITH, READING LEO STRAUSS (2006);
DANIEL TANGUAY, LEO STRAUSS (Christopher Nadon trans., 2007); DANA R. VILLA, POLITICS,
PHILOSOPHY, TERROR (1999) [hereinafter VILLA, POLITICS]; DANA R. VILLA, ARENDT AND
HEIDEGGER (1996) [hereinafter VILLA, ARENDT]; RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, Judging-the Actor and
the Spectator, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES 221 (1986) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN, Judging]; RICHARD

J. BERNSTEIN, Rethinking the Social and the Political, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES, supra, at 238
[hereinafter BERNSTEIN, Rethinking]; George Kateb, The Questionable influence of Arendt (and
Strauss), in HANNAH ARENDT AND LEO STRAUSS 29 (Peter Graf Kielmansegg et al. eds., 1997)
[hereinafter Kateb, Questionable]; Stephen A. McKnight, Voegelin's New Science of History, in
ERIC VOEGELIN'S SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE MODERN MIND 46 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991); Nathan

Tarcov & Thomas L. Pangle, Leo Strauss and the History of Political Philosophy, in HISTORY OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 907 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987).
26.
See Kateb, Questionable,supra note 25, at 29 (emphasizing that Strauss and Arendt were
skeptical of modem democracy).
27.
See infra text accompanying notes 32-106.
See infra text accompanying notes 107-240.
28.
Feldman, supra note 1, at 153-208, 291-348 (discussing pressures leading to breakdown
29.
of republican democracy).
See id. at 349-82 (discussing the Justices' acceptance of pluralist democracy).
30.
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though, have referred to the transition as revolutionary. 3 ' For purposes of
this Article, the designation of the transition from republican to pluralist
democracy is irrelevant. It is crucial, however, to comprehend the enormous transformation that American government underwent during this
time, shifting from one paradigm of democracy to another. This Article
is about those contemporaries who experienced and perceived the paradigm change but nonetheless opposed it. Given how Strauss, Arendt, and
Voegelin will influence subsequent political and theoretical developments-by the late-twentieth century, for instance, Strauss will be known
as the godfather of neoconservatism-their contemporaneous reactions
to the emergence of pluralist democracy provide an unparalleled and
invaluable glimpse inside a paradigm shift central to the American future.
I. THE EMIGRE DISSENTERS

A. Leo Strauss
Strauss launched a sustained critique of the interrelated intellectual
components of modernity that supported pluralist democracy. Historicism, Strauss explained, "seems to show that all human thought is dependent on unique historical contexts that are preceded by more or less
different contexts and that emerge out of their antecedents in a fundamentally unpredictable way." 32 Pit in different words, historicism stresses the (historical) context of all perceptions and experiences. With everything becoming contextual and therefore contingent, historicism allows
us to look constantly toward the future. Awareness of the past can liberate us from that past. If we know when and why an institution-let's
say a particular common law rule of property-first developed, then we
can more readily choose to modify or abandon that institution.3 4 To be
sure, we are not guaranteed to progress in the future, epoch by epoch, but
we can nonetheless aim "toward ever greater prosperity .

.

. enabl[ing]

everyone to share in all the advantages of society or life."
Yet, Strauss warned, historicism undermines the very possibility of
knowledge and understanding. For example, historicism leads us to conclude that we cannot specify the content of justice because it appears to
31.
See, e.g., MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, PEACEFUL REVOLUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND AMERICAN CULTURE FROM PROGRESSIVISM TO THE NEW DEAL 124-64 (2000) (referring to

New Deal as constitutional revolution).
32.

STRAUSS, NATURAL, supranote 25, at 19.

33. STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 59.
34. Id. at 67.
35.
STRAUSS, CITY, supranote 25, at 4. Strauss continued:
The progress toward ever greater prosperity would thus become, or render possible, the
progress toward ever greater freedom and justice. This progress would necessarily be the
progress toward a society embracing equally all human beings: a universal league of free
and equal nations, each nation consisting of free and equal men and women.
Id.
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vary from society to society, from context to context. Justice means one
thing in the United States, another thing in China, and another thing in
Egypt-or so the historicist claims.37 More broadly, "[a]ll understanding,
all knowledge... , presupposes a frame of reference . . . , a comprehensive view within which understanding and knowing take place." 3 8 Thomas Kuhn, the renowned historian and philosopher of science, would soon
refer to this overarching frame of reference as a paradigm. 39 The problem
with this outlook, Strauss argued, is that "[t]he comprehensive view of
the whole [or, in other words, a paradigm] cannot be validated by reasoning, since it is the basis of all reasoning." 40 We always must choose
among competing viewpoints, but we are left "without any rational guidance."41 Each viewpoint is "as legitimate as any other."4 2 But then,
Strauss asked, is not historicism "self-contradictory?" 43 How can historicism claim that it is a valid viewpoint itself?" And even more important,
when humanity is ostensibly freed of all "permanencies,"45 such as
knowing "the distinction between the noble and the base," 46 then we are
too apt to spiral into terror, as happened with Hitler and the Nazis. "It
was the contempt for these permanencies which permitted the most radical historicist in 1933 [to gain power] ."7
Strauss attacked the pretensions of modem social science with equal
vigor. Social scientists claim that facts and values must be separated: 48
"the Is and the Ought" cannot be joined.4 9 They posit that all knowledge
must be empirical, based on experience of facts, and that therefore social
science must be "value-free" and "ethically neutral.,,50 But to Strauss,
modem social science is wrong-headed on several counts. Most simply,
he argued that value-free social science is impossible. Values seep into
36. See STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 97 (explaining how the conventionalist position undermines claims ofjustice).
See STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 63 (arguing that historicism ties
37.
political philosophies to specific places and times).
38.
39.
40.

STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 26.
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 1-9 (2d ed. 1970).
STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 27.

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id
Id. at 25.
Id.

45.

STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 26.

46.
47.
48.
on Max

Id.
Id. at 27.
STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 39-40. Strauss focused his analysis, in particular,
Weber's explication of social science. Id. at 36-78; see also STRAUSS, POLITICAL

PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 23 (tracing the desire for value-free social science to Weber). For
Weber's views, see MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Edward A. Shils
& Henry A. Finch trans., 1949); MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (H. H.

Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., 1946); Stephen M. Feldman, An Interpretation of Max Weber 's
Theory of Law: Metaphysics, Economics, and the Iron Cage of Constitutional Law, 16 LAw & SOC.
INQUIRY 205 (1991).
STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 41.
49.
50.
STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 19; STRAUSS, NATURAL, supranote
25, at 16-17, 40-41.
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any social or political analysis in numerous ways, from the choice of
research questions to the definition of terms." At a deeper level, to insist
on value-free social science, including political science, would be to render it meaningless: "It is impossible to study social phenomena, i.e., all
important social phenomena, without making value judgments. . . . A
man who refuses to distinguish between great statesmen, mediocrities,
and insane impostors may be a good bibliographer; he cannot say anything relevant about politics and political history."52
Even if value-free social science were possible, the single-minded
focus on empirical research, on facts, would necessarily preclude any
knowledge of values and ends. From the modem standpoint, values,
which are the sources of our goals or ends, are not subject to scientific
(empirical) determination and therefore are not knowable. 53 Modem social science leads us, then, to ethical relativism.
[T]here cannot be any genuine knowledge of the Ought. [The modem
social scientist] denied to man any science, empirical or rational, any
knowledge, scientific or philosophic, of the true value system: the
true value system does not exist; there is a variety of values which
are of the same rank, whose demands conflict with one another, and
whose conflict cannot be solved by human reason. Social science or
social philosophy can do no more than clarify that conflict and all its
implications; the solution has to be left to the free, non-rational decision of each individual. 54
Modem social science, with its desire to be empirical and "neutral
in the conflict between good and evil," 5 relegates us to a radical and
irrational individualism-where each person acts on arbitrary preferences-and ultimately, to nihilism. 56 Not only must we "recognize all
preferences or all 'civilizations' as equally respectable," we must accept that "[ilf our principles have no other support than our blind preferences, everything a man is willing to dare will be permissible."58
Strauss, in sum, concluded that modernity is imploding: its own
premises inevitably cause the edifice of modernity to collapse upon itself. But as Strauss would insist, the rise of the Nazis and the ensuing
Holocaust were not wrong merely from a relative perspective. According
to Strauss, we must have more than irrational individual preferences and
culturally relative values if we are to avoid sliding toward nihilism and
STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 21-25.
52. Id. at 21.
53. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 40-41.
54. Id. at 41-42.
55. STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 18.
56. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 4-5; STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note
25, at 18-19.
51.

57.

STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 5.

58.

Id. at 4-5.
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accepting genocide. And as modernity goes, Strauss added, so goes pluralist democracy. Built on the modernist premises of historicism, empiricism, and relativism, not onily is pluralist democracy indefensible from a
Straussian standpoint, but it also perches us precariously on the edge of a
moral abyss.5 9 But then what should we do? Strauss did not want to repudiate democracy, though he found its current instantiation in the United States to be frail and dangerous. 60 To a degree, he sought to modify
and therefore save democracy. Strauss, it seems, wanted answers. After
all, Strauss criticized modernity for leaving us with only contingencies,
for undermining the certainty of ostensible answers. But what solutions
did Strauss propose in response to the problem of democracy and the
crisis of modernity?
Unfortunately, at this very point, Strauss's writings became far
murkier. He turned to philosophy-specifically classical political philosophy-because, he argued, it could lead us from opinion to truth.6 1
Strauss feared that the methods of modern social science structure our
understandings of politics and government by injecting the fact-value
dichotomy. 62 To avoid being led astray in this manner, we must return to
a "pre-scientific understanding" of politics6 3-"a coherent and comprehensive understanding of what is frequently called the common sense
view of political things." 64 And ancient or classical philosophy can provide us with that pre-scientific or "original form of political science."6 5
Yet, Strauss acknowledged that classical political philosophy cannot
provide us with clear and direct access to solutions for our current difficulties.66 We cannot solve our problems by pretending to live in a Greek
polis; a global economy, nuclear weapons, and the proliferation of nation-states present us with unique political dilemmas. Even so, we must
quest after "universal knowledge" of the truth, quest for answers to our
dilemmas, and ancient philosophy might guide us on our journey. But

59.

E.g., STRAUSS,

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 37-38; see STRAUSS,

LIBERALISM, supranote 25, at 3-25 (discussing liberal education); PANGLE, supra note 25, at 77-78
(discussing Strauss's emphasis on the degeneration of democracy); TARCOV & PANGLE, supra note
25, at 927-30 (discussing Strauss's criticisms of liberal democracy).
"We are not permitted to be flatterers of democracy precisely because we are friends and
60.
allies of liberal democracy." STRAUSS, LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 24; see SMITH, supra note 25,
at ix (describing Strauss as friend to democracy); TARCOV & PANGLE, supra note 25, at 909 (noting
that Strauss viewed himself to be a friend to liberal democracy). But see DRURY, supra note 25, at
133-35 (arguing that Strauss was hostile to democracy).
STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at I1-12, 66.
61.
62.
STRAUSS, CITY, supra note 25, at 11-12.
Id. at 11.
63.
64.
Id.
65.
66.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 11;PANGLE, supra note 25, at 26-28; TARCOV & PANGLE, supra note 25, at 918-

19.
STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supranote 25, at 11.
STRAUSS, CITY, supra note 25, at I1; PANGLE, supra note 25, at 76-77; TARCOV &
68.
PANGLE, supranote 25, at 910-13.
67.
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the end of the quest might never be reached-it might never become
visible.69
In his quest for truth, Strauss insisted that we consider whether the
ancients had correctly linked political philosophy with natural right. 70 To
explore this possibility, Strauss distinguished between the classical (or
ancient) and modem concepts of natural right. According to the ancients,
natural right could be comprehended only in connection "with a teleological view of the universe," Strauss explained.7 1 "All natural beings have a
natural end, a natural destiny, which determines what kind of operation is
good for them." 72 Natural right, then, arose from the inherent end or purpose of a political regime. That is, "classic natural right doctrine .

.

. is

identical with the doctrine of the best regime." 73 The philosophical quest
for natural right amounts to a search for "the perfect moral order." 74
Strauss left ambiguous, it should be noted, the precise relationship between classical (or ancient) natural right and classical (or ancient) natural
law. Sometimes he appeared to distinguish between natural right and
natural law, but other times he appeared to use the terms interchangeably. 75 In fact, when Strauss equated classical natural right with the best
regime or perfect order, he defined natural right in a manner that resonated closely with commonplace definitions of natural law.7 6 Strauss himself referred to natural law as "an objective order." 7 7 That societal order
or best regime, Strauss suggested, entailed "doctrines [that] taught the
duties of man." 7 8 Thus, at one point, Strauss wrote: "Traditional natural
law is primarily and mainly an objective 'rule and measure', a binding
order prior to, and independent of, the human will." 7 9
Regardless, Strauss unequivocally stressed a break between classical natural right (and natural law) and modem natural right (and natural
69. Straussians might claim that Strauss engaged in esoteric writing. He distinguished the
exoteric political writings or teachings that were useful and palatable in the philosopher's particular context-from the esoteric-political writings or teachings that were aimed for universal truths
but that were left more obscure. STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at 226-29;
PANGLE, supranote 25, at 56-65; TARCOV & PANGLE, supra note 25, at 914.
70. See STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 81-89 (discussing the origin of natural right).
71.
Id. at7.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 144.
74. Id.; see MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 30 (explaining that Strauss characterized natural
right as referring "to proper governing"); TANGUAY, supra note 25, at 118 (explaining that Strauss's
notion of natural right focused on the best regime).
75. For instance, when discussing the relationship between religion and the best regime,
Strauss wrote that "natural right or, rather, natural law becomes independent of the best regime and
takes precedence over it." STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 144. But see TANGUAY, supra note
25, at 118-19 (distinguishing between natural right and natural law).
76. See, e.g., FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 12, at 85-89 (describing how proslavery advocates argued for a natural order in society).
77. STRAUSS, HOBBES, supra note 25, at xii. Strauss also wrote: "According to the classics,
the best constitution is a contrivance of reason. ... It is in accordance with nature, or it is a natural
order." STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 314.
78. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 182.
79.

STRAUSS, HOBBES, supra note 25, at xi.
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law). 80 To be sure, Strauss's historical narrative is idiosyncratic: traditional accounts tend to describe a logical movement from premodernity
to modernity that links the ancient and modem notions of natural right
(passing relatively smoothly from antiquity through Christianity and into
secularity).8 1 But Strauss emphasized discontinuity: the sharp distinction
between the ancients and the moderns helped explain, according to
Strauss, the fragility of modem democracy. Machiavelli initiated modem
political theory by rejecting the ideals of Plato and Aristotle for the nittygritty of realpolitik. Instead of describing the just or perfect republic,
Machiavellian political theory guides the ruler who must maneuver
through the pitfalls of reality. 82 Strauss argued, then, that Hobbes sought
to retain Machiavelli's realism while reintroducing "moral principles"
into politics-reintroducing, that is, natural right (and natural law).8 ' To
do so, Hobbes focused on "the fear of death, and, more particularly, the
fear of violent death at the hands of others." 84 In Hobbesian political theory, as interpreted by Strauss, "[d]eath takes the place of the telos,"85 and
"natural law must be deduced from the desire for self-preservation."8 6
Thus, unlike in classical political philosophy where natural right starts
with the best political regime, which then engenders certain duties and
responsibilities, Hobbes's modern political theory starts from an assertion of individual natural right-"from an absolutely justified subjective
claim which, far from being dependent on any previous law, order, or
obligation, is itself the origin of all law, order, or obligation."8 Consequently, Hobbes concluded that "[t]he state has the function, not of producing or promoting a virtuous life, but of safeguarding the natural right
of each." 88

80. Id. at xi-xii; STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 120.
81.
TANGUAY, supra note 25, at 102-03, 118.
82.
STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 177-79; McALLISTER, supra note 25, at 154-56;
e.g., NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Luigi Ricci trans.), reprinted in THE PRINCE AND THE
DISCOURSES I (Modem Library ed. 1950); NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON THE FIRST TEN
BOOKS OF TITUS LIVIUS (Christian E. Detmold trans.), reprinted in THE PRINCE AND THE
DISCOURSES, supra, 99 . While Aristotelian virtue strove for human excellence, Machiavellian virt6i
strove for political usefulness, for the preservation of the political community (or republic) in a
treacherous world. FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supranote 12, at 12, 14-15; TARCOV & PANGLE, supra note
25, at 916-17.
83.
STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 179; e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B.
Macpherson ed., 1968).
84. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 180.
85.
Id. at 181.
86. Id.
87. STRAUSS, HOBBES, supra note 25, at xii. "Traditional natural law is primarily and mainly
an objective 'rule and measure', a binding order prior to, and independent of, the human will, while
modem natural law is, or tends to be, primarily and mainly a series of 'rights', of subjective claims,
originating in the human will." Id. at xi-xii; see STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 181 ("[T]he
fundamental moral fact is not a duty but a right. . . .").
88.
STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 181. "Hobbes jettisoned the entire tradition of
political philosophy oriented toward human excellence, thus freeing the state from any obligation
other than safeguarding individual natural rights." MCALLISTER, supranote 25, at 157.
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Even further, according to Strauss, not only did the early modems,
like Hobbes, transform (and diminish) natural right, the later modems
repudiated it altogether. 89 Jeremy Bentham, for one, is famous for denigrating "[n]atural rights [as] simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible
rights, rhetorical nonsense,-nonsense upon stilts." 90 Bentham's disciple,
John Austin, rejected the concept of natural law as "ambiguous and misleading." 9 ' Indeed, many critics insisted that widespread disagreements
about the content of natural right demonstrated that it was inherently and
hopelessly ambiguous. 92 In the United States, the Framers' generation
had been firmly committed to natural right (and natural law), yet after the
Civil War, numerous American jurisprudents repudiated it.93 According
to jurist and scholar Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., natural-law jurists suffered from a "naive state of mind." 94 Modernists stopped searching for
universals (rights and laws) in nature and instead focused on historical
changes, individual claims of right, and sovereign assertions of law.95
When Strauss considered whether the ancients had correctly linked
political philosophy with natural right, he emphasized that the mere disagreement among individuals and societies about the content of natural
right does not logically necessitate its repudiation.96 Because the rejection of natural right ultimately leads, he argued, to the monumental modernist problems of historicism and relativism, we should demand stronger
proof before jettisoning the possibility of natural right, and from
Strauss's perspective, such proof is not forthcoming. 97 Not only did
Strauss, then, want to contemplate the truth and implications of natural
right, he reconsidered the fundamental republican democratic principles.
In opposition to pluralist democracy and its countenanced pursuit of self89. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 298-99 (explaining how Burke does not begin
from natural right); see MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 30 (explaining that Strauss traced the development of modernity "until, finally, the entire concept of nature had dissolved as a useful assumption."). Thus, Strauss wrote: "The problem of natural right is today a matter of recollection rather
than of actual knowledge." STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 7.
90.

JEREMY BENTHAM, Anarchical Fallacies, reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY

BENTHAM 489, 501 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
91.

JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 19 (Wilfrid E. Rumble

ed., 1995) (1832). Austin wrote, "[T]o say that human laws which conflict with the Divine law are
not binding, that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense." Id. at 158.
92. "The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest
men have differed upon the subject ..... Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J.,
concurring); see FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 12, at 85-90 (describing how the disagreements
between abolitionists and proslavery advocates over the content of natural law and natural right
contributed to the demise of natural law in America).
93. See FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 12, at 93-94 (discussing the positivism of postbellum
Langdellian legal scientists).
94. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., NaturalLaw, 32 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1918), reprinted in The
Essential Holmes 180, 181 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
95. See STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 7-8 (discussing the modernist rejection of
natural right); cf, FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 12, at 91-136 (discussing the modernist approach
to law).
96.

STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 97.

97.

Id. at 9-34.
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interest,98 Strauss sought to resurrect the common good. "Laws are just to
the extent that they are conducive to the common good. But if the just is
identical with the common good," 99 he reasoned, "the just or right cannot
be conventional: the conventions of a city cannot make good for the city
what is, in fact, fatal for it and vice versa. The nature of things and not
convention then determines in each case what is just." 0 0 Consequently,
Strauss continued, the political activities of citizens and governmental
officials should be virtuous, aiming for perfection and justice.'o
B. HannahArendt
Despite the difficulty of deciphering Strauss's writings, Arendt's
work might be even more complex. Like Strauss, Arendt criticized modernity in the shadow of the Holocaust. 102 To Arendt, modernity generated danger: it not only rendered possible totalitarianism, Nazism, and the
Holocaust, but also threatened the United States and its pluralist democratic system with risks unrecognized by most Americans.103 Arendt
maintained that modernity relegates humanity to a meaningless quest
after the best instrumental means for achieving ultimately arbitrary
ends.'" A vacuous willingness to conform replaces a desire for genuine
freedom. 05 Individuals dwell on self-interest and economic prosperity,
while humanity celebrates the processes that produce specious historical
progress. 0 6 People universally "demand . . . happiness," 0 7 but suffer
"the mass phenomenon of loneliness"'0 o and "widespread unhappiness"1 09 I short, Arendt argued that modernity drains away the juices
that sustain human vitality and leaves a shriveled, moribund carcass. But
unlike Strauss, Arendt concentrated less on the problems of modernity
and more on a solution: politics. For Arendt, politics (or political action)
could provide a cure for the ills of modernity: politics could be the
source and the realm of meaningful human existence."l 0

98. See id. at 106-07.
Id. at 102.
99.
100. See Tarcov & Pangle, supra note 25, at 920, 923-24 (discussing common good).
STRAUSs, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 133-34; STRAUSS, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra
101.
note 25, at 40, 94.
See ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 25, at vii-viii; MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 3-5.
102.
See MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 15-17, 24, 38-39. According to Arendt, "[I]dentity has
103.
been disconnected from citizenship in modem society, with the result that we modems have lost our
sense of what politics is for. What characterizes the masses from whom totalitarian leaders derive
their support is their lack of political commitment ...... Id. at 16. Arendt, in other words, emphasized the danger inherent in personal isolation and political apathy, which subsequent commentators
would stress in describing the United States. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 46-47, 107 (2000).
104. See VILLA, ARENDT, supra note 25, at 10-11.
ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 40-41.
105.
106. Id. at 33, 296-97; MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 15-17, 36-38.
ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 134.
107.
Id. at 59.
108.
Id. at 134.
109.
110. Id. at 29-31.
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What, then, is political action, according to Arendt? In modernity,
we often associate politics with economic interests and disputes. For
instance, a debate about whether to enact social welfare legislation that
would provide food stamps for indigent individuals would be an archetypical political contest. But for Arendt, this debate would be social rather than political, where the social is a bastard combination of the private and public (political) spheres."' Arendt sought to maintain a sharp
"division between the public and private realms, between the sphere of
the polis and the sphere of household and family, and ... between activities related to a common world and those related to the maintenance of

life."l

2

Arendt, in other words, narrowed the scope of politics. Indeed, critics have wryly noted that "Arendt rules out as nonpolitical almost everything we usually think of politics being 'about.'"" ' The precondition for
politics, as Arendt conceptualized it, was plurality: "the fact that men,
not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.""l4 To be clear, Arendt
emphasized a plurality or "diversity of opinions"'' 5 rather than a plurality
or "multiplicity of interests""' 6-where opinions refer to individual views
of, for instance, the common good, and interests refer to individual or
group desires or goals. And a community could not sustain the requisite
plurality of opinions without protecting the "unique distinctness," the
individuality, of each person.1 7 "If men were not distinct, each human
being distinguished from any other who is, was, or will ever be, they
would need neither speech nor action to make themselves understood.
Signs and sounds to communicate immediate, identical needs and wants
would be enough.""'8 Arendt explained that the medium of political action, the way that people can initiate and participate in politics, is by
speaking.'" And it is through political speech-that is, political actionthat "men distinguish themselves instead of being merely distinct; they
are the modes in which human beings appear to each other, not indeed as
physical objects, but qua men."' 20 In other words, political action is how
one realizes his or her humanity-taking the initiative to be a unique

111.
See id. at 27-29.
112.
Id.at28.
113.
McGowan, supra note 25, at 75; see BERNSTEIN, Rethinking, supra note 25, at 248-49
(criticizing Arendt's distinction of the political and the social).
114.
ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 7; see Kateb, supranote 25, at 14.
115.

ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 226.

116.

Id.

117.

ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 176.

118.
Id. at 175-76. Plurality also assumes a type of equality among individuals. KATEB, supra
note 25, at 14.
119.
ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 26-27, 179; VILLA, ARENDT, supra note 25, at 31-35.
Arendt, in effect, justifies the protection of free expression: "Opinions will rise wherever men communicate freely with one another and have the right to make their views public .
ARENDT,
REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 227.
120.
ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 176.
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person in meaningful coexistence with other unique persons.121 Arendt
depicted the ancient Greek polis as illustrating a political or "public
realm":122 it "was reserved for individuality; it was the only place where
men could show who they really and inexchangeably were." 2 1 Plurality
and individuality, then, are integrally intertwined. Plurality exists only
when humans can realize or actualize their uniqueness, while unique
individuality can be actualized only in relation to a plurality of others.12 4
Conformity, it follows, obliterates the possibility for political action: "no
formation of opinion is ever possible where all opinions have become the
same." 25
Political action, Arendt continued, not only "must be done in company with others," 26 but also must be "for the sake of all." 27 That is,
through "the benefit of a multitude of opinions," 28 a community can
specify the "public spirit" or common good.129 What, then, is the content
of the common good? Arendt never answered this question with more
than vague conundrums. She explained that political action "is not a
means to some end beyond itself,"',3 0 and that "[t]o act politically is to
talk about politics."' 3 1 The common good, it would seem, equates with
political action itself. To act politically is to achieve the common good.
Thus, the creation, preservation, or both of a site facilitating political
action would constitute the common good.132
Humans can experience true freedom, Arendt maintained, only
when they engage in political action. It is "a body politic which guarantees the space where freedom can appear." 33 When we confound the
political with the private and slide into the social-as we have in moder121.

Arendt emphasized taking the initiative, an "impulse" to begin "something new." Id. at

177; see ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 216 (emphasizing "a deliberate act" as "the foun-

dation of freedom"); id. at 223 (discussing "the spirit of the new").
122.

ARENDT, HUMAN, supranote 25, at 41.

Id. Arendt emphasized speech in describing politics in the Greek polis:
123.
To be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and
persuasion and not through force and violence. In Greek self-understanding, to force people by violence, to command rather than persuade, were prepolitical ways to deal with
people characteristic of life outside the polis, of home and family life, where the household head ruled with uncontested, despotic powers, or of life in the barbarian empires of
Asia, whose despotism was frequently likened to the organization of the household.
Id. at 26-27.
124.
125.
126.

BERNSTEIN, Judging, supranote 25, at 223.
ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 225.
KATEB, supranote 25, at 14.

127.

Id.

128.

ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 225.

129.

Id.

130.

KATEB, supra note 25, at 16.

131.

Id. at 17.

132.

See ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 255 (describing Thomas Jefferson's desire

for a ward system of government as emphasizing a public space or site for politics); KATEB, supra
note 25, at 119 (discussing how "[t]he common interest is the preservation of the frame of action, a
constitution").
133.

ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 125.
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nity-we tend to define freedom in accord with the social realm. 13 4 We
think freedom is the pursuit, for instance, of economic prosperity. We
believe freedom "requires and justifies" only "the restraint of political
authority."' Freedom becomes "located in the realm of the social, and
force or violence becomes the monopoly of government."l36 We forget
that freedom lies in political action itself. Arendt insisted that freedom
"means the right 'to be a participator in government', or it means nothing."l37 Thus, freedom and politics are indivisible: "Freedom is a good
valued for its own sake, not for anything it allows us to produce, gain, or
achieve. And freedom is exercised only in [political] action."' 38
Arendt's most sustained discussions of politics revolve around antithetical examples: the combined actions of revolution and constitution
making as prototypical political activities, on the one hand, and the imposition of totalitarianism, on the other. A revolution, Arendt argued,
aims "to bring about the formation of a new body politic;"' 39 it is when
"the political way of life begins." 4 0 Building "the foundation of a body
politic which guarantees the space where freedom can appear,"l41 a successful revolution establishes a "foundation of freedom" 4 2 and demands
"the constitution of a republic."l 43 The key to the triumphant American
Revolution, then, was the drafting of constitutions in numerous states
simultaneous with the issuance of the Declaration of Independence.144
Under modem conditions, the act of foundation is identical with the
framing of a constitution, and the calling of constitutional assemblies
has quite rightly become the hallmark of revolution ever since the
Declaration of Independence initiated the writings of constitutions for
each of the American States, a process which prepared and culminated in the Constitution of the Union, the foundation of the United
States.145
Arendt underscored the nature of revolution and the narrowness of
the political realm, as she conceptualized it, by comparing the American
and French Revolutions. While the American Revolution succeeded
largely because it concentrated on establishing a public space for freedom-that is, for political action-the French Revolution failed largely
because it failed to do the same. The American revolutionaries included
134.

ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 30-31, 40.

135.
136.

Id. at 31.
Id.

137.

ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 218.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 45.
ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 35.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 125.
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the poor, but these people, according to Arendt, were "not miserable."1 4 6
The French revolutionaries, though, needed to deal with an immense
number of wretchedly impoverished people. 147 Consequently, during the
French Revolution, the private and the social infected the political realm.
And when a revolution tries to solve the social problem of poverty-the
drive of the impoverished for basic needs-the opportunity to achieve
political freedom is sacrificed to economic necessities.148 "Nothing, we
might say today, could be more obsolete than to attempt to liberate mankind from poverty by political means; nothing could be more futile and
more dangerous.

. .

. The result was that necessity invaded the political

realm, the only realm where men can be truly free."l 49 Indeed, Arendt
insisted that the Framers of the United States Constitution erred by
dwelling more on the creation for citizens of a private space for economic activities than a public space for political freedom.' 50 American (national) government, for instance, operates through representatives, so
citizens too frequently forget politics; they confuse economic liberty with
political freedom.' 5 ' The people lose "the opportunity of being republicans and of acting as citizens."' 52
While the making (or defending) of a constitution exemplifies political action,' 53 the imposition of totalitarian government contravenes politics and freedom. 5 4 Totalitarianism, Arendt explained, destroys plurality:
in the political realm, individuals are isolated, and in the private realm,
they are doomed to loneliness.' 55 A totalitarian government dismantles
both the public and private realms. "It is the very nature of totalitarian
regimes to demand unlimited power. Such power can only be secured if
literally all men, without a single exception, are reliably dominated in
every aspect of their life."' 56 Hence, under totalitarian rule, the people
endure "the experience of not belonging [t]o the world at all, which is
among the most radical and desperate experiences of man."' 57 The epitome of totalitarianism is the concentration camp, where inmates suffer
severe deprivation and isolation and can barely remember political freedom.'" 8 The inmates are forced to view survival as "the competition of

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 67-68.
Id. at 113-14; BERNSTEIN, Rethinking, supranote 25, at 243-45.
ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 114.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 268-69; KATEB, supranote 25, at 19.
AR ENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 253.

See KATEB, supra note 25, at 17 (discussing "the defense of a constitution or form against
153.
internal erosion or external attack").
154. See ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 25, at 475, 478-79; MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 29;
VILLA, POLITICS, supra note 25, at 187-91.
ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 25,Id. at 475; MCGOWAN, supranote 25, at 16.
155.
156. ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 25, at 456.
157. Id. at 475.
158. See id. at 437-41; see also MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 15-16, 29.
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all against all, creating a highly atomized society."l 59 As Arendt concluded, "A life without speech and without action

. . .

is literally dead to the

world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived
among men."o60 A concentration-camp survivor, in Arendt's words, literally "returns to the world of the living." 1 6 1
From Arendt's perspective, as should now be clear, the deprivation
of political freedom and action is catastrophic, even though she casts the
scope of political action as extraordinarily narrow. Indeed, if one thinks
in terms of republican and pluralist democracies, Arendt's concept of
politics is neither.1 6 2 Unlike republican democratic thinkers, who stressed
the significance of having a relatively homogenous population, Arendt
urged the importance of plurality, which obviously resonates with pluralist democracy. But unlike pluralist democratic theorists, Arendt repudiated a plurality of interests and instead emphasized a plurality of opinions.
Like a republican democratic thinker, Arendt alluded to the common
good, proclaiming that politics should aim to be "for the sake of all,"1 63
but then she left us with a puzzling tautology, explaining that the common good equated with political action in pursuit of the common good.'
Like a pluralist democratic theorist, Arendt favored "equal and full participation in the political,""' but then she rejected any pursuit of economic well-being in the political realm.' 66 Arendt would admit that strategic and instrumental thinking might be appropriate in the social realm,
but they are never acceptable in politics; thus, social science experts who
might guide us in choosing the best means to achieve predetermined ends
can never contribute to political action.' 67 Ultimately, Arendt scorned
pluralist democracy as a process-structured pursuit of self-interest:
Through pressure groups, lobbies, and other devices, the voters can
indeed influence the actions of their representatives with respect to
interest, that is, they can force their representatives to execute their
wishes at the expense of the wishes and interests of other groups of
voters. In all these instances the voter acts out of concern with his
private life and well-being, and the residue of power he still holds in
his hands resembles rather the reckless coercion with which a black159. MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 16-17.
ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 176; see VILLA, POLITICS, supra note 25, at 181-82
160.
(emphasizing the uniqueness of totalitarianism).
161.

ARENDT, ORIGINS, supra note 25, at 444.

See McGOWAN, supra note 25, at 81 (discussing the difficulty of categorizing Arendt's
162.
concept of political action).
KATEB, supra note 25, at 14.
163.
Arendt is often criticized for emptying political speech of all significant content. See
164.
VILLA, ARENDT, supra note 25, at 36-40-41.
165. MCGOwAN, supranote 25, at 25.
166. Id. at 48-49; cf id. at 48 (discussing general welfare as economic and thus not appropriate
for political realm). Also, Arendt sometimes suggested that only those able or qualified to be political should be allowed to participate in political activity. VILLA, ARENDT, supra note 25, at 35, 3940.
167. MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 61; BERNSTEIN, Rethinking, supranote 25, at 253-54.
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mailer forces his victim into obedience than the power that arises out
ofjoint action and joint deliberation.
As Arendt peeled away elements of republican democracy and pluralist democracy, her goal emerged, however nebulously. She aimed to
articulate a "pure politics," an exhilarating communal connection among
political actors.' 69 Individuals engage in political speech or action solely
for the purpose of creating and disclosing their meaningful identities to
other individuals.o70 They seek to achieve no other ends because if they
do quest after more, then they necessarily corrupt their political actions.
When an individual pursues self-interest, acts instrumentally or strategically, or seeks economic or social justice, then he or she cannot actualize
meaningful self-disclosure. The true person is obscured. "Without the
disclosure of the agent in the act,"' 7 ' Arendt wrote, "action loses its specific character and becomes one form of achievement among others. It is
then indeed no less a means to an end than making is a means to produce
an object."' 72 When the purity of politics is violated, then political
"speech becomes indeed 'mere talk,' simply one more means toward the
end, whether it serves to deceive the enemy or to dazzle everybody with
propaganda."173 Thus, from Arendt's standpoint, "Nothing justifies [political] action; nothing is gained or accomplished through action. Action
is simply the embodiment, the realization, of freedom-and requires
nothing further to be experienced as a good." 74
But there is a problem: Arendt has refined politics to a point so microscopic that it has perhaps disappeared from view. The concrete occurrence of political action would seem to be "almost miraculous."' 7 1 In her
effort to lead us toward a potentially exhilarating form of politics, she
instead has led us to a utopian abyss.176 If politics is neither the republican democratic pursuit of a substantive common good nor the pluralist
democratic pursuit of self-interest, then what is it? Why would individuals engage in political speech, as limited by Arendt? What, exactly,
would they talk about? Arendt would answer: individuals would speak to
achieve self-disclosure. Maybe so, yet one must wonder: would Arendt's
notion of self-disclosure be enough to prompt political action in a real as
opposed to a utopian world, or would it leave the political realm inert?
Arendt wrote that the "revelatory quality of speech and action comes to
168.

ARENDT, REVOLUTION, supra note 25, at 269.

KATEB, supra note 25, at 21.
169.
170.
In pure politics, "[a]lthough nobody knows whom he reveals when he discloses himself in
deed or word, he must be willing to risk the disclosure." ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 180.
171.
Id.
Id.
172.
173.

Id.

174.
MCGOWAN, supra note 25, at 61 (emphasis added).
175.
BERNSTEIN, Rethinking, supra note 25, at 243 (describing manifestations of the "revolutionary spirit" as "almost miraculous").
176. See McGOWAN, supranote 25, at 34.
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the fore where people are with others and neither for nor against themthat is, in sheer human togetherness."1 77 Sheer human togetherness? Is
Arendt, here, urging us toward political action or some type of unformulated communal ecstasy?178
C. Eric Voegelin
Like Strauss and Arendt, Voegelin criticized modernity. He argued
that individuals always view their respective societies as structured or
ordered so as to be endowed "with meaning in terms of ends divine and
human."1 79 Thus, individuals develop a "self-interpretation" that supposedly reflects the "cosmic order."so The main problem with modernity,
according to Voegelin, is that its roots are twisted around a cancerous
misinterpretation of society vis-A-vis "the transcendent order of being."18 1
In particular, modernity has developed askew because of an acceptance of "gnosticism."l82 In Voegelin's terminology, gnosticism is the
belief that a particular type of knowledge can enable an individual to
attain salvation or deliverance (or escape an alienated existence). Put in
different words, gnosticism is "a belief in the power of knowledge to
transform reality, to create earthly perfection."' 83 Modernity evolved as
gnostics adopted the concept of Christian (sacred) eschatology and applied it to the saeculum. Christian eschatology posited stages of spiritual
advancement culminating in the City of God, but early modernists extended this sacral periodization of time into the secular realm. 184 The
result was a belief in the modernist idea of progress: the conviction that
human ingenuity could engender endless advancement in the material
world, endless forward movement for humankind.18 1
As Voegelin phrased it, the idea of "Christian transcendental [or eschatological] fulfilment" had become "immanentized"-brought within

177. ARENDT, HUMAN, supra note 25, at 180.
178. Arendt imagined political actors as if they stood behind some Rawlsian super-veil of
ignorance. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (articulating Rawls's veil of
ignorance theory). Critics of Rawls questioned whether he had drained away the essence of humanity by positing that political actors forget their specific identities. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 128-32 (1982); Joshua Cohen, A More Democratic Liberalism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1503, 1513 (1994) (reviewing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)
[hereinafter RAWLS, LIBERALISM]). For Rawls's attempt to reformulate his theory in response to his
critics, see RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra, at 22-28.
179.
VOEGELIN, ORDER, supra note 25, at 19.
180. VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 167.

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at 126.
MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 21; see McKnight, supranote 25, at 60.

For a discussion of the Christian concept of eschatology and its adoption into modernist
thinking, see HANS BLUMENBERG, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE MODERN AGE 37 (Robert M. Wallace
trans., Mass. Inst. of Tech. 1983) (1966).
185.
MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 22-23; McKnight, supra note 25, at 59.
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the reach of humans in "mundane existence."' 86 And Voegelin here was
insistent: "Such an immanentist hypostasis of the eschaton ... is a theoretical fallacy." 8 7 In the perverted world of modernity, "man assumes
God's role as the primary actor leading history to its culmination (telos),
reason rather than revelation becomes the instrument for attaining saving
knowledge, and concrete European nation-states become terrestrial paradises in which humanity finds the fulfillment of its highest aspirations." 188 In short, the modern world suffers from a spiritual disorder or
pathology that confounds the sacred and the secular. 89
Of course, Voegelin explained, modernists do not recognize that
their idea of progress arises from a perverted gnosticism. They believe
that a conviction in progress rests firmly on a rational (and secular)
ground. They convince themselves that humanity advances by questioning or doubting religion, but in reality, modernists have immanentized
Christian concepts, applying them to the mundane world. Therefore,
modernists are hubristic: they display excessive pride in their capabilities
to achieve untold tasks that, in actuality, lie beyond their limited powers.
Such hubris is most evident in the social sciences. Social scientists mistakenly assume that they can apply the methods of the natural sciences to
gain objective knowledge of human society and politics.190 But, Voegelin
insisted, the insistent application of scientific method leads social scientists to skew their inquiries. Because they practice "value-free science,"
which maintains a dichotomy between facts and values,' 9 ' social scientists treat humans "as discrete objects," separated "from the transcendental context," from the spiritual realm.19 2 By necessity, social scientists
limit their research goals to fit the constraints of their (scientific or empirical) method, and consequently, they must dismiss (as unscientific)
any potential insights gleaned from other methods. 193
To be certain, the empiricism of scientific method produces some
types of progress, but at a steep cost. We gain formal or instrumental
rationality, but lose our substantive moorings. Voegelin wrote:
The death of the spirit is the price of progress. Nietzsche revealed
this mystery of the Western apocalypse when he announced that God
was dead and that He had been murdered. This Gnostic murder is
constantly committed by the men who sacrifice God to [secular] civilization. The more fervently all human energies are thrown into the
VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 120; McKnight, supranote 25, at 66.
186.
187.
VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 120 (emphasis added)..
McKnight, supranote 25, at 59.
188.
189. See COOPER, supra note 25, at 136; MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 169-71.
190. See McKnight, supranote 25, at 58-59.
MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 173 (quoting Voegelin).
191.
192. COOPER, supra note 25, at 67-70; MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 173 (quoting
Voegelin).
See COOPER, supra note 25, at 68; VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 3-26; McKnight,
193.
supra note 25, at 55-56.
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great enterprise of salvation through world-immanent action, the farther the human beings who engage in this enterprise move away from
the life of the spirit. And since the life of the spirit is the source of
order in man and society, the very success of a Gnostic civilization is
the cause of its decline.194
Thus, modernist societies are spiritually, religiously bankrupt. And
to make matters worse, gnosticism encourages people to believe that
mundane "ersatz realities" can fill the spiritual "vacuum."195 Modernist
societies are, in a sense, "narcissistic": they dwell on humans as the
source of salvation (and progress). 19 6 Human inventiveness and ideas
replace faith. 19 7 This narcissistic reliance on human ideologies, Voegelin
lamented, has led to catastrophic modernist experiments in civilization,
including not only Nazism and Communism but also liberalism and democracy.19 8 "The closure of the soul in modern Gnosticism can repress
the truth of the soul," Voegelin wrote, "but it cannot remove the soul and
its transcendence from the structure of reality."' 99
Even so, Voegelin still found that "there is a glimmer of hope" in
our situation, though "it will require all our efforts to kindle this glimmer
into a flame by repressing Gnostic corruption." 200 What must we do to
defeat gnostic modernism? Return to the "divine ground of being": we
must comprehend the natural order of society. 20 1 For Voegelin, this return, this comprehension, requires a resurrected devotion to Christianity,
which he deemed the best interpretation of God and experience. 2 02 Furthermore, Voegelin argued that, by recognizing the fundamental spiritual
element of human existence, we could create a "new science of politics." 20 3 To do so, instead of blindly following empirical scientific method, we would need to specify the proper object of study and then develop
and apply the best method for understanding that object. 20 Given
Voegelin's focus on the spiritual, he drew on Aristotelian methodology
to describe how people interpret (or self-interpret) the interrelated experiences of the secular and spiritual realms. By developing a "history of
order"-a history of how various societies have structured or ordered
themselves and have interpreted their "ends divine and human"194. VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 131. In fact, Voegelin even criticized Strauss and
Arendt for each using methods that reproduce gnostic modernism. See COOPER, supra note 25, at
132-39.
195. McALLISTER, supra note 25, at 172 (quoting Voegelin).
196. Id. at 171 (quoting Voegelin).
197. Id. at 22.
198. See MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 172-74; VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 164-65,
173-74; see also NASH, supra note 25, at 74 (describing a trend of conservative critics of liberalism
in the early 1950s).
199. VOEGELIN, NEW, supranote 25, at 165.
200. Id. at 189.
201.
McALLISTER, supra note 25, at 172.
202. Id. at 252; VOEGELIN, NEW, supranote 25, at 163-65.
203. VOEGELIN, NEW, supranote 25, at 3.
204. Id. at 4-5; COOPER, supranote 25, at 68; McKnight, supranote 25, at 55-56.
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Voegelin believed that he could help humanity struggle toward a "true
order."2 05 Most important, this true order would entail a spiritual marshaling because, ultimately, "God and man, world and society form a
primordial community of being." 20 6 To Voegelin, we need to grasp the
significance of this intertwined existence of God and humanity and hold
it tightly. For without spirituality, Voegelin warned, we are doomed to
desolation.
H. THE INFLUENCE OF THE DISSENTERS

Pluralist democracy might be distasteful, with its emphasis on selfinterest, its grounding on ethical relativism (tied to empiricism), and its
excessive reliance on process. Any governmental system, it seems, must
ultimately pursue substantive goals, which implicitly if not explicitly
manifest certain values. Is pluralist democracy so bereft of foundational
values that it might be unworkable and even dangerous in the long run,
as all three political theorists feared? Strauss, Arendt, and Voegelin proffered diverse solutions: Strauss looked to ancient philosophy to provide
foundational values; Voegelin believed religion could reconnect us to a
spiritual order; and Arendt sought to purify politics of all corrupting
forces at the outset. But despite their efforts, one is left with an uncomfortable conclusion: we cannot easily identify a practical alternative to
pluralist democracy. Viewed together, Strauss, Arendt, and Voegelin
demonstrate a crucial truth about our pluralist democratic world. The
transition from republican to pluralist democracy cannot be undone.
Take Voegelin. Compared to Strauss and Arendt, Voegelin was "the
mystic." 2 07 Political salvation, he maintained, lay in religious salvation.
To restore "the forces of civilization," we would need to return to a spiritually ordered society. 208 And here lies the problem with Voegelin's
solution. With his emphasis on religion and, more specifically, on Christianity, he appeared to seek a resurrected "medieval order." 209 Unsurprisingly, then, his message appealed to a coterie of "Catholic, traditional
conservatives," but it could not captivate a more diverse group of American intellectuals. 2 10 And without doubt, most Americans could not abide
a historical approach that equated Hitler and Harry Truman as practitioners of gnostic politics-regardless of whether many of those same Americans could believe that "[h]istory is a story told by God." 2 1 1 Meanwhile,
according to Strauss, philosophy-especially ancient political philosophy-revealed a potential answer to the messy political maneuverings
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

VOEGELIN, ORDER, supra note 25, at 19.
Id. at 39.
MCALLISTER, supranote 25, at 222.
VOEGELIN, NEW, supra note 25, at 189.
VOEGELIN, ORDER, supra note 25, at 22.

210.

MCALLISTER, supranote 25, at 252, 271, 297 n.1; NASH, supra note 25, at 536.

211.

MCALLISTER, supra note 25, at 252; see NASH, supra note 25, at 74; VOEGELIN, NEW,

supra note 25, at 170-73.
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that infected modernity. He repudiated pluralist democracy and, like
Voegelin, sought to lead us on "a return to origins." Whereas Voegelin
sought to resurrect a medieval Christian order, Strauss sought to resurrect
republican democracy. But Strauss's desired republican democratic regime could not skirt an overwhelming obstacle: it did not culturally and
socially fit Strauss's twentieth-century world.2 12 Finally, Arendt, too,
repudiated pluralist democracy, yet she refused to attempt the full reversal of direction necessary for a return to either a republican democratic
regime or a Christian order.213 Instead, she imaginatively tried to
reconceptualize politics to avoid the pitfalls of both republican and pluralist democracies. For Arendt, politics rather than philosophy or religion
provided the solution for the ills of modernity.214 But Arendtian politics
was so purified of the issues usually associated with political debate that
one would be hard-pressed to find any practical implications for American government. In the end, despite Strauss's, Arendt's, and Voegelin's
contrasting tendencies-Strauss favoring ancient philosophy; Arendt
favoring politics; and Voegelin favoring religion-none of them was
able to provide a ready alternative to pluralist democracy. 215
I do not mean to suggest, though, that the three were not influential.
As mentioned, Voegelin, without exerting wide political pull, appealed to
a handful of traditionalist conservatives. The sheer impenetrability of his
writings undoubtedly dissuaded some other potentially sympathetic readers. Displaying an astounding erudition in philosophy, religion, and history, Voegelin was compelled to coin numerous terms and phrases to
communicate his complex thoughts; to understand Voegelin, then, one
needs to penetrate this unique vocabulary. For that reason, his expositors
often include a glossary of Voegelinian terminology to enlighten wary
readers. 2 16 Even so, despite the denseness of Voegelin's writings, Time
remarkably featured him in a 1953 article,2 17 but alas, frustrated magazine readers responded with letters condemning the article as "gobbledygook," "revolting," and "garbled nonsense." 2 18
Arendt, no easy read herself, claimed to focus more on politics than
philosophy, yet her political theory had little connection to social reality.
212.

See VILLA, ARENDT, supra note 25, at 8.

213. "While Arendt is unquestionably antimodern in a broad sense, she hardly shares the
cultural conservative's wish to return to the premodern. Arendt refuses to deal in this type of nostalgia." Id at 174. Yet, as Villa discusses, some commentators have characterized Arendt as also attempting to resurrect the civic republican tradition. VILLA, POLITICS, supra note 25, at 165-66.
214. See VILLA, POLITICS, supra note 25, at 155-56 (contrasting Strauss's turn to philosophy
and Arendt's turn to politics).
215. The three thinkers, though, also overlapped significantly. For instance, Arendt might have
favored politics, but she was an accomplished political philosopher. Voegelin might have favored
religion, but his erudition on political philosophy was unsurpassed. Strauss might have favored
ancient philosophy, yet he demonstrated great respect for religious traditions.
216. FEDERICI, supra note 25, at 207-36; EUGENE WEBB, ERIC VOEGELIN 277-89 (1981).
217. Max Ways, JournalismandJoachim'sChildren, TIME, Mar. 9, 1953, at 57-61.
218.

FEDERICI, supra note 25, at xxiv, 192 n.8.
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Consequently, her abstractions have not significantly swayed politicians
or political advocates. Regardless, her writings have been heralded within the world of political theory.2 19 Most notably, her conception of a pure
politics influenced the German philosopher Jirgen Habermas's development of his renowned communication theory. 220 Habermas posited the
existence of an ideal speech situation: a counterfactual intersubjective
encounter that is cleansed of domination, coercion, and other distortions
arising from economic power and strategic maneuvering. 22' The ideal
speech situation, as such, "makes possible unforced universal agreement." 22 2 A consensus that emerges from the ideal speech situation reflects only the force of the best argument and thus allows us to identify
truth and normative legitimacy.223 Thus, just as Arendt aimed for a politics purified of extraneous considerations, Habermas aimed for commu224
Habermas
nication purged of distorting material and strategic forces.
then built on this theory of communicative action to articulate a discourse theory of democracy, grounded on his notion of an "ideal communication community." 225
Strauss is unique, being the only of the three 6migrds to have wielded substantial influence in the concrete world of American politics. Numerous neoconservatives have drawn sustenance from Strauss's thought.
Of course, one should not mistake influence for intent. Strauss rarely
wrote with the purpose of directly intervening in American political debates, 2 26 though he was not apolitical. Despite the ambiguities in his writings, Strauss's imprimatur of the common good, virtue, and natural right
manifested unmistakably conservative political leanings.227 He admitted
that the pursuit of virtue and the common good might require the exclu-

MCGOWAN, supranote 25, at 98.
219.
See Jurgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of Power (Thomas
220.
McCarthy trans.), reprinted in HANNAH ARENDT: CRITICAL ESSAYS 211, 212-14 (Lewis P.
Hinchman & Sandra K. Hinchman eds., 1994) (tying Habermas's theory of communicative action to
Arendt's political theory).
221.

JORGEN HABERMAS, What Is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION

AND THE

EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 1, 105-10 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979).
222.
Jflrgen Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, in JOSEF BLEICHER,
CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS 181, 206 (1980).

223.
Id. According to Habermas, "all speech acts oriented to reaching understanding" presuppose the validity claims of sincerity, truth, and normative legitimacy. JORGEN HABERMAS, REASON
AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 307 (1984) (emphasis added). We presuppose, in other

words, that speakers sincerely assert the truth and normative legitimacy or rightness of their propositions. Id
See Stephen M. Feldman, The Problem of Critique: Triangulating Habermas, Derrida,
224.
and Gadamer Within Metamodernism, 4 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 296, 308 (2005).
JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
225.

THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 322 (William Rehg trans., 1996). See generally Feldman, supra
note 224 (discussing Habermas more extensively in conjunction with Gadamer and Derrida).
226. See MCALLISTER, supranote 25, at 221.
227. See PANGLE, supra note 25, at 83-85; cf DRURY, supra note 25, at xi (noting that even
Strauss's students disagree about his meaning); STRAUSS, LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at v-viii
(discussing the difficulty of even defining liberalism and conservatism).
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sion of some individuals from the polity,2 28 as well as the coercive control of others. An individual "cannot achieve the perfection of his humanity,"229 cannot be virtuous, "except by keeping down his lower impulses." 230 To control such lower impulses, Strauss argued, sometimes demands coercion. Hence, rather than stressing the maximization of freedom and autonomy, Strauss suggested that coercion sometimes amounts
to the common good. "Justice and coercion are not mutually exclusive; in
fact, it is not altogether wrong to describe justice as a kind of benevolent
coercion. Justice and virtue in general are necessarily a kind of power.
To say that power as such is evil or corrupting would therefore amount to
saying that virtue is evil or corrupting." 23 1 In light of such sentiments,
Strauss inclined predictably toward other conservative outlooks. He was
adamantly anti-communist232 and was far more elitist than egalitarian,
stressing that not everyone is equally virtuous. 2 33 On this point, Strauss's
notion of political practice can be fruitfully contrasted with that advocated by Arendt.
For Arendt, a healthy politics is an agonistic politics of open, neverending debate; a politics that takes place in a public realm free of
force and coercion, upon a 'stage' suitable for the expression of human plurality and civic equality. For Strauss, a healthy politics is one
in which the gentry or gentlemen rule; in which the passions of the
demos are restrained by the virtues of their betters; in which enough
order and freedom are present for the pursuit of philosophy; and in
which philosophers can stand as potential 'umpires' over politicalmoral disputes. 234
Regardless of Strauss's intentions and the sparseness of his overtly
political writings, he has wielded considerable sway as the so-called
"godfather" of neoconservatism.235 Neocons such as Irving Kristol and
Allan Bloom echoed Straussian themes with their attacks on the ethical
relativism of modernity and the substantive vacuity of pluralist democracy. 2 36 They called for a renewed "moral clarity" that harkened back to the

228. See STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 130-32.
229. Id. at 132.
230. Id. at 132-33.
231.
Id. at 133.
232. Tarcov & Pangle, supra note 25, at 933. "[I]t could no longer be denied that Communism
will remain, as long as it lasts in fact and not merely in name, the iron rule of a tyrant .... "
STRAUSS, CITY, supra note 25, at 5.
233. STRAUSS, NATURAL, supra note 25, at 134-35, 140-1. The masses form and follow opinions, but the elite seek the truth. See id. at 12.
234. VILLA, POLITICS, supra note 25, at 156. George Kateb categorizes Arendt as being hyperdemocratic, wanting more democracy. KATEB, QUESTIONABLE, supra note 25, at 30. Kateb categorizes, Strauss as being "antidemocratic" and "authoritarian" Id. at 39.
235.

DOUGLAS MURRAY, NEOCONSERVATISM: WHY WE NEED IT 30 (2006).

236. E.g., ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 38-39 (1987) (attacking
relativism).
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republican democratic concepts of virtue and the common good.23 7 They
denounced liberal social engineering programs, such as affirmative action, as being grounded on falsities propagated by hubristic social scientists. 2 38 Moreover, because the neocons exerted political power during
Republican presidencies, several neoconservative oriented Justices have
been appointed to the Supreme Court and have subsequently brought
neoconservative themes to bear in their decisions and opinions, especially those related to constitutional jurisprudence. 2 39 The now standard conservative invocation of originalism denotes a desire to return to a pre1937 republican democratic style of judicial review. For instance, the
neoconservative emphasis on virtue and moral clarity has surfaced in
several free expression-religious freedom cases where the Court has required the government to provide funding or public building access to
organizations spreading religious messages. 240 In the Establishment
Clause context, neoconservative Justices, such as Clarence Thomas and
Antonin Scalia, have attacked the 'wall' metaphor, which suggests that
church and state are strictly separated. Maintaining that the wall metaphor is too hostile to religious values, they instead have advocated for
non-preferentialism: the government, according to this viewpoint, cannot
prefer one religion over another but otherwise can favor religion over
irreligion.24 1 Supposedly following an originalist approach, Thomas has
gone so far as to argue that state and local governments should be constitutionally permitted to establish religion. 24 2 n short, while pluralist democracy remains predominant, the 6migr6s' dissenting voices have made
(and continue to make) their marks in American political thought and
government.

237.
See, e.g., William Kristol, Postscript-June2004: Neoconservatism Remains the Bedrock
of US. Foreign Policy (2004), reprinted in THE NEOCON READER 75, 75 (Irwin Stelzer ed., 2004);
Murray, supranote 235, at 46; IRVING KRISTOL, NEOCONSERVATISM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN

IDEA 238, 247-48 (1995) (invoking republican democratic concepts).
238.

NATHAN

GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION:

ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC

POLICY (Basic Books 1978) (1975).
239.
Stephen M. Feldman, Conservative Eras in Supreme Court Decision Making: Employment Division v. Smith, Judicial Restraint, and Neoconservatism, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 1791, 1803
(2011) (discussing Justices Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Roberts as neoconservative Justices).
240.
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102-03, 111-12 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23, 840-45 (1995).
241.
E.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 757-60, 769
(1995) (holding, with Scalia majority opinion, that the private display of a large Christian cross on
public property did not violate establishment clause); see Robert H. Bork, Slouching Towards Gomorrah 289 (1996) (explaining non-preferentialism).
242.
Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 852-55 (Thomas, J., concurring).

ARAB SPRING, LIBYAN LIBERATION AND THE
EXTERNALLY IMPOSED DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
HAIDER ALA HAMOUDIt
For generations, the United States of America has played a unique
role as an anchor of global security and advocate for human freedom.
Mindful of the risks and costs of military action, we are naturally reluctant to use force to solve the world's many challenges. But when
our interests and values are at stake, we have a responsibility to act.
-Barack Obama, March 28, 2011 (justifying the NATO intervention
in Libya).
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary events in the Arab world should cause us to wonder
what happened to our commitment to the democratic revolution. America's understanding of its own role in supporting democratic orders is, as
a result of the so-called Arab Spring, as confused as it has ever been. I
hope in these few pages to expound upon these ideas of democractic
commitments and their consequences, which must command greater consideration.
In particular, I want to explore a central irony in our times concerning the externally imposed democratic revolution.2 On the one hand,
many of us across the entire American political spectrum adhere to the
principle of democratic rule as core normative commitment.3 We believe
in a moral conception of government wherein authority may only derive
its powers from the consent of the governed, a principle reflected in two
cornerstone and foundational documents that conceptualized human
rights in modernity-the Universal Declaration of Human Rights4 and
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
t
1. Ben Feller, Obama Libya Speech Strongly Defends Intervention, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 28, 2011, 8:28 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/28/obama-libya-speechn_841311 .html#text (for the full text of the speech, follow the hyperlink at the end of the article).
I should note at the outset that I borrow the term "externally imposed revolution" from
2.
Andrew Arato's commendable work on the Iraq Constitution. ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION
MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION: THE POLITICS OF IMPOSED REVOLUTION IN IRAQ 1 (2009).

Again, President Obama's speech justifying the Libya intervention is instructive. While
3.
offering a litany of reasons as to why humanitarian intervention was justified, in a manner described
more fully in Part IV hereof, the President made an implicit reference to something akin to a "domino theory" of tyranny that offered a robust commitment to support the democratic "impulses" that
had to that time convulsed the Arab world. See Feller,supra note 1.
4.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 21, 1 3, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(lll) (Dec. 10, 1948) ("The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.").
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the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. On the other
hand, there seems to be a broad consensus that views forcible regime
change of tyrannies into regimes of democratic rule as a per se illegitimate interference into the affairs of other nations, a position likewise
conceptualized as foundational in the United Nations Charter. Where
our praise for democracy is nearly universal, and there is no end to the
laudations we are willing to heap upon citizens who are willing to sacrifice their lives and their freedom in its name in their own tyrannical
states, 7 we grow timid when asked to bear similar burdens abroad. We
are worried that somehow to do so would be to engage in "unsupervised
meddling in the processes of choice within other states,"8 and that it
would therefore lack popular legitimacy.
The distinction as between our professed faith in democracy and our
almost politically correct unwillingness to "impose" it on other states is
remarkable, and in some ways conceptually difficult to support. For if a
people are the true foundation of the legitimacy of its government, then
by what right, and under what conception, could it possibly be that foreign intervention to remove a tyrant and restore to the people their natural right to rule themselves be itself denied legitimacy? How can the legitimacy of the state be judged as against the authority granted to it by its
people on the one hand, and by the position of a despot supported by no
such authority on the other? How can any reasonable person who takes
her normative commitment to democracy seriously claim that in a conflict between a foreign invader committed to restoring democratic rule
and an unspeakable tyrant committed to denying it, legitimacy to rule lies
necessarily, ipso facto, with the tyrant by virtue of nothing other than
nationality? The irony is particularly disturbing when the repression is
itself foreign, albeit undertaken at the request of the tyrant. That is to say,
somehow there is international legitimacy in Saudi Arabia providing
troops at the Bahraini tyrant's request in order to repress a popular uprising.9 Illegitimacy would have ensued only if a nation somehow intervened to support the Bahraini people against a remorseless tyrannical
monarchical family utterly lacking in the most basic understandings of
5.
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, art. 25,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966) ("Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, ... without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors . . .. ").
6. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting the threat or use of force against the political
independence or territorial sovereignty of member states).
7.
For a recent noteworthy example relating to the Arab Spring in particular, see Nicholas D.
Kristof,Release My Friend!,N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2011, at A27.
8.
W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 82,
89 (2003).
9. See Ethan Bronner & Michael Slackman, Saudis, Fearful of1ran, Send Troops to Bahrain
to Quell Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2011, at Al (describing the entry of Saudi troops into Bahrain at the Bahraini monarch's request for the purposes of suppressing a popular uprising).
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decency, let alone tolerance.' 0 To the committed democrat, something is
amiss under such a conception.
We strain hard to find our ways out of this morass of respect for
sovereignty on the one hand and commitment to democracy on the other.
We search for any plausible reason, no matter how irrelevant or beside
the point, to justify intervention to institute democratic rule. In other
words, at times we seek to institute democratic rule, but we look for a
different reason to justify our action. It is as if the democratic commitment in such matters is something to be embarrassed by rather than to be
proud of.
The most popular form of indirect legitimation of democratic intervention involves hinging the regime change to some other, more recognized form of international interference with sovereignty. Most notably,
it is legitimate, experts maintain, to engage in regime change in particular circumstances where there was a preexisting reason to initiate war in
the first place, as in Japan after the Second World War, or Afghanistan
following the events of September 11, 2001." While such sorts of inter10. The outrages committed by the Bahraini government against its own people are well
documented by respected human rights organizations and are described to some extent later in this
Article. Such outrages include systematic attacks on those who provided medical care to protestors,
as well as the injured protestors themselves, Bahrain: Systematic Attacks on Medical Providers,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 18, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/18/bahrain-systematicattacks-medical-providers; dismissals of workers and expulsions of students for participating in prodemocracy rallies, Bahrain: Revoke Summary Firings Linked to Protests, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July
14, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/14/bahrain-revoke-summary-firings-linked-protests;
the killing of dozens of protestors engaged in peaceful protests, including a 14-year-old boy, Teenage Activist Killed in Bahrain Protest, AMNESTY
INT'L (Aug.
31,
2011),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/teenage-activist-killed-bahrain-protest-2011-08-31;
and the prosecution of teachers by military tribunal, Teachers to Be Tried By a Military Court,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
2011),
23,
INT'L
(Aug.
AMNESTY
Such inciMDE11/043/2011/en/dd5fdlea-alde-406c-b69b-f56328aaf5a0/mdel10432011en.pdf.
dents have continued unabated long after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, often meeting
with denials on the part of the Bahraini authorities that border on the farcical. Hence, for example, at
the end of January, 2012, a nineteen year old opposition figure was arrested and died while in police
custody, after being allegedly run over by a police car. The Bahraini government claims he was
never injured by the police, and in fact died of "natural causes"; specifically, sickle cell anemia.
CNN Wire Staff, 4 Killed in Protests in Bahrain, Opposition Group Says, CNN, (Jan. 27, 2012,
12:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/27/world/meast/bahrain-unrest/index.html?iref-allsearch.
In addition, the Bahraini government commissioned a group of experts, led by the well-respected M.
Cherif Bassiouni, to investigate complaints about human rights abuses committed during the height
of the uprising in February and March of 2011. That report, despite its being commissioned by the
Bahraini monarch, contains devastating allegations respecting police misconduct and broad human
rights abuses. See BAHRAIN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, REPORT OF THE BAHRAIN

INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (2011), http://files.bici.org.bhfBICireportEN.pdf. These are
but a fraction of the reported incidents of gross human rights violations designed to impede democratic rule. For further details on these and other matters, see the websites of both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.
I1. Citing the example of Kosovo, the inestimable public international law scholar Michael
Reisman indicates that "regime change may be internationally lawful when it is the contextually
appropriate instrument of an intrinsically lawful action." Reisman, supra note 8, at 89 (emphasis in
original); see also ARATO, supra note 2, at 34 (pointing out that one distinction as between Germany
and Japan after the Second World War on the one hand and Iraq on the other was that the former two
states were the aggressors in their respective conflicts).
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vention have a long and storied modem history, from Germany 2 and
Japan to Cambodia" and Uganda,14 the potential for their use has grown
exponentially as a new (to date, still controversial) basis for intervention
into the affairs of sovereign states has arisen. This is the "responsibility
to protect," designed to prevent future humanitarian catastrophes that
resemble the Rwandan genocide of 1994.'" Indeed, in contemporary Libya it was precisely this doctrine, and the concomitant endorsement of the
principle by the Security Council,' 6 that President Obama and NATO
made use of to initiate hostilities against Qaddafi's regime.'
Yet this approach raises its own concerns, in the first place because
of the obvious opportunity for doublespeak it affords. The Security
Council Resolution that authorized force against Libya quite evidently
did not authorize regime change in favor of democratic rule and against
brutal tyranny.' 8 Yet it is difficult to maintain that NATO's bombing
campaign was designed (at least beyond its earliest stages) to protect
civilians from a humanitarian catastrophe rather than to remove a globally despised tyrant who had rendered his nation a caricature and replace
his regime with a democratic government.1' If NATO is permitted to
12.

The reference here, of course, is to the well-known occupation of Germany following the

Second World War. PETER H. MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC 6 (1963).

13.

Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 to put an end to the Khmer Rouge regime, which had

in four years caused 1.7 million deaths. BEN KIERNAN, THE POL POT REGIME: RACE, POWER, AND
GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA UNDER THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-79, at 450-52 (3d ed. 2008); Khmer

Rouge, Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations
/k/khmer rouge/index.html (last updated Nov. 21, 2011).
14. After various border clashes, Tanzania invaded Uganda to end the horrific rule of Idi
Amin, whose human rights violations, including the murder of hundreds of thousands of civilians,
were legendary. TONY AVIRGAN & MARTHA HONEY, WAR IN UGANDA: THE LEGACY OF IDI AMIN
76(1982).
15.
Carlo Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and HumanitarianIntervention:
Too Many Ambiguitiesfor a Working Doctrine, 13 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 191, 191-94 (2008).
16. S.C. Res. 1973, 1| 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
17. Obama's principal reliance on a responsibility to protect was unambiguous. Feller, supra
note I ("Gaddafi declared that he would show 'no mercy' to his own people. He compared them to
rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment. In the past, we had seen him hang
civilians in the streets, and kill over a thousand people in a single day. Now, we saw regime forces
on the outskirts of the city. We knew that if we waited one more day, Benghazi-a city nearly the
size of Charlotte-could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the region and
stained the conscience of the world. It was not in our national interest to let that happen. I refused to
let that happen. And so nine days ago, after consulting the bipartisan leadership of Congress, I authorized military action to stop the killing and enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1973.").
18. Security Council Resolution 1973 in fact only authorizes force "to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi,
while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory." S.C. Res.
1973, supra note 16, 14.
19. This matter, respecting the extent to which NATO was more engaged in regime change
than it was in protecting civilians, at least beyond its initial stages, is the subject of Part IV. It suffices to note for now, however, that the seeming disjunction between NATO's stated aims of humanitarian intervention and its apparent, ultimate objective of regime change was not a matter that went
without comment in the popular media. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Libya's Dark Lesson for NATO,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2011, at SR4 ("More than six budget-busting months against one of the weakest
militaries in the world, with shortages of planes, weapons and ammunition that were patched over by
the pretense that NATO was acting simply to 'protect civilians,' when it was clear to everyone that
the alliance was intervening on one side of a civil war . . . .").
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clothe its regime change efforts under the dubious pretext of responsibility to protect, this merely privileges the next international actor seeking
pretext to engage in regime change to do the same. This may be well and
good to the extent that such interventions are humanitarian efforts to
institute democratic rule, but when undertaken for more nefarious purposes (acquisition of territory, intimidation of weaker neighbor, creation
of a pliable client state), the problems with doublespeak and pretext in
undertaking intervention become quite apparent.
Moreover, even if regime change could be justified as a means to
vindicate some other recognized principle of international law and relations, it is difficult to see how the imposition of democratic rule once
regime change was undertaken could be similarly justified. Nothing in
the Hague Convention grants the right to an occupier, justified or not in
its occupation, to institute democratic reform.20 Thus, resistance to such
reforms by even small numbers of post conflict elites would render such
reforms potentially suspect. Indeed by the standard of the Hague Convention, it was the Japanese Matsumoto Commission and not the United
States that had the better legal argument respecting the nature of the constitutional change to which Japan should be subjected."
The essential problem therefore remains-we believe in democracy,
and we seek to spread it, but are desperate to deny ourselves any right to
do so, engaging in any manner of subversion or deception to mask our
true intentions, as if we were in such ventures truly out to steal oil rather
than help to fulfill what we believe to be legitimate national aspirations
of other peoples.
While perhaps longstanding, this confusion respecting the role of
external powers in fomenting or supporting a domestic democratic revolution reached something of a crisis point with the eruption of the Arab
Spring. In state after Arab state, from Morocco in the west 2 2 to Bahrain23

In fact, the Hague Convention IV prohibits an occupier from making any change to the
20.
laws in force in the territory occupied "unless absolutely prevented." Convention Between the United States and Other Powers Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
Shortly after the war, a panel of senior Japanese legal scholars proposed a draft constitu21.
tion that bore a very close resemblance to Japan's historic Meiji Constitution, effectively retaining
the general legal and political regime of the state as it had long existed. RAY A. MOORE & DONALD
L. ROBINSON,

PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY:

CRAFTING THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER

MACARTHUR 74 (2002). It was the United States that objected, drafting an alternative, radically
different Constitution in a matter of days and insisting on its enactment in the place of the Meiji
Constitution. Id at 106-08. By any reasonable standpoint, the United States had not adhered to the
terms of the Hague Convention IV in demanding such a radical change, in favor of liberal democracy, to territory under its occupation.
22.
Max Fisher, Will Morocco Be the Arab Spring's Next Greatest Success-or Great Failure?,
THE
ATLANTIC
(July
1,
2011,
6:59
AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2011/07/will-morocco-be-the-arab-springs-greatsuccess-or-great-failure/241286/.

704

DENTVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:3

and Yemen in the east,2 4 millions of protestors crowded the Arab streets,
demanding in most cases regime change, and this on the most basic of
democratic principles-because, to cite the familiar refrain heard by these brave demonstrators, "the people want the fall of the regime." 2 5 The
demand deserves emphasis. That these convulsions were self-evidently
democratic in spirit is demonstrated by that near uniform refrain, originating in Tunisia and widely popularized in Egypt's Tahrir Square, respecting "the people's" demand.26 The claim was neither that Mubarak
had transgressed against God, nor that Asad had failed to uphold the
principles of shari'a,but rather that the people had chosen to strip their
respective regimes of legitimacy, and that was enough. Learned scholars
had long told us that in this region law divorced from Islam would have
no legitimacy-that the only legal rules that could function would be
those believed to be from God. 27 Yet political legitimacy was being lo-

23. Cynthia Johnston, Bahrain Seeks Calm, Opposition Demands Constitution, REUTERS
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/16/us-bahrain(Feb.
16,
2011,
6:48
idUSTRE7IE7FS20110216.
24. Cynthia Johnston & Frederick Richter, Old GuardFights Back Across Region: Protesters
in Bahrain to Bury Their DeadFriday After ProtestsAgainst Sunni-Minority Monarchy, EDMONTON
J., (Feb. 18, 2011), http://VWww2.canada.com/edmontonjoumal/news/story.html?id=elf91032-cl214c23-8a26-c6a6ffab0c90&p=1.
25. Haider Ala Hamoudi, The PEOPLE Want the Fallof the Regime, ISLAMIC LAW INOUR
TIMES: OR FOAM FROM A CAMEL'S MOUTH, SPEWING AND SUBSIDING (July 26, 2011, 1:37 PM),

http://muslimlawprof.org/2011/07/26/the-people-want-the-fall-of-the-regime-and-norwegianterrorism.aspx.
26. See Marwa Awad & Hugo Dixon, The Art of Revolution: Egypt's Nonviolent Warriors,
THE DAILY STAR (Apr. 14, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Apr/14/The-art-ofrevolution-Egypts-nonviolent-warriors.ashx#axzzleTZGOg3O (describing chants in Tahrir Square);
J. David Goodman, Tunisian Protesters Watch Mubarak Trial with Envy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15,
2011, 2:03 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/tunisian-protesters-watch-mubaraktrial-with-envy/; Hundreds Arrested in Syria Sweep: Activists, ABC NEWS (May 2, 2011, 2:56 PM),
Johnhttp://www.abc.net.aulnews/2011-05-02/hundreds-arrested-in-syria-sweep-activists/2697630;
ston, supra note 23; Johnston & Richter, supra note 24; So Far,So Pretty Good: Amid Trepidation,
the New Regime Is Making a Remarkably Hopeful Start, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2011, at 63.
27. Perhaps the most well-known and deeply respected proponents of such a theory is the
inestimable Wael Hallaq, who indicates in a notable essay as follows:
[A]n explanation must be provided as to the assumption underlying this question, namely,
the posited necessity for today's Muslims to live by a religious law. Since the middle of
the nineteenth century, Muslim societies have embarked on a course of identity crisis
caused, among other things, by the disappearance from their daily lives of the religious
structures that sustained them for over a millennium. One of these structures, and a central one at that, was Islamic law as a religious and pragmatic system. To say that this law
was "the core and kernel" of Islamic life is indeed to state the obvious. Thus, for these
societies to regain their cultural and religious identities, a form of Islamic law must obtain-and this for two good reasons. First, historically, Islamic societies have lived by a
religious law for over twelve centuries, and what made their identities what they have always been was their possession of a particular legal phenomenon. Islam has always been
a nomocracy. Indeed, Islamic societies and polities have throughout these centuries exemplified the highest form of what a nomocracy can be. Second, it is at present inconceivable that Muslims can or will want to transform their Weltanschauung into a Western
model of rationality and secularism. They view the modernity of the West as incompatible with their vision of morality and ethics, as having miserably failed in maintaining the
social fabric and in creating a coherent worldview or a meaningful cosmology. The truth
claims of Western reason and modernity seem diametrically oppositional and extremely
antithetical to the Islamic ethos. The "return to Islam" that we have been witnessing since
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cated by its masses in a different place altogether, one recognizable to
any committed democrat-with the people. Suddenly earnest and learned
efforts to undertake the "challenge" of finding liberal democracy
Islamically compatible seemed to have the problem precisely backward.2 8 It is the Islamist who has the challenge, who must justify recognition of shari'ain a polity that as a core normative matter locates political legitimacy not with God, but the people. 2 9 America's earlier attempts
at democratic revolution in the region, in the form of Iraq, had not only
led to (qualified) success, 30 but the notion had managed to spread
throughout the entire Arab region, to say nothing of Iran.
the Iranian Revolution is partly caused by this disenchantment with Western culture and
its products.
Wael B. Hallaq, Can the Shari'a Be Restored?, in ISLAMIC LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF
MODERNITY 21, 42-43 (Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & Barbara Freyer Stowasser eds., 2004). The
Arab Spring demonstrations do considerable violence to this essentialist position respecting the
importance of shari'a in modem Muslim societies. As is demonstrated in the main text, far from
rejecting "the truth claims of Western reason," these demonstrators quite self-evidently adopted truth
claims set forth in the Declaration of Independence (respecting the right of the people to alter or
abolish a government) and the Gettysburg Address (respecting government of, for and by the people)
more than anything in Islamic political history. This is not to say that Arab democrats seek to replicate their Western counterparts entirely and without modification, or even that, within a generally
secular polity, some role for Islamic law might well be retained. It is to say that the notion that there
is some starkly different political worldview at play in the Arab world is an increasingly difficult one
to support. To the extent this is so in the Arab world, it is emphatically even truer in those Muslim
states that have managed the transition to democratic and largely (though not necessarily entirely)
secular political regimes tolerably well, among them Turkey and Indonesia. See Landon Thomas Jr.,
Turkey Prospers by Turning East, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2010, at Al (describing Turkey's rise as a
regional economic power); Amelia H.C. Ylagan, Corporate Watch, Bus. WORLD (July 13, 2009),
2009 WLNR 13279690 (describing the effort by Morgan Stanley to include Indonesia as one of the
world's rapidly developing and influential economies, on par with Brazil, China, India and Russia).
28.

See generally KHALED ABou EL FADL, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY

(Joshua Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds., 2004).
To be clear, the challenge to the Islamist, to justify the use of religious law and religious
29.
argument in a liberal democratic state, is not an insurmountable one. This is a topic that has been the
subject of some debate between two of the greatest political philosophers of our era, Habermas and
Rawls. Compare Jurgen Habermas, Religion in the Public Sphere, 14 EUR. J. PHIL. 1, 8-9 (2006)
(arguing in favor of resort to religious argument as being compatible with liberal citizenship), with
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 213 (expanded ed. 2005) (suggesting that argument must be

grounded in "public reason" accessible to all citizens). In addition, specifically in the Islamic context, Abdullahi An-Na'im has advocated a form of secular citizenship that more closely resembles
that of Rawls than Habermas, suggesting that ideal citizens would make resort to "civic reason."
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF
SHARI'A 7 (2008). In any event, it is not my purpose to contribute to this rich and enlightening
debate, but only to point out that the core normative political commitment among those who insist
the regime must fall because the "people" demand it is to popular democratic rule. All else, including the use of religious law, must be justified in relation to that, and not the reverse.
Respecting the limited, but real, success of the Iraqi democratic experiment after obvious
30.
initial difficulties, see Babak Dehghanpisheh et al., Rebirth ofa Nation, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 2010, at
31.
Iran's recent "Green Revolution" likewise arose because of broad suspicions that the
31.
results of its 2008 presidential election had been manipulated so as to ensure a victory for the conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. See Mark Tran & Julian Borger, Iran Elections: Ahmadinejad to
be Sworn in as President by August, GUARDIAN (June 23, 2009, 7:25 AM),
The protestors then
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/23/iran-guardian-council-results.
continued to voice opposition even after the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamane'i, had urged them to
cease. Sadegh Zibakalam, Dismissing Iran 's 'Greens' Is Premature, THE DAILY STAR (May 10,
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/May/10/Dismissing-Irans-
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And yet, during the Arab Spring and throughout its continuing aftermath, confusion has reigned respecting America's preferred response
to such broad vindications of its core normative values. This confusion is
caused, to some extent, by the obfuscation respecting America's supposed "responsibility to protect" civilians against slaughter. To take the
simplest example, if one regards the rhetoric respecting humanitarian
intervention seriously, it remains difficult to understand precisely what to
make of evolving attitudes toward Syria. The use of force by NATO,
akin to that used in Libya ostensibly to protect civilians, has never been
seriously contemplated, though Syria's regime has killed far more civilians than Qaddafi ever had an opportunity to. 32 Yet in contrast with Libya, American policy is decidedly confused.
On the one hand, there have been important expressions of sympathy with the Syrian democrats. This is best illustrated by the remarkable
and courageous decision of the United States Ambassador Robert Ford,
to visit areas where protests were strong and to meet with opposition
leaders at great risk to his own personal safety.33 The United States was
also quick to express outrage and even expel diplomats when particularly
gruesome reports of a civilian massacre appeared in the media. 34
Yet at the same time, the United States appears determined to work
exclusively within the United Nations, where it is obvious that nothing
substantive will be achieved because of continuing, well established Russian opposition. 35 As a result, there is no talk of a no-fly zone, or a safe
haven, or any other form of meaningful pressure. There is only, instead, a
U.N. endorsed peace plan that is so far from being implemented that it
bears scant resemblance to reality on the ground,36 and the dispatch of
greens-is-premature.ashx#ixzzlcrCJ2ZVq. Given the Supreme Leader's putative role as God's
representative "discovered" by humanity, the refusal to heed his wishes speaks volumes respecting
the extent to which the Iranian protesters held tightly to core democratic political commitments. See
Haider Ala Hamoudi, A State Which Claims Its Supreme LeaderIs 'Discovered' Has a Very Difficult
Time Running Itself by and Through Law, THE DAILY STAR (Oct. 1, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Law/Oct/0l/A-state-which-claims-its-supreme-leader-is-discoveredhas-a-very-difficult-time-running-itself-by-and.ashx#axzzlcrBX30vO (describing the role of Supreme Leader as being one divinely ordained within the Iranian political system).
32. As of March 27, 2012, the United Nations estimated that 9000 civilians had been killed in
the continuing Syrian assault on protestors. Louis Charbonneau & Michelle Nichols, U.N. Raises
Syria Death Toll Estimate to More than 9000, REUTERS (March 27, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/27/us-syria-toll-idUSBRE82QS820120327. By contrast, on
March 10, 2011, approximately two weeks from the imposition of the "no fly zone," CNN had
reported that between 1,000 and 2,000 protesters in Libya had been killed. Rebel Leader Calls for
"Immediate Action"
on No-Fly Zone, CNN
(Mar.
10,
2011,
5:02
AM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2011l/WORLD/africa/03/09/libya.civil.war/index.html.
33. David Hartwell, US. Ambassador to Return to Syria, GLOB. INSIGHT (Dec. 7,2011).
34. Elizabeth A. Kennedy, Nations Expel Syrian Envoys: Houla MassacreCould Prove To Be
Watershed Moment; U.S. Joins Eight Other Countries In Ousting Diplomats, AssoC. PRESS, May
30, 2012.
35. Patrick J. McDonnell, U.S.-Russia Clash on Syria Grows Louder, L.A. TIMES, June 1,
2012, at 3.
36. Elizabeth A. Kennedy, Analysts: Diplomacy Failing In Syria U.N. Blames Regime for the
Latest Round ofKillings, Violence, ASSOC. PRESS, July 14, 2012.
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corresponding toothless U.N. monitoring teams to Syria, which repeatedly demand the Syrian government to take action to limit civilian casualties, to no discernible effect. 7
Meanwhile, the situation appears to drag on, and democratic reform
within Syria seems less likely than civil war. Indeed, the International
Committee for the Red Cross has recently declared that the conflict has
reached the stage where it must be referred to as civil war.38 Precisely
how Syria has managed to earn such broad deference from the world's
democracies, while Libya did not, and under what normative or legal
conception all of this might be justified, remains a mystery. Certainly it
appears to have nothing whatsoever to do with a responsibility to protect
civilians from massacre.
In Bahrain, the rhetoric is even milder notwithstanding the popular
protests against it that convulsed the nation in February and March of
2011,39 and have continued sporadically through the start of 2012, demanding, once again, the fall of the regime. The problem, it seems, is not
so much that the Arab people have a problem locating legitimacy in rule
of the people. They have risked their lives to do so. It is more that NA TO
and the United States seem to have a hard time articulating these ideals,
exported though they are from the West, against the tyrannies that repress the same Arab people.
In other words, all of this obfuscation respecting responsibilities to
protect and the repeal of legitimacy from one state and not another suggests something deeply disturbing to the democrat-namely, that legitimacy to rule exists for tyrants under certain geopolitical circumstances
that have nothing to do with a constitutive conferring of that authority by
their people. This is hardly a realization of our democratic ideals. We
need a new formulation, one that does not bestow legitimacy upon some
repressive tyrants and not others.
This is not to say that the United States will realistically be engaging in regime change across the globe as against undemocratic regimes.
It is self-evident that any nation, the United States by no means an exception, will for a variety of reasons treat similarly situated nations differently. Yet let us call it what it is-pragmatic and painful accommodation to
geopolitical reality that has nothing to do with any particular tyrant's
legitimacy. Qaddafi had no legitimacy to rule when it became apparent
that his people conferred no authority upon him, and this (and not some
mythical responsibility to protect) is the reason that NATO found it justified to remove him. For strategic reasons, it may not always be expedient
37.
Id.
Neil MacFarquhar, Syria Denies Attack on Civilians, in Crisis Seen as Civil War, N.Y.
38.
TIMES, July 16, 2012, at A6.
39.
Joby Warrick & Michael Bimbaum, Questions as Bahrain Stifles Revolt, WASH. POST,
Apr. 15, 2011, at Al.
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to treat similar despots, those in Bahrain and in Syria for example, similarly. We can if we must negotiate with a tyrant. Yet this is not a reason
to deem that tyrant as possessing any sort of legitimacy to rule. When a
Bahraini monarch calls in a foreign army to put down protesters chanting
"the people want the fall of a regime," let us not suggest, even by implication, that the actions of such a monarch are entitled to any sort of respect on the basis of misguided notions of sovereignty. They cannot be,
as it is no more legitimate to a democrat to deny one's people their right
to rule than it is legitimate to deny another people a right to rule themselves. Suppression of popular uprising should be no more legitimate
than foreign invasion, even if each, from time to time, is tolerated, again
out of geopolitical necessity.
Put differently, if deference to Realpolitik limits our abilities, as is
probably inevitable, at the very least it should not limit our idealistic and
romantic normative commitments in favor of the democratic revolutionaries. Put into concrete terms, Libya, in the end, would have gone the
way of Bahrain had NATO chosen not to intervene in its affairs. If there
are sound geopolitical reasons that the removal of Qaddafi proves more
sanguine than that of Bahrain's tyrant monarch, then so be it, but let us at
least be honest respecting what these leaders are-unspeakable tyrants
with not an ounce of legitimate authority to undertake the actions they
did. The political legitimacy belongs in both cases to one and only one
entity-the people.
To be clear, this is not to say that all revolutions are democratic, and
that each popular upheaval deserves the support of those committed to
democracy. Patently, this is not true. A normative commitment to democracy as an ideal form of government is not the same as a messianic
and near-maniacal belief in its universal appeal to everyone, everywhere
at every time. It should be self-evident that populations overcome by
religious fervor, or obsessed with Marxist utopias, have in the past engaged in uprisings that were not premised on the principle of democratic
rule.4 0 This is to say nothing of poorer societies where states and effective state institutions are quite weak. 4 1 In such a state, the nature of national citizenship would be a difficult one to sustain among much of the
population, let alone democratic participation in the state. To attempt
democracy in such circumstances is a project doomed if not to failure,
then to substantial disappointment. I do not therefore quibble with the
proposition that one cannot effectively "impose" democracy on a state
that does not seek it. I do contest with some force the notion that a state
can be understood not to desire democracy merely because its institutions
40. See infra Part II.B for one such example, 1979 Iran, in detail.
Some commentators have described Yemen in this fashion. See, e.g., Ginny Hill, Yemen:
41.
Security and the Collapsing State, BBC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2011,
12:18 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-l 1482963.
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have been captured by a tyrant who has managed to effectively suppress
his people.
External intervention is not precisely what comes to mind when one
speaks of a "democratic revolution." Usually, the idea is of democratic
revolutions of a different sort, indigenous ones. Foreign intervention, by
contrast, is dismissed as some sort of externally provoked coup rather
than what it has the potential to be, which is an externally supported
democratic revolution.. This is unfortunate, and in the balance of the
Article, I hope to demonstrate that if our normative commitment to democratic rule is as we say it is, we should not shy away from such democratic interventions (any more than we need be embarrassed by democratic revolution) but embrace them unapologetically and fervently, even
if for tactical and strategic reasons we are obviously unable to advance
them universally.
Part Two sets forth the manner in which the externally imposed
democratic regime change can and should be thought of more as a form
of democratic revolution than externally imposed coup. Part Two further
suggests that just as not all external impositions are illegitimate efforts to
acquire territory or create a neighboring client-state, so all internal revolutions are not necessarily democratic. A premier example of a nondemocratic revolution might be 1979 Iran, which stands in stark contrast with
the very democratic revolutions that currently convulse the Arab world
(and have shaken Iran in the recent past). Part Three of this Article outlines an alternative vision, one which rescues the democratic revolution
more fully, and clarifies the role of external agency in bringing it about.
Part Three also lays out how these ideas more fully conform to American
ideals in the context of the Arab Spring. Part Four, through the example
of Libya, demonstrates that in many ways the vision laid out herein is
already largely American policy. As a result, what is currently required is
not a fundamental reworking of American commitments and its actions
in relation thereto so much as a more honest expression of what those
commitments are, and their relationship to the externally imposed democratic revolution.
II.DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONS, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL

A. Coups, Revolutions, Reforms and the Democratic Transformationof
the State
Perhaps it is best to begin by attempting to characterize precisely
what it is that is happening in the Arab world through the Arab Spring.
One possibility that can be immediately dismissed is to describe the recent events as being a series of coups.
42.

See Reisman, supra note 8, at 89.
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A conventional definition of a "coup" tends to involve the following
elements: (1) a very quick transformation over a matter of days, (2) necessarily entailing violence, (3) in which the leaders of the state are replaced by other leaders, (4) involving a small number of individuals with
some measure of political power, and (5) motivated by greed. 4 3 COups
are also most often taken in secret and therefore lack any sort of public
accountability." So defined and so understood, coups almost surely are
not grounded in any sense of popular legitimacy and would be problematic to any committed democrat.
Quite plainly, the events of the Arab Spring do not come close to
fitting this model. In fact, there is not a single criterion among those
above that would apply to the Arab Spring uprisings. Some of the criteria
are absolutely not met-for example, the transformation in Libya took
more than six months. 45 The notion that most of the other criteria have
been met could only be described as risible in its inaccuracy. These protests that led to the fall of the respective regimes were not just grounded
in popular legitimacy; they originated and sustained themselves on the
backs of tens of thousands of ordinary men and women who bravely took
to the streets seeking the fall of tyrants and the restoration of their human
dignity-at much risk to their lives and their fortunes in their respective
states. 46 Militaries may have been involved, either as caretakers following the deposing of a president in the case of Egypt, or in a blanket refusal to defend a tyrant in the case of Tunisia, but it was the people that
drove the transformation.47 To describe them as insiders, or motivated by
greed, or even relying upon the threat of violence to achieve their ends, is
to mischaracterize their motivations and their aspirations considerably.

43.

STEVEN R. DAVID, THIRD WORLD COUPS D'ETAT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 8

(1987).
44.

PAUL BROOKER, NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: THEORY, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 63

(2000).
45. The Libyan uprising began with a series of demonstrations on February 16, 2011, against
the rule of Libya's strong man, Col. Muammar Qaddafi. Alan Cowell, Protests Take Aim at Leader
of Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at A14. The outcome was not settled until more than half-ayear later, in August of 2011, when the rebels finally took control of Qaddafi's compound in Tripoli.
Libya: The Fall of Tripoli-Wednesday 24 August 2011, GUARDIAN MIDDLE E. LIVE BLOG (Aug.
24, 2011, 8:41 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/middle-east-live/201 1/aug/24/libya-rebelstake-gaddafi-compound-live-updates.
46. Thomas Friedman, TlAm a Man', N.Y. TIMES, May 15,2011, at WKIO.
47. See Aya Batrawy & Sarah El Deeb, Egyptians Mark First Anniversary of 'Friday of
Rage',
THE
SALT
LAKE
TRIBUNE
(Jan.
27,
2012,
1:15
PM),
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/world/53390704-68/military-protesters-mubarak-brotherhood.html.csp
(describing Egyptian military as having taken power upon Mubarak's ouster); Jonathan Eyal, Arab
Spring May End in Political Winter; Mid-East, North Africa Could Be Chaoticfor Years as Revolutions Stall, THE STRAITS TIMES (July 21, 2011), http://sun7stiqa.straitstimes.com/
World/Story/STIStory_250169.html (indicating that Tunisia's army refused to fire on protestors).
The role of the military as partial agent of the democratic transformation is described more fully in
Section Ill.B infra.
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I would continue, as I would certainly regard such a description as
appalling, but I need not, because I think it sufficiently obvious as not to
require further discussion.
Yet if the Arab Spring transformations are self-evidently not coups,
are they "revolutions"? Do they, that is, involve the type of massive legal
and constitutional structural changes that normally arise in a revolution,
achieved through extraconstitutional means? Here, the picture is more
mixed, mainly because it is difficult to know precisely how much formal
constitutional change there will in these states once the transformations
are complete. In Egypt, an elected legislature created a constitutional
assembly to draft a new permanent constitution, but that assembly was
promptly suspended by the judiciary.48 Later the military council disbanded the lower house of the legislature pursuant to a decision by the
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt ruling that its entire composition
was illegal. 4 9 The recently elected president, Mohammad Morsi, ordered
the lower house reinstated, this was challenged by the ruling military
council, which in turn has led to even more confusion and delay concerning the efforts to draft a new constitution.o
Given this, it is hard to know precisely what kind of state will
emerge in Egypt pending further developments. It is possible, however,
that the constitution will not look very different from that of the Mubarak
era. This may well be because the purpose of the protests was not so
much the creation of an entire new and transformational legal and political structure but rather the removal of a tyrant and the consequent realization of the democratic principles that already existed within the constitutional fabric that had been grievously abused by Mubarak. .
In Tunisia, the outcome is similarly uncertain, as elections for a
constitutional assembly were not held until the October of 2011." It is
not clear whether or not the changes to the constitution that the constitutional assembly since formed will undertake will likewise be conservative and limited in their scope, or more pervasive and transformational.

48.
Yasmine Saleb & Dina Zayed, Egyptian Court Blocks Creation of Constitutional Assembly, THE DAILY STAR (LEB.), Apr. 11, 2012.
49.
Nate Wright, Chaos and Fearin Cairo as Judges Shut Down FirstFree Parliament,THE
TIMES (LONDON), June 15, 2012, at 31.

50. Egypt Court Delays Ruling On Constitutional Addendum, Parliament Decree Until
17,
2012),
(July
ONLINE
AHRAM
Thursday,
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1 /64/47990/Egypt/ Politics-/Egypt-court-delays-ruling-onconstitutional-addend.aspx.
51.
See David D. Kirkpatrick, Tunisia Postpones Election, PossiblyAiding New Parties,N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2011, at Al 0; Paul Schemm, Tunisian Islamist Party Claims Election Victory, Set to
Dominate Writing of New Constitution, NEWSER (Oct. 24, 2011, 4:17 PM),
http://www.newser.com/article/d9qitbugO/tunisian-islamist-party-claims-election-victory-set-todominate-writing-of-new-constitution.html.
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Libya's elections were only held in the summer of 2012 and thus
the outcome in that state is in some ways even harder to predict. 5 2 Nevertheless, while the precise structure of the future state certainly remains
uncertain, it is hard to believe that whatever emerges will be anything but
entirely transformed in a fundamental fashion, given that Col. Qaddafi
has over the past several decades created a state structure that can only
be described as bizarre and therefore unlikely to survive. The three
states thus might offer three very different outcomes as concerns the substantive extent of formal legal and constitutional change undertaken.
What about process? Are these changes more reforms than revolutions? That is, is some sort of principle of legality being followed? In
Libya, surely extralegal means were necessary to effect the change, as
Qaddafi was deposed in war and no constitution existed to guide a subsequent electoral process. Legality is perhaps most closely adhered to in
Tunisia, where some respect for legal principles has applied. In December of 2010, President Ben Ali, the authoritarian ruler of Tunisia for decades, fled the country, and the prime minister indicated at first he would
assume control.54 The Constitutional Council indicated in January of
2011 that the post of president was vacant, but that in fact it would have
to be the vice president who assumed control pursuant to Article 57 of
the Tunisian Constitution, and not the prime minister.5 ' The vice president assumed that position on January 14, 201 1.56 The Court ruled that
elections would have to be organized within sixty days.57 On March 3,
2011, within the sixty day deadline, the election was scheduled for July
of that same year. 8 It was then delayed until October, and successfully
held then.5 9 The process of transformation thus appeared to at least arguably hold to principles of legality.

52. David D. Kirkpatrick, Libya: Monitors PraiseElection, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, at A8.
53. Libya, in theory, is not governed by any constitution save the Qur'an, though this does not
seem to mean anything, in that Qaddafi himself is hardly committed to any sort of recognizable
Islamic rule. NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC
LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 86 (2002). The balance of govern-

ance is supposed to be undertaken by popular, local committees and congresses through some form
of direct democracy. Id; see also The World Factbook: Libya, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ly.html (last updated Nov. 7,
2011). In theory, Qaddafi has not held an official position within the state since 1977; the state has
no national leader. Mohamad Bazzi, What Did Qaddafi'sGreen Book Really Say?, N.Y. TIMES, May
25, 2011, at BR27. It is hard to believe that any subsequent regime would seek to continue this
inanity.
54. Tunisia Swears in Interim Leader, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 16, 2011, 2:35 PM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/201111513513854222.html.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Tarek Amara, Tunisia Interim PresidentCallsJuly 24 Election, REUTERS (March 3, 2011,
6:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/03/us-tunisia-elections-idUSTRE7227IP2011
0303. .
59. Islamists to the Fore: Tunisia's General Election, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2011, at 57.
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Egypt straddles these two examples, in that the transformation process purports to be legal, with the active participation of courts, yet there
is cause for skepticism. The "constitution" under which Egypt is operating is no more than a series of provisional constitutional declarations
issued by the ruling military council. The major declaration issued was
effectively blessed by referendum in March of 2011 and in fact is little
more than a series of amendments to the Mubarak era constitution. 60 But
the military has unilaterally amended it at times, including an amendment in June of 2012, just before a presidential election, that appropriates
to the military council powers previously belonging to the president.
Perhaps from the perspective of process it would be best to describe
these changes then, at least in Tunisia and perhaps in Egypt, as
"refolutions" in motion, borrowing from the phrase made famous by
Timothy Garton Ash, among others, to describe the transformations in
Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism. 62 The line between reform and revolution is not always clear, as numerous scholars
have pointed out. JTnos Kis, for example, points to the traditional distinction in his work on the transformations that took place in Eastern Europe
and the difficulty of placing those transformations into one camp or the
other.6 ' Andrew Arato has focused on the same region and pointed to
some of the same confounding dilemmas.
In the end, however, perhaps none of this really matters. Perhaps
there is no purpose in getting lost in the thickets of taxonomy. If we are
to examine these events from the standpoint of their legitimacy as committed democrats, it may be well enough to describe them as "democratic
transformations." The touchstone for their legitimacy, that is, must be
neither the extent of the changes sought, nor the processes by which they
were obtained, but rather by the extent of popularsupport for them. That
is, even if Egypt, or Tunisia, end up with a constitution quite similar to
the one that previously existed, yet, importantly, not put to the same
grievous abuses, surely a fundamental transformation will have occurred-one worthy of the support of a committed democrat. Surely the
demand for a change of leadership is enough under these circumstances.
In March of 2011, a referendum was held whereby modest amendments to the existing
60.
Egyptian constitution were approved so that the document could serve as a provisional constitution.
Jason Petrucci, Egypt's Referendum, Reasonfor Guarded Optimism, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Mar. 31,
2011, 5:35 PM), http://thedailynewsegypt.com/global-views/egypts-referendum-reason-for-guardedoptimism.html. These became the basis of the second "constitutional declaration." .
Abdul Rahman Hussein, Egyptians Protest Against New Powers for Military Council,
61.
GUARDIAN, June 20,2012, at 20.
62.
Timothy Garton Ash, Revolution: The Springtime of Two Nations, THE NEW YORK
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/l989/
15,
1989),
REVIEW OF BOOKS (Jun.
jun/I 5/revolution-the-springtime-of-two-nations/?pagination=false.
Jinos Kis, Between Reform and Revolution, 12 E. EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 300, 300-01
63.
(1998).
64. See, e.g., Andrew Arato, Constitutions and Continuity in the East European Transitions, I
CONSTELLATIONS 92, 92-93 (1994).
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The important point is that these uprisings did not in any way resemble illegitimate military juntas seeking to impose their authority in
place of that of a deposed president or dictator; they were popular demands for massive and fundamental transformation. The mere fact that
the people of the Arab states were not necessarily seeking broad constitutional change so much as the political realization of democracy long
promised and never delivered hardly seems to be any sort of reason to
deprive their movements of the same normative power afforded to any
democratic revolution.
To illustrate why this is, one might well contrast the recent Arab
Spring uprisings with the transformative changes of an earlier era, and
specifically, Gamal Abdul Nasser's takeover of Egypt. That was, let us
be clear, engineered by a cadre of junior military officers (insiders), operating in secret, using the threat of military force, completing their operation within a period of days and motivated certainly by a desire for
power. This group of army officers created a Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC) which banned all political parties, vested all governmental authority in the RCC and then created a constitution which the dean
of Arab constitutionalism, Nathan Brown, has described as perfection in
"the art of writing anticonstitutionalist constitutions."6 6 In that case, there
was change of a radical nature that occurred. It heralded the end of a
monarchy and its replacement with a nondemocratic "republic" engineered and administered by a group of army officers who assumed all
governmental authority. It almost certainly led to more change than a
mass protest movement that paralyzed a nation and brought down a tyrant in order to institute the free and fair elections promised in the legal
system that already existed. Yet it was also a coup, hardly the inspiration
for democratic transformation. What the Nasser example demonstrates,
more than anything, is that in assessing the legitimacy of these transformations from a democratic standpoint, we need not look to the extent of
the legal and political change undertaken as a formal matter (meaning the
level of amendment to the existing legal and constitutional structure), nor
to its legality, but only to the extent to which the changes were truly the
product of popular demand.
B. Nondemocratic PoliticalTransformation
We might well look past process, or the extent of formal legal
change, but it is not enough for the committed democrat to look solely to
the level of the popular demand to assess the legitimacy of the transformation. The uncomfortable fact remains that not every transformation
demanded by a people is democratic in impulse and outlook. Some, in
fact, are very much the opposite. In such cases, it hardly behooves the
65.

See M.E. YAPP, THE NEAR EAST SINCE THE FIRST WORLD WAR 67 (1991).

66.

BROWN, supra note 53, at 78-79.
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democrat to support the change or deem it somehow legitimate, though
of course it would be foolish and counterproductive to impose democracy under such circumstances, in the face of such broad popular opposition. To illustrate by way of example, I turn to a decidedly nondemocratic political transformation, indeed a revolution under almost any defimition, with which I am familiar as a scholar of modem Shi'ism-the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
That the Ayatollah Khomeini, the figure leading the Islamic Revolution, was not a liberal democrat was a fact perfectly obvious to anyone
paying attention. Long before the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s,
the Ayatollah Khomeini had established an entire juristic career premised
on the principle of Islamic government under the aegis of a Supreme
Jurisprudent, the most knowledgeable of the clerics, who would administer that state, carrying the same political authority as that of the Prophet
Muhammad himself6 These ideas largely crystallized while Khomeini
was in exile in the 1960s in the seminaries of Najaf, in particular in the
publication of a well-known pamphlet entitled "Islamic Government"
that was based on a series of lectures offered in Najaf in 1970.68 Highly
influential, and often translated as "Guardianship of the Jurist,"69 Khomeini lays out in the pamphlet in ample detail precisely the manner in
which the government is to be managed, administered, and run by the
leader of the clerical classes.70 On the matter of the people drafting their
own legislation to determine their future, he had this to say:
[I]f laws are needed, Islam has established them all. There is no need
for you, after establishing a government, to sit down and draw up
laws. ... Everything is ready and waiting. All that remains is to draw
up ministerial programs, and that can be accomplished with the help
and cooperation of consultants and advisers who are experts in different fields, gathered together in a consultative assembly. 7 '
The true source of authority, however, does not lie with such tech-

nocrats. Thus, Khomeini indicated:
But as for the supervision and supreme administration of the country,
the dispensing of justice and the establishment of equitable relations
among the people-these are precisely the subjects the faqih has
studied. Whatever is needed to preserve national independence and
67.

Hamid Mavani, Analysis of Khomeini's Proofsfor al-Wilaya al-Mutalqa (Comprehensive

Authority) of the Jurist, in THE MOST LEARNED OF THE SHI'A: THE INSTITUTION OF MARIA' TAQLID

183, 183-84 (Linda S. Walbridge ed., 2001); see also Haider Ala Hamoudi, Between Realism and
Resistance: Shi'i Islam and the Contemporary Liberal State, 1IJ. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 107, 112
(2009).
68.
AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI, ISLAM AND REVOLUTION:
DECLARATIONS OF IMAM KHOMEINI 25 (Hamid Algar ed. & trans., 1981).
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69.
Christopher de Bellaigue, Who Rules Iran?, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (2002),
available at http://www.mafhoum.com/press3/100P54.htm.
70.
KHOMEINI, supra note 68, at 98.
71.
Id. at 137-38.
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liberty is, again, precisely what the faqih has to offer. For it is the
faqih who refuses to submit to others or fall under the influence of
foreigners, and who defends the rights of the nation and the freedom,
independence and territorial integrity of the Islamic homeland .... 72
Elsewhere, in the event this was insufficiently clear, Khomeini indicated:
The judicial and governmental functions assigned . . . to the fuqaha

[plural offaqih] are retained permanently.73
The point is repeated for its emphasis later:
The 'ulama [scholars] of Islam have been appointed . . . to the posi-

tion of ruler and judge, and these positions belong to them in perpetuity.74
Khomeini not only failed to dissemble respecting these matters, he
considered it a higher calling to disseminate his ideas. Concerning the
Islamic government, led by the jurist as described above, he had this to
say in his highly influential 1970 pamphlet: "It is our duty to work toward the establishment of Islamic government. The first activity we must
undertake in this respect is the propagation of our cause; that is how we
must begin."7 1
Taking up his own challenge, Khomeini continued to advance these
ideas from exile throughout the 1970s with such ferocity and vigor that
he managed to alienate much of the Najaf senior establishment, among
them the Quietist Abol Qasim al-Khu'i, and even the Grand Ayatollah of
his day, the formidable Sayyid Muhsin Al-Hakim.7 6 Because of his ideas,
he was passed over for the position of Supreme Jurisprudent in Najaf
after Hakim's death in favor of Khu'i, who did not advocate clerical engagement in politics, rendering Khomeini something of an outlier within
Najaf itself.77
In response, Khomeini turned against Najaf for its political apathy
concerning Iran, going so far as to dismiss its clerics as "sound asleep" in
one remarkable declaration, issued in 1971,78 and "dead and buried"79 in
another. Yet despite senior jurist apathy within Iraq, Khomeini's ideas
respecting Islamic government had been percolating among rising schol72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 137.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id. at 126.
Devin J. Stewart, The Portrayalof an Academic Rivalry: Najaf and Qum in the Writings

and Speeches of Khomeini, 1964-78, in THE MOST LEARNED OF THE SHI'A: THE INSTITUTION OF
MARiA' TAQLID, supranote 67, at 216, 223.

77.

See id

78.
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ars such as Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr.80 In particular, they inspired Sadr
to develop more precise guidelines, and add more intellectual heft, respecting the future Islamic state and the means by which the Supreme
Jurist would be determined. 8'
Underlying all of these ideas from Khomeini was a hatred and contempt for the West that was given frequent voice. In t964, upon the
Shah's granting of immunity from Iranian prosecution to soldiers of the
United States, Khomeini accused the government of "reduc[ing] the Iranian people to a level lower than that of an American dog." 82 Later in the
same speech he described the United States, the United Kingdom, and
the Soviet Union each as more "unclean" than the other." In his 1970
pamphlet, he described the United States and the United Kingdom as
imperialists and indicated that faqih rule is necessary because it is the
"faqihwho refuse[d] to submit to others or fall under the influence of
foreigners" and "who does not deviate either to the left or to the right,"
thinly veiled references to the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively. 84 In 1972, in a message to Muslim students in North America,
he indicated that "[i]mperialism of the left and of the right have joined
hands in their efforts to annihilate the Muslim peoples."85 In February of
1978, nearly a year before the Shah's departure, he described the British,
the Soviet Union, and the United States as bringing misfortune upon Iran
in its modem history and described the Carter Administration in particular as employing the "logic of bandits."" The consistency and stridency
of the rhetoric over two decades of speeches and writings is remarkable.
All of this, both the program for Islamic government and its stridently anti-imperialist, regional liberation emphasis, was a matter of so
much debate, and so much intellectual ferment, that it is very difficult to
take seriously any claim that Khomeini had somehow claimed any interest in a democratic transformation in his society, as opposed to an Islamizing one. Until his return to Iran, Khomeini never suggested any deviation from his long established view that the state had to be Islamic and
the people would not be consulted on the point in any real way.t8 Several
80. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, You Say You Want a Revolution: Interpretive Communities and
the Origins ofIslamic Finance,48 VA. J. INT'L L. 249, 272-73 (2008).
81.

CHIBLI MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW: MUHAMMAD BAQER AS-SADR, NAJAF

AND THE SHI'I INTERNATIONAL 70 (1993). It would thus be fair to say that the structuraldetails of
the state that Khomeini envisioned was not laid out until Sadr's work. Id. Of the essential principle,
however, that the jurists would act as rulers and judges, there could be no doubt, Khomeini had, as
the main text shows, spent his entire life advancing, and indeed proselytizing, the notion of juristic
rule wherein the Supreme Jurisprudent would occupy a political leadership role akin to that of the
Prophet Muhammad.

82.
KHOMEINI, supra note 68, at 182.
83.
Id. at 185.
84. Id. at 137.
85. Id at 210.
86. Id. at 221, 224.
87. See SHAUL BAKHASH, THE REIGN OF THE AYATOLLAHS: IRAN AND THE ISLAMIC
REVOLUTION 72 (1984). At most, Khomeini was prepared to concede a referendum, but solely for
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months before his arrival in Iran, and completely consistent with his extensive work over the previous several decades, he described the revolution as "one hundred percent Islamic" and its leadership as "belong[ing]
to the clerical community."88
Were Khomeini a minor figure in the 1979 Revolution who had
managed to take control by some fortuitous circumstance, it might be
maintained that somehow the revolution was democratic if Khomeini
himself was not. Yet this was not the case, Khomeini was the undisputed
face and voice of the revolution. Thus, he was given authority within
days of his return to appoint an executive government.89 Given all of this,
if anyone in Iran in the late 1970s agitating in favor of Khomeini's return
to lead the state was duped into believing Khomeini was a liberal democrat or could possibly find liberal democracy acceptable, they had managed to dupe themselves. Assuming the bulk of the Iranian people leading the revolution to be reasonably aware of Khomeini's consistent positions over the course of decades, the only conclusion is that this transformation designed to hand him executive control was indeed a revolution, but it was by no means democratic, in spirit or intent, even if some,
even some within Iran, may well have wished it so.
As Khomeini's designs and his positions, were well known to anyone who bothered to pay the slightest attention to his writings, his
speeches, and his juristic career, it is no surprise that he began to implement them immediately. The creation of the Islamic state that had been
long discussed among activists began to take shape, precisely in the form
he, along with Sadr and others, had originally presented as a "blueprint"
in their extensive work on the subject. 90
The temptation to accept the theory of duplicity on the part of the
Khomeini-that he promised a people's choice and a democracy in the
sense we understand it and then failed to deliver on it-would be strong
among those committed to democratic governance. But the lesson might
be that we must come more fully to terms with a core, uncomfortable
truth. Not every people is particularly interested at any given time in
liberation through self-rule and that various ideological mirages, from
Marxism to these rather extreme manifestations of political Islam involving juristic supervision of government and judiciary have their influence
and their sway at times.9 1 Any attempt to make some sense of the democratic revolution, and indeed to restore it to the exalted normative place
the purpose of confirming that the people had chosen an Islamic state, not as a means of offering a
free choice. Id. Khomeini's position was that the "referendum" had already taken place in the form
of the popular uprising against the Shah. Id
88. Id. at 48.
89. BAKHASH, supra note 87, at 51.
90. MALLAT, supranote 81, at 6.
91.
As the earlier references to the Green Revolution make clear, I would certainly not characterize Iran's more recent convulsions as being anything but fundamentally democratic in impulse.
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to which it belongs, requires us to acknowledge this, and to admit that
where our normative values are not shared, they will not be realized.
III. REMOVING THE FORMALIST BARRIERS

A. The Typology of the Transformation
Let us then take the strands outlined above and attempt to combine
them into a more cohesive set of ideas concerning the democratic revolution cum coup cum radical reform, all of which I shall bundle into the
single word "transformation," denoting as it does substantive political
change of the more fundamental sort, to be distinguished from incremental and ordinary lawmaking. The first strand, again, is to free ourselves
from the shackles of taxonomy. That is, the precise typology of the transformation is of little moment for our purposes, whether it be premised on
legal continuity (as in East Europe's various velvet revolutions), focused
primarily on the removal of a corrupt and tyrannical political leadership
with little formal legal change (as may yet occur in some states of the
Arab Spring), or involving an entire break with legality and the existing
political and legal regime (as in the American, French, and Romanian
Revolutions, and as is sure to occur in Libya).
To be absolutely clear, I mean this not as generalized criticism of
the valuable and important work that has been done in categorization in
this area, but rather only that, to the extent that the project involves the
restoration of the democratic revolution as normative commitment,
something too much can be made of typology. Once such typologies are
abandoned, the second, related strand is to look to the substance of the
transformation and the extent to which it might be characterized as one
that is committed to the establishment of continued popular rule as its
core normative commitment, rather than the use of the people and evident popular demands as instrument to the creation of another form of
government, be it Marxist, nondemocratic Islamist, or anything else.
Viewed through such a lens, there was little that was democratic
about the 1979 Iranian Revolution, in both conception and execution,
even as the more recent Green Revolution in Iran was fundamentally
democratic. 92 There was absolutely nothing democratic about Nasser's
Free Officer Coup in Egypt in 1952, involving as it did the repeal of a
democratic constitution and the subsequent banning of all political parties in Egypt, signaling what one prominent Egyptian commentator has
I do not mean by this that there were no liberal democratic groups that might have partici92.
pated in the 1979 Revolution, hoping that despite Khomeini's well established position respecting
Islamic rule, some space might exist for them to project their own vision onto the state more successfully than Khomeini might project his. It would be silly to reduce all revolutionaries to any single
rigid archetype in any revolutionary transformation. The point is that the general thrust of the Iranian Revolution, and most importantly the figure who led it, was the establishment of juristic, not
popular, rule.
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described as the end of democracy in Egypt. 93 The same could not be
said respecting the massive, popular uprisings that led to the transformations in Eastern Europe, the "refolutions" that generally, with the exception of Romania, adhered to strict processes of legality.
Similarly, and most relevant for the purposes of this Article, the
transformations of the Arab Spring are unambiguously grounded in assumptions of popular sovereignty. Some of these states, as with Libya,
will, assuming they can manage their transformations despite significant
obstacles,94 lead to fundamental transformations of state structure in a
manner that surely will involve a break with legality. It is hard to understand how Qaddafi's bewildering Jamahariyyastructure95 is supposed to
function, let alone precisely how one would amend it to adhere to principles of legality. With others, such as Tunisia, the matter is far less certain. Constitutional amendment, perhaps far reaching, perhaps profound,
but nonetheless legal (meaning in conformity with existing rules of
amendment as laid out in the current constitution) might be a potential
promising means to achieve necessary change.
Naturally all such changes would need to be evaluated on a continuing basis to ensure that they were democratic. The road to democratic
rule in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya alike is fraught with peril. By privileging substance over form, a sensible temporal reexamination of this sort is
more possible than when attempting to formally describe a particular
change as a "revolution," "reform," or a "coup."
Yet, the more important result of liberating the democratic transformation from the shackles of form is that this permits the conception of
the democratic transformation to be restored to the exalted and romantic
place to which a committed democrat would like to place it. Adherence
to the form of the change simply will not serve to achieve this. It is impossible to imagine that one finds a group of people who bravely take to
the streets, as in Syria, under a hail of live ammunition to demand the
people's right to rule themselves, dying in significant numbers on a daily
basis as a result, any less inspiring if they manage to achieve their aims
with the belated acquiescence of the existing regime through a series of
far reaching legislative and constitutional changes negotiated in an East
European style "round table."96 The brave men and women of Tahrir
93. Ahmed Othman, The Revolution ofJuly 23 and the End ofDemocracy in Egypt, ASHARQ
ALAWSAT, July 23, 2011, at 20.
94. Rami Al-Shaheibi, Libyan Defense Minister Seeks Deal in Seized Town, ARAB NEWS
(Jan. 25, 2012), http://arabnews.com/middleeast/article56801 .ece (quoting U.N. Envoy for Libya
Ian Martin that "weak, at times absent, state institutions, coupled with the long absence of political
parties and civil society organizations ... render the country's transition more difficult").
BROWN, supra note 53, at 86 (describing a confounding organization involving myriad
95.
committees and congresses acting in theory through some form of direct democracy at local levels).
96.

See Jon Elster, Introduction, in THE ROUNDTABLE TALKS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF

COMMUNISM 1, 3 (Jon Elster ed., 1996) (describing the round table process in the states of the former Soviet bloc).
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Square are no less entitled to the sacred space of the democratic revolution than those of Libya even if the change they manage to achieve adheres to processes of legality or involves in the end less formal change to
the legal structure.
This is largely because legality has nothing to do with the nobility
of the protesters, but rather is decided more by the tyrant, or at least the
institutions of authority. An Eastern European communist regime wise
enough to see that its time has come to an end which seeks maximum
near term influence through round table negotiations will be able to
avoid the messiness of "nonconstitutional" change through earnest bargaining, while an unrepentant and bloody tyrant such as Romania's
Ceaugescu leaves his people no choice but the means of non-legality.
The process mechanisms effectively dictated by the autocrats who control the means of violence should hardly impinge upon our core romantic
and normative commitment to the democratic protesters themselves. The
romantic conception in the end is of a people who seek change of the
fundamental, transformationalsort, whose end is the creation or restoration of a state that is ruled by its people and whose people constitute the
legitimacy for its existence. The means by which this is achieved are
largely irrelevant.
B. TransformationandAgency
The typology of the revolution is related to, if distinct from, another
formal distinction from which we need to free ourselves: the agency of
the democratic transformation. Let us begin with a rather salutary example where democratic transformation was not initiated by the peoplethat of post-Franco Spain.98 Commentators frequently discuss the rather
remarkable manner in which democratic change was brought about in
Spain through the enactment of a Fundamental Law, thereby adopting
Franco's authoritarian lawmaking model to ensure careful adherence to
principles of legality in the democratization process. 99
But there is another fascinating aspect of Spain's democratic transformation that is worth exploring. It was administered by a monarch
whom Franco had trusted would ensure authoritarian continuity.100 A
king vested with absolute authority, that is to say, seems as capable as
the people for bringing about democratic transformations under the proper conditions. Naturally, and as discussed earlier in this Article, neither a
See Ruth Jackson Lee, The Stepchildren of the EU: Bulgaria and Romania, 16 J.
97.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 361, 370 (2007).
ANDREA BONIME-BLANC, SPAIN'S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY:
98.
CONSTITUTION-MAKING 9 (1987).

THE POLITICS OF

Id. at 24.
99.
Id. at 18 (describing earlier attempts at democratic reform undertaken by Franco and the
100.
first post-Franco prime minister as "feeble" and indicating that democratization did not begin in
earnest until the King chose to embark upon that course).

722

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WRE VIEW

[Vol. 89:3

democratically minded monarch nor a foreign power can bring democratization to (or impose democratization upon) a people uninterested in it.
There is no doubt that pressures for democratic reform had been building
in Spain when the king embarked upon the course he did.'0o Yet without
the king, the success of the democratic transformation was by no means
assured. The king was, without serious question, the agent for the transformation even if the transformation required conditions other than the
king's good intentions to sustain itself.
In stark contrast, despite repeated calls for political reform over the
course of years, and despite repeated promises to undertake such reforms, the rulers threatened by the Arab Spring generally took precisely
the reverse course, stalling any changes in favor of democratization until
the promises of such reforms could no longer be taken seriously by any
reasonable person.1 0 2 Those transformations were initiated instead by
101.
Id. at 22-23.
102.
To take the simplest example, in the middle of the last decade, President Hosni Mubarak
of Egypt promised a series of wide-ranging and much touted democratic reforms that were supposed
to permit, among other things, true competition in presidential elections. Megan K. Stack & Sonni
Efron, Presidentof Egypt Calls for Open Election, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at Al. The subsequent elections turned out to be anything but fair and free-there were widespread voting irregularities reported, and a leading opposition candidate, liberal activist Ayman Nour, was in jail during the
election. Editorial, Not Fair,Not Free, BALT. SUN, Dec. 13, 2005, at 18A. Moreover, at the same
time that these supposedly democratic reforms were set to take place, President Mubarak was
grooming his son to take his place. Daniel Williams, Egyptians Wonder ifDynasty Is Near; Mubarak's Son Gaining Prominence, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2004, at Al4. This sort of warped dynastic
succession masquerading as republicanism took place in Syria as well, where Bashar al-Asad had
replaced his father in 2000. As with Mubarak, Bashar has long promised reforms that have yet to be
delivered. Fouad Ajami, Your Silence Is Killing Us; As a People Rise in Revolt, a Son Emulates the
Cruelty of His Father, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 15, 2011, at 0. Libya had taken a similar course with Seif
al-Islam el-Qaddafi, the son of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, setting himself up to replace his father
and promising, as did Bashar al-Asad, to undertake political and economic reform. Landon Thomas
Jr., Unknotting Father'sReins in Hope of 'Reinventing' Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, at All.
Given the rather disconcerting Arab pattern, the surprise lies not so much in the promise but in the
credulous Western media and government attention Seif seemed to gamer for his reform charade. Id.
(describing Seif as trying to "dismantle" the authoritarian and socialist structure his father had created, indicating he had a "bold independent streak" and suggesting there was "evidence of popular
support" for Seif domestically); see also Anton La Guardia, Gaddafi's Son Wanted as Torture
Watchdog, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 26, 2006, at 19 (describing Seif as "the most prominent
voice for political reform in Libya"). Incredibly, the United Kingdom even apparently wanted him to
act as some sort of independent "watchdog" to ensure that anyone deported from the U.K. to Libya
was not tortured. Id. Leaving aside the preposterous notion that a son could under any circumstances
be considered an independent "watchdog" over the activities of his father's regime, left hardly discussed by reputable sources was the possibility that Seif was grandstanding to receive international
attention and hardly interested in anything other than the accumulation of power, precisely as Bashar
and Gamal were in similarly situated regimes. In any event, the good intentions of this supposed
political reformer with the bold independent streak have been forced to light by popular demands to
end the political system that he was supposedly working so hard to "dismantle." Rather than joining
their cause, he hitched his wagon to his father's and described the regime opponents as "rats."
InomineX, Libya: 31 August 2011, Saif al-Islam Gadhafi Speech, English Summary, YOUTUBE
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-gRPsrYxtXA&feature-related. He has been
indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity in connection with the
repression of protesters, which included the use of live fire ammunition to disperse crowds and the
deployment of snipers to fire on those leaving mosques after the Friday prayers. Zach Zagger, ICC
Issues Arrest Warrantsfor Libya Leader Gaddafi, His Son, Head of Intelligence, JURIST (June 27,
2011, 8:43 AM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/06/icc-issues-arrest-warrants-for-libya-leader-
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inspiring masses of ordinary people courageously demanding the creation of regimes of popular sovereignty as described earlier.103 Yet, the
role of other institutions cannot be gainsaid. In particular, the army
proved to be a decisive agent of the democratic transformations throughout the Arab Spring. Where the army hitched itself to the fate of the regime, as in Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, the outcome has been far less
certain, or dramatically unsuccessful."' Where the army has declined the
invitation to kill its own people, as in Egypt and Tunisia, the ouster of the
sitting ruler was swift. 0 5 In Egypt, in fact, the military's role is significant enough, particularly in transition, that it might well be considered in
something of a (tense, perilous but nonetheless real) partnership with the
Egyptian people in managing the transformation.' 6 Both the people and
the army are thus equal agents in engineering the fate of the transformation in these states. 0 7
Thus, just as distinctions between "coup," "reform," and "revolution" are less than helpful in describing and resurrecting the romantic
appeal and normative power of democratic transformations, so is a relentless focus on the people as being the exclusive agent of such transformation. Naturally, the existence of popular support and legitimacy for
any transformation is fundamentally important, whether it be registered
at the moment of change or years later, at first election. A democratic
transformation in which the people are not invested and where the people
seek something else entirely is hardly self-sustaining. Yet the precise role
of the popular will in achieving the change, relative to other institutions
or influences, might well be overstated. The revolution, that is to say,
should require the people's support to earn the sacred space. When that
support is precisely manifested, however, is of less importance.

gaddafi,-his-son-head-of-intelligence.php. A less fitting candidate for human rights "watchdog" can
scarcely be imagined.
See discussion supraPart L
103.
Borzou Daragahi, Other Regimes Emboldened by Gadhafi'sBrutal Tactics; Arab Leaders
104.
in Yemen and Elsewhere Follow His Lead in Using Extreme Force to Stay in Power, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 20, 2011, at C20.
Eyal, supra note 47 ("Former Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled only when
105.
his soldiers were no longer prepared to fire on demonstrators; Egypt's Mr[.] Mubarak left under
similar circumstances.").
The words of Egypt's notorious star novelist Alaa Al Aswany, author of the best-selling
106.
The Yacoubian Building, perhaps best described this uneasy but real relationship as between people
and military. In an interview with Thomas Friedman, Al Aswany indicated "[w]e have had a revolution here that succeeded-but is not in power. So the goals of the revolution are being applied by an
agent, the army, which I think is sincere in wanting to do the right things, but it is not by nature
revolutionary." Thomas Friedman, Pay Attention, N.Y.TIMES, May 29, 2011, at WK8.
. It is commonly reported that very serious questions have arisen recently respecting the
107.
democratic commitments of the military rulers of Egypt, as they begin to repress protestors and
protect their own economic and political interests. See, e.g., Chibli Mallat, Saving the Egyptian
Revolution from the Military, JURIST (Dec. 27, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/chibli-mallategypt-military.php. This is indeed troubling, yet it only demonstrates the central role that the military
has played and is playing in managing the democratic revolution. If the military turns enemy of the
revolution, that is, the democratic future of Egypt is far more precarious.
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C. The Externally Imposed Democratic Transformation
Seen in this light, the externally imposed democratic transformation
is little more than locating the agency for democratic transformation at
least in part in a force that is neither a domestic monarch (as in Spain)
nor a domestic military (as in Tunisia and Egypt) but something external
to the nation-state altogether. In some cases, such agency might even
precede popular convulsions in favor of democratic rule because of the
effective machinery of repression organized by the state. I was in Iraq
during its first truly democratic elections, at the start of 2005.08 I remember the manner in which men, women, and children took to the
streets before sunrise, the cities silent because of the security ban on
driving vehicles, each with a grim sense of determination and purpose on
their way to voting booths in many cases miles away, braving suicide
bombers, terrorist threats to observe a boycott, and extremist promises of
future retaliation against any who dared to show up to vote. 109 I was there
as late morning turned to afternoon, and the streets began to erupt in joyous celebration, with hordes of young people waving their purple fingers
(stained by ink after voting, to prevent voter fraud) at any camera they
could find, determined to show their lack of fear at those who sought to
intimidate them against voting. Each was dressed in his finest wear, as if
no more important occasion than this could be imagined. If this did not
meet whatever standard we seek to establish in order to restore democratic transformation as romantic commitment, then quite frankly nothing
does.
It would be wrong to say that these people brought about the democratic transformation in their state. It would be equally wrong to say that
they did not want it. There was nothing devoid of popular legitimacy in
this set of events, irrespective of the fact that they were brought about
initially by the United States. In fact, even to describe the democratization process as being solely externally imposed prior to that election
108.
At that time, I served as a Project Manager for a legal education reform project that was
managed by the International Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul University. I was specifically
charged with introducing experiential forms of education into the Iraqi law school curriculum. Other
aspects of the project included library enhancement and other forms of curricular reform. The entire
project was managed by Sermid Al-Sarraf in Baghdad and led from Chicago by David Guinn and
Cherif Bassiouni.
109.
HAIDER ALA HAMOUDI, HOWLING IN MESOPOTAMIA: AN IRAQI-AMERICAN MEMOIR
248-49 (2008) [hereinafter HAMOUDI, HOWLING IN MESOPOTAMIA]. To be sure, there were limitations respecting the overall success of the democratic experiment in Iraq in 2005 owing largely to the
fact that the Sunni population had largely respected the electoral boycott, either out of fear or conviction, thereby exacerbating existing sectarian divisions. Id. at 249. This boycott was never repeated, however, and Iraqis currently vote in large numbers irrespective of sect or ethnicity. Haider Ala
Hamoudi, Identitarian Violence and Identitarian Politics: Elections and Governance in Iraq, 51
HARV. INT'L L.J. ONLINE 78, 94 (2010) [hereinafter Hamoudi, Identitarian Violence],
http://www.harvardilj.org/online. In any event, the point here is not that the initial election was an
untrammeled success but that it was democratic and successful enough (particularly when viewed in
conjunction -with subsequent elections in Iraq which are deeply democratic) to act as inspiration for
democratic transformation.
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would be a mistake. The greatest proponent for near-term elections after
the American invasion was not the United States, which counseled delay
repeatedly, but rather the high Shi'i cleric Ali Sistani, who demanded
elections as early as June of 2003, less than two months after Saddam's
statue had been brought down in Firdous Square in central Baghdad.no
Agency for democratic transformation, that is to say, in Iraq was divided
among three different entities. The first was the United States, whose
removal of an unspeakable tyrant made it possible for domestic elites to
voice their demands without being summarily executed."' The second
were domestic elites themselves, who demanded early elections and
similarly sought that they be held on schedule and without delay.1 2 And
the third, of course, were the Iraqi people, who have in repeated electoral
events voted in overwhelming numbers irrespective of ethnicity, religion,
or sectarian group.
In other words, a focus on both the typology and agency of democratic transformation might be distracting us from what should be the
core undertaking, which is to evaluate the transformation through its
commitment to and realization of popular democratic rule. It may in the
end be no more important that the transformation be characterized as
"reform" or "revolution" than it is that it be led in the first instance by
the people, the army, a monarch, a foreign power, or (more likely) some
rather complex combination of the foregoing. The point is not that a
democratic transformation can be possible without public supportclearly it cannot be. The point, rather, is that an additional agent is often
required, at times to instigate the reform, at other times to support it, and
the nationality of that agent hardly need concern the committed democrat.
Thus, internal transformations that do not lead to the creation of
popular democratic rule, even those that might enjoy popular legitimacy
in their time (such as Khomeini's Iran) are hardly inspirations for those
of us passionately, normatively, and romantically committed to a conception of democratic transformation. Those that do lead to democratic
transformation, even if brought about in the first instance by a wellintentioned king rather than the people, as in Spain, may be extolled.
Similarly, external regime transformations often, indeed almost always,
110.
Hamoudi, Identitarian Violence, supra note 109, at 85.
111.
For more details respecting the manner in which the Saddam regime managed to silence
the clerical elite wherever and whenever they sought political change of any sort, see id.
This included not only Sistani and the clerical elite, but the existing interim Iraqi govern112.
ment as well as the Kurdish political leadership. See Au A. ALLAWi, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ:
WINNING THE WAR, LOSING THE PEACE 344-46 (2007). Again, there was initial Sunni disaffection

from the state and a resulting opposition to elections, a matter that in other contexts I have emphasized as having been particularly problematic. Hamoudi, Identitarian Violence, supra note 109, at
93-94; see also HAMOUDI, HOWLING IN MESOPOTAMIA, supra note 109, at 248-49. Yet for our

purposes it suffices to say that the Iraqi people currently embrace democratic governance with fervor, and they have been instrumental in ensuring its qualified success to date. Of this there can be
little doubt.
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do not lead to the establishment of popular democratic rule, and are as
such justifiably enough castigated. These would include the attempted
destruction of a state and its incorporation into the invading state, as in
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990113 and the establishment of client states
largely dependent on host state support to survive, as in former Soviet
controlled15Eastern Europel14 or Lebanon during the period of Syrian occupation."
Yet, at times the external intervention does lead to the creation of
popular democratic regimes, in a manner that we later almost uniformly
regard as salutary and that as a result ought to require us to reevaluate
whether or not our commitment to the sovereignty of tyrants is as deep as
we actually say it is. Perhaps the example par excellence of unabashed
democratic imposition over elite domestic objection lies in the example
of Japan. Following the conquest of Japan at the end of World War II,
the United States undertook a military occupation of the country and
sought a rather thorough transformation of its regime from that which
was authoritarian to something far more democratic."' 6 The extent and
necessity of constitutional changes to bring this about proved to be
among the most contentious disputes between the United States and Japanese -legal elites.117
The Japanese, for their part, had created a committee known as the
Matsumoto Committee.' Its initial purpose was to engage in a constitutional study; however, it quickly proposed a constitution that attempted
to adhere as closely as possible to the principles of the existing Meiji
Constitution." 9 One would assume that international law would then
impose upon the United States duties as occupier to accept such a revision, as the Hague Convention requires a state to uphold laws in force
"unless absolutely prevented," 20 and the Matsumoto Committee, Japanese in origin and inception, was making a concerted effort to uphold
existing Japanese law.

113.
114.

ALLAWI, supra note 112, at 43.

JUAN J. LINz & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND
CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 236-38

(1996).
115.
Upon the conclusion of the Ta'if accords in 1990 and the conclusion of the Lebanese Civil
War, Syria became the dominant power within Lebanese politics, given the equivalent of a mandate
to control its affairs. FAWWAZ TRABOULSI, A HISTORY OF MODERN LEBANON 245-46 (2007). That

only ended with the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the subsequent Cedar
Revolution. MICHAEL YOUNG, THE GHOSTS OF MARTYRS SQUARE: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF

LEBANON'S LIFE STRUGGLE 54, 57 (2010) (referring to the Cedar Revolution as the "Independence
Intifada").
116.

See MOORE & ROBINSON, supranote 21, at v-vi.

117.
118.
119.
120.

Seeid.at23.
Id.at73-74.
See id. at 74-75.
Hague Convention IV, supranote 20, at art. 43.
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Yet this was not to be. MacArthur had earlier told Prime Minister
Konoe that the Meiji Constitution required significant revision to be sufficiently democratic.121 Faced with an existing constitution in a separate
sovereign nation-state, MacArthur elected to impose his vision. The
Matsumoto proposal was summarily rejected, described in a meeting
with the Japanese representatives as "wholly unacceptable" to MacArthur.12 2 An alternative was completed on MacArthur's orders in six days,
by a group of twenty-one Americans which, as a cover memorandum to
MacArthur proudly explained, included "nearly every form of American
political thought."l 23 It was offered with an ultimatum-either the document itself would be presented as the proposal of the Japanese government, or the government would not survive politically, as it would lose
the support of MacArthur himself.124 This document became the template
of the ultimate constitution enacted in Japan about a year later, a constitution that remains in force and is the foundational document of its liber-

al democracy.125
Those of us committed to democratic transformation, however
achieved, find little difficultly with all that transpired. The imposition,
after all, was upon the Matsumoto Committee, which was entitled to no
presumption of popular legitimacy, and MacArthur's express purpose
was to ensure greater democratic transformation. 126 The revised constitution has achieved that purpose to admirable effect over the past several
decades, ruling over a nation that, notwithstanding its current economic
problems, rose from near total destruction to becoming the second largest
economy in the world with dizzying speed.127 There is very little to regret
in this story.
By contrast, those who castigate the externally imposed democratic
transformation as per se illegitimate and a violation of the sovereignty of
another state will no doubt have a harder time explaining why it is that
the United States was entitled to act as it did. The rather happy story of
the evolution of Japan and Germany from fascist nightmares to democratic, stable nations stands in stark contrast, after all, to the principle
that interference in the internal affairs of other states constitutes an infringement on their sovereignty, a core violation of the United Nations
Charter 28 if nothing else. Yet, would anyone actually think it was the
See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 21, at 51.
121.
122. Id. at 108.
123. Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
124. See id. at 111.
125. See id. at 110, 329.
126. See id. at 51.
127. See Michael A. Panton, Politics, Practiceand Pacifism: Revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 163, 197-98 (2008).
128.
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
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duty of the Allied powers to permit the continued existence of Nazi
Germany rather than impose democratic rule? If not, then precisely how
does one less apologetic than I am about the promise of imposed democracy expansion over the desires of repressive domestic forces go about
defending the World War II examples while demanding greater respect
be given to sovereignty for Iraq under Saddam Hussein in light of his
attempted genocide of two separate indigenous populations?1 29
The explanation most often begins with Reisman's wise insight that
while making regime change "generally lawful" would render international law into a nullity, regime change as a "contextually appropriate
instrument of an intrinsically lawful action" is another matter.' 3 0 Thus, to
extend Reisman's analysis, Japan and Germany had engaged in such
broad, unconscionable violations of international law, from expansionism to genocide, that to leave the regimes in place, even after the community of nations had forced their abatement, would only invite further
international instability, and the replacement of the regimes was the only
alternative, the "contextually appropriate instrument" to address the violations that had transpired.
While it is perfectly obvious that no system of international law
could sustain itself if it became generally acceptable for one state to
obliterate another for any reason it saw fit, this justification for regime
change seemh rather unconvincing and incomplete, at least when viewed
through a contemporary lens. Could it really be said that preventing the
Japanese government from enacting its own constitution was the "contextually appropriate" course in light of Japan's earlier, nearly unconditional surrender at Potsdam,"' its seemingly sincere belief that the Meiji
constitution was sufficiently democratic,1 32 and the requirement of the
Hague Convention to apply laws in force in a territory under occupation? 33 If the action was still justified because of the danger that Japan
had only a few years earlier posed to its neighbors, then under what principle could it not have been "contextually appropriate" to force a democratic constitution upon Iraq, a totalitarian state that had invaded its
neighbors twice and had to be forcibly removed each time? 34 It is true
that a sanctions regime imposed in Iraq since 1991 had effectively cripSaddam's brutality as against his own people is well documented, but involves among
129.
other things the organized killing of hundreds of thousands of Kurds in the latter part of the 1980s
and similar number of Shi'a in 1991, the latter undertaken by tanks adorned with the painted slogan
"[n]o Shi'is [will survive] after today." MARION FAROUK-SLUGLETT & PETER SLUGLETr, IRAQ
SINCE 1958: FROM REVOLUTION TO DICTATORSHIP 269-70,289 (2001).
130.
Reisman, supranote 8, at 89 (emphasis in original).
131.
See MOORE & ROBINSON, supra note 21, at 30.
132.
See id.at 51.
Hague Convention IV, supranote 20, at art. 43.
133.
134.
Iraq was largely responsible for starting hostilities with Iran in 1980 through a series of air
raids, the impetus being a desire by Saddam Hussein to be the undisputed power broker within the
Persian Gulf region. See FAROUK-SLUGLETr & SLUGLETT, supra note 129, at 256-57. It moreover
invaded Kuwait in August of 1990 and claimed it as its own province. Id. at 279.
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pled its army and prevented it from being a significant threat, but does
the catastrophic effect that sanctions have upon a civilian population,35
truly make it the more "contextually appropriate" instrument to deal with
Iraq? If so, why would the same not be true for 1945 Japan? The difficulty is thus apparent. Context can slip all too easily into pretext given the
lack of any sort of guiding standards to understand when regime change
might be acceptable as part of an "intrinsically lawful action" (whether it
be war against Iraq or Japan) and when it might not.
Moreover, an approach that permits regime change as part of lawful
action says little about the nature of the resulting regime. In other words,
regime change as concerns Nazi Germany, the theory might run, was
warranted in light of the unprecedented atrocities it had committed and
the foreign invasions in which it had engaged. Yet, on what basis, other
than an impassioned and unapologetic commitment to democratic rule,
could the resulting, emerging, democratic state of West Germany, imposed by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, be considered normatively superior to the Soviet satellite state of East Germany,
imposed by the Soviet Union?1 3 6
Again, the passionate democrat has no such qualms. Those transformations that are democratic and undertaken with broad public support
(either immediately or subsequently manifested) belong within the category of democratic transformation and occupy the sacred space. Those
transformations that do not do so, regardless of how the transformation
was achieved or by whom, cannot be similarly regarded. The distinction
seems altogether more natural to those of us committed to the realization
of the principle of democratic rule than the fruitless search for "intrinsically lawful action[s]" and "contextually appropriate instrument[s]" for
them.1 37
IV.

LIBYA AND THE REALITIES OF THE EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

While the ideas outlined herein may appear to some to be extreme
respecting the causes and nature of external intervention, they are, I
would submit, in some respects reflective of existing American policy in
deed if not quite in word. As such, what is required is not so much some
sort of grand change in policy, but rather an attitudinalshift in favor of
the externally imposed democratic revolution. The problem, to state the
matter forthrightly, is not so much that we are doing the wrong things,
but that we obfuscate respecting our actions. In addition to having the
benefit of meaning what we say, a more honest approach respecting external intervention and external imposition will also permit us to advance
See ALLAWI, supra note 112, at 65 (describing the catastrophic effect of the sanctions).
135.
Derek J. Vanderwood, The Korean Reconciliation Treaty and the German Basic Treaty:
136.
ComparableFoundationsfor Unification?,2 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J.411, 414 (1993).
137.
Reisman, supranote 8, at 89.
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our political values as periodic eruptions such as the Arab Spring arise
from time to time and to assess the extent to which such values should be
compromised by the hard realities of geopolitics.
The recent upheavals in Libya demonstrate the extent to which the
notion that "regime change" need be linked to some "intrinsically lawful
action" has devolved into farce, and a new approach and new understanding is warranted. Libyans had for over forty years suffered under
the cruel and brutal dictatorship of Moammar Al-Qaddafi, whose human
rights record was a string of outrages, from disappearances to extrajudicial executions to the routine use of torture.' 38 There was nothing resembling public participation in government; in fact, political parties were
banned.13 9 It was in this environment that the citizens of Benghazi, taking
advantage of the popular uprisings throughout the region against Arab
autocrats, poured out onto the streets in February of 2011 demanding
their right to alter or abolish the tyranny in which they had lived since
1969. 140
Certainly President Obama articulated a defensible position that
there was a desperate need to intervene to prevent a humanitarian disaster that was alarming, if not close to Rwanda in its scale, when Qaddafi's
forces began to consolidate control over all of Libya following that initial
popular uprising.141 That the Security Council repeated the same humanitarian intervention mantra in its authorization of force was certainly helpful in reinforcing that NATO had undertaken an "intrinsically lawful"
action.142 W en the Arab League repeated the call on similar grounds,
this may have added even greater legitimacy.143 The case for humanitarian intervention at that point was thus plausible enough.
Yet, it is plain that NATO and its member states exceeded such a
mandate many times over. The humanitarian catastrophe in the form of
an assault on Benghazi had passed within only a few weeks of the start of
the intervention, and the conflict swiftly settled into a civil war that became something of a stalemate, a term that even U.S. military officials

138.

See generally BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF

STATE,
2009
HUMAN
RIGHTS
REPORT:
LIBYA
(2010),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/l36074.htm (describing the various human rights
violations committed in Libya in 2009).
139. Id. at sec. 3.
140. See Anthony Shadid, Cycle of Suppression Rises in Libya and Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2011, at Al4.
141.
Feller, supra note 1 ("[W]e saw regime forces on the outskirts of the city. We knew that if
we waited one more day, Benghazi-a city nearly the size of Charlotte-could suffer a massacre that
would have reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world. It was not in our
national interest to let that happen. I refused to let that happen.").
142.
S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 16.
143.
Ethan Bronner & David E. Sanger, Arab League Endorses No-Flight Zone Over Libya,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at Al.
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did not hesitate to use.1'4 One could readily have imagined at that point
not so much an effort to remove Qaddafi but instead a narrowly circumscribed attempt to create a "safe haven" in Benghazi and to ensure that
Qaddafi was not in a position to threaten a second assault. This is precisely what the United States had done vis-a-vis Iraq's Kurdish region
following its uprising in 1991.145
However, this was hardly what was done in Libya. Admittedly, for
some number of days, the rhetoric remained fixed on the principle of
protecting civilian life, with NATO commanders insisting that they were
not the air wing of the rebel force. 14 6 But this ruse became increasingly
difficult to sustain as NATO began to train and organize rebel forces, 147
as over $1 billion in aid was collected to assist the rebels,14 8 and subsequently, in the middle of the stalemate, the United States recognized the
rebel leadership as the governing authority of Libya and gave it access to
Libyan frozen assets worth $33 billion.149 Even after the rebels cemented
control of Libya's capital, airstrikes continued as the rebels pursued
pockets of resistance in parts of the country loyal to Qaddafi. 50 That this
could have anything to do with civilian protection was preposterous.
Wisely, given these developments, the rhetoric respecting humanitarian intervention began to recede within weeks of the intervention and
abated nearly entirely by its end. The matter was by then described more
forthrightly. Two sides to a conflict had been drawn into stalemate, and
NATO had plainly thrown its weight behind the side that appeared to
represent the democratic aspirations of the Libyan people. Or, to quote
Germany's Foreign Minister upon the decision by that nation to recognize Libya's rebels (the Transitional National Council) as its legitimate
government, "[t]he Transitional Council is the legitimate representation

144.
Adrian Blomfield, Libya: John McCain Calls on U.S. to Recognise Rebel Leadership,
THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 22, 2011, 7:37 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews
/africaandindianocean/libya/8469027/Libya-John-McCain-calls-on-US-to-recognise-rebelleadership.html (quoting Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that Libya was
moving towards a "stalemate").
See FAROUK-SLUGLETT & SLUGLETT, supranote 129, at 294-95 (describing the Kurdish
145.
autonomous region after the First Gulf War).
Edward Cody & Leila Fadel, NATO Grudgingly Expresses Regretfor Strike That Killed
146.
Libyan Rebels, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2011, at A10 (quoting Deputy Commander of NATO operations in Libya, Rear Adm. Russell Harding, as indicating that "I have to be frank and say it is not for
us, trying to protect civilians, to improve communications with rebel forces").
CJ. Chivers, Inferior Arms Hobble Rebels in Libya War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2011, at
147.
Al.
148.
Paul Richter, Panetta Sees Extremism Risk in Libya Rebel Panel, L.A. TIMES, June 10,
2011, at A7.
See William Wan & William Booth, Libyan Rebels Given Full U.S. Recognition, WASH.
149.
POST, July 16, 2011, at A9.
Rod Nordland, Waiting Game as Talks Proceed Near a Holdout Town in Libya, N.Y.
150.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2011, at Al4.
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of the Libyan people... . With this council, we want to support the building of a democratic and law-abiding Libya."' 5 1
Thus, ultimately, NATO support for the rebels' cause was a crucial
element in their victory,152 one that would have been unimaginable not
only if NATO had elected to refrain from its initial airstrikes, but also if
NATO had truly attempted to circumscribe its mission in any reasonable
fashion to avoiding humanitarian disaster. If, by contrast, we assume that
the Libyan rebels were not democratic in impulse and action but instead
unabashed religious fanatics along the lines of the Taliban in Afghanistan
in the manner that Colonel Qaddafi suggested on repeated occasions,"' it
is hard to imagine NATO or any member state within it would have reacted similarly, nor would any committed democrat have urged them to
do so. In such a case, "responsibility to protect" would almost certainly
have led to a very limited set of strikes to avoid civilian massacre but
certainly not to replace Qaddafi's regime, which had tempered its earlier
extremist tendencies, with one broadly sympathetic to Al Qaeda.
What NATO sought, in other words, was a democratic transformation. What it did was act as agent, or co-agent in any event, to that
transformation. It is true that in Libya (as opposed to Iraq or Japan) it
was the people who rose up first and NATO who came to their aid thereafter. Yet this does absolutely nothing to derogate from the fact that there
was an external intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state, and that
intervention, beyond its earliest phases, was directed not at "protecting
civilians," but at democratic transformation.
To deflect this discussion through references to responsibilities to
protect and humanitarian intervention is quite deleterious for a number of
reasons. First of all, it requires nations to obfuscate respecting the nature
of their intervention, which of course can lead to confusion respecting its
ultimate aims. Qaddafi insists preposterously that NATO's ambitions
were colonial.15 4 It is helpful when confronting such nonsense to respond
151. Judy Dempsey, Germany Officially Recognizes Libyan Rebel Government, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 2011, at A10; see also Oliver Wright, Three Days to Get Out of the UK-Hague Expels
Libyan
Embassy
Staff
THE
INDEPENDENT
(July
28,
2011),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/three-days-to-get-out-of-the-uk-ndash-hague-expelslibyan-embassy-staff-2327278.html (quoting the U.K. Foreign Secretary, upon British recognition of
the Transitional National Council, as suggesting that "[t]hrough its actions, the National Transitional
Council has shown its commitment to a more open and democratic Libya").
152. By March 11 of 2011, only weeks into the Libya uprising, it was clear that in the absence
of external military intervention, the rebels in Benghazi would be extinguished by the better armed
and trained Qaddafi forces. See Anthony Shadid, Momentum Shift as Libyan Rebels Flee an Oil
Town, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2011, at Al.
153. Respecting Col. Qaddafi's descriptions, see Richard Spencer, I Am Like the Queen, Says
Gaddafi in Plea to People, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 25, 2011, at 16-17 (quoting Qaddafi as
saying, "It is obvious now that this issue is run by al-Qaeda.... Those armed youngsters, our children, are incited by people who are wanted by America and the Western world.").
154. Dan Murphy, Qaddafi Issues Threats: 'Let Libya Burn', THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Backchannels/2011/0901/Qaddafi-issues-threatsLet-Libya-burn.

2012]

ARAB SPRING

733

with what one's true aims are as they concern regime change (namely,
democratic transformation), and why they are legitimate, rather than to
obfuscate in turn by claiming the aim of protecting civilians even when
the actions are clearly not directed in such a fashion.
But more importantly, the honest approach permits the recapture of
the sacred ground for democratic transformation. It permits the United
States to establish and proclaim clearly its values, and explain when it
might be derogating from them and why. This is to say, Bahrain's democratic protestors were no less deserving of support from any committed
proponent of democracy than those of Libya. Once we concede, as we
must, that NATO's actions subsequent to its lifting the siege of Benghazi
had nothing to do with humanitarian protection and everything to do with
democracy promotion, then we must concede that Bahrain's restive democrats were normatively entitled to the same support, against a heartless
tyrant whose security forces think nothing of shooting children, detaining
human rights activists, and imprisoning doctors who tend to the wounded.'5 5 It may be that geopolitical considerations counsel against intervention, and that the United States and its NATO allies may not be in any
sort of position to intervene to impose democracy wherever the ground
seems suitably fertile. But let us at least admit to ourselves that this is a
compromise to principle rather than its realization and that our commitments, our sympathies, our ideals, and our vision lie with the democratic
revolutionaries and not with their opponents. Let us, if we can do nothing
else, at least grant to the world's aspiring and repressed democrats their
sacred space, let us honor them properly with our own romantic sympathies with their noble endeavor even if we must, distastefully and in light
of the harsh realities of the world, deal with the tyrants who repress them
as if they were legitimate.
CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that attempts to categorize revolutions, indeed
radical political transformations generally, along neutral process-based
lines obscure our romantic commitment to them and deny them the sacred space to which they are entitled. My own effort is only to expand on
this concept. I want to suggest that our commitment to the transformation
must be precisely the same if the transformation sought is radical reform
or revolution, achieved through deep structural legal change or through
adherence to principles of legality, as these are all but formal procedural
niceties that have little to do with the result that is sought by those demanding change. Indeed, our commitment to the transformation should
also be unaltered if achieved with the support, or even the instigation, of
an external power with subsequent popular endorsement or by a domestic
For a more detailed account of the human rights atrocities to which the people of Bahrain
155.
have been subjected, see sources cited supranote 10.
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force, friendly monarch or professional military, acting with popular
support. In the end, what is at stake is government of, for, and by the
people. How it is achieved, and by whom in the first instance, is of little
consequence.

DEMOCRACY, VIOLENCE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
IN THE SHADOW OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION THEORY
TUAN SAMAHONt

Professor Richard Albert's ambitious article Democratic Revolutions argues that elements of political revolution long thought by social
scientists to be essential-mass mobilization, rapidity, violence-are not,
in fact, the sine qua non of revolution.' The term "revolution" captures a
broader political and legal phenomenon than just the episodic, violent,
mass-mobilized political conflagration.2 Traditional political taxonomists, contenting themselves with classifying revolutions based on the
supposed procedural criteria, neglected to acknowledge that not all revolutions are created equal.3 Albert responds to this value-free approach by
advancing a normative theory of "democratic revolution" that attempts to
distinguish legitimate democratic revolutions, such as the American
Revolution, from illegitimate, non-democratic ones, such as the Russian
Revolution. To this end, Albert relies on Emmanuel Sieybs's concept of
the People as le pouvoir constituant (constituting power) and proposes a
need for "continuing" legitimacy, i.e., a revolution is democratic when
the People have consented to the revolution as a legitimate course of
action, and consented to and framed institutions that advance liberal
democratic rights on an ongoing basis. Ultimately, his project seeks to
rehabilitate, to legitimate, to justify the democratic revolution, which has
been sullied by its inattentive grouping with its undesirable, undemocratic cousin, and to make clear what is essential to a democratic revolution. 6
This response essay identifies two objections to this thesis. In Part I,
I argue that the "democratic" in democratic revolution is greatly overrated. Democracy is one desirable aspect of Western democratic governance, but it is in considerable tension with other features of constitutional
government, including the protection of minority interests. In particular,
democracy harbors the risk of unruly and ill-informed majoritarianism.
In Part II, I develop the argument that, generally speaking, whether or
not violence or its threat is a sine qua non of democratic revolution-hood,
violence, or at the very least its threat, very often does accompany revolution. Several of Professor Albert's cited historical episodes do not supProfessor of Law, Villanova University School of Law
f
1. Richard Albert, Democratic Revolutions 2, 9-14 (Mar. 20, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
2.
Id.
3. Id. at 2, 8.
4.
Id. at 7-9.
5. Id. at 33-36.
6.
Id at 3-4, 5.

735

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

736

[Vol. 89:3

port, and indeed undermine, his thesis. Finally, in Part III, I consider
constitutional revision and interpretation in the shadow of democratic
revolution theory and ask whether Albert's account could currently justify democratic revolution in the United States.
I. DEMOCRACY IS NOT AN UNMITIGATED GOOD

Professor Albert proposes a new political taxonomy to differentiate
a good revolution from a bad one, or as he conceptualizes it, a "democratic" from a non-democratic revolution. By "democratic" revolution,
he does not mean a revolution initiated by the masses rather than political
elites. His article clarifies that elites may initiate and execute a revolution; mass mobilization is not a necessary condition for democratic revolution.7 Instead, by "democratic," he means those revolutions that "increase the range of liberty of citizens, expand opportunities to exercise
liberal democratic rights and freedoms, and to multiply popular choice."
Such a revolution is located-and ranked-along "the scale of righteousness" depending on how much it "advances the cause of freedom
and weakens the forces of oppression."9
The "democratic" in "democratic revolution," however, has its
downsides, and there are good reasons not to be as sanguine as Albert
about unbridled majoritarianism. Democratic revolution theory places
emphasis on "the People" being the constituting power; yet "the People"
do not all hold the same collective view. indeed, the theory calls for
counter-revolutionaries to contest the revolution.o The possibility of
dissent among the People-and unless we are to dehumanize the counterrevolutionaries, they too form a portion of the People-means that the
theory of democratic revolution may overemphasize democracy at the
expense of other desirable structural features of Western liberal governments, such as constitutional pre-comniitment, the protection of minority
interests, and political structures like separation of powers and federalism
designed to promote deliberation and disperse power. Democracy, by
definition, is at some level majoritarian: when controversies arise in a
pluralistic democracy, factions resolve their political disputes with resort
to some version of "majority rules" for election, legislation, confirmation
of appointees, and decision-making on collegial courts.
Unruly majoritarianism not tempered with due regard to deliberation and republican civic virtue, however, may lead to outcomes for political minorities that prove insensitive, unfair, discriminatory, and oppressive. Consider the familiar case of a revolutionary war for independence from colonial hegemonic rule, only to be followed by the rule of an
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 39-40.
Id.
Id. at 32-33.
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ethnic majority that neglects or oppresses a minority's interests." In such
a case, it may be said that, although there may be "constituting" legitimacy ab initio in throwing off a colonial ruler, there is no continuing
legitimacy-at least with regard to the minority of individuals who
would revolt, for example, to form a separate state. Of course, this further fracturing and lack of continuing legitimacy can continue as an (almost) ad infinitum loop, particularly when one considers changes in majoritarian preferences over time. Thus, democratic revolution theory justifies a relentless and vicious cycle: democratic revolution against oppressive government, new democratic government constituted, majoritarian oppression of minority, rinse and repeat. Given the reality of
majoritarianism and the inevitability of a dissenting minority, it is unclear where the end to justified democratic revolution really lies.
Consider the example of voter initiatives and referenda, often authorized among the Western states of the United States, to legislate majoritarian political preferences more than occasionally at the expense of a
political minority.'2 The citizen initiative permits voters to bypass a legislature's usual role and its procedures in lawmaking or constitution
amending." Presumably, initiatives occur because elected representatives, in their exercise of republican deliberation, reject the popularsupported measure as full of personal political hazard, imprudent, unconstitutional, etc. Often courts play a politically moderating
countermajoritarian role as vindicator of entrenched rights even as
against popular initiatives. During a revolution, however, judges acquiesce to majoritarian demands, as Albert would probably acknowledge.14
In such a case, democracy is more likely to take the form of raw
majoritarianism rather than consensus-seeking facilitated by structures
like federalism or the separation of powers. Accordingly, the stated objects of democratic revolution, i.e., to "increase the range of liberty of
citizens" and "to multiply popular choice," 5 may potentially conflict
with one another, at least with regard to the liberty of citizens with minority interests adverse to the popular choice of "King Numbers."' 6

11.

See, e.g., S. J. TAMBIAH, SRI LANKA: ETHNIC FRATRICIDE AND THE DISMANTLING OF

DEMOCRACY 13, 17, 70-72 (1986) (describing post-independence implementation of democratic
majoritarian policies that discriminated against ethnic and linguistic minority).
12.
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996) (discussing Colorado's 1992
statewide referendum "Amendment 2").
13.
See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § I (reserving to the People "[t]he power to propose laws
and amendments to the constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the
general assembly and also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any act
or item, section, or part of any act of the general assembly").
14.
Cf Albert, supra note 1, at 21
15.
Id. at 39.
16.

RUSSELL KIRK, JOHN RANDOLPH OF ROANOKE 73-74, 553-54

0 (characterizing

legisla-

tive majority as monarch "King Numbers," who seeks to confiscate and tax property of political
minorities).
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Beyond the problem of unruly majoritarianism lies the related difficulty of an ill-informed majoritarianism. When "the People" are ill informed in the context of either a functioning government or a revolutionary period, their consent may not be properly given. The "consent" may
be intentional and voluntary, but not knowing. We know that political
ignorance is widespread, and perhaps rationally so.' 7 Public choice suggests that when interest groups are large and transaction costs to communicate and organize are high relative to the benefits, the free rider
problem makes it unlikely they will mobilize to petition government officials or otherwise register their preferences. 8 In such a case, those
elected representatives may prove inattentive to the People's real concerns, appealing to them only through symbolic gestures, perhaps nationalistic or jingoistic, and the representatives may focus on their own selfinterest or those of well-organized interest groups whose costs to organize are low relative to the benefits for doing so. This knowledge and attention gap makes mental consent unlikely on the part of the People and
therefore requires the fallback substitute of performative consent, i.e.,
acquiescence. But acquiescence as consent may mean that the practice of
democratic government differs significantly from its theory. The passive
consent of acquiescence "does not distinguish among grudging, reluctant,
or enthusiastic acceptance." 1 9 The gap along that spectrum suggests the
institutions created to act on behalf of the People may be ill policed due
to public apathy resulting in the public choice problems of governance.
More seriously, acquiescence as consent also suggests that a democratic government may have difficulty living up to the "continuing legitimacy" expectations of democratic revolution theory, which is no small
problem given that the key distinguishing feature of a democratic revolution is whether it "exhibit[s] constituting and continuing legitimacy."20
After all, under democratic revolution theory, the People as the constituting power "can, as it pleases, revoke its consent from those constituted
institutions, and once again constitute new powers for new institutions
staffed by new individuals."2 1 Contrary to Albert, such a result, if his
justifying theory were embraced, could invite further revolution, 22 or
attempts at it, if nothing but acquiescence or consent by a majority were
required. Revolution tends to be contagious-consider Europe in 1848,
Eastern Europe in 1989, or the so-called Arab Spring in 2010 and continuing into 2011-and it may be that the phlegmatic People acquiesce

17. Ilya Somin, PoliticalIgnorance and the CountermajoritarianDifficulty: A New Perspective on the CentralObsession of ConstitutionalTheory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1304-13 (2004).
See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
18.
THEORY OF GROUPS 2, 29, 33-35, 48 (1965).

19.
20.
21.
22.

Albert, supra note 1, at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 38.
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until some external force awakens them from their slumber. When they
awaken, the consequences may be tumultuous.
II. REVOLUTION DOES OFTEN INVOLVE VIOLENCE OR ITS THREAT

Albert wishes to emphasize the substance of a revolution's endi.e., whether it is democratic or non-democratic-rather than the procedural means by which it may come to pass. 23 In particular, he disputes
the necessity of the relationship between revolution and violence (or its
threat).24 His burden is heavy, however. Political revolution is intimately
tied with violence and tumult. Eugene Delacroix's painting Liberty Leading the People, which portrays the French July Revolution of 1830, epitomizes that connection. 25 Delacroix personifies Liberty as a determined
French peasant woman striding across the dead bodies of the fallen forces of reaction. 26 She draws after her a ragtag-but-noble band of armed
revolutionary irregulars as she leads, musket with bayonet in one hand,
tricolor in the other.27 Delacroix has accurately captured the violent spirit
of most revolutions. Rebuttal of that fixed association requires good historical exemplars of nonviolent revolution.
To meet this burden, Albert proposes several counterexamples of
revolutions that were ostensibly non-violent events. Contrary to his assertion, those events that count as revolutions, at least under his approach, 28 all presented actual violence, or at least involved its very substantial threat. To begin, Albert offers the example of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as a pre-twentieth century revolution that he claims delinks revolution and violence and for which violence-oriented traditional
revolutionary theory "would find trouble accounting." 29 Although the
Glorious Revolution in England is styled "Bloodless," historians
acknowledge that label is misleading.3 0 In fact, it involved a Dutch inva23. Id at 7, 66.
Id at 14-17.
24.
BARTHELEMY JOBERT, DELACROIX 128-33 (Terry Grabar & Alexandra Bonfante-Warren
25.
eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1998) (1997).
26. Id. at 132.
27. Id.
28. It is unclear whether the Georgian, Hungarian, Polish, or Ukranian revolutions count as
revolutions under Albert's own definition. For example, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, which
challenged disputed parliamentary elections, see JONATHAN WHEATLEY, GEORGIA FROM NATIONAL
AWAKENING TO ROSE REVOLUTION, DELAYED TRANSITION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 183

(2005), would not constitute a revolution for Albert because it does not meet the requirement of
"nonconstitutionality." The Supreme Court of Georgia nullified the prior election results for 150
proportional seats and a new parliamentary election was held to elect new representatives under the
same constitution (albeit amended through the formally ordained amendment process), see id. at
194-95. As the revolutionaries sought to vindicate and amend the constitution rather than overturn it,
it is unclear the revolution met Albert's requirement of "nonconstitutionality,". See Albert, supra
note 1, at 23, 24. Accordingly, the fact that these "revolutions" were non-violent does not establish
Albert's point.
Albert, supranote 1, at 16.
29.
30.

TIM HARRIS, REVOLUTION: THE GREAT CRISIS OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY, 1685-1720,

at 275 (2006).
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sion with an assembled army of over 14,000,31 attendant bloodshed during battles outside Dorchester, in Reading, and at Wincanton, 32 and rioting anti-Catholic mobs 3 3-in short, both actual and threatened violence
characterized the revolution. If the Glorious Revolution supports any
proposition about revolutionary violence, it is only the modest claim that
occasionally revolutions end mercifully quickly with less violence and
loss of life than might have occurred if the established order had not miscalculated the likelihood of revolution and quickly capitulated on the
battlefield.
In some of the counterexamples, Albert defines what counts as violence too narrowly because he apparently excludes violence and threats
of violence on the part of the establishment. But counterrevolutionaries,
not just the revolutionaries, may perpetrate violence. 35 Consider the supposed "nonviolent" struggle for Indian independence.36 The British colonial forces responded to revolutionaries with extreme prejudice on several occasions. For example, in 1930 the British massacred some 200-250
nonviolent Indian protestors at the Kabuli Gate in Peshawar when they
opened fire on the crowd with machine guns.3 7 Their violent deaths refute the notion that the Indian revolution was nonviolent, at least when
the colonial power's violence is considered.
Moreover, it is a mistake to focus only on Gandhi's nonviolent
campaign for India's independence. The lengthy fight for India's independence was multifaceted and included violence employed against the
British by Indian revolutionaries, such as the efforts of Subhash Chandra
Bose and the Indian National Army, revolutionaries not affiliated with
Gandhi's non-violent resistance movement. 3 8 Further, consider the Indians' considerable numerical advantage as against the British. When large
numbers of discontent protesters greatly outnumber a foreign occupying
force, can it truly be said that the threat of violence is ever far away? The
in terrorem effect on the British would have been potent.

31.

W.A. SPECK, RELUCTANT REVOLUTIONARIES, ENGLISHMEN AND THE REVOLUTION OF

1688, at 79 (1988).
32. HARRIS, supra note 30, at 275, 295 (reporting thirty dead at Wincanton, fifty-three at
Dorchester, and thirty to fifty at Reading).
33. SPECK, supra note 31, at 89; HARRIS supra note 30, at 296, 372 76 (describing antiCatholic mobs in England and Scotland).
34. SPECK, supra note 31, at 80, 87.
35. Even Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Revolution" featured riot police who violently suppressed
peaceful student demonstrations by attacking them with truncheons. MICHAEL LONG, MAKING
HISTORY, CZECH VOICES OF DISSENT AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1989, at 19-20 (2005). There was
very much the threat of violence by the old guard, including (apparently) a student death at the hands
of the police, though this report of a death later proved false, id. at 20, 124.
36. Albert, supranote 1, at 16-17.
37. Irfan Habib, Civil Disobedience 1930-31, 25 SOCIAL SCIENTIST 55-56 (1997), available
at www.jstor.org/stable/3517680.
38.
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Other proffered counterexamples of "nonviolence" fare no better
under a definition of "violence" that encompasses the old regime's resistance. The Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan featured violence initially in
the city of Jalalabad as the government "deployed internal troops to suppress civilian protesters" in clashes that left dozens wounded. Interior
Ministry troops also attacked protestors in the capital of Bishkek with
more than twenty hospitalized and two hundred arrested.4 0 Crowds then
captured the principal government building while widespread looting and
arson occurred, allegedly by counterrevolutionaries. 4 1 The weeks that
followed would also be marred by political assassination.42
Of course, it is impossible to know ab initio whether a democratic
revolutionary undertaking will turn violent because revolutions are complex and inherently chaotic events. The possibility of a true revolution
unfolding without violence or its threat cannot be ruled out. One need
not, however, establish that all revolutions are violent. It is enough that
they frequently are violent. This concurrence of violence and revolution
suggests the relationship is not accidental. Accordingly, too readily justifying revolution should give one pause. Consider the project of the social
contract theorists and their discussion of the theoretical "state of nature"
as a type of justification, or alternatively rejection, of revolution. How
readily a Locke or a Hobbes justified or rejected revolution turned on
their alternative conceptions of the state of nature, which would obtain
during the disorder accompanying revolution. If an absence of civil authority is more akin to Locke's great "Inconveniences of the State of
Nature . . . where Men may be Judges in their own Case," 4 3 revolution
might more readily be justified. Conversely, if Hobbes is correct that
"the life of man" in a revolutionary state of nature is "solitary, poor[],
nasty, brutish, and short,"" that alternative looks less appealing than
simply tolerating a monarch, even if one's liberty is constrained.
To be sure, revolution is occasionally justified-even acknowledging the probability of attendant violence. Those occasions, however,
must be carefully weighed in light of the likelihood that violence will
accompany them. The traditional theorist's focus on the violent procedure of revolution suggests prudence about those weighty substantive
reasons adequate to justify it. 4 5 If Albert were to defend a more modest
39.

ERICA MARAT, THE TULIP REVOLUTION: KYRGYZSTAN ONE YEAR AFTER, MARCH 15,

2005-MARCH 24,2006, at 5 (2006).
40. Id at 129.
41.
Id.
42. Id. at 130.
43.

JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 293-94 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge

Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 65 (Ernest Rhys ed., E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc. 1940) (1651).
44.
45.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (reflecting a similar sentiment,
"Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light
and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to
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proposition about revolution and violence-i.e., revolutions may often be
violent, but less bloody than supposed-we would need to ask the further
question what quantum of violence would be acceptable in order for a
democratic revolution to be justified? Given the imperfect state of the art
of political forecasting, it may be that no satisfactory answer to the revolutionary question could be offered.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (AND INTERPRETATION) INTHE SHADOW
OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION THEORY

In the first portion of this response essay, I suggested that the "democratic" in democratic revolution might prove undesirable. Although
majority rule is an essential component of democracy, majoritarianism is
in tension with other aspects of liberal governance, including the constitutional protection of minority interests and structures designed to promote consensus. Accordingly, the emphasis on the "democratic" in democratic revolution implies a version of majority rules to constitute a legitimate governing institution without any necessary regard for these other
features of Western-style governance. In the essay's second part, I separately questioned whether a true Albertian revolution could be truly nonviolent by illustrating that the historical record is less than reassuring on
this count. In this portion of the essay, I argue that in light of revolution's
majoritarian and violent realities, it is desirable to avoid revolution by
facilitating a measure of democratic but deliberative control. Thus, the
essay considers constitutional revision and interpretation in the shadow
of democratic revolution theory. To do so, it asks whether Albert's account would currently justify democratic revolution in the United States
or whether Article V and "interpretation" can adequately serve the ends
that a democratic revolution might otherwise seek to attain.
As previously argued, revolution, even democratic revolution, could
very likely prove violent and majoritarian in its most crassly undesirable
sense. Assuming it is desirable to avoid unfiltered majoritarian outcomes,
or at least the violent process, how could "continuing legitimacy" be
secured through nonviolent, democratically legitimate change? Historically, one agent for facilitating constitutional change in the U.S. system
has been the judiciary's sub rosa amendment of the Constitution under
guise of interpreting a constitutional text characterized as ambiguous, or
at least as underdetermined. Albert anticipates interpretation-quarevision as a nonviolent species of democratic revolution as his theory
attempts to account for, and ratify, among other things, constitutional
restructuring that occurs outside formally authorized procedures, such as

suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are
accustomed.").
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that constitutional order that emerged outside of Article V during the
New Deal settlement.4 6
Perhaps the difficulty of the formal supermajoritarian process and
the asserted exigency to respond to changed circumstances might be invoked as a justification for interpretation-qua-amendment. But this approach fails both a criterion of the democratic revolution and a critique of
it. First, if one rejects the hyperrealist indeterminacy premise, then the
use of constitutional interpretation to legitimate amendment-in-fact succeeds only because "We the People" are inattentive, ignorant, or deceived. Albert accepts that the acquiescence-as-consent essential to constituting and continuing legitimacy may encompass "grudging, reluctant
or enthusiastic acceptance," 4 7 but does that consent also embrace acquiescence predicated on inattention, ignorance, or deception? If so, continuing legitimacy may prove a rather empty concept. Second, in the particular case of the New Deal, interpretation-as-amendment occurred without violence, but it remained decidedly majoritarian. The Court's expansion of the national government's authority was not costless to private
minority interests. Consider Carolene Products and its famous footnote
four: the Court ratified the majoritarian exercise of legislative power
through a presumption of constitutionality that restricted claims of individual right -against the national government. 48
If judicial interpretation-as-amendment is an inadequate device for
maintaining continuing legitimacy under the U.S. Constitution, does the
formal mechanism of Article V adequately serve the ends that a democratic revolution might otherwise seek to attain? If not, does its
supermajoritarian structure justify an appeal to democratic revolution
theory and nonconstitutional action?
It is perhaps ironic that one generation's revolutionaries may be the
defenders of the next generation's establishment, but it remains that the
Philadelphia Convention drafted a document resistant to facile amendment. Article V accommodates demand for democratic change, but does
so by allowing only clear supermajorities to have their way. Although the
procedural rules facilitate the avoidance of revolution and its violent hazAlbert, supra note 1, at 9, 18. In this sense, Albert's project draws upon and parallels
46.
efforts, for example, by Bruce Ackerman and Mark Tushnet, to explain and justify constitutional
change outside Article V's formal rules for amendment. Democratic revolutions with constituting
and continuing legitimacy are his answer to Ackerman's constitutional moment resulting from
constitutional politics. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 10-31

(1998). Those democratic revolutions are his answer to Tushnet's constitutional hardball. See also
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523 (2004) (describing constitutional hardball as a strategy for altering constitutional orders).
Albert, supra note 1,at 38.
47.
48.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.").

744

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 89:3

ards by forcing consensus before allowing change, Article V denies a
simple majority its right to govern as it pleases. Indeed, it promotes "the
more general constitutional principle of republicanism, which attempts to
promote the public good within a system of popular representation'9
more than it attempts to promote democracy. A strongly deliberative
process, however, is not costless if it produces veto gates from which
proposed amendments may not emerge. Initiation of the amendment process requires bicameral two-third supermajorities with a requirement that
three-fourths of state legislatures, or conventions in them, ratify any
amendment.o The alternative of a constitutional convention, where twothirds of the state legislatures initiate the process whereby constitutional
amendments may be proposed with the same three-fourths rule for ratification, is no less demanding.5' Indeed, that there have been only twentyseven successful amendments, ten secured as an early negotiated political
compromise, demonstrate the formal Article V process is not very democratically responsive.
Moreover, Article V is likely to be even less effective when addressing matters where the institutional or individual interests of Article
V gatekeepers-the prerogatives of Congress and its members or the
interests of the several States-are directly at stake. Consider a hypothetical repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment, which itself repealed state
legislative selection of senators and provided for direct election of U.S.
senators.5 2 To the extent that it were thought such an amendment would
subject senators to renewed state legislative accountability, such an
amendment would never be proposed. Thus, Congress and the States
act as important gatekeepers for initiating the Article V process.
This conclusion suggests that Article V would inadequately address
the demands of democratic revolution theory and, depending on the particular democratic demand (e.g., the redistributive demands of the "Occupy Wall Street" movement were it to win majoritarian support), 4
49. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our SupermajoritarianConstitution, 80 TEX.
L. REv. 703, 705 (2002).
50. U.S. CONST. art. V.
To complicate matters further, Article V provides that a state may not be stripped of its
51.
equal representation in the Senate (i.e., two senators per state) without its consent. U.S. CONST. art.
V. This provision gives a state an effective veto power over any such amendment.

52.

U.S. CONsT. art. XVII.

53. The ratification of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, which provides that "[n]o law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an
election of Representatives shall have intervened," is not to the contrary. James Madison proposed
the original amendment as a part of the Bill of Rights. Jay M. Zitter, Construction and Operation of
Twenty-Seventh Amendment to United States Constitution Relating to CongressionalCompensation,
95 A.L.R.5th 459 (2002). Its ratification required over two hundred years and Article V required no
further action by Congress. Id.
54. Douglas Schoen, Polling the Occupy Wall Street Crowd, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 18, 2011),
availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001 424052970204479504576637082965745362.html
(noting his firm's polling of 200 protestors in New York's Zuccotti Park and reporting that 65%
favor guaranteed health care, education, and retirement and 77% favor increasing taxation on
wealthiest, while 58% oppose increasing taxation on all).
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could justify a new American Revolution. If constituting or continuing
legitimacy is at its heart a claim about a democratic majority being able
to rule, then likely Article V would not deliver. One might alternatively
consider an Article V amendment to the way in which we amend under
Article V. Authorizing additional tools to more easily amend the document, perhaps by disintermediating the gatekeepers, could possibly meet
the demands of his theory."
Of course, such concessions to Albert's theory would prioritize democracy over republicanism, constitutionalism, and other desirable features of Western-style liberal governance. Moreover, if his premise that
revolution has no necessary association with violence is untrue, as I have
argued it is, Article V rightfully becomes more attractive as a deliberative mechanism for change that seeks broad consensus and change without the inevitable bloodshed that attends the People's irregular exercise
of constituting power.
CONCLUSION

This response essay identified two objections to Albert's democratic
revolution theory. First, democracy is but one desirable aspect of governance. Its overemphasis is in tension with the protection of minority interests and the consensus-seeking features of constitutionalism. Second,
whether or not violence or its threat is a defining characteristic of revolution, violence and its threat often do attend revolution. In light of the
undesirability of crass majoritarianism and revolutionary violence, this
essay considered whether his theory could be accommodated either by
interpretation-as-amendment or by the Article V method for amending
the document. Neither would suffice to satisfy the demands of his democratic revolutionary theory. That conclusion stands, reductio ad absurdum, as a strong suggestion that the premises of democratic revolutionary theory are mistaken.

These tools might assume the form of a national citizen petition or a revision commission
55.
convened periodically to assess the document. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. Xl, § 2 (providing for
revision commission that convenes every twenty years to consider amendments to Florida Constitution).

AT&TMOBILITYL.L.C. V. CoNcEPcIoN: THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST
PREEMPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FAA
INTRODUCTION

Beginning in 1984 with Southland Corp. v. Keating,' the United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly held 2 that the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) 3 preempts state laws invalidating arbitration agreements.
Most recently, the Court held in AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion4
that California law "classifying most collective arbitration waivers in
consumer contracts as unconscionable" was preempted by Section 2 of
the FAA.'
Section 2, the "primary substantive provision of the Act,"' outlines
both the general rule for the treatment of arbitration clauses as well as the
exception to the rule:
A written provision in

...

a contract evidencing a transaction in-

volving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.7
The Court has construed the language of the FAA's saving clause"save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract"-to allow the invalidation of arbitration agreements by
"generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability."' This interpretation of the saving clause, coupled
with the Court's general presumption against federal preemption of state
1. 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984).
2. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding
that California's rule classifying most collective arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable was preempted by the FAA); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688
(1996) (holding that a Montana statute, which conditioned the enforceability of arbitration clauses on
their compliance with a special notice requirement, was preempted by the FAA); Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483, 491-92 (1987) (holding that the provision of California Labor Law, which stated that
wage collection actions may be maintained without regard to any private agreement to arbitrate, was
preempted by the FAA); Southland, 465 U.S. at 15-16 (holding that the California Franchise Investment Law was preempted by the FAA).
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). Because this Comment focuses upon the preemption of state
3.
laws, it refers only to sections contained in Chapter I of the FAA, which focuses principally on
domestic arbitration. However, the full FAA includes additional chapters and sections. See id. (
201-208,301-307.
4.
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
Id. at 1746, 1753.
5.
6. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
9 U.S.C. §2 (2006).
7.
Doctor'sAssocs., 517 U.S. at 687 (interpreting the saving clause of 9 U.S.C. §2).
8.
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laws,9 might lead observers to expect not only a liberal application of this
saving clause, but a distinct proclivity of the Court to uphold state laws
against challenges under the FAA. However, in practice, the Court has
"routinely" held that the FAA preempts state laws invalidating arbitration agreements. o
Part I of this Comment provides a brief description of the history
and case law pertaining to FAA preemption. Part II summarizes the facts,
procedural history, and opinions in Concepcion. Part III describes the
inherent conflict in the Concepcion Court's decision. In addition, Part III
examines the practical implications of the Concepcion decision and the
means by which the Supreme Court or Congress could bring this decision into closer alignment with federalist principles. This Comment concludes by noting that although the holding in Concepcion represents a
steadfast adherence to the line of jurisprudence preempting state laws
under the FAA, these collective decisions deviate from and conflict with
the principles inherent in the preemption doctrine and federalism.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Preemption Doctrine
The doctrine of preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution," which states that federal law is the "supreme Law of the Land." 2 The Supreme Court has articulated the general concept of preemption as recognizing that "under the Supremacy
Clause,. . . any state law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged
power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield."' 3
The preemption doctrine can be divided into two primary categories: express preemption and implied preemption.14 Although all preemption cases require the court to make a determination about the congressional intent of the federal statute, express and implied preemption differ
in how this determination is made.15 Express preemption involves the
interpretation of statutes that include an express provision dictating that
the federal legislation preempts state laws. However, even without such
9. Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 398
(2004) ("[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
10. Id. at 393-94 & n.2.
II. See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n., 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992); see also
Drahozal, supra note 9, at 397. But see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79
CORNELL L. REv. 767, 770-77 (1994) (asserting that the prevailing view that preemption and supremacy are either identical or inherently connected is incorrect and that they represent two distinct
legal concepts).
12. Drahozal, supra note 9, at 397 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
13. Gade, 505 U.S. at 108 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. David S. Schwartz, The FederalArbitrationAct and the Power of Congress Over State
Courts, 83 OR. L. REv. 541, 547 (2004).
15. Id
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an express preemption clause, the court may nonetheless determine that a
state law is impliedly preempted by federal legislation.' 6 This implied
preemption requires a determination of Congress's preemptive intent
based on other statutory provisions, legislative history, or both.' 7 Implied
preemption is further subdivided into field preemption and conflict
preemption.'8 Field preemption exists when the Court finds, within federal legislation, a clear congressional intent that federal law should exclusively occupy a field.' 9 The Supreme Court has inferred the requisite
congressional intent to create this type of preemption in cases where the
federal statutory scheme is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it." 2 0
Conflict preemption arises when a state law actually conflicts with the
federal law.2 1 There are two situations in which courts may find conflict
preemption 22: first, where the federal and state laws are mutually exclusive, such that a party would be unable to simultaneously comply with
both laws, 23 and second, where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." 24 The former category of conflict preemption is also referred
to as "impossibility preemption," 25 while the latter is typically referred to
as "obstacle preemption." 2 6 Obstacle preemption is the most frequent
category of implied preemption at issue in cases. 2 7 In these types of cases, the threshold requirement for preemption is that the state law "frustrate [the] imperative of enforceability" of the federal legislation.28
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 ("Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at
least two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is
so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, and conflict pre-emption, where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility, or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 435 (3d

ed. 2009).
19.

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 435.

20.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Cons. & Dev. Comm'n., 461 U.S. 190, 203-04
(1983) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
21.
Schwartz, supra note 14, at 546 n.17.
22.
Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm:Conceptual and Interpretive Issues,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1151 (1998).
23.
See, e.g., Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963);
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 126-28 (1913) (evaluating conflict between the Federal
food and drugs act and state statute regulating labeling consumer goods).
24. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at
436.
25.
Gregory M. Dickinson, An EmpiricalStudy of Obstacle Preemptionin the Supreme Court,
89 NEB. L. REV. 682,684-685 (2011).
26.
Drahozal, supra note 9, at 397-98; Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration'sSuspect Status, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2011).
27. Drahozal, supra note 9, at 398.
28.
Aragaki, supra note 26, at 1242 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 356 (2008)).
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Although the power to preempt state laws is constitutionally authorized,2 9 the Court typically construes the preemptory effect of federal laws
in light of the Unites States' federalist foundation, such that "in subject
matter areas 'traditionally occupied' by the states, the Court applies a
presumption against preemption." 30 The Supreme Court expounded upon
this concept by explaining that because preemption is an "extraordinary
power in a federalist system," Congress must make its intention to "alter
the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government . .. unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.",3 Thus,
the doctrine of preemption attempts to strike a balance between the uniformity of laws on a national scale 3 2 and the preservation of the States'
right to serve as "laboratories"33 for experimentation with respect to social and economic policy.34
B. FederalArbitrationAct
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 "in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements." 3 5 The Supreme Court has recognized that the FAA was fundamentally designed to "overcome courts'
refusals to enforce agreements to arbitrate,"36 and has described Section
2 as reflecting a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration."3 7 Although
the Court's interpretation of the FAA's reach has changed since its enactment, 38 the modem reading allows its application in state courts, 39

29. See supranotes 11-13 and accompanying text.
30. Drahozal, supra note 9, at 398 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)); see also AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1762 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) ("Where ... the field which Congress
is said to have pre-empted includes areas that have been traditionally occupied by the States, congressional intent to supersede state laws must be clear and manifest." (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977))).
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot31.
ing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1984)).
32. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking ConstitutionalFederalism,74 TEX. L. REV. 795,
799-800 (1996) (discussing the conflicting objectives of not "disrupting the existing balance of
federal-state powers" and facilitating "one set of rules in the relevant field").
33. This quote is a reference to Justice Brandies's dicta in New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
34. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, CorrectingFederalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation:
The Supreme Court and the FederalArbitrationAct, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 11 (2004.
35. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
36. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
37. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
38. See Aaron-Andrew P. BruhI, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the
Evolution ofFederalArbitrationLaw, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1427-32 (2008).
39. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1984) (choosing not to confine the application of the FAA to federal courts).
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extends its scope to the equivalent of Congress's Commerce Clause
power,4 0 and permits its use in statutory causes of action.4 1
The general rule created by Section 2 of the FAA is that courts must
place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and
enforce them according to their terms.42 The saving clause at the end of
Section 2 provides the mechanism under which state laws and rules may
be upheld against challenges under the FAA, contingent upon these laws
and rules being based on "generally applicable contract defenses." 4 Although the plain language of Section 2 allows for the invalidation of an
arbitration clause "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract," the Supreme Court has rarely utilized the
exception," the presumption against preemption 4 5 notwithstanding.
As the Supreme Court established in Volt Information Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, "[t]he FAA

contains no express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration." 4 6 Accordingly,
conflict preemption was the only ground on which the Court could find
that the FAA invalidated state laws addressing arbitration.4 7 The Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA's preemptive power as ansing under the obstacle subsection of conflict preemption,48 stating in Volt that
state laws found to "undermine the goals and policies of the FAA" would
be preempted.49

40. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 268-70 (explaining that the FAA extends to the current reach of
the Commerce Clause power).
41.
See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991); Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480-84 (1989).
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546
42.
U.S. 440, 443 (2006)); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1989).
43. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
44.
Cornpare Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (holding California's Discover Bank rule was
preempted by the FAA), and Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688 (holding the Montana statute was
preempted by the FAA), and Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (holding the California
Labor Code was preempted by the FAA), and Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 (holding the California
Franchise Investment Law was preempted by the FAA), with Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-79 (holding the
FAA did not preempt the California Law).
45.
Drahozal, supra note 9, at 398 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
46. Volt, 489 U.S. at 477.
47. See id; supra Part LA and accompanying notes 14-28; see also Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal
Opportunityfor Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1191 (2011).
48. Note, An Unnecessary Choice of Law: Volt, Mastrobuono, and Federal ArbitrationAct
Preemption, 115 HARV. L. REv. 2250, 2253 (2002) (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 477); see also
Drahozal, supra note 9, at 396-98 (noting the different categories of preemption analysis, including
"obstacle" conflict preemption).
49.
Volt, 489 U.S. at 477-78 (framing the issue presented in that case and quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), as creating the authority to exercise obstacle preemption over
state laws).
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While the Supreme Court has recognized that determining congressional intent is the "ultimate touchstone" of the preemption doctrine,o
many commentators have noted that the language and the legislative history of the FAA lack the requisite preemptive intent to invalidate state
arbitration laws."
C. Southland Corp. v. Keating5
The Supreme Court first applied the FAA to preempt a state law
that undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements in Southland
Corp. v. Keating.5 ' In Southland, several franchisees sued the Southland
Corporation in state court, "alleging, among other things, fraud, oral misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation
of the disclosure requirements of California's Franchise Investment Law
(FL)."54 After the individual cases were consolidated, Southland Corporation filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause
in the franchise agreements.55 The trial court granted Southland's motion
to compel arbitration on all claims except those based on the FL.56 The
court of appeals reversed, allowing arbitration on the FL claim; however, this ruling was subsequently overturned by the California Supreme
Court, which held that the FIL "require[d] judicial consideration of
claims" and furthermore, that the statute was not preempted by the
FAA.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme
Court, holding that the California law was preempted because it stood as
an obstacle to accomplishing Congress's objectives in enacting the
FAA.58 Specifically, the Court explained that upholding the California
Supreme Court's holding would create a situation in which the right to
50. See Retail Clerks Int'l. Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963); see
also Schwartz, supra note 34, at 16.
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 34, at 23-27; Jean R. Sternlight, Panaceaor Corporate
51.
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court'sPreferencefor Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637,
641-44, 49 (arguing that Congress did not intend to prevent states from protecting weaker parties or
to enforce arbitration agreements against ignorant consumers); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral
Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1952-53 (1996)
(referring to the Supreme Court's expansion of FAA jurisprudence as a "slight-of-hand" [sic]). But
see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the
FederalArbitrationAct, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 112-14 (2002) (arguing that the Southland
Court reached the correct conclusion about the FAA's legislative history).
52. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
53. Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent JudicialSkepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the UnsettledLegal Landscape, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 477, 485 (2009) (arguing that "since the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Southland v. Keating, the FAA's substantive application in state courts and preemption of
state laws undercutting the enforceability of arbitration agreements has been accepted").
54. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 4 (1984). California's Franchise Investment Law
is codified at CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000--31516 (West 2011).
55. Southland,465 U.S. at 4.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 10.
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enforce an arbitration contract was dependent on the particular forum in
which the case was brought.59 The Court opined that in drafting the FAA,
"Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the
enforceability of arbitration agreements."6 o
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued
that the saving clause in Section 2 allows for the revocation of arbitration
agreements on any grounds that are sufficient to revoke a contract at
common law.61 Therefore, Justice Stevens argued, the FAA should not
preempt the FIL because the waiver was based on public policy, which
forms a sufficient basis for the revocation of a contract at common law.62
Justice O'Connor's dissent proposed an alternative rationale for not
preempting the California law, asserting that Congress's intent was to
create "a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts."63 Based
on this assertion, Justice O'Connor articulated that Section 2 "should
have no application whatsoever in state courts," thereby eliminating the
FAA's authority to preempt state law in state courts.6
D. Perry v. Thomas65
Preemption under the FAA next arose in Perry v. Thomas, which
involved Section 229 of California's Labor code, requiring that litigants
be provided a judicial forum for resolving wage disputes.66 The Supreme
Court held that the California statute was in "unmistakable conflict" with
Section 2 of the FAA, and that therefore, "[u]nder the Supremacy Clause,
the state statute must give way." 67
Again, Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor dissented, 68 mirroring
the arguments presented in their dissenting opinions in Southland.69 Although the majority made a passing reference to the availability of general contract defenses to arbitration clauses, it made no attempt to apply
this assertion to the public policy argument advanced by Justice Stevens.70 The majority opinion merely noted that courts "may not rely on
the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law

Id at 15.
59.
60.
Id
Id at 19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61.
Id. at 20.
62.
Id. at 25, 36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63.
64.
Id at 31.
65.
482 U.S. 483 (1987).
66. Id at 491; CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 2011).
67. Perry,482 U.S. at 491.
68. Id at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 494-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
69. See Southland, 465 U.S. at 19-20 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part):
Southland, 465 U.S. at 25, 36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
70. See Perry,482 U.S. at 491-92 (majority opinion).
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holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable
the court to effect what we hold today the state legislature cannot." 7 1
E. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto7 2
In Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto, the Supreme Court held that
the FAA preempted73 a Montana statute that invalidated arbitration
clauses unless they were types in underlined capital letters on the first
page of the contract.74 The holding was predicated on the idea that
"[c]ourts may not . .. invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws
applicable only to arbitration provisions" because Section 2 requires that
arbitration clauses be afforded the same authority as other contracts.
The Court reasoned that the Montana statute "condition[ed] the enforceability of arbitration agreements on [their] compliance with a special
notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally," and therefore,
the statute must be preempted.
Justice Thomas dissented based on his "view that [Section] 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to proceedings in state courts," 77
the same rationale presented by Justice O'Connor in Southland and Perry

78

F. Discover Bank v. Superior Court7 9
Although Discover Bank v. Superior Court was not heard by the
Supreme Court, it presented a unique challenge to the FAA insofar as it
created a judicial framework allowing California courts to treat arbitration agreements containing class arbitration waivers differently from
other contracts.80 The case involved a challenge by a credit card holder
who sought class arbitration despite language in the arbitration agreement that forbade it. 1 The Supreme Court of California held that when a
consumer alleges that a class action waiver in a consumer contract has
the effect of exculpating a party with superior bargaining power, the contract is unconscionable and unenforceable. 8 2 The rule created by Discov71.

Id. at 492 n.9.

72.

517 U.S. 681 (1996).

73. Id. at 683 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. §27-5-114(4) (section (4) repealed 1997)).
74. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996).
75. Id. at 687 (emphasis in original).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
78. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25, 36 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Perry,
482 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79.
113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogatedby AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. 1740 (2011).
80.
Lampley, supranote 53, at 485-86.
81.
Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1103.
82. Id. at I110 ("We do not hold that all class action waivers are necessarily unconscionable.
But when the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes
between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat
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er Bank was a key element in the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T
Mobility L.L. C. v. Concepcion.83
II. AT&T MOBILITY L.L.C. V. CONCEPCION
A. Facts
In 2002, Vincent and Liza Concepcion contracted with Cingular
Wireless, which was subsequently purchased by AT&T,8 4 for the purchase of cellular telephones and service. The contract included an arbitration clause that "required ... claims to be brought in the parties' individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported
class or representative proceeding."8 6 The Concepcions purchased the
AT&T cellular service, and although the telephones were advertised as
free, the Concepcions were charged $30.22 in sales tax based on the
phones' retail value.8 7
B. ProceduralHistory
The Concepcions filed a complaint against AT&T in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California, alleging that
AT&T had "engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax
on phones it advertised as free."88 The complaint was consolidated with a
putative class action based on the same claims. 9
In 2008, AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the terms of the
agreement; however, the Concepcions opposed the motion, arguing "that
the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory under California law because it disallowed classwide [sic] procedures." 90 Relying on the rule the California Supreme Court articulated in
Discover Bank, the district court found the arbitration clause unconscionable and denied AT&T's motion.91
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, finding not only that the
Discover Bank rule rendered the arbitration clause unconscionable, but
large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then, at least to the extent the
obligation at issue is governed by California law, the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of
the party 'from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.' Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should
not be enforced." (alteration in original) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2011))).
83. See AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
84.
AT&T acquired Cingular in November of 2005 and renamed the company AT&T Mobility in January of 2007. Id. at 1744 n.1; Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 852 n. I (9th
Cir. 2009), rev'd, sub nom. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)).
85. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 & n.1.
86. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1744-45.
91.
Id. at 1745 (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005),
abrogatedby Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740).
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that it was not preempted by the FAA because that rule was "simply a
refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in California." 9 2 The Ninth Circuit further noted that "Discover
Bank placed arbitration agreements with class action waivers on the exact same footing as contracts that bar class action litigation outside the
context of arbitration."
C. Majority Opinion
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit and held that FAA preempts the
Discover Bank rule because "it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 94
The Court rejected the argument that the Discover Bank rule was
based upon unconscionability, and thereby falls within the saving clause
of Section 2 of the FAA, because "nothing in [Section 2] suggests an
intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives." 9 5 The majority further stated that the
"overarching purpose" of the FAA is to ensure agreements are enforced
according to their terms, and because requiring class arbitration fundamentally alters arbitration, permitting class proceedings in this case
would be inconsistent with the FAA. 96
The majority found that the Discover Bank rule allows parties to a
consumer contract to "demand [class arbitration] ex post," and because
arbitration in this context is mandated by the rule, rather than by agreement of the parties, it is inconsistent with the FAA. 97 Further, the majority identified three inherent problems with class arbitration.98 First, class
arbitration "sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration-its informality-[making] the process slower, more costly," and less likely to
result in final judgment." Second, it requires a level of procedural formality sufficient to bind absent parties to the results. 00 Third, it increases
the risk to defendants because allowing an aggregation of claims increas-

92. Laster v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd, sub nom.
AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
93. Id. at 858 (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 990 (9th
Cir. 2007)).
94. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
95. Id. at 1748.
96. Id.
97.
Id. at 1750-51.
98. Id at 1751-52.
99. Id. at 1751.
100.
Id. ("For a class-action money judgment to bind absentees in litigation, class representatives must at all times adequately represent absent class members, and absent members must be
afforded notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a right to opt out of the class. At least this amount of
process would presumably be required for absent parties to be bound by the results of arbitration."
(citations omitted)).
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es the chance of suffering "a devastating loss," thereby coercing defendants into settling what might otherwise be questionable claims.' 1o
D. Justice Thomas's ConcurringOpinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas described his reading of
Section 2 of the FAA, which is based upon the linguistic differences between the general rule and the saving clause. 10 2 Specifically, Justice
Thomas emphasized that although Section 2 requires that arbitration
clauses be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," the saving clause applies only to "grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract."' 03 Justice Thomas concluded that these semantic differences indicate a congressional intent to apply the saving clause solely to
those "grounds relating to the making of the agreement."'1 Accordingly,
because the Discover Bank rule does not relate to contract formation, it
does not qualify as a basis for revocation pursuant to the saving clause of
Section 2 and is, therefore, preempted by the FAA.1o
E. Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer and joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, criticized the majority for
preempting California law, and maintained that the Discover Bank rule is
consistent with not only the plain language of the FAA, but its primary
goals as well. 0 6
The dissent argued that the Discover Bank rule was formulated by
Supreme Court's interpretation of two provisions of the
California
the
California Civil Code,10 7 and that the rule applies to contracts generally,
according to the principle of unconscionability.' 0 8 Because the rule "applies equally to class action litigation waivers in contracts without arbitration agreements as it does to class arbitration waivers in contracts with
such agreements," the rule comports with the saving clause of Section
2-falling directly within the scope of the FAA's exception.109
Furthermore, the dissent asserted that the Discover Bank rule is consistent with the purpose of the FAA insofar as it "puts agreements to
arbitrate and agreements to litigate 'upon the same footing.""' 0 Although
the majority asserted that the Discover Bank rule stands as an obstacle to
Id. at 1752.
101.
102. Id. at 1753-54 (Thomas, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 1754 (emphasis added) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
104. Id. at 1754-55.
Id. at 1755-56.
105.
Id. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106.
107.
Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1670.5(a), 1668 (West 1985)).
108.
Id.
Id. at 1757 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1112 (Cal. 2005),
109.
abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740); see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
Id. at 1758 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
110.
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the primary objective of the FAA by "discriminating in practice against
arbitration," the dissent argued that this finding is erroneous because
"class arbitration is consistent with the use of arbitration" and is a form
of arbitration used in California and other jurisdictions."' Because the
language of the Discover Bank rule is consistent with Section 2, and because the principles of federalism demand that the Court honor the presumption against preemption, the dissent contended that the Discover
Bank rule should have been upheld.1 12
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's holding in AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion deserves both commendation and criticism. The Concepcion Court
should be lauded for creating a uniform field of jurisprudence pertaining
to preemption under the FAA. Conversely, the Court's decision warrants
condemnation based on its continuing disregard of federalist principles in
FAA preemption cases. In resolving this dispute, the Court was forced to
evaluate the competing interests that exist at the very core of preemption
under the FAA. By deciding the case as it did, the Court effectively
chose to eschew the concept of consumer fairness and protection in favor
of commercial interests.
A. Leveling the FieldofPreemption Under the FAA
The Supreme Court's decision in Concepcion normalized the statutory and judicially-created laws relating to arbitration and collective action waivers across the country, yielding two related benefits: (1) a more
universal framework upon which to guide the decisions of lower courts;
and (2) direction to businesses and individuals responsible for drafting
contracts, allowing these entities to better create enforceable agreements.
The Court's decision in Concepcion to abrogate the Discover Bank
rule created a consistent line of jurisprudence with respect to the preemption of arbitration clauses under the FAA, dating back to Southland.1 13
Prior to the decision in Concepcion, California, as a result of the Discover Bank rule, remained the only jurisdiction that consistently found collective action waivers in contracts with arbitration agreements substanId. at 1758 (citing id at 1747-48 (majority opinion)). The American Arbitration Associa111.
tion has described class arbitration to be "a fair, balanced, and efficient means of resolving class
disputes." Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Furthermore, the dissenting opinion
asserts that the majority's assertion that class arbitration is inconsistent with the goals of the FAA
cannot be traced back to the FAA itself because at the time of its enactment, "arbitration procedures
had not yet been fully developed," so the idea of precluding class arbitration was not yet envisioned.
Id. at 1759.
112. Id. at 1762 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996)).
113. See, e.g., Id. at 1753 (majority opinion) (holding California's Discover Bank rule
preempted by the FAA); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688-89 (1996) (holding
the Montana statute preempted by the FAA); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491-92 (1987) (holding the provision of California Labor Law preempted by the FAA); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984) (holding the California Franchise Investment Law preempted by the FAA).
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tively unconscionable.1 4 This discrepancy was remedied by the Supreme
Court's decision in Concepcion, bringing the prevailing laws in California pertaining to arbitration clauses and class waivers into line with the
laws in the rest of the country."' In addition to creating consistency
among judicial decisions, the Supreme Court eliminated the concern expressed in Justice Baxter's dissenting opinion in Discover Bank-that
California, because of its minority position on the issue, may be a targeted jurisdiction for plaintiffs' lawyers seeking favorable outcomes in this
type of case." 6
By creating consistent precedent across the various states and federal circuits, lower courts are afforded a solid foundation upon which to
base future decisions, thereby reducing the likelihood that their decisions
will be overturned by appellate courts. This benefit was expressed by
Justice O'Connor in Allied-Bruce, in which she stated that her primary
reason for concurring in that decision, despite believing that it was ultimately wrong, "rest[ed] largely on the wisdom of maintaining a uniform
standard.""' 7 This notion favoring a uniform application of the law has
also been expressly articulated in other preemption contexts.' 18
Establishing a consistent line of decisions serves an additional purpose-informing those individuals and companies charged with drafting
contracts as to the current state of the law. This benefit was also
acknowledged by Justice O'Connor, stating, "[P]arties have undoubtedly
made contracts in reliance on the Court's interpretation of the Act in the
[ten years that have passed between the decisions in Southland and Allied-Bruce]."'19
A consistent field of FAA preemption jurisprudence provides businesses operating in multiple states with a more concrete expectation of
the enforceability of their consumer agreements, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the transactions take place. Rather than being compelled
to draft multiple versions of agreements for use across different states, a
company is better positioned to have a single consistent agreement for
114.
Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 400-01 (2005) (outlining California's minority position holding collective arbitration provisions unconscionable).
115.
Compare Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated
by AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011); with Doctor's Assocs.,
Inc., 517 U.S. at 688-89 (holding the Montana statute preempted by the FAA); and Perry, 482 U.S.
at 491-92 (holding the provision of California Labor Law preempted by the FAA); and Southland,
465 U.S. at 15-16 (holding the California Franchise Investment Law preempted by the FAA).
116.
Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1118 (Baxter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117.
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118.
See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353, 1376-77 (2006) (discussing the express preemption provision found in the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) (ERISA provisions
"shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan")).
119.
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 283-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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use in all states where it conducts business. The impact of this change on
consumers varies based on one's perspective. On one hand, it increases
the likelihood that consumers will be compelled to arbitrate any dispute
individually, meaning that many potential claims become cost prohibitive-thereby eliciting the exact scenario that the DiscoverBank rule was
intended to prevent. 120 In this scenario, consumers who have suffered
only minimal damages cannot likely justify proceeding to arbitration and,
as a result of the lack of financial damages, will likely be unable to find
attorneys willing to assist them. This results in the arbitration provision
operating as a de facto exculpatory clause. 12 1 Alternatively, having the
ability to draft fewer agreements, coupled with more certainty as to the
enforcement of these agreements, results in a reduction of costs to businesses. In some cases, the reduced costs of drafting and litigating these
agreements could be quite substantial. Theoretically, this should reduce
the gross costs of producing products or rendering services, allowing
companies to offer goods and services to consumers at a lower price
without affecting profitability. In practice, however, it is unlikely that the
majority of businesses would pass this savings on to the consumer.122
B. Another Battle Lost for the PresumptionAgainst Preemption
While, admittedly, there is some inherent benefit to be derived from
having a consistent line of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the violation of
a fundamental principle of federalism is significantly more problematic
to both the judiciary and the country at large.
In the final lines of his dissent, Justice Breyer addressed an important concept relating to preemption in general, recognizing that the
principles of federalism, upon which this country was founded, dictate
that state laws be given the benefit of the doubt, in the form of a general

120. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110 (majority opinion).
121.
See id. at 1008-10.
122. Much has been written on the topic of the "pass-through" of cost reductions to the end
consumer. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F.Supp.2d 26, 74 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that
even if cost savings were generated, there was a lack of evidence to indicate that the savings would
accrue to the benefit of consumers). Most frequently this topic arises in the context of mergers and
anti-trust litigation where courts require a showing "that the intended acquisition would result in
significant economies and that these economies ultimately would benefit competition and, hence,
consumers." F.T.C. v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (1 lth Cir. 1991); see also Jamie
Henikoff Moffitt, Merging in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for Consistent Judicial Efficiency
Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1697, 1745 (2010) (describing consumer "pass-through" as one of three
factors courts use to determine the evaluate efficiencies of merging entities). This "Passing-On"
requirement exists because of the general belief that businesses are unlikely to pass along savings to
a consumer unless market forces compel them to do so. See Paul L. Yde & Michael G. Vita, Merger
Efficiencies: Reconsidering the "Passing-On" Requirement, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 735, 740 (stating
that both proponents and opponents of a passing-on requirement have adopted "a conception of
market conduct in which a firm will 'pocket' merger-specific efficiencies in the form of higher
profits unless competition forces the firm to pass on the efficiencies in the form of lower prices")
(emphasis in original). But see id. at 743-46 (arguing that other factors, including the firm-specific
demand and efficiencies, are more indicative of market price effects).
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presumption against preemption.12 3 Against this backdrop, a review of
the prominent preemption cases, from Southland to Concepcion, reveals
that the decisions could, and arguably should, have been decided in the
alternative.
In Southland, the Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the FAA
preempted California's Franchise Investment Law (FIL). 124 Interestingly,
only Justice Stevens' concurring and dissenting opinion discussed the
presumption against preemption.125 In his opinion, Justice Stevens argued
that because the language of Section 2 "does not define what grounds for
revocation may be permissible . . . the judiciary must fashion the limitations as a matter of federal common law." 26 Justice Stevens further reasoned that the Court should recognize that by including an exception
within Section 2, Congress intended "to make arbitration agreements as
enforceable as other contracts, but not more so."l27
Justice Stevens contended that the anti-waiver provision in the FL
was justified by a public policy concern, and because public policy provides grounds for the revocation of a contract at common law, this provision, when viewed together with a presumption against preemption,
should have prevented the California law from being preempted by the
FAA.128
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor argued in her dissent that Congress's intent was to create "a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts, [which was] derived ... from the federal power to control the
jurisdiction of the federal courts," and as a result, the Court should have
held that the FAA does not apply in state courts.129
Despite having two sufficient bases for not preempting the California law-a narrow justification in public policy and a broader justification in the FAA's inapplicability in state courts-the Supreme Court
instead dispensed with the presumption against preemption and held that
the FL violated the Supremacy Clause.' 30 This decision not only infringed upon a "field traditionally occupied by State law,"' 3' thus violat123.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1762 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that
Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action." (alteration in original) (citing
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))).
124.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
125.
See id. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126.
Id. at 19.
127.
Id. (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12
(1967)).
128.
Id at 20-21. The Court applies a presumption against preemption in areas traditionally
occupied by the states, including contract law. Drahozal, supra note 9, at 398 (citing United States v.
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)).
129.
Southland, 465 U.S. at 25, 31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
130.
Id. at 15-16 (majority opinion).
Id. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Ray v. Atlantic
131.
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978)).
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ing the principles of federalism, but also influenced each of the subsequent cases based on the principle of stare decisis.13 2
In Perry, despite indicating that state law defenses are "available if
that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and
enforceability of contracts generally,"' 33 the Court brushed aside the public policy justification for the California labor provision and held the law
preempted by the FAA.1 34 The dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens
and O'Connor again addressed the inappropriateness of applying the
FAA in state court proceedings' 35 and outlined a public policy defensethe desire to prevent employers from forcing employees to waive their
right to bring suit in the court system-that should have protected the
state statute from preemption. 136 Thus, as in Southland, the Supreme
Court was content to disregard the notion of a presumption against the
preemption of state laws despite the existence of valid reasons that would
have allowed the Court to defer to the California courts and legislature.
In light of Montana Supreme Court Justice Trieweiler's concurring
opinion setting forth the "real" reasons for upholding the statute,13 7 in
Doctor's Associates, the Supreme Court was limited in its ability to find
that a Montana statute was not preempted by the FAA. The plaintiffs
argued to the United States Supreme Court that the Montana statute
could be upheld as nondiscriminatory because the statutory notice requirement was merely a state law rule requiring that "[u]nexpected provisions in adhesion contracts must be conspicuous."' 3 8 This interpretation
would be consistent with the FAA because it does not apply only to arbitration agreements, but instead presents a requirement, under state law,
that govern contracts generally. The Court, however, did not address this
argument because the Montana Supreme Court failed to cite any such

132.
See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
133.
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).
134. Id. at 491.
135.
Id. at 493-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting, O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 495 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 493-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137.
Bruhl, supra note 38, at 1459 (citing Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 (Mont.
1994) (Trieweiler, J., concurring), vacated,sub nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U.S.
1129 (1995)). Justice Trieweiler's concurring opinion included the following language:
What I would like the people in the federal judiciary, especially at the appellate level, to
understand is that due to their misinterpretation of congressional intent when it enacted
the Federal Arbitration Act, and due to their naive assumption that arbitration provisions
and choice of law provisions are knowingly bargained for, all of these procedural safeguards and substantive laws are easily avoided by any party with enough leverage to stick
a choice of law and an arbitration provision in its pre-printed contract and require the party with inferior bargaining power to sign it. The procedures we have established, and the
laws we have enacted, are either inapplicable or unenforceable in the process we refer to
as arbitration.
Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., concurring).
138. Casarotto,517 U.S. at 687 n.3.
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general common law doctrine.' 39 Therefore, had Justice Trieweiler not
been so candid in his comments disparaging arbitration and adhesionary
arbitration clauses, this statute might have been upheld as not discriminating against arbitration, but creating a general requirement that terms
in a contract must comport with the reasonable expectations of the consumer.140
In Concepcion, sufficient grounds existed to find that the FAA did
not preempt the Discover Bank rule, particularly when considered in
conjunction with the underlying presumption against preemption inherent in the federal system. While the majority argued that the rule "treat[s]
arbitration agreements with class arbitration waivers differently from
other contracts, . . . [rendering] any arbitration agreement containing a

class arbitration waiver . . . per se unenforceable,"'41 the Discover Bank
rule is facially based on the common law principle of
unconscionability,14 2 which presents a basis for invalidating contracts
generally, thereby falling within the saving clause of Section 2 of the
FAA.
In isolation, each of the cases outlined in this section had sufficient
grounds upon which to uphold the statute against a challenge of preemption under the FAA, but when viewed collectively, these cases represent
a clear departure from the presumption against preemption and signify an
infringement upon States' rights as "independent sovereigns in our fed-

eral system."l 43
Throughout the years, many of the Supreme Court Justices have articulated misgivings about this line of decisions,'" which Concepcion
now joins. As the author of the original dissenting opinion in Southland,'4 5 Justice O'Connor remained highly critical of these decisions
involving preemption under the FAA.146 This criticism included a reiteration of her belief that this line of precedent was "'unfaithful to congressional intent, unnecessary, and in light of the [Act's] antecedents and the

139.
Bruhl, supra note 38, at 1460 (quoting Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681,
687 n.3 (1996)).
140.
Id. at 1461-62 (citing Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 69 (Mont. 2002)).
Lampley, supra note 53, at 485-86.
141.
142.
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T
Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
143.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)) ("[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system,
we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action."
(alteration in original)).
144.
See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21-36 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282-84 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); (Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
145. Southland, 465 U.S. at 21-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146.
See, e.g., Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 282-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Perry, 482 U.S. at
494-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

764

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

intervening contraction of federal power, inexplicable . . .

[Vol. 89:3
47

Further,

Justice O'Connor stated that "[a]lthough each decision has built logically
upon the decisions preceding it, the initial building block in Southland
laid a faulty foundation."l 48 Justice O'Connor also underscored the inconsistency in the Supreme Court holdings under the FAA, opining that
although Congress may limit or preclude a waiver of a judicial forum,
the Court has never explained why state legislatures should not also have
such power. 14 9 She further recognized that although a litany of Supreme
Court decisions asserted that the pre-emptive effect of a federal statute is
fundamentally a question of congressional intent, "over the past decade,
the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent
with respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edifice of its
own creation."so Perhaps most striking, however, was her eventual capitulation, acknowledging that in the ten years following the decision in
Southland, after subsequent cases had built upon its reasoning and "parties [had] undoubtedly made contracts in reliance on the Court's interpretation of the [FAA]," she was "persuaded by considerations of stare
decisis . .. to acquiesce in today's judgment."' 5 '
Justice Stevens, who wrote a decision concurring in part and dissenting in part in Southland,152 further criticized the holding in his dissenting opinion in Perry v. Thomas, stating that through the Court's decision in Southland, the Supreme Court had, for all intents and purposes,
effectively rewritten the FAA "to give it a pre-emptive scope that Congress certainly did not intend." 53 Justice Stevens further explained that
because the states retain the power to "exempt certain categories of disputes from arbitration" this authority "should be preserved unless Congress decides otherwise. . .. 154
Justice Scalia, although not on the Court at the time Southland was
decided, also asserted that this decision "clearly misconstrued the Federal
Arbitration Act," stating that "[a]dhering to Southland entails a permanent, unauthorized eviction of state-court power to adjudicate a potentially large class of disputes."' 55 Justice Scalia further explained that in spite
of this belief, he would not dissent from future opinions based on Southland, but will "stand ready" to overrule the decision should four other

147. Perry, 482 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Southland, 465 U.S. at 36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
148. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. Perry, 482 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Southland, 465 U.S. at 21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
150. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151.
Id.at283-84.
152. Southland,465 U.S. at 17 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. Perry, 482 U.S. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154.
Id. at 494.
155.
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justices decide to do so, as "Southland will not become more correct
over time."
.
The primary problem with the Concepcion decision is that it relies
upon the faulty interpretation of the FAA's preemptive effect established
in Southland. The Court's categorization of the FAA as a preemptive
substantive law ignores the primary factor in the preemption analysis:
congressional intent.15 7 The FAA and its legislative history are devoid of
reference, either express or implied, to its effect on state law.'s This
reasoning alone should have been sufficient to compel a decision against
any preemptive effect when contemplated against the backdrop of federalism. 159
In addition to the congressional intent problem, the line of decisions
from Southland to Concepcion conflict with the principle of state sovereignty inherent in the federalist system.160 This concept, which dates
back to the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, was
articulated by the Supreme Court as follows: "The constitutionally mandated balance of power between the States and the Federal Government
was adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of our fundamental
liberties.""' The Court's interference with this balance of power infringes on States' rights by failing to acknowledge their retention of sovereign
power.162 The idea that the Supreme Court "should not go far out in front
of Congress in discovering national policies in silent statutes when the
effect is such a large-scale intrusion into state autonomy on a matter of
traditional state regulation"l 63 has been violated by the Court's interpretation of FAA preemption in Southland and its progeny.
Beyond its infringement upon traditional state powers, FAA
preemption has also invalidated numerous state laws designed to protect
individual consumers.' 64 The Court's extension of FAA preemption in
156.
Id. at 285.
157.
See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 554-57; Schwartz, supra note 34, at 7-10; see also supra
notes 46-51 and accompanying text. But see Christopher R. Drahozal, Revisiting Southland, 10
DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 23, 27-28 (2004).
158.
Schwartz, supra note 34, at 8 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1984).
See supranotes 29-34 and accompanying text.
159.
160.
Schwartz, supra note 14, at 571-72.
161.
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985)).
162.
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (requiring Congress to make its
preemptive intent "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" so as to "acknowledg[e] that
the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which
Congress does not readily interfere.").
163.
Schwartz, supra note 34, at 30.
164.
E.g., Miller v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 769 F.Supp.2d 1336, 1343 (D. Utah 2011) (holding
that the FAA preempted portions of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, UTAH CODE ANN. 1953
§ 13-11-4 in a deceptive trade practice suit); Abela v. General Motors Corp., 669 N.W.2d 271, 278
(Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the FAA preempted provisions of a motor vehicle lemon law
statute, M.C.L.A. §§ 257.1401-1409, prohibiting waiver of rights and remedies); Estate of Ruszala
ex rel. Mizerak v. Brookdale Living Cmtys., Inc., I A.3d 806, 809 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010)
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Concepcion represents a further shift towards the protection of corporate
and commercial interests at the expense of consumer protection.
C. PracticalEffects of the Decision
The Concepcion decision will undoubtedly have practical effects on
not only future preemption jurisprudence but also in the drafting of consumer contracts. While the impact that the Concepcion decision will
have on commercial agreements may not be fully appreciated for years to
come, the Court's decision has already influenced a variety of cases
across the nation.
One of the first decisions to apply the Supreme Court's holding
from Concepcion was Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.'65 In this case, the
plaintiff sought injunctive relief and other remedies for claims brought
under the California Unfair Competition Law, California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, California False Advertising Act, and the Federal
Communications Act.166 The defendant moved to compel arbitration and
the plaintiff opposed on the grounds that these claims were not subject to
arbitration as a matter of public policy, 167 citing previous California Supreme Court decisions. 16 8 The Supreme Court's holding in Concepcion
compelled the court's decision, stating that the FAA "preempts California's exemption of claims for public injunctive relief from arbitration" in
federal court, "despite public policy arguments thought to be persuasive
in California."16 9
Although, on its face, the Concepcion decision served only to overturn California's Discover Bank rule, some commentators have suggested that the holding is broad enough to apply nationwide. 170 Because the
Concepcion decision presents a tremendous obstacle to the invalidation
of arbitration and class waivers on the grounds of unconscionability, that
attorneys may focus on alternative grounds upon which to invalidate
arbitration clauses, such as issues of contract formation or contract revocation. In theory, this should provide a legitimate means of invalidating
agreements that contain arbitration clauses because the saving clause of
Section 2 has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to treat agreements
(holding that the FAA preempted a prohibition of arbitration provisions in living facilities' contracts
contained in the Nursing Home Responsibilities and Rights of Residents Act, N.J.S.A. 30:13-8.1).
165.
No. C 10-05663 WHA, 2011 WL 1842712, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011).
166.
Id.
167. Id at *1-2.
168. Id. at *1 (citing Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67, 75-76 (1999)
(holding that claims for public injunctive relief brought under the CLRA are not subject to arbitration); Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., 66 P.3d 1157, 1165 (2003) (holding that claims for public
injunctive relief brought under the UCL are not subject to arbitration)).
169. Arellano, 2011 WL 1842712, at *2.
170.
E.g., Stephen G. Harvey & Angelo A. Stio, Ill, Supreme Court Upholds Class Action
Waiver Provisions in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP CLASS ACTION
CLIENT ALERT (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications-article.aspx?ArticleKey2094.
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containing arbitration clauses "upon the same footing" as those without
such provisions.' 7' Furthermore, this approach is consistent with the
Court's efforts "to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other
contracts, but not more so."l72
Concepcion will also likely have a far-reaching impact on the drafting of contracts. With the elimination of what at least one commentator
has argued is the principal means by which to invalidate arbitration
clauses,"' businesses will undoubtedly be encouraged to incorporate
arbitration provisions into a greater number and broader range of contracts.174 These include not only a wider breadth of consumer service and
product contracts, but potentially into employment agreements as well.175
Moreover, while the arbitration agreement in Concepcion had many
consumer-friendly provisions, 76 in light of this decision, the motivation
for businesses to include such terms is severely diminished if not eliminated altogether. The inclusion of the favorable terms in the AT&T
agreement was likely done in an effort to directly combat any potential
allegation that the inclusion of an arbitration clause was substantively
unconscionable. In fact, the district court specifically noted the favorable
consumer treatment in this agreement, stating that the dispute resolution
mechanism found in this agreement was "quick, easy to use, and prompts
full or ... even excess payment to the customer without the need to arbitrate or litigate."'n7 With the unconscionability loopholel 7 8 now closed,
companies drafting consumer agreements are no longer incentivized to
include such consumer-friendly terms in their agreements because the
need to combat unconscionability was effectively eradicated by the Concepcion Court.

171.
E.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
478 (1989).
172.
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).
173. See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 38, at 1436-37.
174. Jeffrey M. Judd, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion-Supreme Court Enforces Class Action
Waiver,

JUDD

LAW

GROUP

PUBLICATIONS/TALKS

(May

11,

2011),

http://juddlawgroup.com/supreme-court-enforces-class-action-waiver/.
175. Id.
176. The agreement provided that a consumer may initiate a dispute by completing a form on
AT&T's website. AT&T then had the option to settle any claim presented. If the claim proceeded to
arbitration, AT&T was required to pay all costs for non-frivolous claims. For claims of $10,000 or
less, arbitration could be conducted in person, by telephone, or based only on submissions. AT&T
was precluded from recovering attorney's fees and in the event that a customer received an arbitration award greater than AT&T's last written settlement offer, AT&T was required to pay a $7,500
minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant's attorney's fees. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (majority opinion).
177.
Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2008 WL 5216255, *ll (S.D. Cal., Aug. 11, 2008), rev'd
sub nom. AT&T Mobility L.L.C v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
178. See Bruhl supra note 38, at 1436 (describing unconscionability as an "outlet" for "court[s]
wishing to strike back against arbitration"); Lampley supra note 53, at 489-91 (characterizing
unconscionability as the "defense of choice" in cases contesting the validity of arbitration clauses).
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D. PotentialCures
Should the Court decide to reconsider its decision in Concepcion
and seek a greater balance between commercial interest and consumer
fairness, the current line ofjurisprudence may limit its ability to do so.
One such method would be for the Supreme Court to overturn the
line of decisions dating back to Southland. Currently, none of the Justices who comprised the majority in Southland remain on the Supreme
Court. More importantly, six of the nine current Justices have, at some
point, expressed displeasure with or misgivings about this line of decisions.17 9 While this solution is not impossible, it is improbable given the
Concepcion decision and established jurisprudence.180 There have been
numerous opportunities over the past twenty-seven years to overturn
Southland, and even with a collection of prominent legal scholars advocating for this course of action,'81 the Supreme Court has declined to do
So.
A more direct approach to remedying the effect of the Concepcion
decision on both the consumer and States' rights could come in the form
of a legislative solution. Clearly, the most direct and certain way to effect
change in this area would be though a congressional amendment of the
FAA. By amending the saving clause to reflect a more clearly defined
exception to the general application of FAA principles, Congress could
provide more detailed direction to the Supreme Court as to the intended
scope of the FAA and any potential exceptions to its provisions.
The process of amending the FAA may have already begun. The
proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011182 seeks to amend the FAA to
restrict the enforceability of arbitration clauses in employment, consum-

179. Justice Breyer authored the dissenting opinion in Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756-62
(Breyer, J. dissenting), which Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Thomas
authored dissenting opinions in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996)
(Thomas, J. dissenting), and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285-97(1995)
(Thomas, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas's dissent and authored a separate
dissenting opinion in Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284-85 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
180. The inertia of the line of decisions from Southland to Concepcion, coupled with the Supreme Court's general reluctance to overturn cases render this potential solution highly unlikely. See
Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1057,
1102 (2002) ("Unless we are to assume that a majority of the Supreme Court only disagrees with
two cases a year on average, which seems highly implausible, the rate of overrulings suggests a
general reluctance to overturn precedent."); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 284 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
181.
See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (No. 02-634), 2003 WL 1701513; see also Drahozal, supra
note 157, at 23.
182. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011). This legislation was originally presented in 2007 and was recently reintroduced by Senator Al Franken.
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er, and civil rights cases.' 83 This legislation, according to Senator Franken, is aimed at rectifying the Court's decision in Concepcion.184
Alternatively, there is another recent legislative development that
could have a significant effect upon the landscape of FAA preemption.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 85
contains a directive that requires the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to "conduct a study of, and . .. provide a report to Congress concerning, the use of agreements providing for arbitration of any future
dispute between covered persons and consumers in connection with the
offering or providing of consumer financial products or services." 8 The
statute also provides the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau with the
authority to enact regulations that prohibit or limit the use of arbitration
provisions for the protection of consumers if the prohibitions or limitations serve the public interest.'8 It remains to be seen, however, if the
Supreme Court would find any such regulations enacted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to be in conflict with the FAA.' Given
the Supreme Court's current interpretation of FAA preemption, the
Dodd-Frank legislation may not be able to affect this jurisprudence
without an amendment to the FAA itself.
CONCLUSION

Although the holding in Concepcion is consistent with the holdings
in Southland,Perry, and Doctor's Associates, these decisions collectively demonstrate a departure from one of the core values outlined by the
nation's founders: an inherent deference to States' rights in the form of a
presumption against preemption. By holding that the FAA preempted the
Discover Bank rule, the Supreme Court wrongly decided AT&T Mobility
L.L.C. v. Concepcion and, in doing so, continued down a path which
ultimately deviates from the fundamental principles of federalism embodied in the preemption doctrine.

KristopherKleiner*

183.
Ashley Cummings, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion: U.S. Supreme Court Holds That
the FAA Preempts State Court Rule Finding Class Waivers in Arbitration Contracts Unconscionable,

THE

LITIGATOR

SECTION,

ATLANTABAR.ORG

(May

2011),

http://www.atlantabar.org

/associations/6890/files/Article%202 ConcepcionArticle.pdf
184.
Id.
185.
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
186.
12 U.S.C.A. § 5518(a) (2010).
§5518(b).
187.
188. Cummings, supra note 183.
* J.D. Candidate, 2013. 1 would like to thank the Denver University Law Review Board and
staff along with Professor Alan Chen for their assistance in developing this comment.

CONNICK V. THOMPSON: FORSAKING CONSTITUTIONAL
DUE PROCESS FOR FEAR OF FLOODING LITIGATION AND
Loss OF MUNICIPAL AUTONOMY
INTRODUCTION

In a remarkable decision over forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland launched the modern development of
prosecutorial disclosure requirements designed to uphold the due process
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Almost a century before the
Brady Court's touchstone discovery rule, our nation anticipated the need
to protect individual due process rights legislatively. 3 The Forty-second
Congress introduced 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to target misconduct by government officials and provide a remedy for individual protections secured by
the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Coupling Brady and § 1983, a common
goal shines through: fair treatment of the accused by those with the power to ensure it.
Brady and § 1983 are intended to ensure individual justice; however, the promises of Brady have largely not materialized, and the protections set out in § 1983 have been met with ever-changing interpretations.5 In Connick v. Thompson,6 the United States Supreme Court had
the opportunity to address both of these longstanding ideals and reset the
focus on fair practices and just results.7 Yet the Court, clouded by a fear
of overwhelming the court system and diminishing government autonomy, failed to take such a stand. In effect, the Court shied further away
from the goals and protections sought in Brady and § 1983.
Part I of this Comment briefly describes the history and case law
behind the development of the Brady rule and the evolution of § 1983 in
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Part II summarizes the facts, procedural
1.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).

2.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("[T]he suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution").
3.
See Michael T. Burke & Patricia A. Burton, Defining the Contours of MunicipalLiability
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Monell Through City of Canton v. Harris, 18 STETSON L. REV. 511, 51213 (1989).
4.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Burke & Burton, supranote 3, at 513.
5.
See generally Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEx. L. REV.
685, 686-87 (2006) (detailing the dissonance between the grand expectations of Brady and the grim
reality of criminal litigation today). For a discussion of the evolution of § 1983 in American jurisprudence, see Burke & Burton, supra note 3, at 516-18.
6.
131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
7.
See id. at 1356 (addressing "whether a district attorney's office may be held liable under §
1983 for failure to train based on a single Brady violation").
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history, and opinions in Thompson. Part III asserts three propositions: (1)
the Thompson Court failed to recognize the ideals of Brady and the importance of training prosecutors in Brady evidence; (2) the Court retreated from the purpose of § 1983 due to an unfounded fear of overwhelming the court system and diminishing government autonomy; and (3) the
Thompson Court could have maintained a high standard of § 1983 liability and ruled in Thompson's favor. This Comment concludes that
Connick v. Thompson was wrongly decided, and in neglecting the promises of Brady and § 1983, the Court compromised individual rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Section 1983: Expansion of Supreme Court Jurisprudencefor the
ProtectionofIndividual Rights
Congress developed § 1983 to combat widespread misconduct of
local officials and political authorities. Designed to open the federal
courts to private citizens, § 1983 became "[t]he primary vehicle afforded
citizens for addressing constitutional deprivations" pervading the policies
and practices of municipal officials and state authorities. 9
Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... .o
For almost a century after its enactment, the Supreme Court interpreted this language narrowly, taking a restrictive view of the law's textual implications.' The Court only permitted claims against officials in
their individual capacity acting in accordance with state law; § 1983 did
not provide a remedy for individuals injured by unsanctioned conduct. 12
In the landmark decisions of Monroe v. Pape and Monell v. Department
of Social Services of the City of New York, the Supreme Court removed
these restrictions and reinforced the original goal of individual, constitutional protection. 3

8. Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section
1983 MunicipalLiability, 80 B.U. L. REv. 17, 20 (2000).
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
11.
Burke & Burton, supra note 3, at 516; Gilles, supranote 8, at 23-24.
12. Burke & Burton, supra note 3, at 516 (discussing the restrictive applications of § 1983
liability prior to the Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1971)).
13. Monroe, 365 U.S. 167; Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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Monroe expanded the interpretation of § 1983 to permit suit in cases
where a constitutional injury resulted from an official's abuse of power.14
Allowing the Monroe plaintiff to bring suit against police officers who
seized and detained him unlawfully, the Court opened the door for citizen claims against offending officials whose misconduct rested outside
authorization by state law. The Supreme Court further expanded the
scope of § 1983 seventeen years later in Monell, holding that municipalities were "persons" subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." The
Monell Court acknowledged the legislative intent of the statute to provide "a broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights." 6
Still, the Court made clear that vicarious liability would not apply to
claims brought under § 1983; liability would attach only "when execution of [the] government's policy or custom .

.

. inflicts the injury."

Although Monell declined to fully define the contours of this municipal
liability, the Court ensured that municipalities would be held liable for
causing the individual deprivation of federally protected rights.18
By reiterating the original intent of the legislation and expanding
the scope of the statute, the Monroe and Monell decisions recognized the
importance of combating widespread misconduct and protecting individual rights in the face of state and municipal power.
B. Holding MunicipalitiesLiablefor Failingto Train Employees in City
of Canton v. Harris' 9 and Board of County Commissioners v. Brown2 0
In post-Monroe and Monell Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court
faced varied § 1983 claims and interpreted the statute to provide for a
myriad of constitutional wrongs attributable to municipal policies.2' Still,
the Court remained hesitant to impose municipal liability in cases where
a non-policy-making employee committed an unconstitutional act, not
attributable to an unconstitutional policy or custom of the government
agency. However, in 1989, in City of Canton v. Harris, the Court expanded this understanding of "policy or custom" to include a municipali14. 365 U.S. at 184, overruledon other grounds by Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
15.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691.
16. Id. at 685.
17. Id at 694.
18. Id. at 694-95.
19. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
20.
520 U.S. 397 (1997).
21.
See, e.g., Jett v. Dali. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 736 (1989) (remanding case to
determine whether the defendants "can be considered policy makers ... such that their decisions
may rightly be said to represent the official policy of the [district] subjecting it to liability under §
1983"); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) (finding that decisions of those
"officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question" may
result in municipal liability under § 1983); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1985) (ruling
that plaintiffs may amend their pre-Monell action to add city as defendant because they originally
sued the director of the city's police department in his official capacity); City of Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) (finding that unconstitutional activity was caused by an existing
unconstitutional municipal policy attributable to a municipal policy maker is ordinarily required to
impose liability under Monell).
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ty's decision not to adequately train employees in "their legal duty to
avoid violating citizens' rights."22 Assessing the plaintiff's claim of injury caused by failure of the police to provide proper medical care, the
Court remanded the case to determine whether this failure could be
properly attributed to the municipality's inadequate training program.23
Liability would attach only if the decision to provide inadequate training
rose to the level of an official government policy, where the failure to
train in a relevant respect amounted to "deliberate indifference to the
[constitutional] rights of persons." 24 The Court held that "the need for
more or different training" must be "so obvious" that a failure to train
could properly be characterized as "deliberate indifference" to constitutional rights.25 Further, the deficiency in the city's training program
"must be closely related to the ultimate injury" caused, 26 and a municipality cannot be held automatically liable for a single-incident mishap of
one of its employees. 27 Remanding the case to the court below, the Canton Court provided one hypothetical example of this new standard of
liability: "[T]he need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on
the use of deadly force." 28 The Court explained that because city policymakers know with "moral certainty" that their police officers will use
firearms to arrest fleeing felons, a failure to train the officers in the proper use of deadly weapons can be "characterized as 'deliberate indifference' to constitutional rights." 29 The opinion made clear that in such an
event, if a city's failure to provide proper training results in actual injury,
the city could be held liable under § 1983.30
Eight years later, the Supreme Court built upon the Canton failureto-train rule in Boardof County Commissioners v. Brown ("Bryan County"). 31 Further clarifying the single-incident liability hypothesized in
Canton, the Court pointed out instances in which an "inadequate training" claim could be the basis for § 1983 liability. 3 2 For example, municipal policy makers' continued adherence to a training program "that they
know or should know has failed to prevent tortuous conduct by employees" can trigger municipal liability, as such inaction clearly shows "deliberate indifference."33 The Court contrasted this scenario with the single incident of inadequate screening at issue in Bryan County. An isolated example of improper screening that was neither the obvious conse22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011); Canton, 489 U.S. at 380.
Canton, 489 U.S. at 392.
Id at 388.
Id. at 390.
Id at 391.
Id at 387.
Id. at 390 n.10.
Id.
Id. at 390.
520 U.S. 397 (1997).
See id. at 407-08.
Id at 407.
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quence of improper training nor the last line in a pattern of violations did
not amount to municipal liability under § 1983.34 Although the Court
suggested that for a successful § 1983 claim proof of a pattern of constitutional violations is "ordinarily necessary," it acknowledged, as did
Canton, that such evidence is not always imperative. Proof of multiple
violations may not be required to prove deliberate indifference where the
single violation of constitutional rights was the "highly predictable" and
"obvious" consequence of failing to properly train.35
Whereas Canton set the stage for municipal liability by permitting

§ 1983 claims based on a city's failure to properly train its employees,
Bryan County clarified the contours and implications of the rule. Both
decisions demonstrate the Court's expanding interpretation of § 1983 as
it maintains focus on protecting individual rights.
C. Brady v. Maryland: The Importance of Stifling ProsecutorialMisconduct and ProtectingIndividualDue ProcessRights
In the century following the enactment of § 1983, the Supreme
Court also specified the role of the prosecutor in promoting constitutional
due process in the critical case of Brady v. Maryland.6 After conceding
that he participated in a gruesome murder, the accused discovered that
the prosecutor failed to disclose an accomplice's confession to the homicide. 37 The Brady Court determined that this suppression of evidence was
in violation of constitutional due process and announced a new rule of
discovery and mandatory disclosure. 38 Emphasizing a commitment to
justice and fair play, the Brady Court set forth the rule that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."3 9
Essentially, Brady provided that "on demand of an accused," the prosecution had a duty to disclose any evidence that would tend to exculpate
the defendant or reduce the penalty.4 0
Since this 1963 decision, the Brady rule has undergone significant
judicial alteration. Some of the most notable revisions include eliminating the need for a defendant to specifically request Brady evidence, 4'
requiring disclosure in cases of both exculpatory and impeachment evi-

Id. at 408, 412-13, 415 (holding that a sheriff's isolated hiring decision lacked adequate
34.
screening but did not warrant municipal liability).
See id. at 409-10.
35.
36.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 84.
37.
Id. at 86-87.
38.
Id. at 87.
39.
40.
See id. at 87-88.
See Gershman, supra note 5, at 704-06 (referencing the holding in United States v. Bag41.
ley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)).
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dence,42 and amplifying the importance of not distinguishing between the
good and bad faith of the prosecutor.43
Nonetheless, one of the most prominent modifications deals with
the judiciary's retrospective interpretation of the concept of "materiality."4" Evidence is considered material only when there is a reasonable
probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result
of the proceeding would have been different; essentially, its suppression
reduces confidence in the outcome of the trial. 4s This retroactive evaluation of materiality affords prosecutors wide discretion in determining
what constitutes Brady evidence and often results in the inconsistent application of the rule.46 The indefinite standard makes it difficult to determine with certainty whether a given piece of evidence is material or of
such significance that, if produced, it will affect the outcome of the trial
to a "reasonable probability."4 7 Not only is it difficult for prosecutors to
decide what to disclose under Brady, but it is also difficult for the defense to know what evidence to request and for the courts to be certain
their verdicts are just.
Despite these developments, the Brady Court auspiciously
acknowledged that our system of justice "suffers when any accused is
treated unfairly" and that commanding prosecutors to disclose favorable
evidence to the accused is essential to promoting justice.48 As such,
Brady reflected the enduring commitment of our justice system to fair
play and just results for individuals accused of crimes. The Court
acknowledged, "Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but
when criminal trials are fair. . . ."49
In sum, § 1983 set the stage for municipal liability, and Brady defined prosecutorial responsibilities to the accused. Where Brady established the prosecutorial obligation to disclose evidence, § 1983 afforded
individuals a cause of action for constitutional violations of this sort.
Recently, almost a century since Congress enacted 42 U.S.C § 1983 and
42. Id. at 702.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 n.17 (1979).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Oxman, 740 F. 2d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting the "tendency to adopt a retrospective view of materiality"); United States v. Coppa, 267 F. 3d 132, 140 (2d
Cir. 2001) ("[T]he scope of the defendant's constitutional right . . . is ultimately defined retrospectively, by reference to the likely effect that the suppression of particular evidence had on the outcome of the trial."); Gershman, supranote 5, at 689.
45. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 434 (1995) (refining the Bagley standard holding that a showing of materiality depends on
"whether in its absence [the defendant] received a fair trial, understood as the trial resulting in a
verdict worthy of confidence").
46. See, e.g., Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 853 (5th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1350
(2011) (noting "the difficulty in interpreting Brady" and the common understanding that Brady is a
"'gray' area, subject to interpretation"); Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1365 (acknowledging that "Brady
has gray areas and some Brady decisions are difficult").
47.
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
48.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
49.
Id. at 87.
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more than thirty years since Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court in
Connick v. Thompson faced the interplay between these seemingly complimentary theories.o
II. CoNNICK V. THOMPSON
A. Facts
In 1985, the Orleans Parish District Attorney prosecuted John
Thompson for murder and an unrelated charge of attempted armed robbery.5 1 During the robbery investigation, a cnme-scene technician collected a swatch of fabric stained with the robber's blood.52 Two days
before trial, the assistant district attorney, Bruce Whittaker, acquired the
blood analysis and claimed he placed the report on the desk of his supervisor.53 Not one prosecutor at the Orleans Parish Office disclosed the test
results to Thompson's counsel, and the evidence remained suppressed
throughout the trial. 54 In the weeks following, a jury convicted Thompson of armed robbery, and because of this conviction, Thompson opted
not to testify in his own defense during his subsequent murder trial. 5
Thereafter, the jury convicted Thompson of murder and sentenced him to
death.56
In late April 1999, after eighteen years in prison, fourteen of them
isolated on death row, Thompson's private investigator unearthed the
hidden crime lab report.57 Thompson's attorneys discovered that Thompson's blood type did not match the blood swatch and approached the
district attorney's office with the findings. 58 In light of the newly discovered evidence, the district attorney moved to stay the execution and vacate Thompson's armed robbery conviction.5 9 Concluding that the armed
robbery conviction unconstitutionally deprived Thompson of his right to
testify at his murder trial, the Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed
Thompson's murder conviction.6 0 In 2003, the district attorney's office
retried Thompson, presenting all undisclosed evidence; after only a thirty-five minute deliberation, the jury found Thompson not guilty.6 ' On
May 9, 2003, after serving more than eighteen years in prison, Thompson
was set free.

50.
See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (addressing liability under § 1983 based on a single Brady
violation).
51.
Id at1356.
52.
Id.
53.
Id
Id.
54.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. at 1356-57.
61.
Id. at 1376 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Shortly thereafter, Thompson brought a § 1983 action against the
district attorney's office, claiming that the office violated Brady by failing to disclose the crime lab report to the defense.62 Thompson alleged
liability on two theories: the Brady violation was the result of (1) an unconstitutional policy of the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office and
(2) Harry Connick's deliberate indifference to the obvious need to train
prosecutors in Brady.
B. ProceduralHistory
Before trial, Connick, the sole policy maker for the district attorney's office, conceded that his office violated Brady in its failure to disclose the crime lab report." At trial, the jury rejected Thompson's claim
that the Brady violation was the result of an unconstitutional office policy.65 Nonetheless, the jury found the district attorney's office liable for
failing to train its prosecutors and awarded Thompson fourteen million
dollars in damages.
Connick objected to any liability for failure to train, claiming there
was no evidence that he was aware of a pattern of Brady violations.67
The district court rejected this argument, concluding that a pattern of
violations is not necessary to prove a § 1983 claim; failure-to-train liability attaches when a municipality demonstrates deliberate indifference to
an "obvious" need for training.68 The jury subsequently determined that
additional Brady training in the Orleans Parish Office was "obviously
necessary to ensure Brady violations would not occur"6 9 and found in
Thompson's favor.
A panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
and reasoning of the district court, acknowledging that Thompson "did
not need to prove a pattern" of similar Brady violations. 70 In 2009, a divided Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel opinion, granted
rehearing, and affirmed the district court's decision.7 1 One year later, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a
district attorney's office may be held liable under § 1983 for failure to
train based on a single Brady violation.7 2

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1357 (majority opinion).
Id
Id.
Id
Id.
Id
Id.
Id. at 1378 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1358 (majority opinion).
Id
Id.
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C. Majority Opinion
In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito, the majority held
that a district attorney's office cannot be held liable under § 1983 based
on a single Brady violation and reversed the Fifth Circuit decision." The
majority opinion relied on the Canton rule that a failure to train must
amount to deliberate indifference to the obvious need for more or different training.7 4 Deliberate indifference required proof that a municipal
actor knew or should have known that inadequate training would conse*75
quently cause city employees to violate citizens' rights.
The Court's opinion built heavily on this Canton standard of deliberate indifference and apparent notice, incorporating the idea mentioned
in Bryan County that, for the purpose of a failure-to-train claim, it is "ordinarily necessary" that the plaintiff prove a pattern of similar violations
by untrained employees. In cases where a plaintiff does not prove a
pattern but instead asserts "single-incident" liability, the plaintiff must
show that the failure to train is "so patently obvious" that a violation of
citizens' rights is undoubtedly a "highly predictable" consequence. 7 7 The
Court emphasized that this single-incident liability only attaches in a
narrow range of circumstances and referred to the hypothetical set forth
in Canton as fully representative of such a circumstance.
Subsequently comparing Thompson's claim with the Canton hypothetical, the Court emphasized that the "obvious need for specific legal
training" present in the Canton example is absent in the context of prosecutorial liability. 79 In stark contrast to the absence of legal training in the
police force, "[a]ttorneys are trained in the law and equipped with the
tools to interpret and apply legal principles."80 Emphasizing this difference, the Court explained that law school requirements, licensing procedures, and continuing legal education are designed to ensure that all new
attorneys know how to find, understand, and apply legal rules.81 More
specifically, the majority claimed it was "undisputed . . . that the prosecutors in Connick's office were familiar with the general Brady rule"; as
such, additional training was unnecessary.82 The Court concluded that
recurring constitutional violations were neither "highly predictable" nor
73. Id. at 1366.
74. Id. at 1359 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
Id. at 1360.
75.
76. Id. (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).
77. Id. at 1361 (citing Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409).
78.
Id. (citing Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10 (1989) (providing an example of a city that arms
and deploys its police force without training the officers in the constitutional limitation on the use of
deadly force)).
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at 1361-62.
81.
82. Id at 1363.
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the "obvious consequence" of "failing to provide prosecutors with formal
in-house training" about Brady material.83
In sum, the majority placed Thompson's failure-to-train claim outside Canton's "narrow range" and determined that Thompson did not
meet the necessary standard for municipal liability under § 1983 .84
D. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Concurring with the Court in full, Justice Scalia highlighted this
case as one bad-faith prosecutor's willing Brady violation, which "could
not possibly be attributed to the lack of training."" Justice Scalia stated
that Brady mistakes are inevitable as are "all species of error routinely
confronted by prosecutors."86 The district attorney's office should not be
held liable for its employee's misconduct simply because it did not have
a formal training program covering all species of Brady violations. 87 To
allow such claims would result in numerous cases blaming municipalities
and second-guessing the success of government training programs.
Justice Scalia explained that the majority's rigorous standard of proof is
necessary because without it failure-to-train liability would collapse into
respondeat superior and "become a talismanic incantation producing
municipal liability" in an overwhelming display of circumstances. Justice Scalia concluded by doubting that any Brady violation existed at
all. 90
E. The Dissent
Reiterating the holding of Brady v. Maryland,the dissent, authored
by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, emphasized that Thompson's conviction was fundamentally unfair and the result of "long-concealed prosecutorial transgressions [that]
were neither isolated or atypical." 9' The dissent relied on the same Canton standard set forth by the majority: "Failure to train .. can give rise
to municipal liability under

§ 1983 'where the failure .

.

. amounts to

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained
employees] come into contact."' 92 Refusing to accept the majority's assertion that proof of a pattern of violations is "ordinarily necessary" or
that Thompson's case did not fit within Canton's "narrow range," the

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
378, 388

Id (quoting Board of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).
Id.
Id. at 1369 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id at 1367.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1369.
Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (second and third alteration in original) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
(1989)).
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dissent asserted that the standard of municipal liability under § 1983 was
sufficiently met in Thompson's case.93
The dissent refused to accept the idea that this case was merely the
result of a lone attorney's conduct, asserting that four prosecutors, not
one, participated in the suppression of evidence for nearly two decades. 94
The dissent pointed to evidence that demonstrated a blatant disregard for
Brady guidelines furthered by "persistent, deliberately indifferent conduct for which the District Attorney's Office bears responsibility under §
1983 .95 The dissent provided an account of the numerous Brady violations "that infected Thompson's trials," including suppressed police reports with eye-witness accounts of the assailant, tape recordings proving
the prosecution's key witness came forward subsequent to a reward offer, and the non-disclosure of blood-swatch test results. 96
Further, the dissent described an illustrative history of Connick's
cavalier approach to the importance of Brady's disclosure requirements
that "contributed to a culture of inattention" in the Orleans Parish District
Attorney's Office. 97 The dissent demonstrated that the majority of prosecutors misunderstood Brady and the office "shirked its responsibility to
keep prosecutors abreast of relevant legal developments concerning
Brady requirements." 98 Not only were the Orleans Parish prosecutors
uninformed about Brady,9 9 but Connick, the office's sole policy maker,
misunderstood the disclosure rule himself 00 and provided the office with
inadequate Brady training.'(' In turn, the dissent found it "hardly surprising" that Brady violations occurred and directly affected Thompson's
constitutional rights.' 02
Pointing to these numerous Brady violations and examples of prosecutorial misconduct, the dissent concluded that this evidence proved the
deliberate indifference of the district attorney's office. 103 As such, the
office should bear responsibility for the "gross, deliberately indifferent,
and long-continuation violation of [Thompson's] fair trial right."'1

93. Id at 1370-71, 1377.
94. Id. at 1370.
95. Id
Id. at 1371-72.
96.
Id at 1382.
97.
98. Id. at 1378.
99.
Id at 1378-80 (showing how the testimony of the four prosecutors engaged in prosecuting
Thompson for armed robbery and murder revealed an inconsistent and flawed understanding of a
prosecutor's disclosure obligations under Brady).
100.
Id. at 1378 (explaining how Connick persistently misstated Brady requirements at trial).
101.
Id. at 1379-80.
102.
Id. at 1378.
103. Id. at 1382.
104. Id. at 1387.
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III. ANALYSIS

The Thompson Court failed to embrace the opportunity to reinforce
the original ideals of justice and fairness emphasized in the enactment of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the landmark decision of Brady v. Maryland.The
Court overlooked the downfall of proper Brady compliance and exchanged the protections of § 1983 claims for a fear of overwhelming the
court system and diminishing government autonomy. As the dissent recognized, the Court could have maintained a high standard of municipal
liability while still holding the district attorney's office liable for the constitutional violations it effectuated. 0 5 Nonetheless, the Court failed to
meet the challenge of re-enforcing the importance of justice and providing individual remedy in the face of prosecutorial misconduct. The
Thompson decision stifles the evolution of § 1983 jurisprudence and further erodes the essential goals and promises set forth in Brady.
A. The Thompson Court Failedto Recognize the Shrinking Protections
ofBrady v. Maryland, FurtheringProsecutorialInattentionto the Importance ofDisclosingBrady Evidence
While acknowledging that the duty to produce Brady evidence is
"[a]mong the prosecutors' unique ethical obligations," the majority opinion offered little explanation of the nature of this responsibility.106 Focusing on the existence of various rules of professional conduct and responsibility, the Court assumed that prosecutors routinely make legal and
ethical judgments in accordance with Brady standards.1 07 The Court suggested that an attorney's legal background and codified moral obligations
entitle a district attorney's office to rely on the prosecutors' knowledge
without providing specific training on Brady requirements. 0 8 In so assuming, the Court overlooked decades of scholarship and jurisprudence
suggesting that many prosecutors lack a true understanding of their disclosure obligations and often fall short of compliance with Brady.'09

105.
Id. at 1387 n.28 (maintaining the high standard set forth in the majority and emphasizing
the infringements on Thompson's rights in its analysis, the dissent concludes that Thompson met the
standard).
106.
Id. at 1362 (majority opinion).
107.
See id. at 1362-63.
108.
Id. at 1363.
109.

E.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES,

1973-1995, at 5 (2000) (noting that prosecutorial suppression of evidence combined with law enforcement misconduct accounted for sixteen to nineteen percent of reversible errors); Hugo Adam
Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, MiscarriagesofJustice in PotentiallyCapitalCases, 40 STAN. L. REV.
21, 56 (1987) (documenting hundreds of overturned capital cases, including many where the prosecutor had suppressed exculpatory evidence); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against
Prosecutorsfor Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 700-01 nn.38-42 (1987)
(citing forty cases of Brady misconduct reflected in Supreme Court, state, and lower federal court
decisions); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty
of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 848-70 (1997)
(documenting fifteen state and federal decisions in which a criminal defendant has sought to challenge his conviction under Brady, most of which ultimately led to reversal of the defendant's convic-
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1. The Growing National Problem with Brady Compliance
Because of the vague and retrospective definition of what constitutes material evidence warranting disclosure, modem judicial practice
affords prosecutors certain discretion in defining and disclosing Brady
evidence. Suppressed evidence is material only if it can be shown that
there was a "reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense" it could have affected the outcome of the trial, resulting
in a verdict not "worthy of confidence."'"o Essentially, the prosecutor is
permitted to withhold evidence under the rational belief that, upon review of the case, the appellate court will conclude there was no "reasonable probability" that the evidence would have changed the result."' In
turn, prosecutors enjoy extraordinarily wide latitude to conceal favorable
evidence from the defense.1 2 As the dissenters in United States v. Bagley
predicted, this result-focused standard creates prosecutors who "gamble,
. . . play the odds, and .. . take a chance that the evidence will later turn
out not to have been potentially dispositive."ll 3 Justice Marshall further
explained the problem:
At the trial level, the duty of the state to effectuate Brady devolves
into the duty of the prosecutor; the dual role that the prosecutor must
play poses a serious obstacle to implementing Brady. The prosecutor
... is a trained attorney who must aggressively seek convictions in
court on behalf of a victimized public. At the same time . . . he must

place foremost in his hierarchy of interests the determination of truth.
Thus, for purposes of Brady, the prosecutor must abandon his role as
an advocate and pore through his files, as objectively as possible, to
identify the material that could undermine his case. Given this obviously unharmonious role, it is not surprising that these advocates oftentimes overlook or downplay potentially favorable evidence ... .114
Despite the fact that state and federal courts have heard thousands
of instances of Brady violations and reversed hundreds of convictions
tion); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take ProsecutionDisciplineSeriously,
8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275, 278 (2004) ("All too often prosecutorial misconduct is one of the primary reasons for [the] breakdowns in the adversary system."); Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley,
Trial & Error; Part I: The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999 (reporting that since Brady,
at least 381 defendants national have had a homicide conviction overturned based on concealed
evidence by the prosecution). See generally JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM PART 11:
WHY IS THERE So MUCH ERROR INCAPITAL CASES AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2002)
(detailing the prevalence of mistakes in capital punishment cases and the resulting effect of execution).
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434
110.
(1995).
Ill.
Gershman, supra note 5, at 689-90 (explaining how many prosecutors suppress evidence
with a "completely rational expectation that the suppression either will not be discovered or, if
discovered, will be found by the reviewing court to not be material").
112.
Id. at 690 (citing Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 700 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The standard for
disclosure that the Court articulates today enables prosecutors to avoid disclosing obviously exculpatory evidence while acting well within the bounds of their constitutional obligation.")).
113.
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 701 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114.
Id. at 696-97.
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due to the prosecution's suppression of evidence,' 15 professional discipline of prosecutors is rare.1 16 Without clear legal guidelines, continuing
professional development, or ethical sanctions, Brady violations and
wrongful convictions are frequent." 7 Evidence of noncompliance with
Brady by no means indicates that all prosecutors fail to comply with the
rule; many prosecutors undoubtedly take their ethical responsibilities
seriously. Nonetheless, the reported occurrence of Brady violations resulting in the deprivation of individual rights demonstrates enough oversight to generate concern and warrant a legal remedy. The Thompson
Court failed to acknowledge the importance of this national problem and
prevalent misconduct.
2. Lack of Brady Compliance Evident in Orleans Parish District
Attorney's Office
Bolstering the claim of Connick's deliberate indifference to an obvious need for training is a history of Brady violations in the Orleans
Parish District Attorney's Office under Connick's reign." 8 Of the seven
men exonerated from capital punishment in Louisiana between 1981 and
2010, four were prosecuted in Orleans Parish and all four cases involved
serious Brady violations.11 9 Nonetheless, the Thompson majority quickly
disregarded the examples as "not similar to the violation at issue here."l20
The Court explained that these past violations could not have put
Connick on notice that specific training was necessary to avoid the instant constitutional violation because the current case involved scientific
evidence and the previous violations did not.121 The Court overlooks the
resulting harm that ties these violations together, a consequence that
should have put any policy maker on notice: four wrongful capital punishment convictions.

115. See supranote 109.
116. See Bruce A. Green, ProsecutorialEthics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1596
(2003) (noting that existing rules of ethics fail to regulate large areas of prosecutors' professional
conduct); Rosen, supra note 109, at 703-04 (discussing the absence of remedies against prosecutors); Weeks, supra note 109, at 877-78 (concluding that "the prospect of a civil suit under federal
law for a Brady violation simply does not exist"); Yaroshefsky, supra note 109, at 288 (arguing that
despite the "well documented and all too recurrent violation of professional responsibility," prosecutors who engage in the intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence "are rarely, if ever, disciplined").
117.
See supra note 109.
118.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9 n.6, Smith v. Louisiana, 131 S. Ct. 2988 (2010) (No.
10-8145).
119. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 454 (1995) (holding that prosecution's failure to
disclose the evidence to the defense precluded the defendant from a fair trial); State v. Bright, 875
So.2d 37, 44 (La. 2004) ("[T]he State's failure to disclose the criminal history of its key witness ...
violated defendant's due process rights . . . ."); State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 557 (La. 2002);
State v. Cousin 710 So.2d 1065, 1073 (La. 2001) (reversing murder conviction and death sentences
on grounds that "clear violations of defendant's right to a fair trial ... require reversal of the conviction").
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011).
120.
121.
Id.
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Assuming a history of suppression of evidence is not representative
enough of Connick's cavalier attitude toward the disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the defense, Thompson further demonstrated that Connick
himself had an inadequate understanding of Brady.122 As the Thompson
dissent illustrates, testimony of the other prosecutors in the office revealed similar misunderstandings. 12 3 Yet the Court overlooked the testimony of these officials, stating that an obvious need for additional training was still lacking.12 4 Finally, the Thompson Court expressed distrust of
the evidence proffered by the dissent, evidence that pointed to more
Brady violations beyond the hidden blood swatch. 125 What the dissent
deemed "violations that infected Thompson's trials,"l 2 6 the majority referred to as "legally irrelevant facts." 27 This simple difference in language further shows the pervasive misunderstanding and legally inconsistent application of Brady in modern jurisprudence.
By failing to recognize the widespread misapplication of Brady, resulting in constitutional violations both in Orleans Parish and throughout
the nation, the Thompson majority ignored growing prosecutorial indifference and undermined the importance of Brady compliance.12 8 The
Court assumed that prosecutors "understand constitutional limits, and
exercise legal judgment," specifically in relation to Brady evidence, and
subsequently overlooked the reality of the nature of many prosecutorial
practices today.129 Consequently, the Court failed to consider the power
that upholding the need for Brady training could have on revitalizing the
original ideals of Brady and ensuring a fair and truthful trial.
B. The Court Retreatedfrom the Ideals of§ 1983 for Fear of Overwhelming the Court System and Second-Guessing GovernmentAutonomy
Section 1983 was originally enacted to eradicate widespread misconduct of state and local officials and guarantee individual protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Focused on preserving the professionalism of prosecutors, the Thompson Court downplayed the original reason for permitting § 1983 claims and denied Thompson a remedy. Both
the dissenting and majority opinions agreed that municipal liability under
§ 1983 for failure to train attached "where the failure amounts ... to deliberate indifference" of a knowing municipality that obviously results in
Id. at 1378 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (detailing how "Connick persisted in misstating
122.
Brady's requirements").
Id (noting that Dubelier, Assistant District Attorney, "simply relied on the police to flag
123.
any potential Brady information"). District Attorney Williams expressed uncertainty as to whether
Brady material includes impeachment evidence. Id
See id at 1365 (majority opinion).
124.
See id atl364 n.11.
125.
126. Id.at 1371 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
Id at 1364 n. 1 (majority opinion).
127.
See id.at 1365.
128.
Id at 1361.
129.
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a predictable violation of constitutional rights.130 Nonetheless, where the
dissent's attention centered on the need to protect individual due process
rights, the majority opinion focused more readily on distinguishing attorneys from "average public employees" than on redressing Thompson's
constitutional injury. 3' The fact that Thompson served eighteen years for
a conviction falsified by the district attorney's office received no more
than one reference in the majority opinion.' 32 Instead, the Court's decision hinged on maintaining prosecutorial autonomy and preventing the
flooding of courts with § 1983 claims.13 3
The Court repeatedly emphasized its central concern of preventing

§ 1983 liability from collapsing into respondeatsuperior.'34 The Court's
preoccupation with maintaining prosecutorial autonomy and professionalism implicitly points to a fear that acknowledging a need for Brady
training might undermine the current regime of municipal power.' 3 5
Blaming the Brady violations on one lone prosecutor, the Court praised
the unparalleled qualities of the legal profession. Highlighting how attorneys-unlike the hypothetical police officers mentioned in Canton-undergo unique legal education, on-the-job training, and ethics
evaluations, the majority found it inconceivable that a failure to train
district attorneys ini Brady evidence would "obviously" result in constitutional deprivations.' Yet, a constitutional violation did occur. And the
Court, retreating from the original intent of § 1983 to combat municipal
misconduct, effectively overlooked the need to provide Thompson a
remedy for "the deprivation of [his] rights."' 37
Justice Scalia reinforced this oversight in his concurrence. Preoccupied with the repercussions of opening the prosecution to failure-totrain claims, Justice Scalia stated that without stringent restrictions a
"'failure to train' would become a talismanic incantation producing municipal liability '[i]n virtually every instance where a person has had his
or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee' ... . ."139 justice
130. Id. at 1370-71 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
388 (1989)).
131.
Id. at 1361 (majority opinion) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 578 F.3d 293, 305 (5th Cir.
2009)).
132. Id at 1355 (mentioning Thompson's wrongful imprisonment during the initial presentation of the case).
133. See id. at 1367 (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. E.g., id at 1359 (majority opinion) ("[Employers] are not vicariously liable under § 1983
for their employees' actions."); id. at 1360 ("A less stringent standard of fault for a failure-to-train
'would result in de facto respondeatsuperiorliability on municipalities."' (quoting City of Canton,
489 U.S. at 392)); id. at 1365 ("[W]e must adhere to a 'stringent standard of fault,' lest municipal
liability under § 1983 collapse into respondeatsuperior." (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997))).
135. See id at 1361-63.
136. Id. at 1362-63.
137. See Gilles, supra note 8, at 20, 23 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006))..
138. See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1367 (Scalia, J., concurring).
139. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting City ofCanton, 489 U.S. at 392).
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Scalia concluded that engaging the federal courts in such claims would
diminish the autonomy of state and local governments and cause an
"endless exercise of second-guessing municipal employee-training programs."l 4 0 Justice Scalia's bold assertions made clear what the majority
opinion implicitly feared: the diminished autonomy of state and local
government agencies and a potential flood of litigants overwhelming the
court system.
Overlooking the widespread Brady violations evidenced in
Connick's office and beyond, and overemphasizing the need to restrict
municipal liability under § 1983, the majority's conclusion was misguided. It failed to recognize the constitutional protections necessary to promote a fair and just system and to preserve individual rights in the face of
state and municipal power. Focused on a fear of flooding the court system and undermining the professionalism of the district attorney's office,
the Court left Thompson back where he started: without redress for the
deprivation of his constitutional rights.
C. CouplingBrady Obligationswith § 1983 Liability, the Thompson
Court CouldHave MaintainedIts High Standardof MunicipalLiability and Ruled in Thompson's Favor
Connick v. Thompson presented the Court with a unique opportunity
to refocus a historically misguided understanding of Brady and further
expand municipal liability under § 1983. The Court could have united the
two concepts, curbing prosecutorial misconduct and upholding civil protections guaranteed by the Constitution. Focusing its attention on the
autonomy of municipalities and the need to isolate them from fault prevented the Court from forming this union of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. Moving beyond a preoccupation of potential vicarious
liability and placing Thompson's case within Canton's narrow range of
circumstances, the Court could have saved Brady from its misunderstood
existence and honored Thompson's § 1983 claim.
The Court's fear of lowering the standard of municipal liability and
subsequently flooding the court system was unfounded. Tellingly, in
1992, the Second Circuit applied the Canton rule to a similar § 1983
complaint alleging injury due to a failure to train prosecutors about
Brady.14 1 After holding the prosecution liable, the system was not flooded with unnecessary § 1983 claims or overwhelmed with municipal
doubt.142 In fact, in the twenty years following that case, the Second Cir-

140. Id. (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 392) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141.
Walker v. New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1992).
See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1382 n.17 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("There has been no
142.
'litigation flood or even rainfall,' in that Circuit in Walker's wake." (quoting Skinner v. Switzer, 131
S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2011))).
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cuit experienced no successful lawsuits for single-incident Brady violations.143
Had the Court remained unclouded by a specious fear of diminishing municipal autonomy or flooding the court system, it could have expanded upon the § 1983 jurisprudence following Canton and Bryan
County. Recognizing that the need for some training programs might be
"so obvious" that a policy maker's inaction could be characterized as
"deliberate indifference" to constitutional rights, Canton and Bryan
Country left open the possibility of a "narrow range of circumstances"
where single-incident § 1983 liability would attach.1 " Thompson's claim
falls within this range because (1) like armed police officers, prosecutors
hold the power to change the life of an accused, (2) law school curriculum cannot substitute for professionally training prosecutors in the ethical execution of this power, and (3) Connick's policy of inaction
amounts to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.
The Thompson Court, examining the Canton hypothetical, recognized the obvious need to instruct armed officers about the constitutional
limitations of using deadly force.145 Still, the Court asserted that the responsibilities in the legal profession rest in "stark contrast" to this scenario.14 6 This assertion is misguided and illusory. As the Brady Court
acknowledged in the formulation of its rule, allowing a prosecutor to
withhold evidence and "shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant
... casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that
does not comport with standards of justice."1 47 History shows that prosecutors have taken advantage of this role and subsequently deprived individuals of their constitutional rights.148 Like an armed police officer, a
prosecutor's misconduct can have the power to effectively end the life of

an accused.14 9
Moreover, the Court contrasts the "absence of training" of "police
academy applicants" with the extensive legal training and professional
responsibility expected of prosecutors. Relying on the various requirements of legal education cannot save an accused from constitutional vio-

143. Id. (noting that there has been "no reported 'single violation' Brady case" since Walker
(quoting Brief for Nat'1 Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 39, Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (No. 09-571))); Id ("Walker has prompted 'no
flood of § 1983 liability."' (quoting Brief for Ctr. on the Admin. of Criminal Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch.
of Law, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 35, Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350
(2011) (No. 09-571))).
Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-90; Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997).
144.
145. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1361.
146.
Id.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963).
147.
148. See supra note 109.
See supra note 109; Gershman, supra note 5, at 688 ("[TIragically, Brady violations have
149.
not infrequently contributed to the convictions of innocent persons who, because of the prosecutor's
suppression, lacked critical evidence to prove their innocence.").
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lations.150 Generally, neither law school nor bar preparation adequately
trains novice prosecutors in the requirements of Brady sufficient to substitute for further training in practice.' 5 ' Many of today's law schools
place minimal importance on teaching ethics and providing students with
a realistic impression of the practice of law.' 52 Unlike most other professions, law schools require no clinical or professional experience outside
enter the
the classroom setting.' 3 As a result, many novice attorneys
54
profession "virtually in the dark about how to practice law."'
In addition to providing minimal practical experience, most law
schools today foster an adversarial mindset among lawyers, rather than
an ethical one.' From the curved grading system to the minimal use of
peer collaboration, law school pedagogy is inherently competitive.156
Inexperience combined with competitive training often translates in prac150.
See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1361-62 (attributing the main difference between average
public employees and attorneys to legal training).
151.
See id. at 1385-86 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing research indicating that since 1980,
Brady questions on the Louisiana Bar Examination have not accounted for even 10% of the total
points); see also infra note 152.
152.

See Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A

ROADMAP 13 (2007) ("The unfortunate reality is that law schools are simply not committed to
making their best efforts to prepare all of their students to enter the practice settings that await
them."); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION

OF LAW 24 (2007) (emphasizing that "the underdeveloped area of legal pedagogy is clinical training"); Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School DisappointsLaw Students, the Public,
and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 219, 221-25, 235-42 (2007) (discussing how law
schools ineffectively prepare students and are therefore flooding the market with lawyers incompetent to practice); Ursula H. Weigold, The Attorney-ClientPrivilege as an Obstacle to the Professional and Ethical Development of Law Students, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 677, 678 (2006) ("[l]n most American law schools, students may graduate having very little practice or experience in many of the skills
that lawyers must possess to represent clients competently and ethically.").
153.
Compare Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Note, Gatekeepers of the Profession:
An Empirical Profile of the Nation's Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 191, 193 (1991)
("Law, unlike other professions, requires no formal apprenticeship."), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 4996.2 (West 2010) ("Each applicant shall furnish evidence satisfactory to the board that he or she
... [h]as had two years of supervised post-master's degree experience. . . ."), and N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 7704(2)(c) (McKinney 2011) (stating that to qualify for a license as a "licensed clinical social
worker," an applicant must "have at least three years full-time supervised postgraduate clinical social
work experience"), and OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4757-19-0l(C)(1)(e) (2011) (describing the licensure
requirements of social workers to include "[n]ot less than four hundred clock hours of supervised
practicum and/or field experience, with a primary focus on social intervention coordinated by a an
[sic] individual with an advanced degree in social work").
154.
Dolin, supranote 152, at 235-36.
155. See Krista Riddick Rogers, Comment, Promoting a Paradigm of Collaboration in an
Adversarial Legal System: An Integrated Problem Solving Perspectivefor Shifting PrevailingAttitudes from Competition to Cooperation Within the Legal Profession, 6 BARRY L. REV. 137, 138
(2006) ("[O]ne of the major underlying issues contributing to the crisis within the legal profession
[is] a widespread competitive, adversarial mindset among lawyers . . . ."); see also infra notes 15657.
156.
See, e.g., Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Professoras Fiduciary:What Duties Do We Owe
to Our Students, 45 S. TEx. L. REV. 753, 777-79 (2004) (discussing that grade curves make one
person's success another's failure); Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should
Lawyers Change? A Critiqueof Solutions to Problems with Professionalismby Reference to Empirically-DerivedAttorney PersonalityAttributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 572-73 (1998) ("Studies also suggest that legal education as it is currently configured tends to encourage the development
of competitive relationships among law students, instead of collaborative, supportive connections.").
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tice into the pressure to act unethically in order to win a case.' 57 In turn, a
desire to "win above all else" coupled with a lack of legal accountability
causes prosecutors to forsake the Brady rule and take their chances hiding Brady evidence. 5 8 Even prosecutors attempting to comply with
Brady may fail to disclose Brady evidence simply because they misunderstand the unclear doctrinal guidelines or wrongly interpret the "gray
area".
Despite the increasing possibility of wrongful convictions, the minimal practical experience of novice attorneys, and the confusing nature of
the Brady doctrine, District Attorney Connick did little to effectively
prepare his office.160 Connick testified that he was fully aware "that his
prosecutors would regularly face Brady decisions"' 6 ' and "that constitutional rights would be in jeopardy if prosecutors received slim to no
Brady training," 6 2 yet Connick gave prosecutors little to no Brady guidance. 6 3 The district attorney's office was aware that its prosecutors, fresh
out of law school, were not equipped with sufficient Brady training but
shirked its responsibility nonetheless.'6 Prosecutors within the office
confirmed that training at Orleans Parish was inadequate and the importance of disclosing Brady evidence unclear.16 s Moreover, the 1987
policy manual guiding office conduct devoted no more than four sentences to Brady, four sentences that were "inaccurate, incomplete, and
dated." 66 A quote from an Orleans Parish District Attorney, Eddie Jordan, further reveals the focus of Brady training in Connick's office, "The
[Connick] administration had a policy of keeping away as much information as possible from the defense attorney." 6 7
157. See Roger C. Cramton, FurtheringJustice by Improving the Adversary System and Making Lawyers More Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1599, 1611 (2002) (explaining how
everyday practice pushes even the most ethical lawyer to engage in conduct that is unjust and how as
a result of "the often ambiguous standards of ethics rules, professional discipline has little or no role
in preventing misconduct in litigation and only a limited role in protecting clients"); Patrick J.
Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Finn, the Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REv. 705, 730 (1998) (discussing how new attorneys
feel overwhelming pressure to act unethically); Rogers, supra note 155, at 138 ("This prevailing
attitude of 'anything to get ahead' or 'winning at all costs' often manifests itself in intense competition for clients as well as gamesmanship-type tactics and overly aggressive unprofessional behavior
often exercised under the guise of'zealously representing a client."').
158. See Gershman, supranote 5, at 690; see also supra note 116.
159. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
160. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1360, 1380 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting
how Joseph Lawless, a criminal law and procedure expert qualified to testify in trial, characterized
Connick's Brady guidance as "the blind leading the blind").
161.
Id. at 1383.
162. Id. at 1384.
163. See id. at 1379-84.
164. Id. at 1387.
165. Id. at 1380 (pointing to a study conducted after Connick retired revealing that more than
half of the assistant district attorneys in Connick's office felt that they had not acquired necessary
professional training).
166. Id at 1381.
167. Campbell Robertson & Adam Liptak, Louisiana Prosecutors' Methods Raise Scrutiny
Again, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 20, at A19.
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Connick ignored the pervasive misunderstanding of Brady obligations as well as the history of noncompliance within his office. In turn,
four prosecutors, none of whom were able to clearly define Brady evidence when questioned at trial, participated in the suppression of material evidence that would have prevented John Thompson from serving
eighteen years in prison.16 8 Connick's disregard for the obvious need to
train his employees amounts to a deliberate indifference to a known consequence of prosecutorial misconduct-wrongful convictions and subsequent deprivation of individual rights.
If the Court had embraced the similarities between the Canton hypothetical and Thompson's case, it could have saved Brady from its misunderstood existence in the prosecutorial community. While maintaining
the high standards required for § 1983 liability, the Court could have
reminded prosecutors of the significant role they play in the development
of a trial and guided them to promote justice and fair play above all else.
IV. CONCLUSION

In reaching its conclusion, the Thompson Court failed to recognize a
unique opportunity to reconcile the ideals of Brady v. Marylandwith the
original intent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Instead, the majority focused its attention on the need to isolate municipal autonomy from fault and purportedly save the court system from a flood of litigation. In so doing, the
Court overlooked the growing problems with Brady compliance and stifled the expansion of § 1983. By shifting its focus to preventing the
downfall of Brady and protecting the fundamental need to treat the accused fairly, the Court could have maintained high standards under
§ 1983, while simultaneously holding prosecutors liable and compensating Thompson for his loss. In failing to take a stand on legal misconduct,
the Thompson Court jeopardized the rights of future accused individuals
at the mercy of an adversary system.
Based on a misguided application of § 1983 and failure to
acknowledge the growing problem of noncompliance with Brady,
Connick v. Thompson was wrongly decided, leaving American jurisprudence one step further from empowering the constitutional protections
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.
AFTERWORD

Only a few months after issuing the Thompson opinion, the Supreme Court granted review of yet another case demonstrating the Orleans Parish prosecutors' failure to comply with Brady obligations. 169 On
January 10, 2012, the Court, by an 8-1 majority, reversed and remanded
the murder conviction of Juan Smith, a conviction for which Smith had
168.
169.

See Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1372, 1378-79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012).
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already served a seventeen-year prison sentence.17 0 The Court based the
reversal solely on the Brady violations of the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, specifically the failure of the office to disclose inconsistent eyewitness statements favorable to the defense and material to the
verdict. 17 ' The Court additionally admonished the Orleans Parish Office
for its historically misguided understanding of Brady, expressing shock
that "[the] office is still answering equivocally on [such] a basic obligation . . ..

172

Smith v. Cain turns the number of capital-conviction reversals based
on Brady violations at the hands of Connick's office to an astonishing
five.17 3 These reversals, in conjunction with the numerous other noncapital convictions vacated by appellate courts, further showcase the
Brady violations that pervaded during Connick's tenure.174 To be sure,
the long history of misconduct by the Orleans Parish Office, buttressed
by Smith v. Cain, does not automatically prove Thompson's § 1983
claim because § 1983 liability is not granted by a mere showing of repetition. However, the continued unearthing of that history serves to further
highlight Connick's blatant disregard for Brady during his tenure as policy maker and in his handling of Thompson's case. Connick's deliberate
indifference to a predictable violation of individual rights in Thompson
and obvious need to train his office in proper Brady compliance increases in clarity with each misapplication of justice.
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170. Id. at 631.
Id. at 630-31.
171.
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